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ABSTRACT 
Conservation history, hunting policies and practices in the south western Mozambique  
borderland in the 20thcentury 
 
This study uses both primary and secondary sources to investigate the history of the communities 
living in the southern Mozambique hinterland in the 20th century. It specifically examines the 
evolution of the colonial hunting laws and the establishment of hunting reserves in southern 
Mozambique. In this thesis, I argue that the Portuguese colonial administration put little effort 
into the protection of fauna and ecosystems in the south western Mozambique hinterland. 
Portuguese hunting laws were issued to provide the colonial system with revenue – through a 
system of fees imposed on licensed hunters when entering Mozambican forests and hunting 
reserves – rather than to improve fauna management. Colonial laws (particularly fees for the 
hunting permits) made it difficult for the majority of local African peasants to access game 
resources, on which during periods of drought and lack of foodstuffs they depended for 
subsistence. The study explores the extent to which postcolonial development projects affected 
conservation and the livelihoods of communities living in conservation areas. It shows how the 
period following independence was also characterised by mass killing of wildlife. In 1978, as 
part of the construction of the Massingir dam, Frelimo government officials relocated families 
living along the Elephants valley to areas having poor soils in Coutada 16, thus reducing the 
ability of the cultivators to produce enough food to sustain their families. Lack of food supplies 
increased the dependence of local families on bush meat for food. The armed conflict, which 
broke out immediately after independence in 1975 and lasted until 1992, contributed to the mass 
killing of wildlife, as both government soldiers and RENAMO fighters exploited bush for food. 
The end of the armed conflict allowed the Government of Mozambique (GoM) to implement 
projects aimed at rehabilitating the ecosystems destroyed by war and the transformation of 
Coutada 16 into the Limpopo National Park (LNP) in 2001. In 2002, the integration of the LNP 
into the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP) turned into reality Hertzog´s 1927 desire to 
create a transnational conservation area across the South Africa –   Mozambique border. 
 
 
 
Keywords: 
Agriculture, conservation, coutada, dam, development, displacements, ecosystems, environment, 
fauna, game, hunting, hunting policies, game reserve, migration, park, livelihoods, relocations, 
trade war.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Administrative posts - administrative units within circunscrições encompassing many African 
villages. During the colonial period, administrative posts were the smallest organisational units 
directed by a white Portuguese officer (chefe de posto) appointed by the colonial government, 
serving under the administrator of the circunscrição.  
Assimilado - literally, an assimilated person, an African with sufficient education and material 
wealth to qualify for supposed equality under civil law with whites.1 
Chefe de posto – administrator of African villages. 
Cipaio - African police officer working for the colonial administration 
Circunscrição or circunscrições (pl.) - small territorial units created within a colonial district and 
encompassing several administrative posts. In the present political administration in 
Mozambique, the circunscrições are equivalent to districts. Within circunscrições, there were 
administrative posts (postos administrativos). 
Concelhos – colonial townships in Mozambique. 
Escudo - Portuguese unit of currency created in the Republican period (1910-1926). 
Hosi – designation used for a king in southern Mozambique.  
Lobolo – bride price. 
Machilla - palanquin used to carry (Portuguese) colonial officials in rural areas. 
Nduna – African task manager or assistants of régulo and traditional authorities in African 
villages.  
Regedorias - groups of African settlements. 
Régulo - traditional leader and a headman of an African village.  
Reis - the basic unit of Portuguese currency until 1910. 
Sul do Save - Mozambique south of the Save River. 
Xima  - African name for maize porridge.   
                                                          
1 Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. 1982. A history of African labor in Lourenço Marques; Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From 
kingdom to colonial district [Northeastern University]; see also Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial 
district: A political economy of social change in Gazaland, southern Mozambique, 1870-1930 [PhD Thesis] 
Evanston: North Western University, p. xi 
  
xi 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
DECLARATION ............................................................................................................................. II 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ IV 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... VI 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ VII 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS ................................................................................................................ X 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ XI 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...................1 
Background ........................................................................................................................................... 1 
Aims....................................................................................................................................................... 5 
Rationale ............................................................................................................................................... 8 
Delimitation of the study and rationale for the selection of the area of study................................... 10 
Geography of the area of study .......................................................................................................... 14 
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES .............................................................................................................. 15 
Unpublished sources: documents and reports .................................................................................... 16 
Oral sources: engaging with the local communities ........................................................................... 19 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ................................................................................................................... 22 
Pre-colonial environments and African environmental history .......................................................... 23 
The changing narratives of conservation ............................................................................................ 26 
Community based conservation .......................................................................................................... 32 
Environmental management in the LNP ............................................................................................. 33 
Border dynamics, ethnicity and livelihood strategies in Coutada 16 .................................................. 35 
The construction of the Massingir dam and relocations in Coutada 16 ............................................. 39 
Labour migration from southern Mozambique to South Africa.......................................................... 41 
Outline of the chapters ....................................................................................................................... 43 
CHAPTER II: ENVIRONMENT, POLITICS AND BRANCHES OF PRODUCTION IN PRE-
COLONIAL SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE .................................................................................. 46 
2.1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 46 
2.1. THE EUROPEANS AND TRADE AT DELAGOA BAY BEFORE THE 19TH CENTURY .................................................... 48 
2.2. THE INCREASE OF HUNTING IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN HINTERLAND ............................................................ 50 
2.3. PRE-COLONIAL ENVIRONMENTS, POLITICS, TRADE AND THE FORMATION OF THE GAZA-NGUNI STATE .................. 53 
2.4. ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN THE SOUTH WESTERN MOZAMBIQUE BORDERLAND ............................................... 65 
2.5. HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PORTUGUESE IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE HINTERLAND
 ................................................................................................................................................................ 74 
2.7. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................... 82 
CHAPTER III: WILDLIFE AND HUNTING IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE, 1900-1956 ........ 85 
3.1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 85 
3.2. The institutionalization of hunting in southern Mozambique, 1900-1910 .................................. 88 
3.2.2. Wildlife “preservation” in southern Africa and Mozambique ................................................... 99 
3.3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HUNTING RESERVES IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE ................................................... 104 
3.4. EVOLUTION OF CONSERVATION POLICIES IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE, 1930-1940 ..................................... 108 
3.5. CHALLENGES IN PROTECTING FAUNA IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE, 1940-1950S ......................................... 113 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
  
xii 
 
3.6. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 119 
CHAPTER IV: CHANGING LIVELIHOODS: COLONIAL RULE AND THE LIVES OF 
AFRICANS IN THE SOUTH WESTERN MOZAMBIQUE BORDERLAND, 1940S-1974 .......... 121 
4.1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... 121 
4.2.1. Labour migration from the south western Mozambique borderland to South Africa ............ 123 
4.2.2. Cotton production in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve ........................................................... 135 
4.2.3. Hunting for survival ................................................................................................................. 140 
4.3. ANIMAL DISEASES AND CONSERVATION IN THE SOUTH WESTERN MOZAMBIQUE BORDERLAND ......................... 143 
4.4. NEW MANAGEMENT APPROACHES FOR HUNTING RESERVES IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE ............................... 152 
4.5. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 155 
CHAPTER V: THE BUILDING OF THE MASSINGIR DAM:  DEVELOPMENT, 
CONSERVATION AND RURAL TRANSFORMATION IN COUTADA 16, 1972-1983 ............. 157 
5.1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... 157 
5.2. THE DAM BUILT ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE........................................................................................ 160 
5.3. THE INDEPENDENCE OF MOZAMBIQUE AND ITS IMPACT ON MASSINGIR DAM PROJECT .................................. 165 
5.3.1. Relocations in Coutada16 ....................................................................................................... 167 
5.3.2. Deciding when to leave and where to go ................................................................................ 173 
5.4. THE ILLUSION OF SOCIALIZATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN COUTADA 16 ....................................................... 175 
5.4.1. Moving to new communal villages in Coutada 16 .................................................................. 177 
5.4.2. Development of agriculture and fisheries in the new communal villages .............................. 179 
5.4.3. Developing peoples’ farms inside a conservation area (Coutada16) ...................................... 184 
5.4.4. Livestock keeping inside communal villages in Coutada16..................................................... 185 
5.4.5. Frelimo dispute traditional leaders in Coutada 16 .................................................................. 189 
5.6. IMPROVING THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE LOCAL POPULATIONS IN COUTADA 16 ........................................ 193 
5.7. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 196 
CHAPTER VI: COMMUNITIES IN TRANSITION: WAR AND CONSERVATION IN THE 
SOUTH WESTERN MOZAMBIQUE BORDERLAND, 1976-2002 ............................................. 198 
6.1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................... 198 
6.2. ROOTS OF ARMED CONFLICT IN MOZAMBIQUE AND MASSINGIR REGION ...................................................... 200 
6.2.1. Escaping the warfare .............................................................................................................. 204 
6.2.3. Armed conflict and the environment ...................................................................................... 208 
6.3. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS AND THE END OF ARMED CONFLICT IN MOZAMBIQUE ............................. 210 
6.3.1. Returning from exile and rebuilding life in Coutada 16 .......................................................... 212 
6.3.2. Rebuilding lives in Coutada 16 ................................................................................................ 215 
6.4. THE RISE OF THE TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVATION AREAS INITIATIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA ............................ 217 
6.5. FROM COUTADA 16 TO LNP AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GLTP ......................................................... 220 
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 230 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 232 
SOURCES .................................................................................................................................... 241 
APPENDIXES .............................................................................................................................. 260 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xiii 
 
 
LIST OF  MAPS/ FIGURES AND TABLES/APPENDICES 
Maps  
Map 1: Regional setting of the Great Limpopo Conservation Area 12 
Map 2: Villages of the Limpopo National Park in Mozambique 13 
Map 3: Labour routes from colonial southern Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia to 
Transvaal………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
64 
Map 4: Sul de Save Province and the colonial districts of Massingir, Guijá and Alto 
Limpopo 
69 
Map 5: WENELA recruiting posts in southern Mozambique and routes followed by 
clandestine migrants from southern Mozambique to South Africa ………………………… 
 
131 
Map 6: Regional context of the Gaza-Kruger- Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park 221 
  
Figures and Tables   
Table 1: Livestock in the district of Lourenço Marques in 1908 72 
Table 2: Migrant labour recruited by WENELA in Guijá and Massingir, 1946-1955 129 
Table 3: Communal villages established by Frelimo in Coutada 16 189 
Table 4: Inhabitants of the Villages of Massingir 216 
  
Photos  
Photo 1: Maize field along the Massingir dam reservoir 183 
Photo 2: Residents of the LNP (former Coutada 16) who live near the reservoir keep fires 
lit to keep the hippopotamus from eating the maize planted along the dam shore in the dry 
season. 
 
 
183 
  
Appendices  
Document 1: Vacancy announcement for scouts/ hunting supervisor for forests  and game 
reserve in colonial southern Mozambique  
 
261 
Document 2: Application for hunting license 262 
Document 3: Receipt of application for hunting license 263 
Document 4: Hunting license books (1st and 2nd Classes) 264 
Document 5: Pages of the hunter’s license book  used to list the slaughtered animals 
Mozambique 
265 
Document 6: License for carrying and use of firearms (hunting purposes ) 266 
Document 7: License for carrying and use of firearms (self-defence purposes ) 267 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Background 
In the late 19th century, the Portuguese came to dominate the southern Mozambique hinterland 
and established administrative structures to take control over the local populations and exploit 
natural resources especially the local forests and fauna. As in most white settler colonies in 
Africa, from 1896 to 1897 the Portuguese forced Africans from the age of 18 years and above to 
pay taxes for each hut used as a house. Accordingly, Africans from remote rural areas were 
compelled to leave their home villages and seek employment in the cities and towns in 
Mozambique or migrate to South Africa in search of employment to earn some money to meet 
the new hut tax obligations, buy goods for their families, and pay for lobola or bride price. 
 
In 1910, the Portuguese administration unified into a single regulation the hunting rules of the 
Sul de Save Province. From then onwards, all individuals wishing to hunt in Mozambique, 
whatever their social status, had to apply for hunting licences and pay a fee for the activity. 
Further restrictions were imposed on Africans as they were only allowed to hunt small, and not 
big game or caça miúda in forests surrounding their villages.2 Literally, the colonial hunting laws 
were aimed at limiting Africans from continuing to engage in hunting for commercial purposes; 
presumably, to limit competition between them and white settlers. However, in areas beyond the 
sphere of Portuguese control, some Africans continued to hunt for food while others were 
engaged in hunting for commercial purposes. These Africans used a part of their incomes to pay 
for their hut taxes.  
 
In the early 1920s, the government of the Union of South Africa worked toward the 
establishment of game reserves along the Eastern Transvaal border with Mozambique (the Sabi 
and Shingwedzi game reserves).3 In 1923, these game reserves were merged into a national park, 
                                                          
2Moçambique: Regulamento de Caça de 1910; see also Moçambique: Regulamento de Caça da Província e adaptado 
a Lourenço Marques. Portaria nº 821 de 12/10/1910. Effective implementations of the 1910 Hunting Regulation in 
the Sul de Save Province begun on 14/3/1911.  
3Carruthers, Jane. 1995. The Kruger National Park: a social and political history. Pietermaritzburg: University of 
Natal Press,  p. 33-35 
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which, in 1926, became known as the Kruger National Park (KNP).4 From 1926 onwards, South 
African authorities imposed greater control over hunting along the Eastern Transvaal border with 
Mozambique and demanded that the Portuguese establish a national park in Mozambique 
contiguous to the KNP. Such a park would have dual objectives. It would simultaneously 
function as a buffer zone to the KNP and protect wildlife in Mozambique. The Portuguese 
authorities rejected this request. They argued that the region south of Elephants River to the 
south end of the colony near the KNP had a high number of African settlements with local 
people devoted to agriculture and cattle keeping as part of their subsistence. Therefore, creating a 
national park in such an area would lead to evictions and relocations of the local communities in 
areas outside the park. Such measures, argued the Portuguese authorities with a tinge of 
benevolence, would worsen the already bad living conditions of the local cultivators and their 
families because, besides the land that they used to produce crops for their survival, they did not 
have any alternative means for their survival.5 
 
Owing to the growing interest of the Portuguese administration in demarcating areas for hunting 
related activities, in 1930 the Portuguese administration transformed the Natives Reserve of the 
circunscrição of Alto Limpopo into a hunting reserve. Despite this shift, no measures were put in 
place to relocate Africans to villages situated outside of the reserve. Instead, Africans continued 
living within the hunting reserve despite the threats that hunting activities posed to their lives. In 
the late 1930s, Africans were to experience another change in their lives. The Portuguese 
introduced cotton production in Mozambique and coerced Africans in the reserve to grow cotton. 
Quite often, the cotton promoters used the best African lands to grow cotton and consumed 
cultivators’ time that could otherwise had been spent on food crops. Such situations resulted in 
crop failure and famines and compelled Africans to rely on hunting for food. Indeed, the increase 
of hut taxes from 1942 onwards gave rise to an upsurge in hunting for commercial purposes. The 
money Africans got from the sale of bush meat at Mavodze shops (cantinas) was used to pay the 
hut taxes and other services.  
                                                          
4Stevenson-Hamilton. James. 1937. South African Eden: from Sabi Game Reserve to Kruger National Park. 
London: Cassel & Co, p. 22 
5AHM- Fundo do Governo-Geral. Cx 178/C3: Pasta Caça, Transgressões e Multas, 1926/1933: Nota da Direcção 
dos Serviços de Administração Civil nº 926/2675 de 27/10/1927 
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In 1961, the Portuguese authorities turned the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into a wildlife 
utilization zone, popularly known in Portuguese as Coutada 16. This shift was made to enable 
private safari companies to participate in the management of the area and contribute to the 
improvement of biodiversity management through the development of tourism infrastructure.6 
The Portuguese wanted to transform the lands situated north of the Elephants River into an area 
reserved to exclusive protection of fauna and resettle the local communities in villages situated 
out of the Coutada 16. Nonetheless, this objective was not achieved due to a combination of 
factors. The company appointed by the state to control the hunting reserve made few investments 
in infrastructure and hired a limited number of Africans to supervise hunting. Additionally, after 
independence, the Frelimo party that came into power in June 1975 changed the resettlement 
plans designed by the Portuguese government to relocate families in Massingir district affected 
by the construction of the Massingir dam.  
 
In early 1978, the Frelimo government officials moved families that lived in the flood plains 
along the Elephants valley to the upper lands in Coutada 16. This was done regardless of the fact 
that the area was unhabitable as it lacked necessities such as sources of drinking water, fertile 
soils for cropping and appropriate vegetation for cattle keeping. The situation resulted in 
widespread stomach diseases, animal diseases, and famines. Once again, hunting for food and 
gathering became alternative livelihood strategies for the survival of these communities. Some 
families went back to the dam shores to open new fields to plant maize and grow vegetables to 
enable them to survive until the next maize season.7  
 
Immediately after the relocation of these communities to communal villages in Coutada 16, an 
armed conflict broke out involving the Mozambican government army and RENAMO 
(Mozambique National Resistance) rebel forces. The intensity of armed conflict from 1985 to 
                                                          
6The representative of the Governor-General of Mozambique Rui de Araújo Ribeiro by the Ordinance nº14987 of 
1/05/1961 converted the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into a Hunting Concession nº 16 known in Portuguese as 
Coutada 16 
7The removal of the families that had their houses and fields along the Elephants valley and in the area designed for 
the Massingir dam reservoir to upper lands in Coutada 16 started in early February 1977.  Due to the quick filling 
of the reservoir some of the families that had not yet completed maize harvesting were obliged to leave their 
production behind. 
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1992 forced the local communities to leave their villages and seek refuge in safer places within 
and across national borders. The armed conflict contributed to the devastation of the wildlife not 
only in Coutada 16 but also in almost all rural areas in Mozambique. The end of armed conflict 
in October 1992 enabled about 5000 displaced people from the district of Massingir to return to 
their home villages.8 The resettlement of Mozambican refugees along the KNP east border with 
Mozambique was a huge concern for the South African authorities who feared an increase in 
illegal hunting along the common border in periods of crisis (drought and crops failure). 
Moreover, due to international criticism of the KNP’s elephant culling methods, the South 
African authorities began to see Coutada 16 as an alternative place to relocate large numbers of 
elephants from the KNP, thereby reducing their negative impact on the environment.9  
 
The end of Apartheid in South Africa and armed conflicts in Angola and Mozambique enabled 
southern African states to work on regional plans for preservation of wildlife and natural 
ecosystems along the common borders. From 1996 to 2002, the Southern Africa Development 
Community (SADC) member states worked on both legal and financial issues for the 
establishment of Trans-frontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) in the region. In 2001, the GoM 
transformed Coutada 16 into the LNP and later in 2002, it was included in the GLTP.10 The 
establishment of the GLTP turned into reality Hertzog´s 1927 desire to create a transnational 
conservation area across South Africa and Mozambique. The adoption of the KNP management 
model (where communities are excluded from parks) in the LNP is currently forcing the GoM to 
relocate about 7,000 people living in the “core conservation zone” in village situated outside the 
park. Effectively, the local communities will lose their ancestral land and resources (forest and 
wildlife) that for many years they depend on for their survival.11 
                                                          
8Dolan, Chris. 1999. “Repatriation from south Africa to Mozambique”. Black, Richard Khalid Koser (Eds). The End 
of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction. New York and Oxford Berghahn Books, pp: 85-
110 p. 90 
9Wolmer, William 2003. “Transboundary conservation: the politics of ecological integrity in Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park.” JSAS,  29 (1): 262-278, p. 269 
10AHM: Governo-Geral: Cx. 178/C3: File Reservas e Parques de Caça - Letter from J.B.M. Hertzog to the 
Mozambique Governor-General in Lourenço Marques, 9/8/1927; see also Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National 
Park: A History. Vol.1.  Johannesburg: High Branching, p. 43 
11Although, the Mozambican Land Law (19/97) and the Forest and Wildlife Law (10/99) restricts local populations 
presence in national parks, nowadays, without any exception, all national parks and game reserves have 
communities inside. 
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Aims 
The aims of this study are to investigate the history of the communities living in the south 
western Mozambique borderland in the 20th century. Its central focus is on how the changing 
nature of conservation politics and practices impacted on the lives and livelihoods of these 
communities and fauna. The research seeks to deepen our understanding of the history of this 
particular region and to demonstrate the importance of focusing on the intersection of 
environmental and socio-economic factors in the processes of rural transformation in 
Mozambique and specifically in the south western region. The study analyses the implications of 
the advent of colonialism in hunting in southern Mozambique and deepens our understanding of 
the impact of the monetization of African economies in relation to hunting. It specifically 
examines hunting practices and the evolution of hunting regulations in the colonial and post-
colonial periods and the establishment of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique.  
 
The beginning of construction of the Massingir dam in 1972 resulted in removals of families that 
had their houses and fields in the flood plain areas along the Elephants River and their relocation 
to upper lands in Coutada 16. By focusing on this particular project, the study seeks to elucidate 
the extent to which the late colonial and early post-colonial development projects affected the 
lives of remote rural populations, local ecosystems, and fauna in Mozambique and particularly in 
my area of study (the south western Mozambique borderland or Coutada 16). Lastly, the study 
examines the disruption caused by armed conflict in Mozambique with particular focus on the 
Massingir region and the extent to which the armed conflict affected local peoples’ lives, their 
livelihoods, and fauna. Accordingly, the study also documents the process of rehabilitation of 
fauna in Coutada 16 undertaken by the Government of Mozambique soon after the civil conflict 
and its transformation into the LNP as well as its further integration into the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park (GLTP). It brings new insights to the relationship between conservation and 
community development in Mozambique, particularly in the Massingir region in the period 
following independence.  
 
In 1927 the South African government first requested that the Portuguese authorities establish a 
conservation area in Mozambique contiguous to the Kruger Nation Park (KNP). However, lack 
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of financial resources of the colonial authorities in Mozambique, poor planning in the period 
following the independence (construction of the Massingir dam and resettlements caused by the 
filling of the reservior) and the war that followed Mozambique’s independence hindered the 
accomplishment of such an objective.12 In 2001, the Mozambican Government (GoM) 
transformed the Coutada 16 into the Limpopo National Park. In fact, this transformation was 
achieved due to a combination of factors. The GoM needed to rehabilitate ecosystems destroyed 
by war in south western Mozambique as well as implement community conservation and 
development projects. The end of Apartheid in South Africa, and the ensuing political, economic 
and environmental cooperation between SADC countries allowed Mozambique, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe to work on a transnational conservation Project that in 2002, resulted in the 
establishment of the GLTP (Great Limpopo Tranfrontier Park). This is composed of the LNP in 
Mozambique, the KNP in South Africa and the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe 
(GNP).13   
 
Wolmer argues that KNP authorities’ concerns about resettlement in the border region of 
Coutada 16 of Mozambican refugees, who in times of crop failure would rely on bush meat for 
food and enter KNP territory to hunt “illegally” as well as the need to remove fences to allow 
dislocation of some elephants to neighbouring parks, especially to Coutada 16, are other reasons 
that led the South African government to persuade Mozambique to  transform Coutada 16 into 
the LNP and its further integration in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park.14 Indeed, this study 
discusses the first steps toward the establishment of the LNP and its integration into the GLTP.     
                                                          
12AHM: GG. Cx. 178/C3; Reservas e Parques de Caça - Letter from J.B.M. Hertzog to the Mozambique General 
Governor in Lourenço Marques. 9/8/1927  
13The working group was co-chaired by Mr. Abdul Adamo from the National Directorate of the Forestry and 
Wildlife in Mozambique and by Dr. S C Joubert the then warden of the KNP. For more detailed information on 
this regard see Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume II, High Branching, Johannesburg, 
p. 320 
14The establishment of the Limpopo National Park and its further integration into the GLTP was financially and 
technically supported by the Government of Mozambique, international donors (World Bank, the German 
Development Bank) and conservation agencies such as the Peace Park Foundation (PPF) and the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN); see Wolmer, William 2003. “Transboundary Conservation: the politics of ecological 
integrity in Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park.” JSAS, 29 (1): 262-278; see also DNAC. 2003. Limpopo National 
Park: Management and Development Plan. Ministry of Tourism of Mozambique: National Directorate for 
Conservation Areas. Maputo; Milgroom, Jessica & Marja Spierenburg. 2008. “Induced volition: resettlement from 
the Limpopo National Park, Mozambique” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26 (4): 435-448, Soto, 
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The study also discusses the literature about African history and the beginning of international 
conservation policies in Africa. This literature provides useful links to understand the problems 
faced by the Portuguese to implement measures to protect fauna and to enforce hunting 
regulations in Mozambique. It also helps to understanding philosophies underpinning 
conservation and development projects worldwide and particularly in my area of study. The 
construction of modern state by Frelimo in the years following the independence and its 
development policies area also topics discussed in this study. Considering the paucity of 
literature on colonial conservation policies and practices in the south western Mozambique 
borderland, the study answers the following core questions and related ones:  
 How did the establishment of the Portuguese administrative system in the south western 
Mozambique borderland affect the lives of the communities and how did they affect the 
environment as well as fauna?  
 What broad colonial and post-colonial state conservation policies state were introduced and 
how did they specifically affect the socio-economic dynamics and environmental 
transformations in the south western Mozambique borderland? 
 How did the late colonial and early post-colonial development policies affect the 
environment in the Massingir region (construction of the Massingir dam and armed conflict)? 
 What national and regional initiatives were implemented in Mozambique to rehabilitate 
ecosystems destroyed by the civil conflict?  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bartolomeu. 2012. “Fast-track strengthening of the management capacity of conservation institutions: the case of 
the effect of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park in Mozambique’s capacity” Quinn, Michael S; Len Broberg, 
and Wayne Freimund. Parks, peace, and partnership: global initiatives in transboundary conservation.  Calgary: 
University of Calgary Press; pp. 265-282, Duffy, Rosaleen. 2006. “The potential and pitfalls of global 
environmental governance: the politics of transfrontier conservation areas in southern Africa”. Political 
Geography, 25: 89-112, p. 96-98, Hanks, J. 2002. “Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAS) in southern Africa: 
their role in conserving biodiversity, socioeconomic development and promoting a culture of peace.” Journal of 
Sustainable Forestry, 17 (1/2): 127-148 
 
 
 
  
8 
 
Rationale 
When I was in primary school, I came across some texts about hunting and slavery in the Gaza-
Nguni state and since then I have remained fascinated by how hunting has been central to 
shaping the economy, social relationships, increase political power, or cleavages amongst 
African chiefdoms and between them and the colonial state and its various constituents. One of 
the texts was written by Diocleciano Fernando das Neves, a Portuguese hunter and trader who in 
the 1800s travelled to the hinterland of southern Mozambique in search of ivory. Das Neves had 
been to Gungunhane’s kraals and wrote a diary about elephant hunting in southern Mozambique. 
This and other texts enlightened me on the centrality of hunting and especially elephant hunting 
in the making of the political economy of southern Mozambique before the advent of 
colonialism.15  
 
Despite the fact that the late 20th century academic texts have traced the origins of hunting in pre-
colonial Mozambique, they paid little attention to the evolution of conservancy in colonial and 
post-colonial periods.16 A considerable number of historical studies on southern Mozambique 
have given much emphasis on the colonial war in the Gaza state, labour migration from southern 
Mozambique to the South African mining industry and its impact on both colonial and local 
economies.17 This study is important to the extent that it expands the readers’ knowledge on 
                                                          
15Das Neves book is amongst the oldest books focusing particularly on slavery and hunting in the southern 
Mozambique hinterland and the East Transvaal. Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma 
viagem a caça dos elefantes. Lisboa: Typografia Universal  
16Harries, P. 1983. “Slavery amongst the Gaza Nguni: its changing shape and function and its relationship to the 
other forms of exploration.”  Peires, J. B (Ed.) Before and after Shaka: papers in Nguni History. Grahams Town: 
Rhodes University: Institute of Social and Economic Research, pp: 210-229, Wagner, Roger. 1976. 
“Zoutpansberg: some notes on the dynamics of a hunting frontier.” Institute of Commonwealth Studies: Collected 
Seminar Papers, 20; Liesegang, Gerhard. 1983. “Notes on the internal structure of the Gaza kingdom of southern 
Mozambique.” Peires, J. B (Ed.) Before and after Shaka: papers in Nguni history. Grahams Town: Rhodes 
University: Institute of Social and Economic Research, pp. 178-209 
17Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district: a political economy of social change in Gazaland, 
southern Mozambique, 1870-1930 [PhD] Evanston: North Western University; Covane, L. A. 2001. O Trabalho 
migratório e a agricultura no sul de Moçambique (1920-1992). Maputo: Promédia; Harries, P. 1982. ‘Kinship, 
ideology and the nature of pre- colonial labour migration: labour migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South 
Africa, up 1895.” Marks, S. and R. Rathbone (eds.) Industrialisation and social change in South Africa: African 
class formation, culture and consciousness, 1870- 1930. London: Longman, pp. 142- 166; Harries, Patrick. 1994. 
Work, culture and identity: migrant labourers in Mozambique and South Africa, c 1860- 1910. London:  James 
Currey: Heinemann, Portsmouth; Hedges, David. 1978. Trade and politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries [PhD Thesis] London: University of London - School of Oriental 
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environmental historiography on Mozambique, as it re-examines existing colonial and post-
colonial texts (primary and secondary sources) on conservation and development, and brings 
about fresh insights on conservancy in Mozambique. 
 
To date, there is very limited academic literature on hunting and conservation and more broadly 
on the environmental history of Mozambique. The existing studies on forest management, 
environmental transformation or the extent to which local communities were involved in the 
management of local resources, were written by ecologists, environmentalists and geographers in 
the period following the establishment of the GLTP. These texts, however, paid little attention to 
the history of environmental transformations in the area.18 The literature does not examine 
hunting practices by both Europeans and Africans and their implications for conservancy. For 
example, how colonial rule or the imposition of hut taxes, hunting fees, cotton production 
affected the lives of the local communities and what strategies Africans put in place for their 
survival (e.g.: hunting, labour migration, etc.). This study provides fresh historical analysis and 
insights into migration and conservation practices in the south western Mozambique borderland; 
it illuminates conservation politics and practices in Mozambique more broadly, and makes a 
significant contribution to Mozambique environmental history by documenting the evolution of 
conservation policies and development practices in the Massingir region.  
 
The changing paradigms of conservation from fenced national parks to trans-boundary 
conservation parks are forcing southern African states to bring down the fences and create 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and African Studies; Penvenne, Jeanne Marie, 1982. A History of African Labor in Lourenço Marques, 
Mozambique, 1877 to 1950. [PhD Thesis] Boston: Boston University 
18The existing literature is concerned with the changing nature of spaces and landscape in Massingir due to the war 
and construction of the Massingir dam, labour migration in the nearby Pafuri region; conservation in the post-
colonial period and resettlement resulting from the establishment of the LNP. See for example: Norman, William 
Oliver. 2004. Living on the frontline: politics, migration and transfrontier conservation in the Mozambican 
villages of the Mozambique-South Africa borderland [PhD] London: London School of Economics; Lunstrum, E. 
M. 2007. The making and unmaking of sovereign territory: from colonial extraction to postcolonial conservation 
in Mozambique’s Massingir region [PhD Thesis] Minneapolis: University of Minnesota; Nhancale, Camilo. C. 
2007. Participatory governance for sustainable management of natural resources in the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park: the case of Parque Nacional do Limpopo, Moçambique [Master Thesis], Stellenbosch: 
University of Stellenbosch; Bocchino, Clara. 2008. The socio-economic impact of the Great Limpopo Tansfrontier 
Conservation Area on the livelihood strategies of border communities in the Pafuri Administrative Post [PhD 
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transnational parks also known as Trans-frontier Conservation Areas (TFCA).19 Presently, 
communities living in the core conservation area of the LNP are being relocated in different 
villages outside the park. This research is therefore relevant to the extent that it documents the 
history of the communities living in the LNP prior to its inclusion in the GLTP and their 
relocation in villages situated outside of the LNP. 
 
During the development of this study, new texts on colonialism and hunting in southern 
Mozambique came out, namely an article and PhD thesis by Dias Coelho and McKeown 
respectively.20 These historians have made substantial contributions to the conservation and 
hunting history of Mozambique. Dias Coelho focuses on general issues pertaining to colonial law 
with regards to hunting in southern Mozambique but does not focus on any specific region. My 
thesis complements Dias Coelho´s work as it focused particularly on the south west Mozambique 
borderland and it covers a wider period  (20th century) while Coelho´s thesis focus on the period 
from 1885 to 1930. McKeown’s thesis focuses on the history of the Gorongosa National Park 
(1960s to the late 1990s) but did very little research on my area of study. Nonetheless, this thesis 
complements my work as it focuses on conservation areas that my work has also paid little 
attention to.   
 
Delimitation of the study and rationale for the selection of the area of study 
This work interrogates colonial and post-colonial conservation policies and practices in the south 
western Mozambique borderland. The research pays particular attention on the triangle formed 
by the South Africa border in the west, the Limpopo River in the north and east and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Thesis] Bologna: Bologna University; Milgroom, Jessica. 2012. Elephants of democracy: an unfolding process of 
resettlement in the Limpopo National Park. [PhD] Wageningen University: Wageningen;  
19Zips,Werner and Manuela Zips-Mairitsch. 2007. “Lost in transition? The politics of conservation: indigenous land 
rights and community-based resource management in southern Africa” Journal of Legal Pluralism, 55: 37-71, p. 
38 
20Coelho, Marcos Vinícius Santos Dias. 2013.  “A Comissão de Caça de Lourenço Marques e seu papel  no Estado 
colonial em Moçambique, 1903-1910.” Africana Studia, nº 21, Edição do Centro de Estudos Africanos da 
Universidade do Porto; see also Dias Coelho, Marcos Vinícius Santos. 2015. Maphissa & sportsmen: a caça e os 
caçadores no sul de Moçambique sob o domínio do colonialismo c.1895-c.1930. [PhD Thesis]. Campinas: 
Universidade Estadual de Campinas - Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. McKeown, Kathleen. 2015. 
Tracking wildlife conservation in southern Africa: histories of protected areas in Gorongosa and Maputaland. 
[PhD Thesis] University of Minnesota 
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Elephants River in the south. The use of this unit of study allows me to deepen my and the 
readers’s knowledge about the impact of colonial and post-colonial policies and practices on the 
local population, ecosystem and fauna in this particular region, while exploring the rationale 
behind the establishment of the TFCA in the area.  
 
The period of study of this research commences in 1900 when the British invited delegates from 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the Congo Free State to the Convention on the 
Preservation of Wildlife, Birds and Fish in Africa, which took place in London on 19th May 
1900. This Convention represented the beginning of conservancy in Africa.21 Moreover, it 
appears that it was only after this Convention that the Portuguese colonial administration in 
Mozambique issued laws (1903, 1904, 1906, 1910, 1932, 1936, 1941, 1944, 1951 and 1956) to 
regulate hunting and allow the collection of revenues through a system of fees imposed on 
licensed hunters. Therefore, the beginning of the 20th century marked a new era in conservation 
policies in Mozambique.   
 
The study ends in 2002 when the LNP was included in the GLTP. The inclusion of the LNP into 
the GLTP was followed by measures to protect the elephant and other species. As a result, 
hunting is controlled and local populations are forbidden to kill wild species. From then onward, 
only the officials of the Park’s staff have the responsibility to control human and wildlife 
conflicts.22 From the inception of the GLTP, it became clear that about 7000 people living in 8 
villages located in the Shingwedzi catchment would be resettled outside the LNP to allow the 
protection of fauna and development of tourism.23 
 
                                                          
21Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006. “German colonialism and the beginnings of international wildlife preservation in Africa” 
GHI Bulletin Supplement, 3: 122-143, p.133 
22Milgroom, Jessica; Marja Spierenburg. 2008. “Induced volition: resettlement from the Limpopo National Park, 
Mozambique.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26 (4): 435-448, p. 452 
23Ferreira, S. L.A. 2006. “Communities and transfrontier parks in the Southern African Development Community: 
the case of Limpopo National Park, Mozambique.” Geographical Journal, 88 (2): 166-176, p. 171; see also 
Milgroom, Jessica & Marja Spierenburg. 2008. “Induced volition”, p. 436 
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Figure 1: Regional setting of the Great Limpopo Conservation Area24 
 
 
 
                                                          
24Ministry of Tourism of Mozambique: National Directorate for Conservation Areas. 2003. Maputo: Limpopo 
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Map 2: Villages of Limpopo National Park in Mozambique25 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
National Park: Management and development plan,  p. 8 
25Ministry of Tourism of Mozambique: National Directorate for Conservation Areas. 2003. Maputo: Limpopo 
National Park: Management and development plan. Maputo, p. 13 
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Geography of the area of study 
This study focuses on the south western Mozambique borderland or the triangle formed by the 
South Africa border in the west, the Limpopo River in the north and east and the Elephants River 
in the south. The administrative governance of this area of study underwent several 
permutations. The changes were a direct result of the administrative transformation introduced 
by the Portuguese in the southern Mozambique. For example, before 1942 when the Portuguese 
introduced administrative changes in the Gaza district, the area of study (triangle formed by the 
South African border in the west, the Elephants River in the south and Limpopo River in the 
north and east) was part of the region or circunscrição de Guijá. From 1942 to 1975, this area 
fell into two different administrative regions or circuncrições; the region north of Elephants 
River to the south bank of the Shingwedzi River was part of the circunscrição de Guijá while the 
regions located south of the Elephants River were part of the Circunscrição de Massingir. In 
1923, the area was designated as a Native Reserve. However, in 1930 it was transformed into the 
Alto Limpopo Game Reserve. Similarly, in 1961 the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve was 
transformed into Coutada 16 and finally in November 2001, Coutada 16 was transformed into 
the Limpopo National Park. Because of the administrative changes that implied changes in the 
names of the same area, I have used in this thesis different designations for the same area when 
referring to it in different periods. 
 
Currently, the Limpopo National Park is located in Gaza province and it covers 1.123.316 ha of 
Mopane and mixed Combretum woodlands in the adjacent areas located along the international 
border with South Africa to the south of the international border with Zimbabwe, in the west of 
Gaza Province. The climate of the area can be classified as subtropical with warm wet summers 
and mild dry winters. The average maximum day temperatures increase from south to north, with 
absolute maximum temperatures of above 40° C being common for the months of November to 
February and mean annual rainfall also decreases from south to north. Precise rainfall figures are 
not available for the area. Based on adjacent KNP long-term figures mean annual rainfall varies 
from the order of 360mm in the far northern part to over 500mm along the Lebombo Mountain 
crest in the south western part of the Park. Effective rain occurs from September to April with a 
short dry period of 4 months. The semi-arid climate and agro-ecological conditions influenced 
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population distribution patterns within the area and resulted in concentration of population along 
the river banks, namely the Elephants (locally known as O’balule), Limpopo (locally known as 
Mithi) and Shingwedzi (locally known as Shingwitsi). Moreover, cultivators use the alluvial soils 
found along these rivers to practice agriculture and to access water for their own and their 
cattle’s consumption. Away from the main rivers, agriculture is risky as droughts occur 
regularly, often with devastating consequences to crops and pastures. 26 
  
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This study is based on qualitative methods ranging from an examination of secondary to primary 
and oral sources. Based on these sources, I sought to interrogate colonial and post-colonial 
conservation policies and practices in the south western Mozambique borderland. In 2012, I 
registered at the University of the Witwatersrand as a PhD candidate. The registration enabled 
me to access, in the University’s libraries, academic literature such as books, theses and 
dissertations, as well as online journals through the Wits portal. The review of the secondary 
sources enabled me to set an analytical approach and develop an argument that guided my 
research. Based on lacunas of the existing literature and information gathered during my first 
visit to the fieldwork in the Massingir region, I developed a questionnaire, which I was able to 
use during my subsequent fieldwork trips in the LNP in 2013, 2014 and 2016.27  
 
Colonial newspapers 
At the library of the Mozambican Historical Archives, I was able to access colonial journals and 
newspapers with particular reference to “Jornal Noticias”.28 The articles included in the 
                                                          
26Stalmans, M., W.P.D Gertenbach and Filipa Carvalho-Serfontein. 2004. “Plant communities and landscapes of the 
Parque Nacional do Limpopo, Moçambique”. Koedoe 47(2): 61–81 
27 In June 2012, I benefited from a small grant from Elizabeth Lunstrum (Geographer from York University/Canada) 
to conduct a study on community mobility, conservation and community development in the LNP. This research 
work enabled me to visit my area of study and conduct preliminary interviews used in my research proposal. 
28Noticias is one of the most relevant newspapers in Mozambique, founded in 1933; it contains the day-to-day news 
about the social, economic and political life of Mozambique. Copies of this newspaper are available at the AHM. I 
used it to review trends and discussions of issues regarding management of conservation areas and particularly 
changes in management policies in southern Mozambique in the later 1950s and 1960s. The access to these 
sources is particularly difficult because there is no index of topics. Due to degraded environment in the newspaper 
storehouse, access is restricted. I would like to thank the director of AHM Professor Joel Tembe for having 
allowed me to spend an hour (during many days) reading the newspapers and Professor David Hedges who gave 
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Portuguese colonial journals were concerned about colonial policies and assessment studies done 
for the construction of irrigation schemes in southern Mozambique.29 Although the studies in the 
colonial journals were meant to benefit a colonial audience, they are very useful sources of 
information regarding the political and economic life in colonial Mozambique and particularly in 
my area of study. 
 
Unpublished sources: documents and reports 
In 2013, I spent a considerable part of my time researching primary sources at the Mozambican 
archives namely, Mozambican Historical Archive, Mozambique Institute of Agricultural 
Research (IIAM) and at the Library of the National Directorate of Water (DNA). At the library 
of the Ministry of Agriculture – IIAM, I accessed reports produced by the GoM soon after the 
country’s independence. The reports include assessment studies regarding climate conditions and 
the fertility of soils in the Massingir region. These documents informed me about conditions of 
life of the communities removed along the Elephants valley and relocated in communal villages 
in Coutada 16; the collection includes assessment reports conducted to inform the development 
of irrigation schemes, a few kilometres downstream of the Massingir dam (Chibotana, 
Marrenguele and Banga). The documents illuminate my understanding of the colonial and early 
post-colonial development projects in the Massingir region. 
 
At the library of the Ministry of Public Infrastructure/ National Directorate of Water, I accessed 
information concerning the construction of the Massingir dam, namely assessment studies, maps, 
contracts, and annual reports produced by different teams working on the construction of the 
Massingir dam. The documents in this collection enabled me to understand the State’s objectives 
in constructing the Dam as well as the process of its construction.   
 
The AHM primary sources repository includes documents about colonial rule in Mozambique; 
the repository is divided into collections known in Portuguese as fundos. During the archival 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
me a reference book that helped me to locate some particular newspapers containing articles on conservation and 
hunting; without such assistance the research would not have been possible. 
29The most importnt journals acessed at AHM are Boletim de Estudos da Colónia de Moçambique, Sociedade de 
Estudos da Colónial de Moçambique, Boletim Trimestral and Boletim da Junta de Investigação do Ultramar.  
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research at AHM, I examined documents from the collection of the Governo-Geral de 
Moçambique; Inspecção Superior sobre Administração e Negócios Indigenas (ISANI), collection 
or fundo das circunscrições (districts) of Alto Limpopo, Guijá, and Magude and the collection or 
fundo do Conselho Nacional das Aldeias Comunais (CNAC). Most of the documents at the 
AHM are written in Portuguese. My education up to honours degree in History was done in 
Portuguese. I therefore had no problems in working with Portuguese documents. At the AHM, I 
also found correspondence written in English and I did not find any problems in reading such 
documents. 
 
The Fundo do Governo-Geral or General-Government collection includes files and documents 
on colonial rule such as colonial laws and hunting regulations. The section includes official 
documents and correspondence between the central government and state departments (Interior, 
Agriculture, Veterinary, and Africans Affairs). This collection includes a special section on 
Reservas, Parques de Caça e Munições (hunting reserves, parks, hunting and firearms). The 
collection includes licence books issued to people wishing to hunt in southern Mozambique and 
dockets of people related to illegal hunting. The use of this collection allows the researcher to 
know the problems in the hunting fields and responses given by the Portuguese administration (at 
local levels) to such problems. This repository, accordingly, provides information on the 
processes through which national and foreigner hunters had to go to obtain hunting licences. The 
sections also contain documents on the fauna and flora conferences of 1900 and 1933, hunting 
regulations, diverse correspondence and maps on the delimitation of the southern Mozambican 
border with Swaziland, Natal and the Transvaal.  
 
The Fundo da Direcção dos Serviços de Administration Civil (African Affairs Department 
collection) includes files and documents of the correspondence between the colonial government 
and the local administrations. It contains drafts of the 1903 Hunting Regulation and the later 
regulations. The documents in this collection allowed me to understand the evolution of the 
colonial hunting regulations and the circumstances in which hunting regulations were issued. 
Indeed, some documents explain constraints faced by the colonial authorities in the enforcement 
of each of the hunting regulations. The section also contains a collection of correspondence 
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between the Portuguese government in Mozambique and neighbouring states. It includes 
documents dealing with the establishment of the game boards in Mozambique, namely the 
Lourenço Marques Game Board (Comissão de Caça do Distrito de Lourenço Marques) and the 
Mozambique Game Board (Comissão de Caça de Moçambique). 
 
The analysis of this section enlightened my knowledge regarding the establishment of colonial 
borders, the nature and extent of trade between Mozambique and South Africa, animal diseases, 
erection of fences along the Transvaal and the south western Mozambique border and their 
effects on surrounding border communities. From the analysis of the files and documents of this 
section, I understood structural and legislative changes that took place during the colonial period, 
as well as conflicts arising out of the implementation of colonial rule and measures to resolve 
them or decisions taken by colonial staff working at the local levels.  
 
The Fundo de Inspecção Superior de Administração dos Negócios Indigenas or Superior 
Inspection of Native Affairs collection (ISANI) is another important source of information 
regarding colonial rule. The section includes reports of colonial inspectors about what happened 
at the local levels in relation to the imposition of colonial rule in southern Mozambique. The 
reports of the colonial inspectors about colonial administration in southern Mozambique 
included in this collection cover the period from 1942 to 1956. The reports included what was 
then confidential notes describing the reality on the ground showing how Africans organised 
themselves to claim their rights and to solve specific problems, such as cotton production in Alto 
Limpopo and Guijá, hunting and control of clandestine migration from southern Mozambique to 
South Africa. The reports of the colonial inspectors on “native affairs” are useful sources of first-
hand information regarding the lives of Africans and their relationship with the colonial 
administration.   
 
The limitations of the documents accessed at the AHM stems from the fact that they do not refer 
to the daily life of ordinary people (e.g. the social organization, trade, agricultural production, 
hunting techniques, and environmental transformation). Thus, interviews were used to fill the 
gap left by official records and complete the narrative by privileging the voices of ordinary 
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people. Additionally, documents at the AHM are not organised by themes but according to the 
geographical areas from where they were collected. This categorization of primary documents 
was time consuming, as I had to go through all documents of a given area and collection (e.g.: 
circunscrição de Guijá) to identify documents that were relevant to the study.  
 
It has to be acknowledged that colonial texts and documents are profoundly shaped by colonial 
culture and values.30 However, used carefully and critically, colonial texts are useful sources of 
information, which can enable historians to write or re-write the history of ordinary people. For 
the analyses of colonial documents and texts, Moore-Gilbert suggests that the historian should 
read between the lines of the colonial text in order to detect the multiple meanings of events and 
other historical data that are useful for the reinterpretation of the past. The above-mentioned 
documents were analysed critically and compared with, and read against, other sources, which 
have different perspectives from those of the coloniser. The use of oral sources was very useful 
to fill the glaring gaps left by colonial documents.31  
 
Oral sources: engaging with the local communities    
The historian’s position as an ‘outsider’ of a community may possibly inject greater neutrality 
and objectivity into the process of collection of oral testimony but could also make the project 
unfeasible and there can be no oral sources if people are not willing to speak. The way the 
researcher asks questions is crucial in helping interviewees bring to the present their memories of 
the past.32 The interviewees were sources of information, which were further interrogated in the 
light of the available written sources.   
 
During the fieldwork research, I did not only look at the stories as tales by interviewees but I 
tried to understand the underlying logics and interconnections behind such stories and tales.33 I 
conducted about 60 interviews that ensured that all contents are covered and that the trends 
                                                          
30Moore-Gilbert, Bart J. 1997. Post-colonial theory:  context, practices, politics.  London-New York: Verso, p. 8 
31Van Onselen, C. 1993. “The reconstruction of a rural life from oral testimony: critical notes on the methodology 
employed in the study of a black South African sharecropper.” Journal of Peasant Studies, 20 (3): 494-514  
32Thompson, Paul. 1988. Voices of the past: oral history. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988; p. 144 
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displayed in interviews together with other sources allowed me to write a thesis on the 
environmental history of the south western Mozambique borderland or former Coutada16. 
 
Overcoming constraints during fieldwork 
In May 2012, while I was in Maputo, I met my old classmate, Mr. Germano Dimande, who 
worked for the LNP from 2002 to early 2012.34 Dimande provided me with useful information 
for the preparation of the fieldwork research in 2014 and indicated some very important 
informants that I had to meet in the LNP. In June 2012, I visited the area for the first time. 
During my visit, the park officials were conducting a census to inform the LNP resettlement 
programs. One of the park officials advised me and my colleagues, Filipe Mate from the Eduardo 
Mondlane University-Mozambique and Francis Massé from York University-Canada, not to 
conduct collective interviews of more than 4 interviewees so that people would not identify our 
work with resettlement meetings. The park officials advised us to send our local guide, Mr. 
Rafael Mbumbi in advance to introduce our work in the community. After Rafael had been 
granted permission, we went to introduce ourselves to the interviewees and conduct the research.   
 
During my fieldwork trips in LNP in June 2012, July 2013, January, February 2014, and April 
2016, I visited 5 villages, namely Massingir Velho, Mavodze, Mbingo, Machamba, Chimangue 
and the new village of the Massingir Velho community established in Mucatine in August 
2016.35 In November 2013, when was I working on logistics that would allow me to conduct my 
research in the further northern village of LNP, namely Makandazulo A and B, I was advised by 
the LNP staff to not go to such areas because of the existence of RENAMO soldiers north of the 
Save River, which made the area insecure. Moreover, community members were furious because 
weeks earlier the KNP rangers had killed four rhino illegal hunters from the local villages. Given 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
33Field, Sean. 2001. “Remembering experience, interpreting memory: Life stories from Windermere.” African 
Studies 60 (1): 120-133 
34Mr. Germano Mausse Dinamde was my colleague at the History Department - Eduardo Mondlane University 
when we were still doing honours in History (1996-2001). 
35When I visited the village of Massingir Velho in 2012 to 2014, the local communities were still living in the LNP. 
In August 2015 the LNP transferred the about 500 families from the Village of Massingir Velho in the core 
conservation area of the LNP to Mukatine. This village is located about 50 km soutward from the main entrance 
gate of the LNP.    
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this security situation, I limited my fieldwork to the south bank of Shingwedzi River to the north 
bank of the Elephants River.  
 
Fortunately, I conducted interviews in the most populated villages that had undergone the main 
social and environmental transformation, i.e. relocations due to the construction of the dam, 
cotton production, labour migration, displacement during the civil war and resettlements that 
followed the war. I feel that the situation described above did not negatively influence the final 
quality of the study. Moreover, north of Shingwedzi (Makandazulo) there is a good 
anthropological research done by Rebecca Witter from Georgia University-Canada, which I 
appreciated so much and I have used in this thesis.36    
 
Due to the nature of my research topic, I conducted semi-structured interviews with open-ended 
questions. The use of semi-structured interviews with “key informants” enabled me to collect 
people’s experiences that are not available in any other recorded formats. The use of interviews 
allowed me to capture information about different processes and dynamics of the local 
communities over time. Interviews with key informants informed me about events that happened 
in the past and the views of the informants on such events.  
 
Owing to the nature of my research, i.e. analysis of colonial and post-colonial conservation 
policies, my interviewees were constituted mainly by elderly people - men and women, former 
hunters, former mineworkers, cultivators, herders and traditional leaders – who had information 
about the key issues being discussed. I included some youth particularly to discuss issues related 
to post-colonial economic and political contexts including the lives of the local populations 
during the civil war and the process of the transformation of Coutada 16 into LNP. I am 
proficient in local languages, Shangane and Portuguese, therefore, there was no need for me to 
rely on translators. The language proficiency enabled me to have access to the nuances, 
proverbial and even idiomatic expressions articulated in these languages without any difficulty.  
                                                          
36Witter, Rebecca. 2010. Taking their territory with them when they go: mobility and access in Mozambique’s 
Limpopo National Park [PhD thesis] Athens: University of Georgia. 
 
  
22 
 
The use of interviews enabled me to recover past experiences of communities in former 
Coutada16. These experiences are not available in official documents, reports, newspapers, etc. 
Moreover, the communities live in a remote rural area. As such, most of their experiences 
regarding their relationship with the environment are not registered in the official records. The 
use of interviews allowed me to recall memories about their experiences while representing 
themselves as actors of the same past (what happened in their past, activities, their jobs, wishes, 
relationship with colonial authorities and Frelimo government). 
 
During the fieldwork research I came to understand that while men were open to talk about 
hunting, labour migration to South Africa and the impact of the Massingir dam, women were 
more open to talk about social and labour transformations in Coutada 16 (cropping, their role in 
hunting, cattle keeping and the burden of work imposed by the opening of new family farms and 
communal farms, etc.). The female interviewees had tales on cotton production in the Massingir 
region, involvement of the traditional authorities in cotton production systems and punishment 
by the Portuguese when Africans were not able to collect first class cotton. Thus, I put much 
effort into collecting stories that both men and women wanted and felt free to talk about. At the 
end of the research work, I felt that information given by men complemented that given by 
women and vice-versa. Issues on war were very difficult to talk about. I remember that in 2014, 
while I was conducting interviews in the village of Massingir Velho and talking with an elder 
woman about the armed conflict, she recalled the horrors of the war and the way she lost her 
belongings, her parents and started crying. That was a very emotional moment. Unfortunately, 
one had to manage such delicate situations to allow research to continue. 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The review examines literature and debates on the rise of conservation in Africa and particularly 
in the southern Africa region. It pays attention to analytical models of politics underpinning the 
construction of large projects (dams and irrigation schemes), where implementation implies, and 
often results in, forced resettlements, rupture of the social fabric of communities and the 
undermining of their livelihoods. Above all, this section is meant to examine the strengths and 
shortcomings of the existing body of literature in methodological, historical and empirical terms. 
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In general the literature under review can be classified into eight main categories: pre-colonial 
environment and African environmental history; the rise of conservation in Africa; the changing 
narratives of conservation; community-based conservation, environmental management in 
former Coutada 16; ethnicity and livelihood strategies in former Coutada 16 and resettlements in 
former Coutada 16 and labour migration to South Africa. 
 
Pre-colonial environments and African environmental history 
In the 1970s, historians in the United States began to have much appreciation of descriptions of 
nature.37 In southern Africa, the new Environmental History has allowed historians to re-write 
African History on the eve of colonialism and even during the colonial period.38 The close 
relationship of history and other scientific fields such as geography, anthropology and medicine 
has allowed more in-depth analysis of African environments. Rather than focusing only on the 
history of colonial institutions in Africa or the relationship between the colonizers and colonized, 
white and black, environmental historians have come to focus on the environmental 
transformations (landscapes, water, fires, fauna) and the way political, social and economic 
factors influence them or how they, in turn, are influenced by the environment.39  
 
In the late 1970s, a considerable number of historians who wrote on the causes of the 17th 
century Mfecane and its legacies re-examined pre-colonial and existing contemporary texts.40 
They have produced historical texts on the geopolitics in southern Africa in the late 18th century 
and the life of Africans before the imposition of colonial rule. These texts offer clues and 
explanations about the socio-economic transformation (environmental changes, migrations, 
                                                          
37 Rosenau, Pauline.1992. Post-modernism and the social sciences: insights, inroads and intrusions. Princeton: 
Princetown University Press; Myers, Tony. 2001. “Modernity, Postmodernity and the future perfect”, New 
Literary History, 32 (1), 2001, 33-45 
38Beinart, William and Joann McGregor (eds.) 2003. Social history and African environments, Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press and Oxford: James Currey; McCann, C. James. 1999. Green land, brown land, black land: an 
environmental history of Africa 1800-1900. Portsmouth: Heinemann 
39Beinart, William. 2000. “African history and environmental history.” African Affairs, 99 (395): 269-302, p. 270-1  
40Etherigton, Norman. 1995. “Putting the Mfecane controversy into the historiographical context.” Hamilton, 
Carolyn. (Ed.) The Mfecane aftermath: reconstructive debates in the southern African History. Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press and Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, pp.13-20; p. 17; see also 
Hamilton, Carolyn. 1995. “Introduction: history and historiography in the aftermath.” Hamilton, Carolyn (Ed.) 
The Mfecane aftermath, pp.1-12, see also Wright, John. 1995. “Beyond the concept of Zulu explosion: comments 
on the current debate” Hamilton, Carolyn (Ed.). The Mfecane aftermath, pp.107-121, p.111 
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population pressure, struggle for the control of fertile land, political organisation of local 
chiefdoms) in Zululand and its consequences in southern Africa as well as the establishment of 
the Gaza-Nguni state in southern Mozambique. The reconstructive debates in southern African 
history, particularly the Mfecane Aftermath are useful sources to understand environmental 
changes in the southern Africa in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.41 
 
The development of trade and hunting in the hinterland in the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly 
the ivory trade had an impact on the environment, socio-economic activities and resulted in the 
formation of new powerful political units.42 Indeed, in the southern Mozambique hinterland, 
hunting for commercial purposes and specifically the ivory trade led some African cultivators to 
abandon their activities and became professional hunters known as phissa or maphissa (pl.). 
Junod, a Swiss missionary and anthropologist who analysed the life of people of southern 
Mozambique on the advent of colonialism classified African hunters of southern Mozambique in 
two categories. He attributed the first category to the ordinary hunters or people who hunted for 
subsistence known locally as balhoti and the second category to the professional hunters known 
as phissa or maphissa (pl.).43 Accordingly, other Africans were involved in the long distance 
trade, transporting European manufacturers from Indian Ocean ports (mainly Delagoa Bay and 
Inhambane) to the southern Mozambique hinterland and East Transvaal and African goods from 
East Transvaal and southern Mozambique hinterland to the Indian Ocean ports.44  
The maphissa, as the African traders involved in long distance trade between the interior and 
Delagoa Bay, could stay long periods away from home and acted as intermediaries between 
African elites and the white hunters and traders. By the late 19th century, understanding their 
difficulties as they operated with inferior firearms compared to those used by Europeans and 
lacked mobility (donkeys instead of horses used by their European counterparts), the maphissa 
                                                          
41Eldredge, Elizabeth A. 1995. “Sources of conflict in southern Africa, 1800-1830”. Hamilton, Carolyn (Ed.) The 
Mfecane aftermath, pp.123-161, p. 125 
42MacKenzie, John M. 1988. The empire of nature: hunting, conservation and British imperialism. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, p. 61, 89; Carruthers, Jane. 2008. “Wilding the farm or farming the wild? The 
evolution of scientific game ranching in South Africa from the 1960s to the present.” Transactions of the Royal 
Society of South Africa, 63 (2): 160–181, p. 163-4; Beinart, William. 1989. “Introduction: the scramble for Eden: 
past, present and future in African conservation.” Anderson, David and Richard Grove (Eds.) Conservation in 
Africa: people, policies and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-13, p. 2  
43Junod, Henri Alexandre. 1924. The life of a South African tribe, Vol. II , p.55  
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sought alliances with African chiefs as a means of survival. They gave half their hunting produce 
to the chief in whose land the animal was killed. These offerings functioned as a hunting 
“licence” and they would be allowed to stay and hunt within the local forests.45 In the early 20th 
century, the maphissa used dogs and donkeys in hunting. Junod argues that the declining ivory 
trade in early 20th century forced some of these African professional hunters to settle 
permanently in the Transvaal, while some returned and settled permanently in southern 
Mozambique.46  
 
Today, there is lack of evidence to conclude that African hunters of southern Mozambique are 
part or descendants of these skilled hunters. Moreover, it seems that after the colonial occupation 
of Mozambique, the term maphissa was no longer used to refer to professional hunters. Thus, all 
hunters (professional and non-professional) became known as valhoti. However, the early 20th 
century hunters of south western Mozambique had many similarities with professional hunters 
described by Junod and other historians. My reading of this situation is that the change of 
terminology was made to avoid their persecution by the colonial authorities as the colonial 
hunting regulation prohibited Africans from hunting of big game or just hunting for commercial 
purposes.   
 
Evidences indicate that at the turn of the 19th century, game decreased considerably in southern 
Africa owing to a combination of factors. Liesegang points out that Rinderpest, which struck the 
region in 1867, contributed to the reduction of the populations of ungulates such as buffalo, 
zebra and several species of antelopes and cattle. Additionally, in the same period the area 
witnessed droughts and locusts, which had a negative impact on agricultural production and also 
led to famines. Undoubtedly, the decrease of both wild and domestic stock led to a scarcity of 
meat and Africans tended to exert intense pressure on the available natural resources and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
44Harries, Patrick. 1994. Work, culture and identity, p. 57 
45Harries, Patrick. 1977. Labour migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa, 1852-1895. Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies: Collected Seminar Papers,  21; pp. 61-76, p. 69 
46Junod, Henri-Alexandre.1924. The Life of a South African tribe. Vol. II: London: Macmillan, p. 50 
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escalating hunting.47 Delius’s analysis of the impact of drought, famines and cattle diseases on 
Pedi societies of the Transvaal offers us clues into the responses of African societies to periods 
of crises. Accordingly, Delius has convincingly argued that hunting and labour migration became 
strategies that were put in place to cope with the crises.48  
 
The works of Dioclecioano das Neves, Alan Smith, Roger Wagner, António Rita-Ferreira, 
Patrick Harries, Jean Penvenne, Genrhard Liesegang, Kenet Hermele, and Lisa Ann Brock 
provide additional insights for the analysis of the politics, economy and society in southern 
Mozambique and its hinterland on the eve of colonial occupation.49 The main topics discussed in 
these studies are related to the ivory trade at Delagoa Bay and southern Mozambique hinterland, 
the decrease of game north of Delagoa Bay and increase of hunting in southern Mozambique 
hinterland to East Transvaal, the establishment of colonial rule and labour migration from 
southern Mozambique to South Africa. This study goes further than the above mentioned authors 
as it bring about new knowledge of the relationship between hunting, conservation and 
development in the 20th century.   
 
The changing narratives of conservation 
The re-writing of pre-colonial environmental history allows historians to review colonial 
environmental politics and the extent to which ordinary people were affected by conservation 
politics and the strategies adopted by ordinary people to cope with the changing systems of 
natural resource management.50 In this this regard, John Mackenzie argues that the study of 
                                                          
47Liesegang, Gerhard. 1983. “Famines, epidemics, plagues and long periods of warfare and their effects in 
Mozambique, 1700-1975.” Harare: Conference on Zimbabwean history: progress and development, pp. 23-27 
48 Delius, P. 1983. The land belongs to us: The Pedi polity, the Boers, and the British in the nineteenth-century 
Transvaal. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, p. 68 and 75-77 
49Hermele, Keneth. 1988.  Land struggles and social differentiation in southern Mozambique; see also Covane, L. 
A. 2001. O trabalho migratório e a agricultura no sul de Moçambique; Liesegang, Gerhard. 1983. “Famines, 
epidemics, plagues and long periods of warfare”; Liesegang, Gerhard. 1983. “Notes on the internal structure of the 
Gaza Kingdom of southern Mozambique”; Wagner, R. 1976. “Zoutpansberg, some notes on the dynamics of a 
hunting frontier”, Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. 1982. A history of African labor in Lourenço Marques; Brock, Lisa 
Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district 
50McCann, James C.1999. Green land, brown land, black land: an environmental history of Africa, 1800-1990. 
Portsmouth: Heinemann; see also Beinart, William and Joann McGregor (eds.) 2003. Social history and African 
environments, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press and Oxford: James Currey; also see Wolmer, William. 2003. 
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environmental history is always conditioned by the existence of sources. Accordingly, African 
environmental history writing is severely influenced by the nature of colonial documents and has 
tended to be the history of the conservation institutions in Africa or the impact of colonial and 
post-colonial conservation policies on local communities.51 As a result, there is a tendency by 
some environmentalists and historians to see pre-colonial societies as living in harmony with 
nature, or living lightly on the environment and not depleting forest resources and wildlife. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that all human activities alter the composition of the 
world. I tried to overcome such limitations by bringing into historical analysis the voices of the 
local communities in south western Mozambique and the way they understood colonial 
institutions.52 
 
Historical accounts indicate that hunting in Africa dates back to the pre-colonial period and most 
often it was done to fill the gaps of food or to supply local communities with meat. Probably, the 
monetization of African economies and development of the ivory trade contributed significantly 
to push Africans to engage in hunting for commercial purposes. Carruthers examined the 
evolution of scientific game ranching in South Africa and observes that western researchers who 
investigated colonial conservation in Africa did not analyse the implications of colonialism in 
hunting activities. For Carruthers, the colonial authorities sold firearms to Africans. She further 
argues that the monetization of African economies led to the need for sources of income. 
Accordingly, in the later 19th century the market was the main driver of game hunting. In other 
words, it was the Europeans who pushed Africans to embark on the ivory trade.53 Hunting by 
Africans and Europeans is at the centre of analysis in this study. 
 
The increase of hunting, of course, leads to the reduction of game. Indeed, by the late 19th 
century, the perceived diminution of game in many regions of Africa, led pressure groups 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“Transboundary conservation: the politics of ecological integrity in Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park.” JSAS, 29 
(1): 262-278 
51MacKenzie, John M. 1988. The empire of nature: hunting, conservation and British imperialism. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 
52Beinart, William and Joann McGregor. 2003. “Introduction” Beinart, William and Joann McGregor (Eds). Social 
history and African environments,, p.1-24, p. 5 
53Carruthers, Jane. 2008.  “Wilding the farm or farming the wild?” p.  164 
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(colonial government staff, hunters, tourists) to become more active in promoting hunting 
legislation and establishment of societies dedicated to wildlife preservation.54 These groups, 
acting under the umbrella of their colonial counterparts attempted to shape, in a variety of ways 
the interaction between people and natural resources. These groups contributed to the 
establishment of colonial hunting regulations, parks and hunting reserves. However, it appears 
that their objective was the control of the access to hunting frontiers and controls the game for 
their own benefits rather than to benefit local communities.55 For example, in the later 1880s, the 
British in Kenya, Southern and Northern Rhodesia and the Germans in East Africa created 
regulations and excluded Africans from hunting pursuits. They also imposed several restrictions 
on hunting techniques (nets and fire) and in some areas removed the local population from 
hunting reserves.56  
 
In the late 19th century, the British and the Germans began to put pressure on the Portuguese 
authorities to improve wildlife policies in their African colonies. At the convention on the 
preservation of wild life, birds and fish in Africa which took place in London on 19th May 1900, 
Portugal and other European states (German, Italy, Spain, Belgian and United Kingdom) agreed 
to put forward measures to prevent mass killing of wild animals and create wildlife sanctuaries 
as national parks and hunting reserves.57 In the early 20th century, the Portuguese passed hunting 
laws for the territory under their direct administration (southern Mozambique) and persuaded the 
Nyassa and Mozambique chartered companies to introduce hunting regulation in territories under 
their administration. In 1921, the Mozambique Company that controlled much of central 
Mozambique region ordered the creation of a hunting reserve of 1,000 km2 in the Gorongosa 
region.58 However, no game reserves were created in this period in southern Mozambique. 
 
                                                          
54MacKenzie, John M. 1988. The empire of nature, p.  201  
55Gibson, Clark C. 1999.  Politicians and poachers: the political economy of wildlife policy in Africa. Bloomington: 
Indiana University, p. 2; see also MacKenzie, John M. 1988. The empire of nature, p. 201 
56Gibson, Clark C. 1999. Politicians and poachers, p. 27 
57Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006.“German colonialism”, p. 126 
58In 1960 an additional area of 4.300 km2 was added to the game reserve and then transformed into Gorongosa 
National Park. Since 1960s, Gorongosa National Park is the largest national park in Mozambique.  
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The review of the literature demonstrates the late 19th century and early 20th century colonial 
conservation politics and practices in the British and German colonies of southern Africa were 
dominated by western conservation approaches where conservation required the establishment of 
areas for human dwelling aside from nature and fauna (Fortress conservation or Coercive 
conservation). This approach sees inclusion of people in protected areas as harmful to 
conservation.59 Research conducted in Mozambique demonstrates that the Portuguese 
administration was not concerned with environmental sustainability but economic gains from 
fees charged for hunting licences and for private logging.60 For example, in 1923, the South 
African government merged the Shingwedzi and Sabi Game Reserves and in 1926 created the 
KNP. On the Mozambican side, the Portuguese put little efforts into protecting fauna along the 
Mozambique and South African border. Instead, the Portuguese administration gazetted hunting 
regulations that allowed it to take advantage of hunting fees paid by sports and professional 
hunters. Only in the 1930s, they established hunting reserves in southern Mozambique, namely:  
Maputo Game Reserve for the preservation of elephants, Alto Limpopo Game Reserve in the 
now Gaza province, Panda and Zinave hunting reserves in Inhambane province.61 However, 
these game reserves remained “paper reserves” with lack of staff to supervise its areas and to 
enforce the game regulations. 
 
The diminishing of wild stock in the southern Mozambique hinterland due to uncontrolled 
hunting and the proximity of the area to the KNP forced hunters from southern Mozambique to 
find in the KNP a new hunting frontier. This resulted in conflicts involving South African police 
and “illegal African hunters” from Mozambique.62 The difference in conservation practices 
                                                          
59Adams, William and David Hulme. 2001. “Conservation and communities: changing narratives, policies and 
practices in African conservation.” Hulme, David and Marshall Murphee (Eds).  African wildlife and livelihoods: 
the promises and performance of community conservation. Cape Town: David Philip publishers, pp. 9-23, p. 6-7 
60Hedges, D and Rocha, A. 1993. “Moçambique durante o apogeu do colonialismo português, 1945- 1961: a 
economia e a estrutura social.” UEM- Departamento de História (Ed.). História de Moçambique Vol. 3: 
Moçambique no auge do colonialismo, 1930 – 1961. Maputo: Imprensa da UEM; pp-129-195, p. 165; also see 
Hatton, John; Mia Couto and Judy Oglethorpe. 2001. Mozambique: biodiversity and war. Washington DC: 
Biodiversity Support Programs; also see Schafer, Jessica and Richard Black. 2003. “Conflict, peace and history of 
natural resources management in Sussundenga district, Mozambique.”  African Studies Review, 46 (3): 55-81 
61Sousa, A. Gomes. 1956. “The protection of nature in Mozambique.” Civilisations, 6(1): 96-102, p. 97 
62Beinart, William and Peter Coates.1995. Environment and history: the taming of nature in the USA and South 
Africa. New York, Routledge 
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between the Portuguese and the South African government explains why the South African 
government demanded that Portugal establish a conservation area on the border with the KNP. 
By obliging Portugal to establish such a conservation area, the KNP authorities were sure that it 
would contribute to the protection of the Kruger´s Park’s wildlife as well as in Mozambique. As 
can be seen, the study of conservation politics and practices in the south western Mozambique 
borderland implies a deep understanding of the conservation philosophies underpinning 
conservation objectives of the South African and the Portuguese colonial authorities and of the 
extent to which their practices affected ordinary peoples’ lives along the common border. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this section, after the establishment of protected areas (parks and game 
reserves), colonial authorities in South Africa, Kenya, Rhodesia, West Africa and Tanganyika 
forbade indigenous communities from engaging in traditional hunting pursuits, and Africans who 
hunted for the pot or for trade were labelled as “illegal hunters” or “poachers.”63 According to 
Ellis, the pursuit of conservationist initiatives in most southern African countries led colonial 
states to restrict the local population’s access to natural resources and in some cases, ordinary 
people were forced to abandon their ancestral lands to make space for the establishment of 
colonial parks.64 Based on the research I conducted in south western Mozambique borderlands, I 
elucidate under what circumstances Africans hunted for commercial purposes, or for their 
households survival.  
 
Similarly, Gibson takes up the discussion on the concept of “poachers” in Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. He argues that wildlife policies in Africa are affecting local communities’ interaction 
with the wildlife. Gibson also argues that there is a difference between “hunting practices” and 
“poaching”. While local communities hunt for their survival, “poachers” and “outsiders’” 
hunting activities are driven by economic gains. As he states, for most of the time, poaching 
activities escalate when wildlife products like ivory and rhino horns are given high economic 
value on the market.65 My argument is that when people in rural areas lack incentives to secure 
                                                          
63Adams, William and Hulme, David. 2001. “Conservation and communities” 
64Ellis, Stephen. 1994. “Of elephants and men: politics and nature conservation in South Africa” JSAS, 20 (1): 53-
69, p. 55 
65Gibson, Clark C. 1999. Politicians and poachers”, p. 54-57 
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their basic needs, the tendency is for local communities to seek alternative means of survival by, 
for example, escalating hunting activities. In this thesis, I did consider as poaching the killing of 
wild species by individuals who are conscious of their practices. i.e, hunting forbidden game or 
practice hunting in a forbidden territory (ex: Killing of big game for commercial purposes and 
hunting parties by Mozambicans in the KNP territory), and not in cases where the local 
communities are engaged in hunting in forests surrounding their villages to extract bush meat for 
their and their families consumption. 
 
Ellis analysed the relationship between parks and war in southern Africa. According to Ellis, 
there is a strong relationship between parks management and the army. In most of the South 
African parks, ex-soldiers were employed as wardens. According to Ellis, this management 
strategy was used in South African parks to capture the potential of the wardens’ military 
expertise to fight against illegal hunters.66 During the civil conflict in Mozambique, some high 
officials of the South African Defence Forces (SADF) used KNP territory as training ground for 
RENAMO soldiers, which at that time were fighting against the Frelimo Government.67 The 
strategic location of the KNP in relation to Mozambique (unpatrolled forest along the border), 
enabled RENAMO to use KNP’s forests as corridors used to transport military equipment from 
South Africa to Mozambique. Ellis’s study demonstrates that there had always been a lack of 
control by central governmental institutions in parks and game reserves in southern Africa. Most 
often, soldiers took such opportunity to enrich themselves through illegal hunting. Ellis’ analysis 
also revealed that RENAMO guerrilla forces contributed to the over-exploitation of wildlife in 
Mozambique as its armies depended considerably on hunting and livestock for their survival.68 
This study expands knowledge about the relationship between war and conservation practices in 
the south western Mozambique and maps the consequences of war to wildlife and to local 
ecosystems.  
                                                          
66Ellis, Stephen, 1993. “Of elephants and men”, p. 56  
67Ibiden 
68Interview with Simião Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 16/7/2012 
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Community based conservation 
Adams and Hulme’s article provide useful analysis on the philosophy underpinning colonial 
conservation policies and practices or the way local communities should be empowered to 
become active partners and beneficiaries of post-colonial conservation projects. In fact, if 
communities participate in the management of ecosystems and fauna surrounding their villages 
and share the benefits from their participation in conservation projects, they are more willing to 
take part in community based conservation programs.69 Indeed, in the late 1970s, up to the early 
1990s there were several debates on the involvement of local communities in the management of 
local ecosystems. These debates led the conservationists and park managers to abandon the old 
approaches of conservation that sees inclusion of people in protected areas as harmful to 
conservation principles and progressively integrate local communities in the management of 
forests and ecosystems surrounding their villages. This management principle became known as 
Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) initiatives.70  
 
Although the CBNRM approach enjoys consensus among environmentalists and with some 
examples of success in some of the areas, the approach was not used in the area under study.71 In 
November 2001, the GoM converted the former Coutada 16 into LNP.72 According to the 
Mozambican Forests and Wildlife Law, all social and economic activities that are harmful to 
conservation (opening of new areas for farming, grazing and hunting) are prohibited within 
national parks. For that reason, communities now living in the LNP are being resettled in villages 
located out of the Park.73 In other words, it means that in Mozambique the use of CBNRM 
                                                          
69Adams, William and Hulme, David. “Conservation and communities”, p. 7 
70Child, Brian. 1996. “The practice and principles of community-based wildlife management in Zimbabwe: the 
CAMPFIRE programme.” Biodiversity and conservation, 5 (3): 369-398; also see Hulme, David and Marshall 
Murphee, (Eds.) 2001. African wildlife and livelihoods: the promises and performance of community 
conservation. Cape Town: David Philip Publishers 
71Hulme, David and Marshall Murphree. 1999.  “Communities, wildlife and the new conservation”  Africa Journal 
of International Developmen;  11: 277 – 285,  p. 282 
72See Mozambican land law, 19/97 and the Mozambican Forest and wildlife law, 10/99  
73Cau, Henrique Simione. 2005. Processo da criação do Parque Nacional de Limpopo: estudo do relacionamento 
entre o Estado e as comunidades locais - 1992 à actualidade [Dissertação de Licenciatura] Maputo: UEM- 
Departamento de História, 2005, p. 22 
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approach to involve communities in the management of the forest surrounding their villages is 
applicable only to community forests and not to national parks.74  
 
Environmental management in the LNP 
Few authors have paid attention to the history of the Upper Limpopo or the south western 
Mozambique borderland, the area that in 1961 became known as Coutada 16. The few sources 
about this specific area are dissertations by African, American and European scholars who 
investigated the establishment of the GLTP and some other researchers who paid attention to 
issues related to politics and practices of trans-frontier conservation in the GLTP.75 Although the 
work of these scholars describes rural transformations in the south western Mozambique 
borderland now part of the LNP, they pay little attention to lives of the Africans in my chosen 
area of study and their relationship to the environment. 
 
In a co-authored article, Mavhunga and Spierenburg used archival material to reconstruct the 
history of the GLTP. They argue that the establishment of conservation initiatives in the areas 
that now compose the GLTP (KNP in South Africa, Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe and 
Coutada 16 in Mozambique) destroyed the livelihood strategies of the ordinary people. However, 
due to the existence of different management principles of the colonizers, the Portuguese on the 
Mozambican side of the border allowed ordinary people to continue living in the wildlife 
utilization area (Coutada 16). The work of these scholars is nevertheless important to the extent 
that it illuminates our understanding of the early history of the south western Mozambique 
borderland now part of the LNP.76 
 
                                                          
74Schafer, Jessica and Richard Black. 2003. “Conflict, peace and history of natural resources management in 
Sussundenga district, Mozambique” African Studies Review 46 (3): 55-81 
75Mavhunga, Clapperton & Marja Spierenburg. 2007. “A finger on the pulse of the fly: hidden voices of colonial 
anti-tsetse science on the Rhodesian and Mozambican borderlands, 1945–1956”, South African Historical 
Journal, 58 (1): 117-141; also see Lunstrum, E. M. 2007. The making and unmaking of sovereign territory; 
Wolmer, William 2003. Transboundary conservation: the politics of ecological integrity in Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park” JSAS, 29 (1): 262-278; Murombedzi, James C. 1998. “The evolving context of community-
based natural resources management in historical perspective.” The international workshop on Community-Based 
Natural Resource Management. Washington D.C., United States, 10-14 May 
76Mavhunga, Clapperton; Marja Spierenburg. 2009. “Transfrontier talk, cordon politics: the early history of the 
Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park in Southern Africa, 1925–1940” JSAS, 35 (3): 715-735 
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Apart from the works quoted above, Carruthers’ historical study of the KNP provides a 
refreshing and comprehensive analysis and offers some very important insights into the 
relationship of the KNP authorities and communities located on both sides of the border. 
Although she writes on the environment and conservation history of the KNP, she offers insights 
into the establishment of the trans-boundary initiatives in southern Africa and early migration 
history in the south western Mozambique borderland. Carruthers’ work has undoubtedly 
provided a useful framework and basis for a number of subsequent studies interested in similar 
issues.77 In the same vein, my work builds on and extends her work by looking specifically at a 
localised study that she hardly paid attention to but resonates with some of her central arguments 
and themes such as conservation policies and practices in colonial Mozambique. 
 
Carruthers also shows that farming and conservation practices often exist in conflict with each 
other. The existence of communities in the conservation area means that their lives and livestock 
are endangered due to their proximity to wild animals like lions.78 This means also that wild 
animals and domestic livestock would compete for grazing spaces and transmittable wildlife 
diseases would be a threat to the livestock. So far, this dimension of farming and conservation 
practices has not yet been explored in the former Coutada 16. As is now known, the Portuguese 
allowed Africans to continue with their livestock-keeping practices in Coutada 16. This situation 
has implications for preservation of fauna because in periods local people were not able to grow 
enough food for their subsistence they tend to look for alternative food sources. Thus, my study 
demonstrates that during droughts and period of crisis (war and famines) gathering and hunting 
of wild animals became alternative livelihood strategies for their survival. 
 
In a study about women memories of past in Magude district in the period following the civil 
conflict in Mozambique, Gengenbach demonstrated rural border communities in southern 
Mozambique has used hunting as source of food in periods of drought or when food is lacking. 
Equally, they use bush meat as source of proteins to make meat soup which is eaten with rice or 
                                                          
77Carruthers, Jane. 1995. The Kruger National Park: a social and political history. Pietermaritzburg: University of 
Natal Press, see also Carruthers, Jane. 1993. “Police boys and poachers:  Africans wildlife protection and National 
Parks, the Transvaal 1902 to 1950.” Koedoe, 36 (2): 11-22 
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xima (African name for maize porridge).  Gengenbach study is drawn from a complex analysis of 
oral histories collected in Magude district in the period following the civil war in Mozambique 
(1992). Although Gengenbach study does not focus particularly on the relationship between 
conservation and rural development, effectively it useful to this study as it offers a compressive 
analysis of life, chieftaincies, livelihood strategies and the ways women fight to survival in rural 
southern Mozambique.79  
 
Border dynamics, ethnicity and livelihood strategies in Coutada 16 
Scholars agree that the establishment of the colonial borders was a result of state consolidation of 
territorial space where colonial states created frontiers as a way to demonstrate their areas of 
influence, control and political autonomy.80 Connor argues that the colonial borders were 
demarcated without in-depth studies or due regard for their impact on the social relationships and 
economic interdependence of the local communities. In separate works Connor and Stevenson-
Hamilton argue that the result of such colonial practice is that communities and sometimes, 
ethnic groups found themselves divided between different colonizers.81 As demonstrated in this 
thesis, along the Mozambique and South African border, kinship ties were and still very useful to 
allow the survival of local communities during the period of crises (war, draught). During the 
civil war in Mozambique Shangane communities from Mozambique found refuge in other fellow 
Shangane communities in South Africa. 
 
Border analysis helps to understand human mobility and social networks that are created or 
recreated after the establishment of borders and determine the interdependence or lack thereof of 
the countries and communities located in the border areas. Niehaus’ research in southern 
Mozambique demonstrated how borders are not closed entities. Populations situated along 
borderland regions have taken advantage of living in borderlands by exploring the kinship ties 
                                                          
79 Gengenbach, Heidi. “Mapping Magude.” Binding Memories: Women as makers and tellers of History in Magude, 
Mozambique. Columbia University Press. http://www.gutenberge.org/geh01/index.html acessed August 2017 
80Baud, Michiel; Willem Van Schendel. 1991. “Toward a comparative history of borderlands” Journal of World 
History, 8 (2): 211–42; see also Souto, Amelia. 1991. Moçambique: A delimitação de fronteiras 
[Unpublished],Trabalho Final - Curso de História UEM; Disciplina de Historia de Moçambique, 1991   
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and ethnic relationships existing amongst them.82 The examples of Shangane communities of the 
south western Mozambique borderland are illustrative of this scenario.83 During Manikusse’s 
massacres in southern Mozambique (1820s), the Zulu and Sotho raids on the Gaza-Nguni state 
(mid-19th century) Shangane communities from southern Mozambique migrated and established 
in the Transvaal.84  
 
According to Stevenson-Hamilton (the first warden of the KNP), in the early 20th century, 
differences in hut tax collection in the Transvaal and Mozambique (collection during winter in 
the Transvaal and summer in Mozambique) also enabled Shangane communities to evade tax 
payment; during winter, they stayed in Mozambique and in the summer, they returned to the 
Transvaal.85 As referred earlier in this section, during the armed conflict of the 1980s, border 
communities from southern Mozambique left their villages and settled in adjacent Shangane 
territory in South Africa.86 These examples demonstrate that people living along the borders have 
no exclusive identities. They can belong to either one side or both according to factors 
favourable to their survival at a given period. 
 
Lack of clear demarcation of colonial borders can result in cleavages between colonial powers. 
In the late 19th century, the Portuguese and the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) authorities 
claimed the area of south western Mozambique bordering Eastern Transvaal as being part of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
81Connor, Teresa K. 2003 “Crooks, commuters and chiefs: home and belonging in a border zone in Pafuri, Gaza 
Province – Mozambique.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 21 (1): 93-120; see also Stevenson-
Hamilton, James. 1929. The Lowveld: its wildlife and its people. London: Cassel & Co, p. 169 
82Niehaus, Isak. 2002 “Ethnicity and the boundaries of belonging: reconfiguring Shangaan identity in the South 
African lowveld”, African Affairs, 101 (405): 557-583, p. 559; see also Connor, Teresa K. 2002. “Crooks, 
commuters and chiefs: home and belonging” 
83Connor, Teresa K. 2003 “Crooks, commuters and chiefs: home and belonging”; also see Rodgers, Graeme. 2002. 
When refugees don't go home: post-war Mozambican settlement across the border with South Africa; [PhD] 
Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand 
84Xavier, Alfredo Augusto Caldas. 1984. Reconhecimento do Limpopo: os territórios ao sul do Save e os Vátuas. 
Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1894, p. 23, Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando, 1878. Etinerário de uma viagem a 
caça dos elefantes; Pelissier, René. História de Moçambique: formação e oposição, p. 321; Delius, P. 1989. The 
land belongs to us, p. 95 
85Stevenson-Hamilton, James. 1929. The Lowveld: its wildlife and its people, p. 181  
86Rodgers, G. 2002. When refugees don't go home”; see also Crush, J. & Joann D. McDonald. 2002. “Introduction 
to special issue: evaluating South African immigration policy after Apartheid”. Africa Today, 48: 1-13 
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their territories.87 The disputes for the control of the area resulted in cleavages between the 
Portuguese and the ZAR authorities. In the mid-19th century, the Portuguese approached the 
Transvaal authorities to seek a solution to end the conflict and delimit the borderline separating 
East Transvaal and south western Mozambique.88 As a result, in 1864, a joint commission to 
discuss the delimitation of the Transvaal and Mozambique border was created and on July 1869, 
the Portuguese and the Boers reached an agreement and signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, 
and Borders, which demarcated the borderline between south western Mozambique and the 
Transvaal.89  
 
Nowadays, there is a lack of information on the reasons why the two colonial states 
(Mozambique and South Africa), did not fence the border. Almada states that confrontation and 
the adoption of opposed political philosophies by neighbouring states are reasons that lead 
neighbouring states to demarcate and erect fences along their borders.90 During the colonial 
period, the absence of conflicts between the two colonial powers may be the reason explaining 
the absence of fences along the border.91 More recently, scholars have analysed border dynamics 
on the south western frontier of Mozambique. In such studies, socio political analyses have been 
useful to explore the social, cultural, power dynamics and political transformations in the 
communities living in border regions.92  
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Rodgers explored the lives of Mozambican refugees in South Africa during the Apartheid and 
post-Apartheid periods. His study is concerned with the strategies used by Mozambican refugees 
to integrate themselves in the South Africa society (what he calls living away from home). In his 
study, Rodgers analyses the meaning of “home” to Mozambicans as a strategy they used to 
remember the social, economic and cultural linkages that they have with home communities in 
the Massingir region. As Rodgers argues, from the mid-20th century to the 1990s, the livelihoods 
of the communities of south western Mozambique not only depended on agriculture but also on 
labour migration. Consequently, the political changes that occurred after 1975 influenced 
considerably the livelihood strategies of the local people, with the civil war contributing to 
pushing entire communities near Mozambique’s south western borderland to seek refuge in 
South Africa. Therefore, once again, kinship ties were crucial to establish network to find 
employment in South Africa and places to live.  
 
Rodgers argues that although the South African government knew the harsh conditions under 
which the Mozambicans lived due to the widespread civil conflict it never opened “officially” its 
borders to help the fleeing population affected by war. More often than not, KNP rangers 
arrested and deported Mozambican migrants found crossing the border on foot using the KNP 
bush route.93 According to Polzer, during Apartheid, the South African government was not a 
signatory of the relevant international conventions and refused to give assistance to Mozambican 
refugees in South Africa.94 In line with Polzer, Connor states that social networks and ethnic ties 
have played a major role in the integration of Shangane refugees in South Africa. Shangane 
speaking people were welcomed and allowed to stay in the former homeland of Gazankulu in the 
area today known as Bushbuckridge.95  
 
                                                          
93Rodgers, Grame. 2009. “The faint footprint of man: representing race, place and conservation on the 
Mozambique–South Africa borderland.” Journal of Refugee Studies, 22 (3): 392-412  
94Rodgers, G. 2002. ‘When refugees do not go home”; also see Machava, Aderito. 2005. The importance of social 
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The work of the scholars who analysed border dynamics between South Africa and Mozambique 
is important to understand the relationship of the Mozambican Shangane who went to South 
Africa in search of refuge. Equally, it built a comprehensive framework to analyse the extent to 
which kinship ties helped them to find accommodation, work and places to live in former 
Gazankulu homeland and how this relationship implies new migration dynamics from Massingir 
to South Africa or vice-versa. This relationship has implications for conservation because 
returnees from South Africa always needed to open new fields for cropping and grazing within 
the LNP. Since the scholars were concerned with Mozambican refugees in South Africa, they did 
not pay attention to the lives and livelihood strategies of Shangane communities of south western 
Mozambique hinterland that did not migrate to South Africa in search of work and refuge.96 As 
such, my work complements and deepens the work of these scholars by focusing on the 
experiences of the Shangane communities in Mozambique before leaving to South Africa.  
 
In general, the shortcomings of the work discussed in this section of literature review are the lack 
of historical analyses. Historical data and present-day events are presented and analysed 
separately, there is thus a lack of chronological and intertwined link between events.97 The 
literature lacks analyses of the causes and consequences of events. This study goes further back 
in history to explain the relationship between events and the development of conservation 
politics and practices in former Coutada 16 now LNP in order to show that, indeed, history 
matters in explaining, among other things, contemporary phenomena. 
 
The construction of the Massingir dam and relocations in Coutada 16  
Isaacman and Isaacman suggest that any analysis of the dynamics of dams in colonial and post-
colonial Mozambique has to take into account that social and ecological concerns are 
inextricably linked to broader questions of sustainability and security. Isaacman and Isaacman’s 
research on the Lower Zambezi is illustrative of how changing patterns of the environment 
influenced negatively the lives of local communities living downstream of the Zambezi River. 
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According to Isaacman and Isaacman, the construction of dams in colonial Mozambique also 
revolved around power dynamics and power dominance.98 The study of the Massingir dam is 
important as it clearly elucidates how post-colonial authorities took over the colonial projects. In 
this particular project, the consolidation of independence implied a reformulation of the politics 
and philosophy underpinning its construction. Although Isaacman and Isaacman’s research pays 
attention to environmental transformations in the Zambezi valley, their research offers an 
alternative analytical approach for the study of environmental impacts of dams elsewhere in 
Mozambique. 
 
After independence, local communities in the Massingir region expected that the dam would 
offer great opportunities for their development (irrigation schemes) and contribute to improve 
their lives. However, rather than benefiting the local communities, the construction of Massingir 
dam (1972-1978) contributed to worsen the living conditions of the families that had their homes 
and fields along the Elephants valley who due to the filling of the Massingir dam reservoir had to 
be relocated in poor soils in Coutada 16. Moreover, Frelimo’s social and economic policies 
implemented in the countryside conflicted with the existing social networking and livelihood 
strategies. Frelimo obliged remote rural communities to live in communal villages. This situation 
affected negatively the lives of the local communities who saw independence as a panacea for 
their freedom and a platform for their social and economic development.  
 
Lunstrum’s study on transformation of land and spaces in Massingir region during the 
construction of the Massingir dam demonstrates that communities living along the river banks of 
the Elephants river lost their fertile lands on which they have depended for agriculture and 
grazing. Lunstrum does not give much emphasis to the lives and livelihood strategies of local 
communities before the construction of the Massingir dam or how did the ordinary people 
                                                          
98Isaacman, Allen F and Barbara Isaacman. 2013. “Displacement, and the delusion of development:  
Cahora Bassa and Its legacies in Mozambique, 1965–2007. Ohio, Athens: Ohio University Press (See chapter 
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organise their daily life before the relocations.99 My study addresses this shortcoming because 
without the perspectives of the people of the former Coutada 16, the history of the LNP would be 
incomplete. 
 
Whiteside’s article on relief and development in Mozambique offers important insights into the 
linkages between war and relocation and refugees’ livelihoods during and after conflicts. 
Whiteside noted that almost all displaced Mozambicans who went from Mozambique to the 
neighbouring countries faced two kinds of dilemmas. The first dilemma was the lack of 
resources in the destination country because, most often, the refugees left their belongings in 
their home villages and fled without anything. The second dilemma was the conditions that 
refugees found in their home villages after returning from exile. In most cases, refugees found 
that infrastructure they had left behind had been destroyed by war.100 Whiteside also noted that 
returnees were strongly dependent on food supply agencies because they needed to survive and 
plant crops until harvest.101 Whiteside makes a general analysis of the situation of Mozambican 
refugees in southern African countries and their reintegration in their home villages; hence, he 
pays little attention to specific processes of migration such as those of Massingir communities 
during the civil war and the process of their resettlement after the civil war. Whiteside’s analysis 
is significant to my research to the extent that he reviews migrants’ livelihoods experiences in 
exile and their integration in the economic and social life in their home villages.  
 
Labour migration from southern Mozambique to South Africa 
Labour migration from Mozambique to South Africa started in the later 19th century when 
Africans from the southern Mozambique migrated to work in farms in Natal and to the mining 
industry in the Witwatersrand region.102 During the early 20th century, migration of 
Mozambicans to South Africa was transformed into a cultural factor. Many young boys from 
rural areas of southern Mozambique grew up dreaming of going to South Africa in search of 
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better-paid jobs.103 There is a range of literature analysing the causes and consequences of 
migration of Mozambicans to South Africa. Many scholars agree that drought and the decline of 
agricultural productivity in southern Mozambique and existence of better-paid jobs in South 
Africa are factors that pushed Africans to migrate in search of employment in farms in Natal and 
mining industry in the Transvaal.104 After the Portuguese victory over Gungunhane, the last 
emperor of the Gaza-Nguni state and imprisonment of Portuguese radicals in 1895, the 
Portuguese unified the administration of Mozambique and obliged the ordinary people to pay 
taxes. African males with a palhota (hut) had to secure a source of income to earn money for the 
payment of the hut taxes. Thus, those who had no alternative source of income were pushed into 
the mining industry of South Africa.105 
 
Covane, a historian from the Department of History- Eduardo Mondlane University, analysed the 
causes of labour migration from the Lower Limpopo region to South Africa. Covane´s works 
help us to understand the Portuguese colonial authority’s policy toward migration in the late 19th 
century and during 20th century.106 Covane indicates that from 1887 to the 1970s, several 
agreements were signed between the South African government, the Chamber of Mines and the 
Portuguese to allow Mozambicans to work in the mining sector in South Africa. These 
agreements were revised periodically in response to changes in the political and economic 
contexts. The agreements also allowed the establishment of the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association (WENELA) recruitment posts in Mozambique including the Pafuri post in Upper 
Limpopo.107 Covane’s works also look at consequences of migration of mineworkers on the 
economy and society in Lower Limpopo. Covane´s work does not give much emphasis on 
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‘Kinship, ideology and the nature of pre-colonial labour migration” 
106Diário do Governo de Moçambique, Lei nº 31896 de 27/21942 
107Covane, L. A. 1989. As relações económicas entre Moçambique e a África do Sul, 1850-1964: Acordos e 
regulamentos principais. Maputo: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique; see also Hermele, Keneth, 1988. Land 
struggles and social differentiation in southern Mozambique 
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migration of Mozambicans to South Africa through the KNP and on migration and 
environmental transformation in the Upper Limpopo. This lacuna is addressed in my study. 
 
In terms of the post-colonial period, the works of various scholars such as Hensen, Witter, and 
Wolmer render valuable insights into routes and challenges faced by migrants from southern 
Mozambique to South Africa using the Pafuri border gate.108 However, my study does much 
more than this in the sense that it distinctly discusses the history of labour migration from 
Massingir to South Africa during the colonial period and its implication on the local polity. It 
does this by identifying the cause, the routes and consequences of labour migration on local 
economy and development of hunting. The research seeks to deepen knowledge on the impact of 
labour migration to South Africa on environment (e.g.: opening of new farming fields in Coutada 
16), hunting (use of rifles and gunpowder in the Massingir region brought from south Africa by 
migrants) and decision making for the resettlement of populations affected by the building of the 
Massingir dam. 
 
Outline of the chapters 
Including this introductory chapter and the conclusion, the thesis is organised into six (6) 
chapters.  
 
Chapter 2: This chapter explores the evolution of hunting activities and the ivory trade in 
southern Mozambique during the 18th and 19th centuries and its impact on the life and polity of 
the local population. The chapters demonstrate that during the 18th and 19th centuries, hunting 
and trade between the interior and the Indian Ocean Coast influenced the socio-economic and 
political life of the local people in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The need to ensure 
monopoly over local resources, particularly animal products (animal skins, ivory, rhino horns, 
etc.) in order to continue to supply the global markets influenced how African elites particularly 
the Gaza-Nguni rulers framed their hunting and trade policies to ensure benefits from long 
                                                          
108Norman, William Oliver. 2004. Living on the frontline: politics; Hansen, Heidi Suzanne. 2008. Community 
perceptions of a mine recruitment centre in Pafuri and the development of a cultural heritage site in the Greater 
Limpopo Transfrontier Park; [Msc Dissertation] Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand; see also Witter, 
Rebecca. 2010. Taking their territory with them when they go. 
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distance trade from the southern African interior to the Indian Ocean coast. Above all, the 
chapter provides insight to understand pre-colonial African environment before advent of 
colonialism.   
 
Chapter 3: This chapter looks to the general transformation of hunting in relation to colonial 
policies. It seeks particularly to deepen our understanding of the Portuguese conservation 
policies and particularly changes made to hunting regulations (1903, 1904, 1906, 1910, 1932, 
1936, 1941, 1944, 1951 and 1956). The chapter brings to the knowledge of the reader the life and 
practices of the border communities in Mozambique and their relationship with Mozambique and 
South African authorities. Therefore, it examines the establishment of the KNP and early efforts 
made toward the establishment of a national park in Mozambique and contiguous to the KNP. 
Equally, it explores the establishment of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique and analyses 
the challenges faced by the Portuguese administration to control hunting in southern 
Mozambique from the early 1940s to the late 1950s.  
 
Chapter 4: This chapter analyses the impact of colonial rule on the lives of Africans as well as 
conservation in Guijá and particularly in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve. The chapter places 
particular emphasis on the impact of forced cotton production on the lives of Africans. In fact, 
the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique introduced cotton during the 1920s. However, cotton 
production in southern Mozambique hinterland became compulsory from the early 1930s to later 
1950s. Therefore, this chapter documents the impact of forced cotton production on local 
communities and fauna of my study area. The chapter also describes the evolution of labour 
migration from Guijá to South Africa and its impact on the economy, society, and wildlife. 
Labour migration provided resources (money, rifles and gunpowder) to the migrants which had a 
great impact on the environment. The chapter seeks to explain how such resources were 
channelled to Mozambique and describes their impact in relation to hunting. The last section of 
the chapter analyses the outbreak of animal diseases in southern Mozambique and implications 
on the preservation of fauna. This section does not only describe the outbreak of animal diseases 
in southern Mozambique but explains how the South Africa and Mozambique authorities 
resolved the problem. The chapter provides useful information to understand Portuguese 
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conservation policies in the 1960s and early 1970s (leasing of conservation areas to private safari 
companies).   
 
Chapter 5: This chapter attempts to examine the extent to which the construction of the 
Massingir dam affected local peoples´ lives, local political structures, the local peoples’ 
livelihoods, local ecosystems and wildlife. It analyses the post-independent rural development 
policies in Mozambique and particularly it seeks to document the experiences undergone by the 
down-river communities of the north bank of the Elephants valley displaced by the filling of the 
Massingir dam’s reservoir and relocated in communal villages in Coutada16. It explores how the 
rupture between the colonial government and Frelimo affected the continuation of colonial 
projects in the postcolonial period and explains how the late colonial projects affected the lives 
of the local families in the Massingir region.  
 
Chapter 6: This chapter examines armed conflict in the Massingir region and its impact on the 
lives of the local communities and the environment; it documents experiences undergone by the 
local communities in Coutada 16 to escape the war and routes followed to find refuge within and 
across national borders. Accordingly, it analyses the return of the same communities from exile 
and the process of rebuilding lives in Coutada 16. It seeks particularly to document the 
transformation of Coutada 16 into the LNP and its further integration into the GLTP. In this 
chapter, we conclude the writing up of the history of communities of the south western 
Mozambique borderland as well as the process undergone toward the establishment of a national 
park in Mozambique contiguous to KNP. In fact, the process toward the establishment of a 
national park in Mozambique contiguous to KNP began in 1927 when the South African 
authorities through its Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog requested that the Portuguese government 
in Mozambique establish a national park alongside the KNP.109 
                                                          
109AHM: Governo Geral – Cx. 178/C3 - Note for the clarification of the case nº 778/2106 - Theft of cattle in 
Massingir. South Africa: Secretary-General of the interior - Provincial Services, Reference series of 1927-332. In 
this note, nothing was said concerning the cattle stolen in Massingir region; instead, the South African authorities 
attached to their note Hertzog’s appeal for the establishment of a game reserve in Mozambique alongside the 
KNP. Hertzog attached to his letter a map of the KNP with the following statement “… I have the honour to point 
out that the Portuguese game reserve should adjoin the full length of the Kruger National Park, I. e. from 
Crocodile river in the south to the confluence of the Pafuri and Limpopo rivers in the north and should be about 
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CHAPTER II: ENVIRONMENT, POLITICS AND BRANCHES OF PRODUCTION IN 
PRE-COLONIAL SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the 17th to the early 19th century, the economy and settlements in southern Africa underwent 
constant change owing to factors such as climate, agro-ecological conditions and conflicts over 
the control of ivory and slaves for trading at Delagoa Bay. In the early 19th centuty, competition 
for the control of the local resources (land and ivory) and trade from the southern African interior 
to the Indian Ocean coast led to the outbreak of conflicts opposing the most powerful African 
political units in Zululand. I.e. the Mthethwa kingdom headed by Dingiswayo and the 
Ndwandwe kingdom headed by Zwide.  
 
After the death of Dingiswayo in 1817, Shaka, one of Dingiswayo’s adopted sons, took over his 
father´s power, ruled the state with terror and began a fierce persecution against his enemies. The 
less powerful political units were obliged to pay allegiance to Shaka. Parts of the Ndwandwe 
royal lineage opposed to the Mthethwa migrated to distant lands out of the reach of Shaka. 
Among the Ndwandwe fugitives was Soshangane, also known as Manikuse, who in 1821 
established the Gaza-Nguni state on the south bank of the Limpopo River. From 1821 to 1895, 
the Gaza-Nguni kings dominated the life, politics, economy and particularly hunting activities in 
the southern Mozambique hinterland. The Gaza-Nguni chiefs also established trade networks 
with Europeans and exchanged European goods with African commodities such as slaves, ivory, 
rhino horns and amber. They also imposed hunting fees in their territories and obliged traders to 
pay fees when passing through their territories.  
 
This chapter analyses pre-colonial environments, politics and branches of production in southern 
Africa and particularly in the southern Mozambique hinterland before the advent of colonialism. 
In light of the existing literature, it reviews the 18th and early 19th century environmental and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
fifty miles wide...” see AHM: G.G. Cx. AC 178/C3; File Reservas e Parques de Caça - Letter from J.B.M. Hertzog 
to the Mozambique Governor-General in Lourenço Marques. Dated 9/8/1927, see also Joubert, Salomon, 2007. 
The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume I, p. 43  
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political transformations in Zululand and the establishment of the Gaza-Nguni state in southern 
Mozambique. The chapter examines the development of the ivory trade between African elites 
and Europeans and the occupation of the southern Mozambican hinterland by the Portuguese 
army in the late 19th century.  
 
From the review of the existing historical sources, the chapter sheds new insights into 
understanding the development of the ivory trade and the relationship between hunting and the 
monetization of African economies. The chapter is particularly important because it allows the 
reader of this thesis to understand rural transformations in southern Mozambique and to 
demonstrate how this was a product of the development of the ivory trade in 18th and 19th 
centuries and commercial hunting in the early 20th century. The review done in this chapter is a 
framework to understand facts and events presented and discussed throughout the thesis and 
particularly those related to hunting, colonial hunting laws and conservation policies.  
 
In this chapter, I argue that the demand for animal products, especially ivory, by European 
traders led to an increase of hunting near Delagoa Bay and in the wider southern Africa 
hinterland and contributed to the professionalization of a group of African hunters who became 
the main supplies of ivory and other hunting products to European traders. In the late 18th 
century and during the 19th century, apart from labour migration to plantations in Natal and the 
goldfields in Transvaal, the trade of animal products became a source of income to African elites 
and thus contributed to partial monetization of the economy. In southern Mozambique, the use of 
firearms for hunting facilitated hunting by professional Africans known as maphissa and the 
demand for animal products especially ivory and rhino horns increased hunting for commercial 
purposes.  
 
The sections of this chapter are organised to answer the following questions: What were the main 
economic activities in southern Africa on the eve of colonialism? What is the social, economic 
and political impact of the ivory trade in southern Africa and particularly in southern 
Mozambique? How did African pre-colonial societies manage their environments and fauna on 
the eve of colonialism?  
  
48 
 
Besides this introduction, the chapter is structured into five sections. The second section explore 
the establishment of Europeans at Delagoa Bay and the development of trade between African 
elites and European traders. The third section examines the establishment of trade networks 
between African elites and European traders and the development of hunting and the ivory trade 
in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The fourth section analyses the environmental and 
political transformation in Zululand and the establishment of the Gaza-Nguni state in southern 
Mozambique. The section also pays particular attention to the Gaza-Nguni state polity and its 
impact on hunting regulation. The fifth section analyses the pre-colonial economy and society 
along the Mozambique and Transvaal border. It looks specifically at how local populations’ 
activities (hunting, gathering, livestock keeping and fishing) and the extent to which the local 
politics (Gaza-Nguni state policies) affected local populations’ lives. The last section analyses 
the politics behind the definition of the southern Mozambican borders, the actors involved in the 
process, their roles as well as the conquest of the area in 1895 by the Portuguese army.  
 
2.1. The Europeans and trade at Delagoa Bay before the 19th century 
Although the Portuguese presence in Mozambique dates back to the 15th century, this presence 
was confined to the Ilha de Moçambique and Indian Ocean ports and, in some periods, to the 
hinterland of the Zambeze River where they established European settlements and traded with 
African leaders. 110 
 
During the 17th and 18th centuries, Europeans (French, Dutch, Portuguese and English) competed 
against each other for the control of Delagoa Bay and trade routes between the Indian Ocean 
Coast and the African interior. In the 16th century, the Portuguese established a trading post at 
Delagoa Bay and exchanged Asian and European manufactured goods for ivory, rhino horns and 
amber from the neighbouring African states.111 In 1777-1783, the English also came to settle at 
Delagoa Bay and traded with the neighbouring African chiefdoms. They exchanged ivory for 
                                                          
110Rita-Ferreira, A. 1980. História pré-colonial do sul de Moçambique: uma tentativa de síntese. Lisboa: Centro de 
Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos da Junta de Investigações Científicas do Ultramar, p. 18; see also Smith, Alan K. 
1970, “Delagoa Bay and trade of south eastern Africa” Gray, Richard and David Birmingham (Ed.). Pre-colonial 
African trade: essays on trade in central and eastern Africa before 1900; London: Oxford University Press, pp. 
265-289, p. 272 
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English manufactured goods (hoes, cloths, guns, etc.). Smith indicates that after the 
establishment of the English at Delagoa Bay, Africans from the neighbouring states preferred to 
trade with them rather than the Portuguese who they considered as having products of low 
quality. Smith indicates that although the presence of the English traders at Delagoa Bay became 
noticeable in the later 17th century, it seems that during this period there was not a direct 
confrontation between the English and the Portuguese.112 In 1703, combined factors such as the 
presence of English traders at the bay, lack of ivory suppliers and French pirates forced the 
Portuguese to close the trade at the Bay.113 
 
In 1721, the Dutch East India Company occupied the Bay and established trade networks with 
African elites. From 1724, the Dutch bought slaves from African elites and used them in their 
plantations in the Cape and Natal colonies. Due to conflicts at the bay involving African 
chiefdoms of Tembe and Machavane, in 1726 and 1727, the trade routes linking the southern 
African hinterland and the bay were closed and Europeans traders had difficulty buying goods 
from Africans. Therefore, fearing the worst, the Dutch abandoned their settlements at Delagoa 
Bay in 1730s.114 In 1770, the English-Austrians came to dominate trade at Delagoa Bay. In 1777, 
the Austrian Asiatic Company of Trieste formally occupied the Bay. Like their predecessors, 
they also bought from Africans ivory in exchange for European goods.115 
 
The demand for animal products, especially ivory increased hunting near the port of Delagoa 
Bay and neighbouring areas and led to the extermination of African elephants in the region. A 
contemporary Portuguese historian, António Rita-Ferreira, indicates that in 4 years (i.e., from 
1777 to 1781) of trade, the Austrian company based at Delagoa Bay was able to purchase 20.000 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
111Rita-Ferreira, A. 1980. História pré-colonial do Sul de Moçambique: uma tentativa de síntese, p. 272 
112The supremacy of the English at the Bay forced the Governor-General of Mozambique to suggest the interruption 
of voyages between Portugal and Delagoa Bay because the Portuguese vessels from Delagoa Bay returned to 
Portugal nearly empty. See in Smith, Alan K. 1970. “Delagoa Bay and trade of south eastern Africa.", p. 271-2 
113Smith, Alan K. 1970. “Delagoa Bay and the trade of south eastern Africa.", p. 271-2 
114Smith, Alan K. 1970. “Delagoa Bay and the trade of south eastern Africa.", p. 274-5 
115Rita-Ferreira, A. 1980. História pré-colonial do sul de Moçambique: uma tentativa de síntese, p. 25; Smith, Alan 
K. 1970. “Delagoa Bay and the trade of south eastern Africa.” p. 279; see also Lobato, Alexandre. 2000. Os 
austriacos em Lourenço Marques, Maputo: AHM (Estudos 16) 
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elephants tusks. In other words, it means that in just 4 years more 10.000 African elephants were 
killed to fuel the ivory trade.116 
 
In the late 1770s, the need to control trade and commerce and political influence at the Bay and 
trade routes connecting it to ivory suppliers (mainly African elites in the hinterland) impelled the 
Portuguese to return to the Bay and forced out the Austrians. Accordingly, as a measure of 
security of the Portuguese traders living at Delagoa Bay, in 1789 the Portuguese authorities 
began the construction of the Presidium of Lourenço Marques. However, the stability of the 
Portuguese did not last long. Due to French attacks, in 1796, the Portuguese were again forced to 
abandon the Presidium. The French reoccupied it and stayed at the presidium for 3 years when in 
1799, the Portuguese army forced them out and settled permanently at the Bay.117 
 
The re-occupation of Delagoa Bay by the Portuguese army allowed the Portuguese traders and 
settlers to develop a small town alongside the Bay, which later became known as the town of 
Lourenço Marques. Existing historical sources indicate that in the late 18th century, the 
Portuguese authorities at the Bay established trade networks with the local communities of the 
neighbouring states and exchanged European manufactured goods for African goods. Historical 
research indicates that in the late 18th and early 19th century, hunting products continued to be the 
main goods given by Africans to European traders. The increase of trade at the Bay pushed many 
Africans to become professional hunters who were responsible for the killing of African wild 
stock and thus sell the products of hunting to European traders.118    
 
2.2. The increase of hunting in the southern African hinterland 
Existing historical accounts indicate that slaves and ivory were the main drivers that pushed the 
Europeans and particularly the Portuguese to travel from their trading posts located along the 
                                                          
116 Rita-Ferreira, A. 1980. História pre-colonial do sul de Moçambique: uma tentativa de síntese, p. 25 
117Smith, Alan. 1970. The struggle for control of southern Mozambique,1720-1835.[PhD Thesis] Los Angeles: 
University of California, p. 225  
118 Smith, Alan. 1970. The struggle for control of southern Mozambique, 1720-1835. 
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Indian Ocean Coast to the southern African hinterland.119 From the early 19th century, the 
Portuguese armed with muzzle loading guns travelled mainly from Delagoa Bay and Inhambane 
to the southern African hinterland to hunt elephants and establish new trade networks, which 
allowed them to hunt and buy ivory from Africans.120 They also bought from Africans ambergris, 
rhino horns, hippopotamus teeth, cattle, pigs, goats, gold dust and wild animals’ skins in 
exchange for beads and cotton.121  
 
The trade between Africans and Europeans provided Africans with guns and ammunition. 
Consequently, Africans were involved in hunting to supply the Europeans with ivory and 
received ammunition for additional hunting journeys.122 During the 18th and 19th centuries, the 
development of the ivory trade and animal skins in southern Mozambique resulted in the 
abandonment of agricultural activities by some Africans to engage in hunting, with some 
Africans becoming professional hunters.123 To this end, Carruthers has argued that during the 
pre-colonial period hunting by Africans was limited to consumption. The opening of global 
markets for animal products and use of sophisticated firearms led to indiscriminate killing of 
African fauna and environmental destruction.124  
 
The professionalization of African hunters made the maphissa different from balhoti and gave 
them a special status, which was seen as being important if compared to other activities.125 If the 
game could not be found near their villages, the maphissa could travel dozens or more kilometres 
                                                          
119Mota, Carlos Teixeira. 1989. Presenças portuguesas na África do Sul e no Transval,  see also Liesegang. 
Gerhard. 1983.  “Notes on the internal structure of the Gaza Kingdom of southern Mozambique” p.179, also see 
Harries, P. 1983. “Slavery amongst the Gaza Nguni: its changing shape and the function and its relationship to the 
other forms of exploration”, p. 215; Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p. 29 
120During a trip from Lourenço Marques to the hinterland for elephants hunting, Das Neves noted that elephant 
hunting in southern Mozambique hinterland was well-rewarded activity and easily hunters accumulated wealth on 
expense of elephants killing. Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de 
Elephantes 
121Eldredge, Elizabeth A. 1995. “Sources of conflict in southern Africa, 1800-1830”, p. 131-132; also see Liesegang, 
G. 1983 “Notes on the internal structure of the Gaza Kingdom of southern Mozambique”, p.180 
122Junod, Henri Alexandre. 1924. The life of a South African tribe, Vol. II, p.55; See also Wagner, R. 
1976. Zoutpansberg: some notes on the dynamics of a hunting frontier, p.34 
123Harries, P. 1994. Work, culture and identity; p.13, also see Hedges, David, 1978. Trade and politics in southern 
Mozambique and Zululand, p. 57 
124Carruthers, Jane, 1993: “Police boys and poachers Africans, wildlife protection and national parks, the Transvaal 
1902 to 1950.”  Koedoe. 36(2): 11-22, p.12-13 
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to find game in distant areas in the southern Mozambique hinterland as far as the Zoutpansberg 
in the Transvaal.126 In fact, in the 18th century, there had been a considerable increase in the price 
of ivory at Delagoa Bay.127 Due to the increase of the price of ivory and the involvement of the 
maphissa in world market economy, these hunters were able to gain some cash incomes used to 
buy European commodities.128  
 
The analysis of the African and European trade in the 18th and 19th allows me to conclude that 
the demand of animal products by European traders proved to be a factor that pushed African to 
be involved in hunting and long distance trade. The trade did not lead only to specialization of a 
group of African hunters (maphissa) but also provided to African elites products that were not 
available locally (hoes, beads, coats, blankets, bandoliers, clothes and other European 
manufactured goods) used in their daily life. Thus, the African professional hunters or maphissa 
could now use European products like knives, rifles, and gunpowder to facilitate their activities. 
Massingir oral history indicates that this class of African hunters spent more time on hunting and 
trade rather on agricultural production. Therefore, while the hunters were on their hunting trips 
and trade, the hunters’ families were involved in agriculture. This survival strategy allowed the 
hunters´ families to produce for their survival and use incomes from hunting to buy European 
goods. When food was scarce in their families, they exchanged the hunting products for grains 
and other commodities.129  
 
Beside the maphissa there were other Africans involved in long distance trade between the 
interior and Delagoa Bay. These Africans were the “porters/carriers” used by African elites and 
European traders to transport goods from the interior to Delagoa Bay and vice-versa. Within the 
class of African traders there was a sub-category of Africans acting as intermediaries between 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
125Ibiden, p. 55 
126Ibiden, p.50 
127Delius, P. 1984. The land belongs to us: The Pedi polity, the Boers, p. 18; Bannerman, J.H. 2006. Hlengweni: The 
history of the Hlengwe of the lower Save and Runde Rivers, from late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century, pp. 
1-44, p. 16-17 [This article was revised by the author in 2006. The original version was published in 1981 by 
Zimbabwean History, 12]; also see Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça dos 
elefantes 
128Harries, P. 1994. Work, culture and identity; p, 13-14 
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Africans elites and whites traders (Europeans and Asians, the latter well known in this period as 
Banyan or Hindu traders). Like the maphissa, African traders and porters could stay long periods 
away from their families. They traded iron, copper, gold, tin, civet, animal skins, ostrich, 
marabou, crane fathers and oil seed from the Eastern Transvaal in exchange for hoes, beads, 
coats, blankets, bandoliers, knives, rifles, gunpowder, clothes and other European manufactured 
goods.130  
 
In the early 19th century, ivory in the southern Mozambique hinterland and the Eastern Transvaal 
continued to be the main commodity traded between Africans and Europeans and enabled the 
traders in a short period of time to accumulate wealth at the expense of African elephants. Due to 
the amounts of profits acquired in the ivory trade, some Portuguese government officials based 
in the Mozambican towns such as Lourenço Marques, Beira and Inhambane left their positions 
and engaged in elephant hunting and the ivory trade.131 As explained in subsequent sections, this 
group of Portuguese hunters and traders collected information about African resources and 
culture. The information was further used by the Portuguese administration during their conquest 
of the southern Mozambique hinterland. Additionally, some Portuguese hunters and traders 
served as intermediaries during the first efforts made between the Portuguese and the Transvaal 
government for the establishment of a common border between Mozambique and the 
Transvaal.132   
 
2.3. Pre-colonial environments, politics, trade and the formation of the Gaza-Nguni state 
Scholars who investigated the 18th to early 20th century history of southern Mozambique have 
related the establishment of the Gaza-Nguni state to trade, environment and socio-political 
transformations that took place in Zululand in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.133 Historical 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
129Interview with Fabião Vuqueia, Chimangue February 2014, see also Interview with Jeremias Mafanate Valoi, 
Mbingo 24/2/2014 
130Harries, Patrick. 1977. “Labor migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa; 1852-1895”, p. 69  
131Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1978. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elephantes 
132See Neves, Diocleciano Fernando Das. 1978. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elephantes 
133Smith, Alan K, 1969. “The trade of Delagoa Bay as a factor in Nguni Politics, 1750-1835" Thompson, Leonard 
(Ed.). African Societies in southern Africa; New York: Praeger, pp.171-189; Guy, J. 1980 “Ecological factors in 
the rise of Shaka and the Zulu Kingdom.”  Marks, Shula and Anthony Atmore (Eds.) Economy and society in pre-
industrial South Africa. London: Longman, pp.102-119, Patrick Harries. 1994. Work, culture, and identity: 
  
54 
 
writings on this issue gave room to different views on the causes of the 18th and early 19th 
century Mfecane and its legacies.134 Accordingly, it is still a hard task to definitively say what 
the actual causes of the Mfecane were, as debates are underway and re-examined in light of the 
existing sources and contemporary texts.135  
 
Notwithstanding these debates, Mfecane aftermath changed the geopolitics of southern African 
chiefdoms and imposed new political structures among the mixed farmers south of the Limpopo 
River.136 Historical accounts indicate that as from 1810 to 1830 there were some dispute in 
Zululand and political changes that resulted in a separate set of migrations. These 
transformations are, of course, a result of complex interaction between factors and no single 
factor can help to understand the whole set of transformations. However, the context and the 
factors (environmental changes, migrations, population pressure, struggle for the control of 
fertile land, political cleavages between the local chiefdoms) taken together offer clues to the 
explanations of the socio-economic transformation in Zululand and its consequences in southern 
Africa.137 
 
As discussed earlier, during the in the late 18th and early 19th century, trade at Delagoa Bay and 
especially the ivory trade enabled some Africans to accumulate power.138 However, during the 
first two decades of the 19thcentury, the southern Africa region was struck by a severe drought 
and ecological problems leading to competition for natural resources and control of trade in the 
southern African interior. In Zululand, this completion ended up in cleavages between existing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
migrant laborers in Mozambique and South Africa, c.1860-1910; Heinemann: Witwatersrand University Press: 
James Currey, Portsmouth: Johannesburg: London; Ferreira, Antonio Rita. 1975. Povos de Moçambique; Hedges, 
David. 1978. Trade and politics in southern Mozambique and Zululand; Liesegang, Gerhard. 1996. 
“Ngungunyane: a figura de Gungunyane Nqumayo, rei de Gaza, 1884-1895 e o desaparecimento do seu Estado.” 
In: ARPAC Vol. 8 (Colecção Embondeiro), Maputo; Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district; 
Covane, L. A. 1989. As relações económicas entre Moçambique e a África do Sul.   
134Etherington, Norman. 1995. “Putting the Mfecane controversy into the historiographical context”, p. 17; also see 
Hamilton, Carolyn. 1995. “Introduction: History and historiography in the aftermath.”  
135Wright, John. 1995. “Beyond the concept of Zulu explosion: comments on the current debate.” Hamilton, Carolyn 
(Ed.). The Mfecane aftermath: reconstructive debates in the southern African History. Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press and Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, pp.107-121, p.111 
136Etherigton, Norman. 1995. “Putting the Mfecane controversy into the historiographical context”,  p. 19 
137Eldredge, Elizabeth A. 1995. “Sources of conflict in southern Africa, 1800-1830”, p. 125 
138 Ibiden 
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political units and the less powerful political units were obliged to pay allegiance to the strongest 
ones.139 
 
In separate historical research, Smith and Hedges have asserted that the struggle for control of 
the ivory trade at Delagoa Bay is likely to have been one of the causes that led to a direct 
confrontation between the Mthethwa kingdom headed by Dingiswayo and the Ndwandwe 
kingdom headed by Zwide.140 After the death of Dingiswayo in 1817, Shaka took over his father 
Dingiswayo´s power and ruled the state with terror. The Shaka polity increased conflicts between 
the Mthethwa and the Ndwandwe and resulted in direct confrontations.141 During the conflicts, a 
considerable number of the members of the Ndwandwe kingdom were integrated into the 
victorious regime but some members of the Ndwandwe royal clan migrated to distant lands out 
of the reach of Shaka. Among the group of fugitives was Soshangane (also known as Manikuse) 
who in 1821 established the Gaza-Nguni state on southern bank of the Limpopo River to the 
northern bank of Zambezi River.142 
 
After the imposition of his rule in southern Mozambique, Manikusse designated as Shangane the 
people who adopted his lifestyle and “Tsonga” or amathonga those who were not integrated in 
his political structure or were part of his vassals. Thus, the Lower Limpopo valley where 
Manikusse had established the capital of his kingdom became known as Ka-Shangane and the 
                                                          
139Wright, Jonh. 1995. “Beyond the concept of Zulu explosion: comments on the current debate”, p.10; see also 
Eldredge, Elizabeth A. 1995. “Sources of conflict in southern Africa, 1800-1830; p. 123 
140Smith, Alan. 1969."Trade at Delagoa Bay as a factor in Nguni politics, 1750-1835" Thompson, Leonard (Ed.). 
African societies in southern Africa. London: Heinemann, p. 185, Hedges, David. 1978. Trade and politics in 
southern Mozambique and Zululand,  p. 165 
141Eldredge, Elizabeth A. 1995. “Sources of conflict in Southern Africa, 1800-1830”, p.123; Conflicts amongst 
African elites in Zululand was also stimulated by the increased demand on African slaves. Thus, African elites 
fought each other to have control of the area the population and control of the slave trade.  This issue is at the 
centre of the argument of Cobbing on causes of Mfecane in the early 19th century.  The Cobbing argument is 
rejected, as he does not see Africans as autonomous of their actions (see Wright, p.113). Cobbing arguments and 
interpretation of the causes of the Mfecane have been challenged by several scholars. Moreover, trade in Delagoa 
Bay was so intensive from 1824 onward several years after the Mfecane has begun. See Hamilton, Carolyn. 1995. 
The Mfecane Aftermath: reconstructive debates in the southern African History. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand 
University Press and Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press  
142Liesegang, Gerhard. 1983. “Notes on the internal structure of the Gaza Kingdom of southern Mozambique”  
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people Ma-Shangane.143 Thereafter, the language spoken by a considerable number of people of 
southern Mozambique became known as Shangane.144  
 
Contemporary historians in Mozambique have tended to use the term Shangane rather than 
Tsonga when referring to people of southern Mozambique. In this way, the use of the term 
Shangane rather than Tsonga is made to avoid the insulting meaning of the term Tsonga. 
Hereafter, to avoid confusion, in this thesis, I use the term Shangane to designate the people of 
southern Mozambique, north of Delagoa Bay not because other contemporary historians did, but 
because during my fieldwork in Massingir region and particularly in the LNP, the local people 
and the interviewees preferred to call themselves Shangane and not Tsonga.145  
 
After the conquest of the southern Mozambique hinterland, Manikusse also tried to dominate the 
social, political and economic life of the local populations. During his rule (1820-1859), 
Manikusse conducted several raids on the neighbouring states. I do not discuss in this thesis 
Manikusse’s kingdom external policy, but it seems that some Manikusse’s army raids were made 
to demonstrate his power to the neighbouring states, as well as gain economic and political 
                                                          
143Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p. iii; see also Stevenson-Hamilton, James. 1929. The 
Lowveld: its wildlife and its people, p. 165 
144Today, there is controversy over sources of information used by Junod in his work and some authors have even 
questioned the accuracy of information provided to Junod by his informants. Harries has criticised Junod as his 
work was based on 4 Africans converted to Christianity. According to Harries, these Africans were living near 
Lourenço Marques and they could be probably unaware of the specific details of the life of Shangan living north 
of Lourenço Marques. Nevertheless, despite methodological constraints Junod work still useful for the study of 
southern African societies in the 19th century: Harries, Patrick. 1981. “The Anthropologist as Historian and 
Liberal: H-A. Junod and the Thonga” JSAS,  8 ( 1): 37-50 
145In the present days, there are subdivisions of the Shangane people of southern Mozambique, Junod classified the 
Shangane who inhabited the north bank of Elephants River as Nwalungu or the people of the north and the 
Shangane of the south bank of the Elephants River were classified as a sub group of the Dzonga or Shangane of 
the south. Within the area of study or the triangle formed by the Elephants and Limpopo rivers and the 
Mozambique and South Africa border there are small sub groups of Nwalungo being the Baloyi and Ngovene or 
Ngonyama (lion) the dominant lineages. The further north region is inhabited by the Maluleke lineage extending 
all along the Limpopo as far as its confluence with the Lebvubye River. Further north of the Limpopo River 
there are also some groups of Shangane that occupy low lands of South Africa being more or less mixed with the 
Venda and Shona or Nyai. According to Junod, the Maluleke are one-half of a larger clan called the Nwanati 
whose in the second half of the nineteenth century settled near the mouth of the Limpopo under the name of 
Makwakwa of Khambane and Ndindane. See Junod, Henri Alexandre. 1924. The life of a South African tribe, 
p.16-17; also see Jacques, A. A. 1995. A Swivongo swa Ma-shangana. Johannesburg: Savona Publishers and 
Booksellers, p. 94 
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advantages.146 During the raids, Manikusse´s soldiers confiscated goods and cattle that were 
given as trophies and women that were given as wives to Nguni soldiers. In 1833, Manikuse´s 
soldiers went on successful raids against the Portuguese fort in Lourenço Marques and, in 1836, 
he attacked the Portuguese fort of Capitão-Mor José Marques da Costa in Sofala.147 Manikusse 
and his predecessors also imposed fees on hunters and traders passing through the territory of the 
Gaza-Nguni state. This measure was implemented to establish a monopoly over hunting and the 
ivory trade in his kingdom.148 North of Save River, Manikusse´s son Umzila also tried to 
regulate hunting by imposing fees on hunters passing through territory. Equally, he collected 
taxes and monopolized the export of ivory.149  
 
Although, after the establishment of Manikusse in southern Mozambique, the ivory trade 
continued to be the main source of income for African elites, it clear that from 1824 to 1870 
those (Africans) captured in Zulu raids also fuelled trade at Delagoa Bay. Harries argues that a 
considerable part of male captives seized by the Zulu during raids in neighbouring states were 
sold as slaves at Delagoa Bay and women captives were often integrated to Nguni societies as 
mostly child-bearers. Since there was no lobola for the captives’ wives, marriage with female 
captives proved to be highly profitable and a way to avoid the bride price (paid in cattle) 
demanded for Nguni wives.150 Moreover, due to the arduous nature of the plantation work in the 
Americas, slave owners paid relatively high prices for male slaves rather than female ones. 
Within the Gaza-Nguni state and due to their reproduction value, female slaves had commercial 
value, which could be 5 times that of male captives. Thus, most often the Ndwandwe/ Gaza elites 
procured wives by exchanging them for raided cattle.151  
 
The analysis of pre-colonial society in southern Mozambique suggests division of activities. In 
the Gaza-Nguni state, hunting was very important as it served as a kind of rite of passage for 
                                                          
146For more comprehensive analysis in this regard see Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district 
147Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p. 30-31 
148Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elephantes 
149MacGonagle, Elizabeth. 2008. “Living with a tyrant: Ndau Memories and identities in the shadow of 
Ngungunyana” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 41 (1) pp. 29-53, p. 43 
150Harries, P. 1983. “Slavery amongst the Gaza Nguni”, p. 219 
151Harries, P. 1983. “Slavery amongst the Gaza Nguni”, p. 213 
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young men who had to demonstrate their power and state of masculinity and power before 
entering the army. Thus, young men were expected to engage in hunting where it was argued that 
besides bringing food home (bush meat) they would gain courage and bravery. These attributes 
were important as young males took part in the Gaza-Nguni regiments.152 It would seem, 
therefore, that during the rule of the Gaza-Nguni emperors, hunting was a male-dominated 
activity. Hence, historical accounts offer limited information about direct participation of women 
in hunting.153 Unlike young males that were involved directly in army and hunting, young 
females were involved in domestic activities such as cultivation, cooking, gathering and fishing. 
This division of activities enabled women to take care of the house, the family and children 
while men were away from home participating in hunting parties or on military duties.154  
 
Although it is not clear in the contemporary historical texts, it appears that the division of 
activities in pre-colonial southern Mozambique revolved around power dynamics and gender 
dominance. Thus, men were involved in activities that bring honour to home (war trophies) 
wealth (animal products that could be exchanged for European commodities) and women were 
involved in activities related to the survival of the family (child-bearers, cooking, take care of the 
family, etc.).       
 
Earlier, I described the role of maphissa or African professional hunters who hunted for 
commercial purposes and balhoti (ordinary African hunters) who hunted for food and 
subsistence for their families. Beside these groups of hunters, Junod, indicates that in the pre-
colonial period Shangane communities of southern Mozambique also used to organise hunting 
parties which involved a large number of community members. These hunting parties supplied 
all the families in a given village with meat despite having or not having a member participating 
in it.155  Das Neves states that after a big mammal, such as a hippopotamus, was killed by an 
outsider (European hunter) and extracted the tusks, horns, and teeth the meat was given to the 
                                                          
152 Junod, Henri-Alexandre .1924. The life of a South African tribe. Vol I, London: Macmillan, p.84-85 
153 Junod, Henri-Alexandre .1924. The life of a South African tribe. Vol I, London: Macmillan, p.84-85 
154 Interview with Nalina Zitha, Massingir Velho, 22/1/ 2014  
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villagers living near the forests where the hunt took place.156 This gift, besides supplying the 
local communities with fresh meat, functioned as a sign of recognition of the power of the local 
chief by outsider hunters. Accordingly, they first handed the dead animal to the chief of the 
village where the animal had been shot dead and when the chief had taken his share of the meat, 
it was given to the communities to share it among themselves.157 During the pre-colonial and 
colonial period in southern Mozambique the prospect of receiving such ‘gifts’ propelled chiefs to 
continue to allow the outsider hunters to continue to be involved in hunting in forests 
surrounding African villages.158 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the earlier kings of the Gaza-Nguni state also tried to 
control hunting and mass killing of African fauna, especially the extermination of African 
elephants and rhinos, by imposing taxes on hunters and traders passing through their territory. 
The imposition of taxes specifically on Portuguese hunters and trades led to cleavages between 
the kings of the Nguni-Gaza state and the Portuguese traders who wanted to be exempted from 
payment of taxes during their hunting trips or trade expeditions to the Gaza-Nguni state. For 
example, in 1862, during the conflict that opposed Gungunhane´s sons Umzila and Mawewe, in 
an attempt to try to take control of elephant hunting and thus curb elephant killing, Mawewe 
imposed taxes on hunters and traders passing through his territory. As a reaction to this measure, 
the merchants at Lourenço Marques and their allies in the interior provided support to Umzila 
(rifles, guns and money) to fight his younger brother Mawewe. This offer was made in exchange 
for monopoly control on elephant hunting in the Gaza-Nguni state, a land devastated by war and 
drought.159  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
155Interview with Jeremias Mafanate Valoi, Mbingo 24/2/ 2014; see also Bannerman J. H. “Hlengweni’ the History 
of the Hlengwe of the lower Save and Runde rivers - From the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century. The 
originally text published in Zimbabwean History (1981), XII. Revised 2006, p.16 
156Das Neves book describes hunting that he undertook in Gazaland and Zoutpansberg in South Africa in the late 
19th century; See Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elephantes. 
Lisboa: Typographia Universal 
157Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elephantes 
158 Interview with Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014 
159Pelissier, René. 1988. História de Moçambique: formação e oposição, p. 200, 203; also see Harries, P.1994. 
Work, culture and identity” p. 15; see also Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p. 42 
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Historical accounts regarding the conflict that opposed Gungunhane´s sons Umzila and Mawewe 
indicate that the Portuguese helped Umzila in exchange of allowance to hunt without paying fees 
in his territory. On 27th May 1862, the Portuguese sent to Umzila a friendship treaty (Tratado de 
vassalagem, amizade e comércio) to be put in place in case of his victory. In such a document, 
the Portuguese demanded free trade in his kingdom, friendship relations between the Portuguese 
and Gaza kings and subordination of Umzila to Portuguese administration. Notwithstanding the 
Portuguese support, Umzila was not able to defeat Mawewe. During the conflict, Mawewe got 
support from the Swazi king Mswati and was able to defeat Umzila at the battle of Macontene on 
15th February 1862. The intervention of the Swazi king, Mswati (1838-1865), in the Gaza State 
succession war (1861-1863) had the objective of expanding the Swazi king influence into the 
Gaza-Nguni state and thus enabling him to access local resources, especially ivory and 
captives.160 According to Delius, Swazi raiders supplied the Boers of the Transvaal with young 
captives that were exchanged for hunting dogs, horses, cattle and guns.161 Expanding his 
influence to southern Mozambique, the Swazi king would have more resources (animal products 
and captives) to offer to the Boers of the Transvaal in exchange for hunting dogs, horses, cattle 
and guns.  
 
Mozambique historical accounts are silent regarding the relationship established between 
Mawewe and the Swazi king. However, oral tradition from the Massingir region point that in the 
second half of the 19th groups of Sotho communities (local known as Bveshuas or Amabveshua) 
travelled from Transvaal and settled in the region north of Elephants River. Probably these 
groups lived in southern Mozambique under the aegis of friendship which existed between 
Mawewe and the Swazi King.162  
 
After the defeat of Umzila at battle of Macontene on 15th February 1862, He and his allies 
tracked northwards to Mussorize on the north bank of the Save River where Umzila established 
                                                          
160Ibiden  
161Delius, Peter, 2010. “Recapturing captives and conversations with ‘cannibals’ in pursuit of a neglected stratum” 
JSAS, 36 (1): 7-23, p. 14, see also Delius, P. 1984. The land belongs to us: the Pedi polity, the Boers, p. 95, 138, 
see also Harries, P. 1983. “Slavery amongst the Gaza Nguni”, p. 221 
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the capital of his kingdom (1862-1883).163 It is important to point out here that during conflict 
that opposed Manikusse sons, Umzila and Mawewe (1861-3), male slaves provided a useful 
contribution to the Gaza state as some of them were incorporated into the army while others were 
used as producers in order to free Gaza labour for military duty.164  
 
The defeat of Umzila did not allow the Portuguese to establish a monopoly over hunting in the 
Gaza-Nguni state. Until at least 1895, the defeat of Gungunhane the last emperor of the Gaza 
state, the Gaza-Nguni rulers continued to exert their control on hunting and imposing taxes on 
European hunters and traders when entering or passing through their territories. As explained in 
Chapter 3, the Portuguese conquest of the southern Mozambican hinterland had the objective of 
extending the Portuguese administration to this area and ending the monopoly that the Gaza-
Nguni rulers had over trade and hunting. This, therefore, allowed the Portuguese colonial 
administration to impose its rule and limit the participation of Africans in commercial hunting. 
  
Slavery in Nguni societies implied structural changes in productive systems, military affairs, 
hunting and labour migration. Delius’ analysis on Nguni captives offers fresh explanations in this 
regard. Although numbers involved in the Mfecane aftermath migration need fuller analysis, it is 
a fact that Mfecane drove a considerable number of people from Zululand to southeast Africa 
(Swazi and Gaza are some of the examples).165 Thus, domestic slavery practised by the Nguni 
who incorporated female captives as dependents and wives, besides providing productive 
capacity contributed significantly to increasing the population in southern Mozambique in a short 
period of time.166 Population growth usually has dire consequences especially as it exerts undue 
pressure on available natural resources. Certainly, in the early 20th century, a considerable part of 
the over-exploitation of natural resources that was witnessed south of the Elephants River could 
be attributed to such population growth.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
162Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6,7/6/2012; see also Mendes, António Martins. “Serviços 
Veterinários de Moçambique – 2º período, p. 9-10 
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The period from 1875 to 1878 is also known as “gun boom”. Shangane migrant workers in Natal 
used their wage earnings to buy guns at Delagoa Bay for £2-£3 and resell to the Zulu, Pedi and 
Swazi. According to Harries, a £3 gun could be exchanged for a £10 ivory tusk in the 
Transvaal.167 In the late 19th century, after the opening of the mining industry in the Transvaal 
Shangane could work some time in South Africa and use their wages to buy firearms. During this 
period firearms were one of the major European commodities exchanged along with cloth, with 
African traders for African products. Firearms were increasingly used by skilled elephant hunters 
in the interior and by traders themselves due to physical insecurity. Elephant hunters and traders 
most likely began seeing firearms as a necessary tool of their profession”168  
 
As suggested earlier in this chapter, the ivory trade and elephant hunting contributed to the 
extermination of elephants near the town of Lourenço Marques and its surroundings and pushed 
the hunting frontiers beyond the confines of the small town. The precise numbers involved in this 
trade are not known, as the official records of this trade are scarce. However, it is known that by 
1860, the ivory frontier had moved from the Oliphant-Nkomati area to the Limpopo and 
Elephants River.169 By the 1870s elephants could be hardly seen south of Elephants-Nkomati 
area to the Elephants-Limpopo area, and the best ivory hunting frontiers were to be found north 
of the Save River.”170  
 
It should, however, be noted that the ivory trade during the 18th and 19th centuries was of course 
one of the drivers that contributed to the decrease of the population of elephants, while pests and 
droughts could have been other factors.171 Indeed, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
the area north of the Elephants, Limpopo and Save Rivers was controlled by white adventurers 
particularly the Boers from the Eastern Transvaal who, besides hunting elephants from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
166Delius, P. 2010. “Recapturing captives and conversation”, p. 12 
167Harries, Patrick. 1977. “Labor migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa; 1852-1895”, p. 69 
168Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p. 71  
169Harries, Patrick. 1977. “Labour migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa”; 1852-1895, p.70, see 
also Harries, P. 1994. Work, culture and identity” p.13; see also Murray, Martin J. 1995. Blackbirding at 'Crooks 
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horseback, also bought animal skins from Africans.172 Lack of control of the region north of the 
Limpopo to South Africa´s interior by both Mozambique and Transvaal authorities resulted in 
the development of uncontrolled trade from the coast to Eastern Transvaal. Since the traders paid 
relatively high wages to the carriers when compared to the money that Shangane unskilled 
workers could earn in the emerging cities of Lourenço Marques and Inhambane, many Africans 
preferred working as carriers of high value goods such as hoes and guns from the Eastern 
Transvaal to Mozambique and vice-versa.173 
 
The late 19th century trade from southern Mozambique to the Transvaal also contributed to the 
development of intelligence networks. According to Murray, north of the Elephants River the 
rule of law was virtually non-existent. Trade and contraband was a normal way of life for the few 
Europeans living among dispersed African settlements. Tropical diseases, especially malaria, 
hampered the presence of the Transvaal police within the area. In early 20th century, these 
adventurers controlled the traffic of clandestine migrants from southern and central Mozambique 
to the Eastern Transvaal.174 From the 1940s to the 1960s, this corridor became a preferred route 
for smugglers who imported goods from the Transvaal (beverages and other merchandise) to 
Mozambique avoiding both South African and Mozambican customs authorities.175 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
172Bannerman J. H. 1981. “Hlengweni’ the History of the Hlengwe of the lower Save and Runde, p.16; see also 
Wagner, R“Zoutpansberg, 1977. “Some notes on the dynamics of a hunting frontier”, p. 34 
173In the late 19th there were two routes connecting the Indian Coast to the eastern Transvaal; the first route linked 
the eastern Transvaal to Inhambane port and the second connected the eastern Transvaal with Delagoa Bay. Both 
routes passed through southwestern Mozambique hinterland where the climate is semi-arid and unhospitable to 
humans with a partially dispersed population. The climatic conditions and the existence of extended areas of 
forest and tsetse fly made the area practically very difficult for effective control by the governments of 
Mozambique and Transvaal, and European and Indian traders did not want to cross it. Given the route conditions, 
European traders preferred to hire local people as “carriers” to transport their goods in both directions. Brock, Lisa 
Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p. 74, see also Wagner, R. 1977. “Zoutpansberg: some notes on the 
dynamics of a hunting frontier”, p. 33 
174 Murray, Martin. 1995. “Blackbirding' at 'Crooks' corner 
175AHM, Administration of the district of Lourenço Marques - Sábiè, Ref nº491/50 of 2nd December 1927. Note of 
the Civil Administration Director to the Civil Administration Director in Lourenço Marques. 
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Map 3: Labour routes from colonial southern Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia to Transvaal176 
 
 
 
                                                          
176 Source: Martin J. Murray. 1995.  Blackbirding at 'Crooks' corner', p.375  
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2.4. Economy and society in the south western Mozambique borderland 
Scholars who researched economy and society in southern Mozambique during the 17th to late 
19th centuries have put much emphasis on the development of the ivory and slave trades at 
Delagoa Bay and its relationship with the neighbouring states. However, some specific aspects of 
the economy of the local population north of Delagoa Bay hinterland remain untouched. North of 
the Elephants to south of Save River, the semi-arid climate and the soil types (predominantly 
limestone) which dominate the area militated against dense human settlement and those people 
who chose to settle were mostly concentrated along the main rivers of the area.177 
 
During the 18th and the early 20th centuries, semi-nomadic population inhabited the area north of 
Shingwedzi River to the south bank of the Limpopo and sedentary communities inhabited the 
area stretching from the southern bank of Shingwedzi River to the north bank of the Elephants 
River.178 Until recently, climate and agro-ecological conditions influenced population 
distribution patterns within the area and resulted in concentration of population along the river 
banks, namely the Elephants (locally known as O’balule), Limpopo (locally known as Mithi) and 
Shingwedzi (locally known as Shingwitsi).  
 
In relation to cultivation and tsetse fly control, Harries argues that in the mid-19th century 
cultivators used to burn vegetation and pastures to enable its regeneration during the rainy 
season. It appears that during the civil war in the Gaza state (1858-62) this practice was 
abandoned contributing to the spread of tsetse fly northward, which devastated cattle in the 
region extending 30 miles to the east of the Lebombo Mountains in the Mozambican hinterland. 
Moreover, the rinderpest panzooic, which struck in 1896-7, affected considerably both domestic 
and wild cattle and contributed to their decrease.179 Additionally, periods of drought that 
followed this animal plague contributed to the decrease in agricultural crops, leading to a 
shortage of agricultural products and domestic livestock leaving the local communities 
                                                          
177Liesegang, Gerhard. 1982. “Notes on the internal structure of the Gaza Kingdom”, p.182 
178Morais, J. 1988.  “The early farming communities of southern Mozambique” African Archaeology 3; Maputo: 
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dependent on hunting for their survival.180 In fact, before the conquest of the area by the 
Portuguese in 1895, hunting of wild game, fishing in the rivers, and collecting of fruits in the 
southern Mozambique borderland was done to bridge the food deficits in periods of drought or 
bad harvests (1827-35, 1839-62, and 1889-95).181 This problem helps to explain why before the 
conquest of the southern Mozambique hinterland by the Portuguese army in 1895; some 
communities located north of Shingwedzi Elephants River remained semi-nomadic. With regards 
to life in pre-colonial southern Mozambique and particularly in Guijá and Massingir, José 
Tomossene an old man from Massingir (Mbingo Village) informed me the following: 
“My grandparents told me that before the arrival of the Nguni in the area (c.1821-26?), they 
planted sorghum and maize. Despite the production they had, they continued relying on wild 
fruits and bush-meat for their survival. The early practice of large-scale farming is a recent 
activity. Until 1940s, the population relied on wild dried meat locally known as M´tonga 
(Biltong) for survival”.182 
 
Although Harries´ descriptions of African cultivators of the 18th and 19th centuries are limited to 
African chiefdoms and settlements located near the town of Lourenço Marques, his descriptions 
offer valuable insights into the relationship between agriculture and hunting in southern 
Mozambique. Harries records that as from the 18th until the early 20th centuries, the Shangane 
depended largely on subsistence agriculture known as “slash and burn” for their subsistence.183 
Using this mobile system of cultivation, African cultivators grew mainly sorghum, maize, 
pumpkin and beans in upper lands while along the riverbanks land that was wet all over the year 
was used for the production of maize and vegetables. North of the Shigwedzi River local 
population attributed the use of this mobile system of cultivation to factors such as poor soils in 
upper lands that after some years of cultivation lose fertility. As a result, cultivators had to shift 
from one plot to another in search of fertile land. This cultivation system was not observed along 
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Thesis], Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2000; also see Mendes, António Martins. “Serviços Veterinários 
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the main rivers where the fertile alluvial soils allowed local population to use the same plots for 
longer periods.184 
 
Nowadays, along the Shigwedzi River near Mbingo village, many iron hoes can be found in the 
forest. Some of these hoes are kept under a big tree near the local leader house, where the local 
ceremonies are performed (Pachelo). According to the traditional leader of the Mbingo village, 
the hoes came to the area long before anyone knew that the Portuguese would come to their land 
(probably early 19th century). Concerning their origins and social activities, the headman of 
Mbingo village told us the following story: 
“We are originally from Mabalane and our grandfathers have come to live in this area following 
his son who was an elephant hunter. When they arrived in this area (Massingir), the local people 
were devoted to agriculture and hunting of small mammal like gazelles, rabbits, impala, etc. and 
they never killed hippos, rhinos and elephants. They used small handled hoes that they brought 
from Uvendha (northeastern Transvaal). The same hoes were used to pay lobola (bride price). 
When our grandparents arrived here, the area had plenty of game. The local population grew 
small maize (which could be sorghum or millet); they had no houses and lived in the bush. They 
kept their production in pits opened in the ground. I grew up living in the bush; at that time 
(1930-40?), people built granaries and barns to keep their harvest and slept under shady trees.”185 
 
From 1840 to 1855, 80-100 hoes constituted a bride price valued at 8 to 10 cattle.186 In the later 
19th century, large quantities of imported hoes from Europe (England and Germany) were given 
to Africans in southern Mozambique in exchange for ivory. The influx of European hoes 
contributed to the devaluation of the price of the hoes and they lost their importance as currency 
for the bride price or lobola. Accordingly, British souvenirs and money earned in British South 
Africa replaced hoes in value.187 In the mid-20th century when the Portuguese introduced hoes 
with long handles the cultivators in the Massingir region abandoned the use of the small handle 
hoes.188  
 
                                                          
184Interview with Augusto Fanequisse, Machamba 26/2/ 2014 
185Ibid. 
186Harries, Patrick. 1977. Labour migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa, 1852-1895, p. 67 
187 Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p.48; see also Harries, Patrick. 1977. “Labour 
migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa”,  p. 67  
188 Group interview with Rosina Mbombe, Elina Malhaule, Naquirosa Valoi Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014 
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People interviewed during my fieldwork in the Massingir region pointed out that in the pre-
colonial period hunting skills, especially the hunting of big mammals like elephants, rhinos, and 
hippos, were a symbol of prestige and honour in society. The oral tradition of Mbingo village 
(one of the villages located along the Shingwedzi River) indicates that a part of the population of 
that village is originally from Mabalane region (northeastern part of the former circunscrição of 
Guijá); they came to Mbingo village in search of game.189 Since the Mbumbi clan had 
knowledge and skills of using iron to make arrows and bows for elephant hunting, they were 
allowed to stay in Mbingo by agreeing to teach the local population their skills: 
“Our grandparents did not know the skills of killing elephants; they asked a young man from 
Mabalane to teach them the skills of killing elephants. In order to teach the local people his skills, 
the young man demanded to be given a place to live with his family in Mbingo village. After such 
agreement was made, the young man taught our grandparents how to kill elephants. This is the 
reason why there are many members of Mbumbi clan here in Mbingo. Before the arrival of the 
Portuguese in the area (c.1908) some members of the Mbumbi clan settled in Transvaal and 
continued devoted to elephant hunting.”190 
 
Relying on interviews, it was difficult to determine precisely when the Mbumbi clan came to 
settle in Mbingo and when a part of their members trekked to the Transvaal. Other fragmentary 
evidence indicates that the professionalization of African hunters happened during the ivory 
trade period. Thus, it appears that the group of Mbumbi that migrated to the Transvaal for 
elephant hunting purposes may have been from among the professional hunters described by 
Junod and Wagner.191 In this regard, Junod asserts that the decline of the ivory trade in the early 
20th century forced some of these hunters to follow the game and settle in areas where game was 
still abundant. Thus, some professional hunters settled permanently in the Transvaal, while 
others returned to Mozambique and continued hunting for their subsistence.192  
 
 
                                                          
189 See the map of the Sul de Save province and the colonial districts of Guijá, Massingir and Alto Limpopo on the 
following page. 
190Interview with David Fenias Noquiri, Mbingo 24/1/2014 
191Wagner, R. 1976. Zoutpansberg, some notes on the dynamics of a hunting frontier, p. 34-37 
192Junod, Henri Alexandre. 1924. The life of a South African tribe, Vol. II , p.50 
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Map 4: Sul de Save province and the colonial districts of Guijá, Massingir and Alto Limpopo193 
 
 
                                                          
193 Source: Adapted from Souto, Amelia. 1991. Moçambique: A delimitação de fronteiras. A look to this map it is 
easy to notice that migrants from the coastal area preferred to converge in the Wenela recruiting station and then sail 
to Lourenço Marque where they used a train to South Africa, p.38 
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In the early 20th century, the scarcity of game especially north of the Elephants River forced 
some hunters to look for alternative hunting frontiers. Some of them crossed the frontier to hunt 
in South Africa. Oral sources indicate that in order to compete with European hunters who used 
horses as mean of transport during their hunting parties, in the early 20thcentury, hunters from 
Shingwedzi catchment used donkeys for their transport and transport of bush-meat. To fulfil their 
objectives hunters left the donkeys near the border and advanced with their dogs. After 
slaughtering the animals, they returned to Mozambique to take the donkeys to carry the bush-
meat to places where the meat was processed into biltong and transported to their villages.194  
 
Similarly, donkeys were used for transporting dried meat to the Portuguese shops or cantinas at 
Mavodze along the Elephants valley where the meat was exchanged for grains and other 
commodities. During the same period, dogs became indispensable partners for hunters as they 
helped to chase the game. It would be from this period that almost all households of the villages 
located north of Elephants River started keeping donkeys and hunting dogs in their homesteads. 
 
In reference to the lifestyle of Africans living along the Mozambique and East Transvaal border, 
Stevenson-Hamilton, the first warden of the KNP, argues that at the turn of the 19th century, due 
to the difference in the period of hut taxes collection (winter in the Transvaal and summer in 
Mozambique) the Shangane hunter-cultivators did not fix permanent residences. Accordingly, 
being nomadic allowed them to evade payment by planting and reaping crops in the Transvaal 
during the summer and autumn seasons and relocating themselves with all their belongings to the 
Portuguese territory for the Winter and returning to the Transvaal each spring.195  
 
According to the oral history of the central LNP, the communities of that area continued to lead 
semi-nomadic lives until approximately the 1930s when the Portuguese administration began to 
be effective in the area.196 They began to fix permanent residences on the area and to rely on 
                                                          
194 Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, January, 26/2/2014 
195 Stevenson-Hamilton, James. 1929. The lowveld: its wildlife and its people, p. 181  
196The south end of Coutada16 is a very populated area; consequently, the game in this area is scarce or has been 
pushed to distant areas. Moreover, the area is located at 15 minutes (Mavodze Village) and 45 minutes (Massingir 
Velho Village) driving from the Massingir town. Patrol by KNP rangers is frequent in the area. In the central part 
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both agriculture and hunting for survival. Nowadays, hunting as a survival strategy in the LNP is 
still a practice of the local communities and at least in the north end of the LNP consumption of 
dried bush-meat is still a common subsistence strategy of the local population when food is 
scarce. 
 
Besides cultivation and hunting, the collection of wild fruits in former Coutada 16 is an activity 
that dates back to pre-colonial times. The most important fruit collected within the area is nkanyi, 
a fruit from the Marula tree (Sclerocarya birrea) which is found in abundance in the area. Even 
today, the collection of nkanyi is still a common practice in southern Mozambique at the 
beginning of each nkanyi season (January to February). The fruit can be eaten when it is ripe, 
transformed into juice or used as an ingredient in alcoholic beverages (Marrula cream liquor).197  
 
There are also numerous other wild fruits and plants that are collected in the area for 
consumption and medicinal plants which villagers confirmed to have power to heal many 
diseases. From pre-colonial times, wild fruits and medicinal plants have been and are collected 
by women and children. Research done in this regard indicates that the collection of wild fruits 
does not offer any threat to the environment as the activity does not lead to logging or 
deforestation. Moreover, during the colonial period lack of suitable roads for the transportation 
of the wood restricted its movement within and out of the former Coutada 16 and trees were only 
used for the construction of houses and kraals and even firewood was collected among the dead 
and dry trees.198 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the former Coutada16 access is very difficult. The road conditions are very bad and access is possible using 
4x4. In rainy season, access to the area is not possible at all. Patrol by LNP rangers is not regularly.  A distance of 
less than 90 km takes 3 to 5 hours driving. When the Shingwedzi River is flooded, there is no access to the 
northern part of the former Coutada16 or access is possible using alternative routes, which takes more than 7 
hours driving.      
197Witter, Rebecca.  2010. Taking their territory with them when they go, p.  135, 141 
198Witter, Rebecca C. 2004. Agroforestry, trees and the cultural landscape of the Limpopo National Park, 
Mozambique. A preliminary research report for the World Agro Forestry Centre and the Transboundary Protected 
Areas Research Initiative  
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Archaeological work done by Macamo and Risber in Massingir and along the Elephants valley 
indicates that in the 17th and 18th centuries livestock represented an important asset to the local 
population.199 Moreover, besides its importance in providing milk, hides, cleansing fat, dung 
fertilizer and cement used in the construction of hut floors, during drought or shortage of food, 
livestock sales played a key role in attaining food security. In the second half of the 19th century, 
raids by the Swazis and the Zulus who apprehended cattle decreased the importance of cattle in 
the area.200 A Portuguese account of this period indicates that due to raids by the Bveshuas (in 
Shangane pronunciation Amaveshua), the local people preferred to devote themselves to hunting 
rather than to cattle keeping. The reason given was that that it was easier to keep the products of 
hunting safer, specifically the ivory, than to keep the cattle which were subject to attacks by the 
Bveshuas raiders.201 
 
Table I: livestock in the district of Lourenço Marques in 1908202 
 
Circumscrições Cattle Goats 
Lourenço Marques (town) 63 299 
Marracuene 2.851 7.530 
Manhiça 1.031 10.705 
Sabie 2.804 4.273 
Magude 6.134 14.027 
Maputo 1.832 4.737 
M´chopes 842 14.018 
Xai-xai (municipal area) 10 39 
Xai-xai (rural settlements) 115 107 
Xai-xai (town) 329 11.119 
Bilene 1.251 6.010 
Chibuto 2.819 17.776 
Guijá 578 9.009 
Total 20.660 99.709 
 
                                                          
199Macamo, Solange e Jan Risberg, 2007: “The Archaeology of Massingir, Gaza Province, southern Mozambique”.   
Gilbert Pwiti, Chantal Radimilahi e Felix Chami (Eds.). Studies in the African past: settlements, economies and 
technology in the African past, ,   6: 67-81 
200Harries, P.1994. Work, culture and Identity: migrant laborers in Mozambique and South Africa; p. 10  
201Mendes, António Martins. 2006 “Serviços Veterinários de Moçambique – 2º período”  
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Oral tradition of the Massingir region indicates that the rivalry between the Amaveshua and the 
Shangane continued until the late 19th century when the Amaveshua left the area and trekked 
toward the Transvaal. The same sources also indicate that the departure of the Amaveshuas may 
be related to the civil war, which opposed Gungunhane´s sons Umzila and Mawewe (1861-
1863). The uncertainly about the future of the Sotho in the Gaza-Nguni state may be one of the 
reasons that forced them to trek back to the Transvaal. Umzila who in the mid-1860s came to 
control the Gaza-Nguni state from Mussurize, a new capital in Mossorize on the north bank of 
the Save River was not loyal to the Swazi king and to the Portuguese. Stevenson-Hamilton 
indicates the year of 1870 as the departure of the Sotho from southern Mozambique.203 The 
departure of Amaveshuas encouraged the development of cattle keeping in Alto Limpopo.204As 
can be seen in the table above, during the late 19th and early 20th century, a combination of 
factors (droughts, pests and raids by neighbouring chiefdoms) contributed to low rates of 
livestock possession in the Guijá and Alto Limpopo areas if compared to other parts of the 
district of Lourenço Marques.205 
 
Historical accounts in southern Mozambique have given little attention to fishing practiced by 
ordinary Africans. Maybe this lack of pre-colonial evidence is related to the lesser importance 
given to the fisheries in local economy than the prominence rendered to activities such as 
cultivation and hunting. Moreover, was said that the Nguni did not eat fish.206 Thus, the people 
who adopted the Nguni non-fish-eating tradition relegated fisheries as a less important economic 
activity. For example, while ivory was exchanged for European goods, biltong was exchanged 
for hoes in eastern Transvaal. In this context, fishing was done only for local consumption.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
202Adapted from Mendes, António Martins. 2006. “Serviços Veterinários de Moçambique” p. 6; Brock, Lisa Ann. 
1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p.46 
203Stevenson-Hamilton, James. 1929. ThelLowveld: its wildlife and its people, p. 176 
204Fuller, Claude. 1923 “Tsetse in the Transvaal and surrounding territories” An historical Review. Pretoria: Division 
of Entomology, p. 30 
205Mendes, António Martins. 2006 “Serviços Veterinários de Moçambique”, p.6 
206Xavier, Alfredo Augusto Caldas. 1894. Reconhecimento do Limpopo: os territórios ao sul do Save e os Vátuas, 
p.13 
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During the pre-colonial period, rudimentary techniques and methods were used to catch and dry 
fish. According to Shangane oral tradition the existence of fishing and fertile land along the 
riverbanks are some of the reasons why a considerable part of the Djonga people (Shangane of 
the south bank of Elephants River) settled in this area. During the colonial period and even as 
recent as now (2016) men and women still undertake fishing and the gendered distinctions in 
terms of the allocation of responsibilities between men and women are as still as clearly defined 
as they have ever been. Thus, while men use fishing traps (chiranga) for fishing, women are 
involved mainly in the preparation and drying of the fish. During the dry season, the Elephants 
and Shingwedzi rivers form a complex of pools where women and children organize themselves 
for fishing using traps to catch the fish.207 
 
2.5. Historical geography and the establishment of the Portuguese in southern Mozambique 
hinterland  
The southern western Mozambican borderland covers the adjacent areas located along the 
international border with South Africa to the south of the international border with Zimbabwe. 
Until the late 19th century, beside the natural barriers such as the Lebombo Mountain ridge there 
was no physical border between the territories of south western Mozambique and the Eastern 
Transvaal. This situation facilitated the circulation of hunters and traders from the Mozambican 
coast mainly from Inhambane and Delagoa Bay to the Eastern Transvaal and vice-versa.208 
 
In the mid-19th century, the Boers in the Transvaal claimed control of the trade route between the 
Mozambique Coast and the Eastern Transvaal.209 In 1844, a group of 24 Voortrekkers adequately 
armed and under the command of Andreis Potgieter visited Delagoa Bay.210 During his visit, 
Potgieter tried to establish diplomatic relations between the Transvaal and the Portuguese and to 
find common interest for the establishment of a trade route between the Bay and the Transvaal. 
                                                          
207Interview with Jeremias Mafanate Valoi, Mbingo 24/2/ 2014  
208Brock, Lisa Ann. From kingdom to colonial district, p. 74; see also Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. 
Itinerário de uma viagem a caça de elephantes 
209Mota, Carlos Teixeira. Presenças Portuguesas na África do Sul e no Transval 
210Eldredge, Elizabeth A. 1994. “Delagoa Bay and the hinterland in the early nineteenth century”, p. 153  
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In the following year, Carel Trigardt visited Lourenço Marques with the clear intention to 
expand the Transvaal territory to the sea.211  
 
The disputes over the control of the trade route between the Mozambique Coast and the Eastern 
Transvaal resulted in cleavages between the Portuguese and the Boers. Fearing more raids of the 
Boers of the Transvaal to southern Mozambique and especially to Delagoa Bay, Portugal felt 
compelled to define the borders claimed since 16th century. In early 1847, João Albasini (1813-
1888), a Portuguese hunter and trader owing shops and land in Zoutpansberg, negotiated the 
establishment of a friendship treaty between the Transvaal and the Portuguese.212  
 
In the same year, Albasini sent to the Governor-General in Lourenço Marques the first report on 
the possible special conditions for the relationship between Mozambique and the Transvaal. 
Thus, contacts between the government of the Transvaal and Mozambique started officially in 
1855 and on 14th August of the same year the first treaty on Friendship was signed by the 
Governor-General of Mozambique and President Marthinus Pretorius of the Transvaal. Although 
this treaty focused much more on the increase of the trade between Pretoria and Lourenço 
Marques and the construction of roads and railways from Lourenço Marques to Pretoria, the 
Treaty also mentioned the need to define the borderline between the two countries.213 
 
In 1864, the Portuguese administration in Mozambique and the Transvaal authorities created a 
joint commission to discuss the delimitation of the Transvaal and Mozambique border.214 On 29th 
July 1869, Portugal reached an agreement of understanding with the Transvaal authorities and 
signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Borders, ratified on July 10, 1871. This treaty defined 
                                                          
211Mota, Carlos Teixeira. Presenças portuguesas na África do Sul e no Transval,  p. 51 
212João Albasini was a Portuguese citizen who abandoned his position as a Portuguese officer and settled in the 
African hinterland and devoted himself to elephant hunting; Albasini was also involved in the slave trade between 
the Transvaal and Delagoa Bay; see Eldredge, Elizabeth A. “Delagoa Bay and the hinterland in the early 
nineteenth century”, p.152 
213Roque, Ana Cristina. 2009 “Rethinking borders in south Mozambique”. Aborne - Conference on how is Africa 
transforming border studies? Johannesburg, 10-14th Sept, p.8 
214Roque, Ana Cristina. 2009.“Rethinking borders in south Mozambique”, p.8 
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the borderline between south western Mozambique and the Eastern Transvaal. As the treaty was 
valid for only 6 years, a new treaty was signed in 1875.215  
 
The new treaty preserved the principles of that treaty signed in 1869. This was finally ratified in 
Lisbon in October 1882.216 The Treaty defined the border between Mozambique and the 
Transvaal in a straight line passing through the Lebombo Mountain crest from the 26º 30’ 
latitude south up to the confluence of the Pafuri and Limpopo. From this point, the borderline 
continues along the crest starting in an easterly direction and then inflecting northeast until 
Pokiones-kop, north of the Oliphant River, and the nearest point of the Chicundo Mountain. 
From this point, the borderline is defined in a straight line until the Pafuri-Limpopo confluence. 
The final demarcation of the section from Shingwedzi to Pafuri was concluded in 1894.217 
 
The establishment of the colonial borders did not mean the pacification of the Portuguese colony 
of Mozambique. The area north of Delagoa Bay continued under the rule of the Gaza-Nguni state 
elites.218 The need to undertake effective control of the southern Mozambique hinterland led the 
Portuguese army to subdue the Nguni-Gaza state and other African chiefdoms that had control of 
some territories. In mid-1895, the Portuguese tried to establish with Gungunhane a treaty on 
commerce, friendship and to negotiate the subordination of the Gaza ruler to the Portuguese 
administration. Similarly, to the treaty that the Portuguese tried to establish with Umzila the 
document gave more powers to the Portuguese rather than Gungunhane. Therefore, if 
                                                          
215Roque, Ana Cristina. 2010. “Sources for the history of the southern border of Mozambique”, Preliminary results 
of a Project on the Archives of the Portuguese Commission of Cartography. Journal of Borderland Studies on 
African Borders,  25 (2) 2: 77-93 
216Despite the establishment of the Treaty of Friendship and Borders between the Transvaal and Mozambique, the 
specific work of delimitation of the borderline (placement of markers on the frontier line) had many problems as a 
result of political instability in the region. At the turn of the century, Transvaal was in an open war with England 
(the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902) which interrupted the work of demarcation of the border. In 1926, Portugal 
signed with the government of the South African Union the ultimate agreement on the delimitation and 
demarcation of the Mozambique-Transvaal border. Thus, the work of demarcation of the border-would stretched 
for more than 50 years until the completion of the demarcation of the Pafuri border and the confluence of the 
Limpopo. See Roque, Ana Cristina. 2009. “Rethinking borders in south Mozambique”, p.10 
217The Commission for the delimitation of the southwestern frontier between Mozambique and Transvaal was 
created officially in 1890. This commission was chaired by Joaquim José Machado who later was appointed 
Lourenço Marques district Governor (June 1890). See Roque, Ana Cristina. 2011 “O sul de Moçambique na 
viragem do século XIX. Territorio, exploração científica e desenvolvimento” Africana Studia, nº. 17: Edição do 
Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto, pp.103-112, p.106 
  
77 
 
Gungunhane accepted the treaty, he would lose his authority and become a subject of the 
Portuguese.219 However, Gungunhane did not accept the treaty and continued to resist 
colonialism in his territory. The Portuguese resolved the problem by sending an excursion to the 
capital of the N Gaza-Nguni state with the objective of capturing Gungunhane and take control 
of southern Mozambique.220 
 
In November 1895, Mouzinho the Albuquerque the commander-in-chief and his army travelled 
to the capital of Gaza in the hinterland of southern Mozambique and attacked Gungunhane´s 
citadel. On 28th December 1895, at the battle of Coolela the Portuguese army forced 
Gungunhane to surrender. During the battle, Gungunhane with some of his allies were captured 
and taken to Portugal. After Gungunhane´s defeat, Maguiguana one of the Gungunhane´s 
regimental commanders was able to gather some of his subjects and escape to the southwest 
toward the Lebombo Mountains, from where they sporadically attacked the Portuguese troops.221  
 
North of the Elephants River, African leaders loyal to Maguiguana continued resisting the 
Portuguese occupation of southern Mozambique. In early 1897, the Portuguese sent Lieutenant 
Alfredo Chamusca to the north of Elephants River to pacify the local chiefdoms. Chamusca and 
9 Portuguese soldiers were killed by African leaders at N´fucua when they were about to cross 
the Elephants River.222 The revolts against the Portuguese colonial regime continued until about 
August 1897 when Albuquerque shot down Maguiguana.223 The death of Maguiguana led to the 
decline of African resistance against the Portuguese colonizers in southern Mozambique. From 
the early 20th century, Portugal started the establishment of its administrative structure in the 
southern Mozambique hinterland.224 The strategy of the colonizer was to take advantage of the 
existing local structures and to force local authorities to work for the Portuguese authorities. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
218Covane, L. A. 1989. As relações económicas entre Moçambique e a África do Sul, 
219Serra, Carlos. 2000. “Novas unidades políticas em Moçambique: O Nfecane e o Estado de Gaza” Serra, Carlos 
(Coord). História de Moçambique Vol. 1-Parte I: As primeiras sociedades sedentárias e o impacto dos 
mercadores, 200/300-1885. Maputo: Imprensa Universitária, pp, 87-99 
220Pelissier, René.1988. História de Moçambique: formação e oposição, p. 321 
221Pelissier, René.1988. História de Moçambique: formação e oposição, p.321 
222AHM. ISANI. Cx 26. História da Circunscrição de Guijá com sede em Caniçado. 1959. Administrador. Adriano 
Vaz da Silva 
223 Pelissier, René.1988. História de Moçambique: formação e oposição, p.321 
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Thus, village headmen who were loyal to the colonial authorities replaced those who were not 
loyal to the colonizer.225 
 
From 1902 to 1908, the Portuguese established an administrative post on the south bank of 
Shingwedzi River. At that time Hosi Massingir Ngovene, one of the descendants of Hosi 
Nzuzule Ngoveni was the most influential African leader north of the Elephants River.226 In 
recognition of the authority that Massingir Ngoveni had in the area, the Portuguese named the 
region south of Shingwedzi River to the south bank of Elephants River as Massingir.227 
 
The establishment of colonial rule in the Gaza hinterland was followed by the imposition of 
commercial licenses and hut taxes on Africans. Africans, 18 years older and above and owning a 
hut were obliged to pay 900 Reis per hut used as housing). The hut taxes became mandatory as 
from the fiscal year 1896-7 onward.228  Soon after the hut taxes had become mandatory, the 
Portuguese hired militias known as cipaios to help the Portuguese local chiefs (chefes de posto) 
to enforce the implementation of colonial rule and collect the hut taxes.229 Lack of jobs in Guijá 
forced many Africans to migrate to South Africa in search of employment.230 The migrants’ 
earnings, obtained in South Africa, enabled them to pay taxes, buy clothes, pay for lobola and 
buy useful goods for their families.231   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
224Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district 
225In the early 20th century there were in the Massingir region powerful chieftaincies and lineages that held the local 
political power. These chieftaincies governed villages located along the left and right banks of the Elephants and 
along the Shingwedzi River. 
226Interview with Samuel Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 22nd January 2014. Using oral tradition it was difficult to 
determinate precisely the arrival of the Portuguese authorities in the Massingir region. There are no official 
records referring to the arrival of the Portuguese in the Massingir region. However, using the intersection of 
information, I can argue that the Portuguese arrived in the Massingir region in the early 1900s (1900-1908?). The 
Portuguese established themselves in Guijá and travelled to the surrounding areas including Massingir to collect 
hut taxes. See Ferrão, Francisco. 1909. Circuncrições de Lourenço Marques: respostas das circunscrições aos 
quesitos feitos pela Secretaria dos Negócios Indígenas. Lourenço Marques: Imprensa Nacional  
227 Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 10/07/ 2012 
228 Roesch, Otto. 1991. “Migrant labour and forced rice production in southern Mozambique”, p. 243 
229 Serra, Carlos. (Coord) 2000. História de Moçambique: primeiras sociedades sedentárias, p. 318 
230Interview with Samuel Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 22/1/2014.   
231Covane, L. A. 2001. O trabalho migratório e a agricultura no sul de Moçambique; p. 49  
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In 1897, Portugal signed with the Transvaal government (and later with the South African Union 
at its formation in 1910) protocols and agreements to regulate the recruitment of mineworkers in 
Mozambique to work in the South African mining sector.232 The protocols allowed the 
Witwatersrand Natives Association Labour Association (WNLA which Africans widely chose to 
pronounce as WENELA), a recruiting company affiliated to the Chamber of Mines, to establish 
its agents and recruiting offices in villages and towns in southern Mozambique. In the following 
years, WENELA established about 23 recruiting offices in southern Mozambique. In the 
Massingir region, the Breyner & Wirth Company was the WENELA agent responsible for the 
recruitment of workers from Mozambique and other African countries to South Africa.233  
 
Due to fear of anti-colonial movements in the Gaza region, from 1895 to 1907, the colonial 
administration held the region under the status of a military district. This status conferred more 
autonomy to the Portuguese to administer the region under military law and conduct military 
campaigns against African leaders that were opposed to the establishment of colonial 
administrations in their territories. In 1907, the region became part of the Lourenço Marques 
district and in 1918 it came to be administered according to Portuguese Civil Law. In 1928, the 
region was transformed into the civil district of Gaza.234  
 
Changes made to administration structures in Gaza show the difficulties that the Portuguese 
administration underwent to have effective control of the southern Mozambique hinterland. In 
fact, the administrative control of the district of Gaza was not immediately achieved after the 
defeat of African elites opposed to the establishment of colonial administrations in their 
territories, but after the establishment of the colonial administration structures at local levels. For 
that reason, the Portuguese organised African villages in units known as Postos Administrativos 
or Administrative Posts.235  
 
 
                                                          
232 Covane, Luís. 1989. As relações económicas entre Moçambique e a África do Sul 
233Hansen, Heidi Suzanne. 2008. Community perceptions of a mine recruitment centre in Pafuri,  p.15 
234Moçambique, Província Portuguesa. 1970. O livro do mundo portugues. Imprensa Nacional: Lourenço Marques 
235 Serra, Carlos (Coord). 2000. História de Moçambique: primeiras sociedades sedentárias, p. 318 
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During the colonial period, administrative posts were the main Portuguese administrative units at 
local levels and were directed by a white Portuguese administrative officer (chefe de posto) 
appointed by the colonial Government.236 During their work, the Portuguese local chiefs (chefes 
de posto) relied on the collaboration of African militias known as cipaios. As explained in the 
next chapters, the cipaios and chefes de posto were the most prominent persons working at the 
local levels (administrações) to enforce colonial rule. Chefes de posto and cipaios controlled the 
payment of the hut taxes, labour migration to South Africa and cotton production in the remote 
rural areas of Mozambique. The colonial regime also integrated in its administration former 
African leaders who were not opposed to colonialism. In fact, the Portuguese administration 
considered the traditional leaders (régulos) as guardians of natural resources surrounding their 
villages.237 This position allowed the traditional leaders (régulos) to command in their 
communities, access to land for farming and pasture and to supervise hunting activities.  
 
Jeanne Penvenne and the Department of History of the Eduardo Mondlane University (Maputo-
Mozambique) criticized the idea of integration of Africans in the colonial administrative 
systems. They indicate that before 1961, when Portugal abolished the policy of the natives or 
indigenous people (política do indigenato) for its African colonies (introduced since 1899), it 
was quite difficult to Africans to acquire the statute of civilized natives, assimilado or 
assimilados (pl.).238 The process entailed a lot of requisites (good behavior, be financially stable; 
know to write and speak correctly Portuguese, etc.).  In many ways colonial laws in Mozambique 
considered Africans inferior to their European counterparts and thus, Africans did not enjoy the 
some advantages as their European counterparts (“legal” access to natural resources, access to 
schools, right to vote; exemption from the payment of hut taxes, etc.).  The use of the traditional 
leaders as guardians of natural resources at local level was a way of overcoming the problem of 
                                                          
236Decreto Lei nº31896; 27/27/1942 1ª Série  nº. 47; see also Decreto nº 35733, 4/7/ 1946. See also Feliciano, J. 
Antropologia económica dos Tsonga do sul de Moçambique, Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, Maputo, 1998 
237Interview with Augusto Fanequisse, Machamba 26/2/ 2014: See also Interview with Fabiao Vuqueia, Chimangue 
February 2014, see also Interview with Jeremias Mafanate Valoi, Mbingo 24/2/ 2014 
238Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. 1982. A history of African labor in Lourenço Marques; Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From 
kingdom to colonial district; p174 - 176; see also Hedges, D and Rocha, A. 1993. “Moçambique durante o 
apogeu do colonialismo português, 1945- 1961: a economia e a estrutura social.” UEM- Departamento de 
História (Ed.) História de Moçambique Vol. 3: Moçambique no auge do colonialismo, 1930 – 1961. Maputo: 
Imprensa da UEM; pp. 129-195 
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lack of financial resources to hire Portuguese officials to work at the supervision of natural 
resources at local level rather that a way of empowering African leaders.  
 
This thesis has paid less attention to the Portuguese administrative system in general and has 
focused mainly on the effects of colonial systems in relation to access to natural resources and 
particular to fauna. In terms of civil administration, a group of administrative posts formed 
another administrative structure known as circunscrição. In general, the territories south of the 
Save River formed one province, the Sul de Save Province, or Província de Sul do Save. The 
province had three districts, namely Inhambane, Gaza and Lourenço Marques. In this 
administration, the districts encompassed concelhos (townships) and circunscrições. The Gaza 
district had 5 concelhos (Gaza, Baixo Limpopo, Bilene, Chibuto and Muchopes) and 3 
circunscrições (Guijá, Massingir and Alto Limpopo).239 
 
The complex administrative structure established by the Portuguese in southern Mozambique 
and particularly in Gaza had the objective to increase revenue to the bankrupted Portuguese 
administration as well as to establish mechanisms for further exploitation of Africans and their 
resources. Brock analysed colonial receipts (1900-1908) and concluded that the Portuguese 
administration in Mozambique depended more on money from commercial licenses and hut 
taxes than from government-controlled land.240 From the early 1900s, to the early 1960s, laws 
governing access to natural resources in southern Mozambique were aimed at (i) expanding the 
revenue base of the Portuguese administration (hunting, logging and natural resources exploiting 
fees)  and (ii) allowing settlers to take opportunity  of the local resources (land for agriculture, 
logging and hunting) to implement projects for their own benefit.  
 
Given the lack of capital to undertake direct administration of its African colonies and threatened 
by German and British pretentions of sharing the Portuguese territories of East Africa (central 
and northern  Mozambique), in the late 19th century, the Portuguese leased the central and 
                                                          
239 Moçambique, Província Portuguesa. 1970. O livro do mundo portugues. Imprensa Nacional: Lourenço Marques; 
see  also Decreto Lei nº31896; 27/27/1942 1ª Serie , nº 47 
240Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district , p. 208 
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northern regions of Mozambique to privately owned companies. The central part of Mozambique 
was leased to the Companhia de Moçambique, the Quelimane district was leased to the 
Companhia da Zambezia and the districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado were leased to the 
Companhia de Niassa. These companies operated in many ways like independent states.241  Until 
1942 when these territories came under the direct administration of the Portuguese authorities, 
Portugal had under its administration the territories south of Save River to Maputo River 
(province of Sul de Save), the district of Tete in the central part of Mozambique and Nampula in 
northern part of Mozambique.242   
 
2.7. Conclusion 
During the 17th and 18th centuries, the demand for animal products especially ivory at Delagoa 
Bay contributed to an increase in hunting at the Bay and surrounding areas and pushed 
Europeans to travel to the southern African hinterland in search of ivory and slaves. Owing to the 
easy profits of the ivory trade, in the 18th and 19th centuries, some Portuguese officers abandoned 
their civil service positions in the burgeoning Mozambican towns to engage in elephant hunting. 
Historical accounts indicate that some of these Portuguese hunters were able to accumulate 
wealth and prestige. A Portuguese historian known as Mota-Lopes indicates that among the 
prosperous Portuguese hunters-traders was João Albasini a Portuguese national who managed to 
buy some land and had fixed his residence in Transvaal.243 Albasini played a key role in the 
establishment of friendship agreements between Mozambique and the Transvaal authorities. This 
agreement established the bottom lines for the establishment of the formal (interstate 
agreements) trade route between Transvaal and Mozambique and played a key role on the 
identification of key elements to be considered on the demarcation of the Transvaal and 
Mozambique border  
 
                                                          
241Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district, p.178. The Mozambique and the Nyassa charted 
companies were dominated by British capital. The Zambezia Company was dominated by British capital but 
with substantial Portuguese capital on it.  
242 Moçambique: Decreto Lei nº 31896; 27/27/1942 1ª Serie , nº 47 
243Mota, Carlos Teixeira. 1989. Presenças portuguesas na África do Sul e no Transval durante os séculos VIII e 
XIX. Lisboa, IICT. 
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The 18th to early 20th century the ivory trade in southern Mozambique also shaped lives, led to 
the formation of powerful African states, and contributed to the professionalization of a group of 
African hunters known as maphissa. These hunters were responsible for the killing of elephants 
and selling them to European traders. As a strategy to access the game near forests surrounding 
African villages, they gave half their haul to the chief in the forests where the hunt was 
conducted. The offering functioned as a hunting “licence” and allowed them to stay and hunt 
within the local forests. It appears here for the first time that hunting fees were not a product of 
colonialism. African leaders used it in pre-colonial period to share products of hunting when the 
hunting was undertaken in forests surrounding their villages.  
 
Existing historical accounts have also related the formation of the Gaza-Nguni state to 
environmental and political transformation in Zululand. Accordingly, the fight for the control of 
local resources such as land and trade routes between the East Coast and the interior resulted in 
cleavages between the Mthethwa and Ndwandwe. The cleavages became intensified when in 
1817 Shaka took over Dingiswayo´s power and began to fiercely persecute the Ndwandwe. A 
part of the Ndwandwe who did not want to pay allegiance to Shaka migrated to distant lands. 
Amongst the fugitives was Soshangane who in 1821 established the Gaza state on the southern 
bank of the Limpopo River. From 1821 to 1886, Soshangane and his descendants obliged the 
local population to pay tribute in kind and cattle. The conquest of southern Mozambique by 
Soshangane implied a new type of control over local resources, specifically hunting. Soshangane 
and his descendants imposed hunting fees on traders and hunters passing through his territory. 
This imposition resulted in cleavages between the Gaza-Nguni state rulers and the European 
hunters and trade who wanted to have unlimited access to game in the Gaza-Nguni state.    
 
In the later 19th century, the Portuguese administration sent its army to the capital of the Gaza-
Nguni state to fight and defeat the Gungunhane´s army and eliminate the authority that the Nguni 
aristocracy had in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The defeat of Gungungane allowed the 
Portuguese to dominate the southern Mozambique hinterland, have access, control and exploit 
the local resources and its people. As explained in Chapter 3, after the establishment of the 
colonial administration in southern Mozambique, the Portuguese passed laws that helped its 
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administration to take control over the local resources and limit Africans to continue their 
participation in commercial hunting. Beyond hunting control, the colonial hunting regulations 
were meant to transform the African hunters into a labour force for the colonial system. The 
procedures imposed to Africans when applying to hunting permits were aimed at limiting them 
to engage in hunting and thus reserve hunting for professional hunters and sportsmen who could 
afford to pay the hunting fees. Therefore, Africans would be freed from hunting to work as cheap 
labour for the colonial system. 
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CHAPTER III: WILDLIFE AND HUNTING IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE, 1900-1956 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the establishment of the Europeans and particularly their 
settlement at Delagoa Bay. It described the evolution of the ivory trade at the Bay, its 
surroundings and in the southern Mozambique hinterland. The chapter reviewed the economy 
and life of Africans in southern Mozambique in general and particularly in the southern 
Mozambique hinterland on the eve of colonialism. It described the establishment of the Gaza-
Nguni state by Soshangane a member of the Ndwandwe royal lineage. It also examined the 
political economy of the Gaza-Nguni state (1821-1895) and particularly its policy in relation to 
hunting.  
 
Soon after the conquest of the southern Mozambique hinterland, the Portuguese established in 
the Gaza district administrative structures to enforce colonial rule and regulate access to local 
resources. Owing to the fact that the regions of Guijá and Alto Limpopo are arid, the Portuguese 
administration did not invest in the development of white settlements and agro-industrial 
projects.244 Instead, they relegated the area to the status of a hunting frontier. Nevertheless, they 
did not resettle the local communities in villages situated out of the limits of the hunting 
frontiers. The local communities continued residing in their villages practicing agriculture and 
hunting for food while some villagers hunted for commercial purposes. From the fiscal year 
1896/7, the Portuguese administration imposed hut tax on Africans to force them to work for the 
colonial system or migrate to South Africa in search of work to earn some cash used to pay the 
colonial hut taxes. They also passed several hunting regulations (1903, 1904, 1906, 1910, 1932, 
1936, 1941, 1944, 1951 and 1956) to take control of the hunting and collect revenue through a 
system of fees imposed on licensed hunters when entering the Mozambican forests and hunting 
reserves. 
                                                          
244After his exploration journeys to the territories located south of Save River and some territories located along the 
Limpopo river, Alfredo Augusto Caldas Xavier wrote a report to the colonial administration where he stated that 
the Alto Limpopo region was not appropriate to agricultural developments and thus he did not incentive the 
development of large scale agricultural projects in that area.  He also emphasised that the climate in that area was 
not favourable for white settlements”. See Xavier, Alfredo Augusto Caldas. 1894. Reconhecimento do Limpopo: 
os territórios ao sul do Save e os Vátuas. Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, p. 25 
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The analysis of the colonial documents and information collected during the fieldwork suggest 
that the Portuguese colonial rule in southern Mozambique had never been effective. Africans 
often exploited the gaps in hegemonic colonial control for their own benefit. For example, lack 
of staff to patrol the Mozambican forests and hunting reserves and in order to enforce these 
regulations, allowed African engagement in hunting of big game in the forests within the 
proximity of their villages. In some cases, non-licensed hunters and particularly white hunters 
relied on their African counterparts to conceal them in their villages and hunt for commercial 
purposes, sometimes Africans hunted on their behalf. At the same time that the colonial 
administration was issuing laws to regulate hunting practices, factors such as the demand for 
animal products (animal skins, ivory, rhino horns) in the world markets and the imposition of hut 
taxes pushed Africans to evade hunting laws and hunt big game for commercial purposes to 
obtain cash to pay taxes.   
 
As explained earlier in the introductory chapter, colonial borders in southern Mozambique 
separated villages, families and communities in areas where border passed through. In such a 
situation, the access to game by a given community was driven by their; they could cross the 
border to access the resource notwithstanding the fact that this was now located in Mozambique 
or South Africa. Moreover, the absence of fences along the Eastern Transvaal and Mozambique 
enabled border communities from Mozambique to enter KNP territory for grazing and hunting.  
 
In 1923, the South African authorities merged two game reserves (Sabi and Shingwedzi) located 
along the East Transvaal border with Mozambique, forming the larger park that in 1926 was 
named as the Kruger National Park.245 Archival evidence of correspondence between the 
colonial authorities in Mozambique indicates that from late 1926 to the early 1930s there were 
conflicts involving the South African police (patrolling the Mozambique and South Africa 
border) and Africans from border villages in Mozambique. Indeed, African hunters from 
southern Mozambique had crossed the border and killed a police guard in the KNP. Equally, 
                                                          
245Stevenson-Hamilton. James. 1937. South African Eden: from Sabi Game Reserve to Kruger National Park. 
London: Cassel & Co, p. 22 
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some police guards of the KNP crossed the border, raided African villages and apprehended 
cattle, which were taken to the KNP. These incidents raised the issue of the need to strengthen 
cooperation between South Africa and Mozambique and to establish strategies and policies to 
better manage the fauna along the common border so as to prevent the escalation of illegal 
hunting by borderland communities. Accordingly, in 1927 the South African authorities 
requested that the Portuguese government establish a national park alongside the KNP.246    
 
Although the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique denied the South African request to 
establish a national park alongside the KNP, in 1930, they established a game reserve covering 
the north section of the KNP (i.e., from Elephants River in the south to south bank of Limpopo 
Riveri in the north). For that reason, the Portuguese transformed the Native Reserve of Alto 
Limpopo (created in 1923) into Alto Limpopo Game Reserve. Lack of financial resources by the 
colonial administration to develop touristic infrastructure within the hunting reserve resulted in 
the use of the protected area as a hunting ground to adventurers, sports and trophy hunters. 
247Moreover, the Portuguese did not relocate the Africans living in the reserve. This situation 
made it difficult for the Portuguese local administrative staff to exert control over illicit hunting 
within and outside the limits of hunting reserves.248  
 
This chapter analyses the evolution of colonial hunting laws and conservation policies in 
southern Mozambique (1900-1956). Its central focus is on the southwest Mozambique 
borderland. The contents presented in this chapter seek to answer the following core questions 
and related ones: What were the main conservation regulations (laws) gazetted by the Portuguese 
for the control of hunting in Mozambique and particularly in southern Mozambique? What was 
the rationale behind their introduction? What were the implications of Portuguese conservation 
                                                          
246AHM: DAC. Cx 384. Nota do Tribunal Indígena convocando as testemunhas de acusação e polícias sul-
africanos do Kruger, Johanes Nyvemane, George Makubela, Foscholo Massinga – District Pilgrins Rest 
Transvaal. December 1927 
247For more detailed information on game reserves established in Gaza district see Portaria Provincial nº 485, 
9/6/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº 23, 1ª Série.  Portaria Provincial nº 608, 1/12/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº. 47 2ª Série  
248Limits of Alto Limpopo Game Reserve - Portaria Provincial nº 485, 9/6/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº 23, 1ª Série; 
Portaria Provincial nº 608, 1/12/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº 47, 2ª Série; Moçambique: Provincia do Sul de Save - 
Decreto nº 1145 de 1930 
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policies for fauna and for the lives of the local communities? How did the Portuguese 
conservation policies affect fauna management along the Mozambique border with South 
Africa? 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the weakness of Portugal's capitalist economy limited its ability to 
implement effective measures to protect fauna in Mozambique. Portugal lacked resources to hire 
sufficient and qualified staff to work for the protection of local forests and fauna and to suggest 
effective measures to improve fauna management. This situation resulted in an indiscriminate 
exploitation of natural resources and extermination of fauna in the Mozambican forests and 
hunting reserves. Due to the lack of control of hunting activities along the Mozambique and 
South Africa border by the Portuguese authorities, the KNP board introduced police units to 
control hunting activities along the border zone and therefore curb the killing of the fauna in the 
KNP.  
 
Apart from this introduction, the chapter is divided into four sections. The second section 
analyses the rise of conservation policies in southern Africa in general and in southern 
Mozambique in particular. The third section describes the establishment of hunting reserves in 
southern Mozambique. The fourth section analyses the escalation of hunting in the 1930s and the 
evolution of conservation policies in southern Mozambique. The last section examines the 
challenges faced by the Portuguese administration to control hunting in southern Mozambique 
(1940s to the late 1950s).  
 
3.2. The institutionalization of hunting in southern Mozambique, 1900-1910 
During the colonial occupation of Africa, the European settlers brought from their countries 
colonial armies to fight against African resistance. In most African countries, after the wars of 
colonial occupation some colonial soldiers did not return to the colonial metropolis but continued 
their lives in the burgeoning colonial villages and towns. Some former colonial soldiers engaged 
in sports and increased commercial hunting in Africa.249   
                                                          
249Serra, Carlos. 2000. “Novas unidades políticas em Moçambique: O Nfecane e o Estado de Gaza” Serra, Carlos 
(Coord.) Histotia de Moçambique, Parte I: As primeiras sociedades sedentárias e o impacto dos mercadores, 
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From the 18th to the later 19th centuries, the ivory trade dominated the economy, politics and 
social life of colonial settlers in southern Africa and contributed to the decimation of elephants in 
southern Africa. Due to increased hunting and the mass killing of elephants, in the late 1890s, 
Julius Von Soden (Governor of the German East Africa) restricted hunting to European hunting 
parties. In the same period, he introduced in the Zanzibar and Moshi (near Kilimanjaro) districts 
a hunting licensing system that obliged Africans and European hunters to pay an annual fee of 50 
and 500 Rupiers respectively.250   
 
In East Africa, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) also introduced hunting licenses, 
which could be acquired from the Company head office in London. It seems that the company 
introduced the measure with the express objective of excluding Africans from accessing the 
game. Ironically, it was unthinkable for Africans to travel to Europe to apply for hunting 
licenses, unlike their European counterparts. Souza Correa pointed out that the German and the 
British early hunting regulations did not stop extermination of fauna in Africa because most 
often the colonial states exempted the colonial officers and military staff from the payment of 
hunting fees. As he recognized in the late 1890s, colonial officers and military staff are the ones 
that contributed to the mass killing of African wildlife.251 Equally, in Mozambique, the colonial 
hunting laws exempted all government staff working at the local level from paying hunting fees 
when applying to hunting licenses. This was done because the regulators (the government) 
assumed that all the government staff at local level were responsible for enforcing colonial rule 
including hunting laws. However, the reality at the hunting fields showed that due to the easy 
profits in hunting these officials abandoned their activities to engage in hunting or hired Africans 
to hunt on their behalf. Therefore, besides controlling hunting, this measure contributed to its 
escalation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
200/300-1885. Maputo: Imprensa Universitária, pp, 87-99, p. 90; Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006. “German colonialism” 
p. 22-23 
250Souza Correa, Sílvio Marcus De. 2011. “Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial” XI Congresso 
Luso Afro Brasileiro de Ciências Sociais UFBA -- Salvador, 07 à 10 de Agosto, pp. 1-18, p.3  
251Souza Correa, Sílvio Marcus De. 2011. “Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial.” p. 3  
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Recognising that hunting regulations alone could not stop the extermination of the wildlife in 
Africa, the Governor of German East Africa, Hermann Von Wissmann, influenced by the 
American conservation model and the establishment of Yellowstone Park in the USA (1872) 
began to think of establishing game reserves and national parks in Africa. For that reason, the 
national parks would be set aside and away from human dwelling for exclusive protection of the 
wildlife and in the game reserves hunting was to be allowed, but subjected to a fee and 
restrictions (hunting seasons) to protect the endemic species.252  
 
In the later 1880s and early 20th century, the Germans in East Africa, the Boers in the Transvaal 
and the British in central Africa gazetted hunting laws and established game reserves and 
national parks to protect fauna. However, each colonial state came to consider its natural, local 
contexts and political situation and accordingly established regulations in keeping with these 
considerations. For example, the British in Central Africa and the Boers in the Transvaal forced 
African communities living within the game reserves and national parks to move out. Gißibl and 
Souza Correa agree that the British game tradition was not probably influenced by the German 
conservation policies. Hence, the establishment of game laws in German East Africa opened 
discussions about the preservation of fauna by European colonial powers in southern Africa, 
such as the Portuguese.253    
 
An analysis of the colonial documents suggests that the institutionalization of hunting by the 
Portuguese in southern Mozambique was in response to the decrease of game near the emerging 
urban areas and the need to take control of the game in the southern Mozambique hinterland. In 
the 19th century, the increase in the demand for animal products (skins and ivory) in western 
markets resulted in the increase of hunting near main towns in southern Mozambique and 
particularly near the ports of Inhambane and Delagoa Bay and its neighbouring areas resulting in 
the reduction of fauna near the Mozambican main cities and towns.254 Indeed, drought and 
                                                          
252Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006.“German colonialism” , p.124 
253Souza Correa, Sílvio Marcus De. 2011. “Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial” 
254Wagner, R. 1976. “Zoutpansberg, some notes on the dynamics of a hunting frontier”, p. 35; see also Liesegang, 
Gerhard, 1983. “Notes on the internal structure of the Gaza Kingdom of southern Mozambique”; see also Smith, 
Alan K. 1991. “The idea of Mozambique and its enemies; Ca, 1890-1930” JSAS, 17 (3): 496-52 
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locusts resulted in crop failure and the Rinderpest that struck the sub-continent in from 1869 to 
1877 aggravated the situation as it contributed to the reduction of both wild stock and livestock 
forcing Africans to search for alternative livelihoods such as hunting for food.255  
 
In the southern Mozambican hinterland and particularly in the region or circunscrição de Guijá 
and Alto Limpopo, the ivory trade and labour migration contributed to African possession of 
muzzle-loading guns.256 In May 1895, Gungunhane had been able to buy more than 120 muzzle-
loading guns from an English trader based at Lourenço Marques. After the Occupation War, 
which ended with the defeat of Gungunhane in November 1895, some of the rifles remained with 
Africans.257 During the war, the Portuguese army also sent a considerable number of firearms to 
local administrations to protect the colonial administrative posts.  
 
In 1897, soon after the war against Gunhunhane, the Portuguese administration tried to collect 
the firearms owned by Africans. António Enes, then commander of the Portuguese army 
considered that such equipment was dangerous because Africans could use the firearms to fight 
the Portuguese or for hunting purposes. Dias Coelho indicates that the colonial administration 
was not successful in collecting firearms owned by Africans because they preferred to hide the 
firearms instead of handing them over to the colonial administration.258 Owing to the lack of 
control by the colonial authorities of such military equipment, dishonest officials working at the 
administration offices stole the firearms and sold them to Africans. Nowadays, the oral history of 
the Massingir region acknowledges the impact of the firearms brought by the Portuguese on the 
increase of hunting in the region. Regarding the firearms and hunting in colonial southern 
Mozambique an old woman in Massingir confirmed this.259 
                                                          
255Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006. “German colonialism”, p.125; see also Liesegang, Gerhard. “Famines, epidemics, plague 
and long periods of warfare”; see also Delius, P. 1983. The land belongs to Us,  p. 75 
256 Das Neves, Diocleciano Fernando. 1878. Itinerário de uma viagem a caça dos elephantes, p. 19-20 
257Dias Coelho, Marcos Vinícius Santos. 2015. Maphisa & sportsmen”,  p.75-77 
258Dias Coelho, Marcos Vinícius Santos. 2015. “Maphisa & sportsmen” p.106 
259The area of study or the triangle formed by the Elephants River, Limpopo River and the South African border was 
part of the Circunscricão de Guijá, which had its headquarters at the village of Caniçado. Before 1942 when the 
Portuguese introduced administrative changes in the Gaza district, the Massingir region was divided in two parts; 
the region north of Elephants River to the south bank of the Shingwedzi River was part of the Circunscrição de 
Guijá while the regions located south of the Elephants River were part of the colonial district or Circunscrição de 
Massingir. Thus, the area of study or the triangle formed by the Mozambique and South African border in the 
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“A white man called Nkosa in Guijá collected the muzzle loading guns from the administration 
and sold them to our grandfathers.... Nkosa also supplied our fathers with gunpowder. Africans 
used the muzzle-loading guns for hunting, particularly to hunt elephants”.260 
 
The use of muzzle-loading guns made hunting easier and thereafter Africans who did not have 
abilities to hunt big mammals such as elephants, rhinos and hippos before could now do so using 
the firearms. Penvenne has quoted an unpublished account of the early 20th century to make the 
point that at the turn of the 19th century the Portuguese tried to restrict Africans from hunting by 
proscribing the use of firearms for hunting and went as far as introducing hunting licences in the 
territories under their administration. It seems, however, that until the early 20th century, local 
governments imposed such limitations because no official hunting regulations were published. 
Away from Portuguese control, African males continued to hunt for food and trade.261   
 
Knowing the lack of effective measures to protect fauna in the Portuguese African colonies and 
in Congo region, Paul Kayser, the director of the German Colonial Department approached the 
British Ambassador in Berlin in July 1896 and enquired him about the idea of organizing an 
international conference on the protection of African wildlife. The conference would be an 
opportunity to disseminate to other European nations lessons and experience learned from the 
implementation of conservation policies by the British and the Germans in their African 
colonies.262  
 
After logistical arrangements, the British invited delegates from France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the Congo Free State to a conference that became known as the Convention 
on the Preservation of Wildlife, Birds and Fish in Africa that took place in London on 19th May 
1900. Delegates present at this meeting requested that colonial states introduce hunting 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
west, the Elephants River in the south and Limpopo River in east fell into two administrative regions. The Guijá 
region (the area that goes from the north bank of the Elephants River to the south bank of the Shingwedzi River) 
and Alto Limpopo (north bank of the Shingwedzi River to the south bank of Limpopo River). 
260 Interview with Maressane Foliche Mbombe; Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014 
261Young, Sherilynn. 1976. "Changes in diet and production in southern Mozambique, 1855-1960", [Unpublished] 
paper presented at the British African Studies Association Annual Conference (Sept. 1976), p. 5 quoted by 
Penvenne, Jeanne Marie, 1982. A History of African labor in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, 1877 to 1950. 
Boston: Boston University 1982, p.13 
262Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006.“German colonialism” p. 130 
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regulations in their African colonies to protect wildlife and restrict some hunting techniques 
harmful to fauna (use of fires, nets, pits and sniffing dogs).263  
 
I will not analyse here the contents discussed in the Conference. It is a fact that the colonial 
powers (German, Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Belgian and the UK) agreed to put forward 
measures to prevent mass killing of the African wildlife. However, each country, particularly 
France and Portugal conditioned the establishment of the hunting regulations on the political and 
economic contexts of their colonial territories, the neighbouring countries and the will of the 
chartered companies that administered some territories of these colonial powers.264 
 
As a response to the appeals made at the Convention for better preservation of fauna in the 
European colonial territories, in the early 20th century, Portugal urged the Nyassa and 
Mozambique chartered companies, which controlled the central and the northern provinces of 
Mozambique, to introduce game laws to regulate hunting in the territories under their 
administration.265 In addition, Portugal urged the government of the Sul de Save Province 
(territory under Portugal’s direct administration) to look into issues of fauna protection and 
hunting regulation more seriously.266 As a result, in March 1903, the Lourenço Marques District 
established its game board, which became known in Portuguese as Comissão the Caça da 
Província de Lourenço Marques, or Lourenço Marques Game Board (CCLM).267 This board 
produced a draft of a hunting regulation which, later in the same year, the district government 
                                                          
263Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006.“German colonialism and the beginnings”, p.133 
264Gißibl, Bernhard. 2006. “German colonialism and the beginnings” p.126 
265The Portuguese lacked capital to undertake direct administration of its African colonies. In the late 19th century, 
they leased the central and northern regions of Mozambique to charted companies; the southern Mozambique 
region, the districts of Tete and Nampula in the central and Northern provinces respectively remained under the 
Portuguese direct administration. 
266MacKenzie, John M. 1988. The empire of nature: hunting, conservation and British imperialism. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, p. 208 
267Coelho, Marcos Vinícius Santos Dias. 2013. “A comissão de Caça de Lourenço Marques” p.107-113, see also 
Portaria nº212 de 4/3/1903 
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transformed into the first hunting regulation of the Lourenço Marques district.268 In the following 
year (1904), the government of the district of Inhambane gazetted its own hunting regulation.269  
 
Until 1904, only the districts of Inhanbane and Lourenço Marques had hunting regulations and 
there was no official hunting law for the district of Gaza. So far, there are few colonial 
documents on how hunting control was made after defeat of Gungunhane, the last king of Gaza, 
who until his defeat in 1895 had control of hunting and imposed fees on hunters passing his 
territory. With the establishment of the Portuguese in the Gaza hinterland, there was a need to 
implement a hunting control on such territories or at least unify the existing regulation and create 
a hunting regulation for southern Mozambique or the Sul de Save Province.  
 
In 1905, the Governor-General of Mozambique requested that the Department of Civil 
Administration (DCA) of Lourenço Marques reviewed the Lourenço Marques and Inhambane 
hunting regulations and came up with a new regulation for the Sul de Save Province. 
Accordingly, in 1906 a new hunting regulation was issued for the Sul de Save Province.270 From 
1906 onward, hunting in the Sul de Save Province was governed by the same regulation. As 
explained in the next paragraphs, this regulation was shaped by the discriminatory colonial 
policy as it limited Africans engaged in hunting for commercial purposes. It also detailed the 
instruments to be used in hunting in southern Mozambique, the periods (months) allowed for 
hunting, the time of stay in the forest and fees paid by hunters (hunting licenses). Thus, Africans 
who could not afford to pay the fees were excluded from hunting large game and could only hunt 
small game (known in Portuguese as caça miúda) in the forests located near their villages.271   
 
Before 1906, there were no official limitations to Africans to engage in big game hunting. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, African professional hunters could hunt in forests located far 
from their villages as long as they had obtained permission from leaders of the villages they 
                                                          
268Soto, Bartolomeu. 2009. “Protected areas in Mozambique.” Suich H, Child B (Ed.). Evolution and innovation in 
wildlife conservation: From parks and game ranches to Trans frontier conservation areas. London: Earth Scan, 
pp. 85-102,  p. 85 
269AHM: DSAC, Cx. 80. Moçambique: Regulamento de Caça do Distrito de Inhambane, 1904 
270 Soto, Bartolomeu. “Protected areas in Mozambique”, p. 85   
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wanted to carry out hunting. After a successful hunt, they gave part of the slaughtered animals to 
the local leaders as payment for being accepted to hunt in their forests. The gifts functioned as a 
hunting fee or licence and it was paid after the hunting party.272 The 1906, Hunting Regulation 
obliged applicants for hunting licenses to pay fees in cash. In reality, the Portuguese 
administration in Mozambique used this regulation to exclude from hunting Africans who could 
not give proof of having financial resources to buy an appropriate rifle for the activity and pay 
the appropriate fees. Thereafter, African hunters could no longer share the products of hunting 
with the leader of the villages where hunting was undertaken, as a having permission to hunt in 
forest located away from their villages.  
 
The 1906 Hunting Regulation incorporated many of the aspects of the German East Africa and 
the British East Africa hunting regulations, such as the banning of fires, pits, sniffing dogs and 
iron traps for hunting by Africans.273 For example, after the establishment of the 1906 regulation 
Africans were allowed to use iron traps only when asked to kill an animal threatening the life of 
people in their villages and even in such circumstances, the use of traps had to be approved by 
the Portuguese local authorities.274 Sources regarding African response to this specific regulation 
are scarce. However, as other colonial hunting regulations, it limited the instruments that 
Africans could use for hunting and they could only use bows and arrows to hunt small game or 
caça miúda in forests located near their villages. 
 
Due to the need to control hunting not only in southern Mozambique but also in the whole 
colony of Mozambique, in 1910, the Portuguese authorities established a game board for the 
whole colony of Mozambique, the Mozambique Game Board known in Portuguese as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
271 Moçambique. Regulamento de caça de 1906 
272Alpers, Edward A. 1984. “State, merchant capital, and gender relations in southern Mozambique to the end of the 
nineteenth century: some tentative hypotheses”  African Economic History, 13 (1984): 23-55, p. 37 
273Moçambique: Regulamento de Caça de 1910 
274AHM, DSAC, Cx.80; the 1906 hunting regulation classified the hunting licences into two different types. The 
first type was the licença simples (the limited hunting licence) and the second type was the licença especial 
(special hunting licence). The holders of the licença simples were allowed to hunt caça miúda or small game 
(animals such rabbits, kudos, impalas, inhales, etc.), while the licença especial holders were allowed to hunt big 
game or caça grosssa (animals such as rhinos, elephants, buffalos, giraffes, hippopotamus and crocodiles). See 
Moçambique, Província do Sul de Save: Regulamento de Caça de 1906. The specific hunting regulation for the 
Lourenço Marques district was gazetted by the Portaria Provincial nº 821, 12/10/ 1910  
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Comissão de Caça da Colónia de Moçambique (CCM).275 This board was composed of 
government appointed staff and members from the hunting association. The CCM had the 
responsibility to issue advice to the governmental institutions working on fauna protection and to 
the Governor-General for the establishment of hunting reserves; opening of hunting seasons and 
proposed changes to improve game management and hunting practices. In order to undertake its 
activities, the institution relied on fees charged to professional sports and adventurous hunters. 276  
 
Just after the establishment of CCM, the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique gazetted another 
hunting regulation, which was meant to increase the dominance of the white hunters over 
Africans whom the Portuguese considered to be of inferior status compared to white hunters. Just 
like the 1906 Hunting regulation, the 1910 Hunting Regulation also separated Africans from the 
game and limited their access to bush meat that they depended on for their survival. Africans 
who, due to their social condition, were not able to apply for hunting licences could no longer 
(officially) hunt big game or caça grossa. The 1910 Hunting Regulation had the effect of 
transforming local hunters into illegal hunters (poachers) in their own forests. From then onward, 
if a person without a licence was found hunting caça grossa he could be arrested and obliged to 
pay fines. In reality, this regulation served also as an instrument and expression of the power of 
the Portuguese officers at a local level known as chefes de posto and their militias (cipaios) that 
allowed them to arrest Africans found hunting without valid licenses and send them to jail or 
hard labour at colonial administration offices. 277 
 
The hunting licenses were not the only regulations that allowed the colonial administration to 
have free labour to work for the colonial system. The colonial work regulation (Regulamento 
para a execução do serviço nas circunscrições) also penalized to 3 to 15 days of forced work at 
                                                          
275AHM, DSAC, Cx 80, Regulamento de Caça 1903-1906 
276For the purpose of the establishment of game reserve in Mozambique, the Governor-General did not rely only on 
assistance and advice from the Mozambique Game Board (CCM), but also advice from the government 
departments of Veterinary and Agriculture. Owing to threats of the advance of tsetse fly from regions north of the 
Save River to the southern regions, as from the 1950s onward, change on hunting regulation and establishment of 
game reserves came to consider advice from the Mozambican Mission to Combat Trypanosomiasis (MCT). 
277The 1910 hunting regulation defined the hunting season as from May to October; types and prices of the hunting 
licences and procedures for the establishment of institutions to provide support to hunting (e.g.: National Game 
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local administration offices all Africans found drunk by the Portuguese authorities or failed to 
comply with any other colonial law.278 In acting in such a way, the colonial regime used the 
hunting regulations also a way to get local free labour to work at the local administration offices 
(clear the administration yards, chefes de posto fields and even the fields of the militias) or pay 
penalties equivalent to between 10 and 15 sterling Libras.279  
 
We know from oral sources that there had never been effective enforcement of the hunting laws 
in southern Mozambique. Far from Portuguese administrations, Africans continued to engage in 
hunting near forests surrounding their villages without holding hunting licences or hunting books 
known in Portuguese as cadernetas de caça. People interviewed during fieldwork in Massingir 
recorded that apprehensions of Africans found hunting without hunting licesnses became more 
noticeable in the 1940s and later rather than in earlier periods. Cross checking of data allowed 
me to conclude that this situation is related to the fact that the colonial authority in the southern 
Mozambique hinterland began to be more noticeable during the Salazar regime (1930-1974) well 
known as Estado Novo (literally ‘New State’) rather than the earlier period. Moreover, the first 
attempts to establish hunting reserves in southern Mozambique dates back to 1930s. Literally, it 
means that before 1930 licensed hunters could go hunting in whatever forests of the districts they 
got their hunting licenses.  
 
In an archival search of files of persons who requested hunting licences in the region or  
circunscrição of Magude (located south of the Massingir region, bordering the south of the 
KNP), I found out that in the early 20th century few Africans could successfully apply for the 
hunting licences. For example, of 25 licences issued in 1929, only 3 licenses were given to 
Africans. The archival documents do not indicate the reasons why only few Africans were able 
to apply successfully for the hunting licenses. The procedures that hunters had to follow in order 
to get a hunting licence (fill in the application forms, give proof of having an appropriate rifle for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Board); it allowed the district to regulate special issues which were not included in the provincial hunting 
regulation.  
278Regulamento para a execução de serviços nas circunmscrições. Boletim Oficial de Moçambique, nº 51 de 
12/12/1896. 
279 Dias Coelho, Marcos Vinícius Santos. 2015. Maphisa & sportsmen, p. 100 
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the activity, and pay the appropriate fee) were probably some of the limitations for many 
Africans who intended to legally participate in hunting.  
 
During the application for hunting permits, the hunters had to prove to the local hunting 
commissions that they had appropriate rifles for the game or had secured the sources to purchase 
a recommended rifle. Owing to the fact that some Africans had acquired rifles as compensation 
given by white hunters after working for them or hunting on their behalf, they could not declare 
their rifles because they did not have ownership certificates.280 In addition, even the few Africans 
that could apply (had the necessary financial resources to pay the fees, rifle, known to write or 
assistance to feel the forms to apply for the hunting licence) for the hunting licences were limited 
to using specific rifles and bullets. For example, while white hunters were allowed to use rifles 
up to calibre 22mm, Africans were only allowed to use rifles up to calibre 12mm.281 This 
limitation clearly demonstrates that besides making it difficult for Africans to acquire hunting 
licences they were considered inferiors to their white counterparts. Moreover, they had to use the 
less powerful rifles making it difficult to hunt big game. The explanations given above indicate 
clearly that the Portuguese administration in southern Mozambique also used the hunting 
regulations as a way to transform African professional hunters or maphissa into labour force for 
colonial system and reserve hunting to sportsman or people who hunted for fun.   
 
The 1910 Hunting Regulation also tackled specific issues related to the protection of fauna in 
each district. It allowed, among other things, the government of each district to list and limits the 
hunting of animals considered to be threatened by extinction. From October 1910 to June 1917, 
the district of Lourenço Marques alone produced more than 10 specific amendments to clarify 
issues considered that were not clear in the 1910 Hunting Regulation (e.g.. hunting fees charged 
to hunting licenses holders engaged in hunt of big game and wish to kill animals such as hippos, 
                                                          
280Mozambique: 1910 Hunting Regulation. For more details on the analyses of this regulation see Farinha, J. L. 
1972. Caça, legislação, parques nacionais, coutadas, reservas e regimes de vigilância, outras disposições. 
Lourenço Marques: Imprensa Nacional  
281 Moçambique. Regulamento de Caça de 1921; See Article nº 14 
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elephants, rhinos, hunting seasons, etc.).282 However, none of these regulations indicates, for 
example, the role of local communities on the supervision of hunting or the limits of the hunting 
frontiers. In other words, the amendments were concerned with money that the colonial 
administration could lose in a given hunting season if some of the above mentioned issues were 
not taken into account.  
 
In 1914, the Portuguese administration in Mozambique issued another regulation, which made 
even more difficult for Africans to apply for hunting licenses. The 1914 Regulation for the 
import, sale, use and carrying of firearms made it even more difficult for Africans to apply for 
hunting licenses. The regulation considered Africans as dangerous to the settlers and European 
security and consequently they were not allowed to use firearms. This regulation clearly 
demonstrated the discriminatory characteristic of colonialism as it allowed Portuguese citizens to 
apply for licences to carry firearms.283 Despite the limitations imposed on Africans, the colonial 
government´s lack of resources to effectively control game allowed Africans to continue hunting 
in the forests located near their villages without hunting licences in their possession. Evidence 
suggests that beyond the gaze of the Portuguese administration offices, Africans continued to 
engage in hunting for food and even for commercial purposes.284  
 
3.2.2. Wildlife “preservation” in southern Africa and Mozambique 
The establishment of the colonial borders in the late 19th century did not considerably change the 
life of Africans living along the border. Africans from Mozambique crossed the border to take 
their cattle to graze and look for water in the Sabi Game Reserve or to look for employment in 
the Transvaal, particularly in the LNP (known in southern Mozambique as Skukuza). Owing to 
the absence of a border fence, depending on the availability of pasture and water, the herders 
                                                          
282See Lourenço Marques - Portarias provinciais nºs 821 –12/10/1910; 604 –22/10/1913 See; 319 –18/3/1914; 1058 
–15/9/195; 1135 –13/12/1915; 242 –11/11/1916; 281 –09/10/1916; 369 –24/2/1917; 380 –10/3/1917; 479 – 
30/6/1917 
283Regulamento para importação, venda, uso e porte de Armas de fogo, de 1914 Portaria Provincial nº  2292 de 
07/12/1914.  Boletim Oficial nº 51/1914. 
284AHM. DSAC. Cx. 80. Direção dos Serviços de Administração Civil; see also Portaria 821 –12/10/1910 
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from the border villages in Mozambique crossed the border and drove their cattle to graze or 
drink in the KNP.285  
 
In the early 1900s, colonial authorities in the Transvaal claimed that Africans from Portuguese 
East Africa (now Mozambique) were crossing the border and entering KNP territory for hunting 
pursuits.286 Indeed, MacDonald argues that control of these hunters was particularly difficult as 
they were armed with guns and knew fairly well the hunting grounds and could easily remain 
concealed in the hunting grounds and wait for the best opportunity to move and in the event of 
conflict arising, these hunters did not hesitate to kill the guards.287 Furthermore, if one of their 
colleagues was arrested, they launched raids on police guards to recapture those in custody. In 
1905, illegal hunters killed a guard in the Sabie Game Reserve, and another one narrowly 
avoided the same fate in 1912.288 The archival documents are silent on conflicts involving 
African hunters and cultivators from Mozambique with South African police in the period from 
1912 to 1926. It is known, however, that after the establishment of the KNP there was more 
conflict involving African hunters from Mozambique, herdersmen and South African police.289  
 
In 1923, the South African government merged the Shingwedzi and Sabi game reserves and 
created a national park, which on 31st May 1926 was named as the Kruger National Park.290 In 
late 1926, the KNP board strengthened security measures to discourage unlicensed hunting and 
poaching. A confidential document of the South African police from the district of Peligram 
indicated that as from 1926 onwards all foreigners entering illegally in KNP territory were 
                                                          
285AHM: Governo-Geral, Cx. 154/B1 Auto de Noticia- Relatório do Chefe do Posto Administrativo de Massingire 
Joaquim Paela sobre roubo de gado por um Polícia Sul-africano, 29/12/1926 
286 Birkbly, Carlel. 1939. Limpopo Journey. London: Frederic Muler LTD, p.246 
287Indeed, Carruthers points out that African hunters from Mozambique who entered KNP territory for poaching 
were accompanied by donkeys for transport of bush meat and hunting dogs to chase the wild. Carruthers, Jane. 
1995. The Kruger National Park: a social and political history, p. 93 
288Macdonald, Andrew. 2012. Colonial trespassers in the making of South Africa's international borders 1900 to c. 
1950 [PhD Thesis] London: St John’s College 
289AHM: Direcção de Administração Civil. Cx 384. Nota do director da secretaria do interior para o director da 
circuncrição de Magude, 9/12/1927; see also in the same file: Nota do Tribunal Indígena convocando as 
testemunhas de acusação e polícias sul-africanos do Kruger, Johanes Nyvemane, George Makubela, Foscholo 
Massinga – District Pilgrins Rest Transvaal. 
290Joubert, Salomon, 2007. The Kruger National Park: a history. Volume I, p.3 
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considered illegal hunters and could be arrested and judged according to South African Law.291 
The documents do not indicate the reasons why the transgressors were judged according to the 
South African law. I assume that the South African authorities acted in such a way because it 
was easy to charge Africans found in KNP for the crime of illegal hunting or grazing in 
inappropriate areas rather than charge them for crimes related to illegal trespassing and grazing 
in foreign territory. It should also be underlined that up to the later 1920s there were no border 
fences separating African villages in Mozambique and South Africa. Consequently, it was also 
difficult to differentiate Africans from Mozambican villages with fellow Shangane living in 
border villages in South Africa.  
 
In the late 1926 when the KNP guards began to arrest Mozambicans entering “illegally” in KNP 
territory, there were reported cases of violent confrontations between Portuguese Africans and 
KNP police guards, causing different types of casualties. Indeed, some Portuguese Africans who 
entered KNP territory in late 1926 and early 1927 were amongst the above-mentioned hunters, 
but others were young herders who used to take their cattle to grazing fields along the border. 
Reports in the Mozambican Historical Archives make reference to a number of incidents which 
occurred along the border. I highlight a few to show the different dimensions of the conflicts: 
“On 24 November 1926, 3 South African rangers, based in the KNP office of Satara patrolling the 
area of the Tivoli Farm, intercepted a group of Africans who had killed a waterbuck and a 
strembuck. The police caught one of the Africans and the others ran away. On the following day 
the Africans from the nearest village where the incident took place went back to rescue their 
friend and killed one of the rangers and took some of his belongings (overcoat, khaki drill tunic, 
clothes, knives, ammunition and some money).”292 
 
In early September 1926, a South African police officer from Pashela Police Station patrolling in 
the KNP abandoned his mission and went to the African village of Tocumbane located in the 
circunscrição of Massingir in Mozambique and stole 18 cows and 3 donkeys belonging to an 
African known as Tingalane. At the time the cattle were stolen, they were in the care of two 
young men known as Sidume and Pepelane. Indeed, it was a practice in southern Mozambique to 
                                                          
291AHM. Governo-Geral, Cx. 154/B1 Auto de Notícia- Relatório do Chefe do Posto Administrativo de Massingire 
Joaquim Paela sobre roubo de gado por um polícia Sul-africano, 29/12/1926 
292AHM: DSAC. Cx. 384; Letter from the colonial Governor-General in Mozambique to the Governor of the South 
African Union - Pretoria. Ref nº 1066/G - 29/12/1926  
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send children aged 8 to 12 years to take care of the cattle. The police officer drove the cattle to 
the KNP side and hand them over to a KNP ranger known as Gungunhane.293 
 
The incidents along the border circulated in ‘confidential’ correspondence between the 
Governor-General of Mozambican and the South African Consul in Lourenço Marques (now city 
of Maputo) highlighted these incidents. In 1927, the Prime Minister of South Africa J.B.M. 
Hertzog wrote a letter to the Governor-General of Mozambique asking him for close cooperation 
in the field of environmental protection. Hertzog requested that the Portuguese establish a 
national park in Mozambique alongside the KNP (i.e. covering 50 miles from the Crocodile 
River in the south to the Limpopo River in the north). According to Hertzog, the establishment of 
a park in Mozambique contiguous to KNP would have a dual purpose. It would function as a 
buffer zone to the KNP and at the same time make it possible for the protection of the 
environment and fauna of the Portuguese territory.294  
 
The incidents along the border also raise issues of lack of clear delimitation of the borderline 
between South Africa and Mozambique. A note from the South African Consul in Lourenço 
Marques indicated that in December 1927 there was a secret meeting between Colonel James 
Stevenson-Hamilton (the first KNP warden) with the authorities of the region or  circunscrição 
de Magude to discuss the boundary line between the KNP and the circunscrição de Magude and 
to find lasting solutions to end the conflicts.295 Details on the outcomes of such meeting are 
                                                          
293AHM. Governo-Geral, Cx. 154/B1- Nota sobre maus tratos por parte das autoridades portuguesas; see also AHM. 
Governo-Geral, Cx. 154/B1 Auto de Noticia- Relatório do Chefe do Posto Administrativo de Massingire Joaquim 
Paela sobre roubo de gado por um Polícia Sul-africana, 29/12/1926 
294AHM: Governo Geral - Cx 178/C3 - Note for the clarification of the Case nº 778/2106 - Theft of cattle in 
Massingir. South Africa: Secretary-General of the interior - Provincial Services, Reference series of 1927-332. In 
this note, nothing was said concerning the cattle stolen in Massingir region; instead, the South African authorities 
attached to their note Hertzog’s appeal for the establishment of a game reserve in Mozambique alongside the 
KNP. Hertzog attached to his letter a map of the KNP with the following statement “… I have the honour to point 
out that the Portuguese game reserve should adjoin the full length of the Kruger National Park, I. e. from 
Crocodile river in the south to the confluence of the Pafuri and Limpopo rivers in the north and should be about 
fifty miles wide...” also see AHM: Governo-Geral – Cx. 178/C3; File Reservas e Parques de Caça - Letter from 
J.B.M. Hertzog to the Mozambique Governor-General in Lourenço Marques. Dated 9/8/1927, see also Joubert, 
Salomon, 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume I, p. 43”  
295AHM: DSAC. Cx 384. Nota do Director da Secretaria do Interior para o Director da Circunscrição de Magude, 
9/12/1927; see also in the same file: Nota do Tribunal Indígena convocando as testemunhas de acusação e polícias 
sul-africanos do Kruger, Johanes Nyvemane, George Makubela, Foscholo Massinga – District Pilgrins Rest 
Transvaal. 
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scarce.296 It is known that after the incidents the Portuguese warned communities living along the 
border not to enter KNP territory.297 Besides this warning, no other measures were implemented 
to end conflicts along the border. With regards to conservation, the South African appeal for the 
establishment of a conservation area alongside with the KNP elucidates that there was a need to 
coordinated efforts between the two countries to protect fauna along the common border. 
Therefore, that objective would be easily achieved if the colonial government in Mozambique 
established a national park along side with the KNP.  
 
Mavhunga and Spierenburg analysed the early history of the GLTP in southern Africa and point 
out that after exchange of correspondence (letters) between the Portuguese and South Africa 
authorities, the Portuguese commissioned a study aimed at elaborating a framework for the 
establishment of a national park contiguous to KNP.298 In October 1927, the reports from the 
colonial government departments in Mozambique (Agriculture, Interior, Veterinary, and Civil 
Administration) rejected the idea of establishing such a park. Initially the Portuguese authorities 
in Mozambique refused to establish a park contiguous to the KNP because they felt that the 
conservation area would come close to the city of Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) and would 
involve a large area of prime agricultural land located near the city and surroundings.299  
 
Moreover, in the regions south of Elephants River to the Incomati River in the south of the 
colony there were a considerable number of local people who relied on agriculture and cattle-
raising almost throughout the year as their means of survival. The transformation of the area into 
a national park would mean driving out the local population and relocating them to villages 
outside the area. The measure would almost certainly lead to poverty for those populations, 
which did not have alternative means for survival but depended on their land and the available 
                                                          
296AHM: DSAC; Cx 384- Note from the Mozambique Governor-General to the Governor-General of the South 
African Union – Pretoria; Ref  nº 1066/G, 29/12/1926 
297 AHM, Administration of the district of Lourenço Marques - Sabie, Ref 491/50 of 2/12/1927: Note of the Civil 
Administration Director in Magude to the Civil Administration Director in Lourenço Marques.  
298 Mavhunga, Clapperton; Marja Spierenburg. 2009. “Transfrontier Talk, Cordon Politics”, p.718, see also Joubert, 
S. 2007. The Kruger National Park. Vol I,  p.43 
299 AHM- Fundo do Governo Geral. Cx. 178/C3 File Caça, Transgressões e Multas 1926/1933. See also in the same 
file: Nota da Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil nº 926/2675, 27/10/1927 
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natural resources.300 Notwithstanding, the fact that the colonial authorities in Mozambique had 
refused to establish a park contiguous to the KNP, in the following 70 years, the South African  
authorities, especially the KNP board kept appealing to the Portuguese government to improve 
fauna management along the common border. 
  
3.3. The establishment of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique 
In his book The empire of nature: hunting, conservation and British imperialism, Mackenzie 
states that by the late 19th century and early 20th century, the perceived diminution of game in 
many regions of Africa led pressure groups (colonial government staff, hunters, tourists) to 
become more active in promoting hunting legislation and establishing societies dedicated to the 
preservation of fauna.301 In southern Africa, the German, Boers, and the British pioneered 
experiences of regulating hunting. They used game laws to control hunting within the hunting 
reserves and established game sanctuaries (national parks) for exclusive protection of fauna.302   
 
In the late 19th century, the Transvaal authorities also established two game reserves (Shingwedzi 
and Sabie game reserves) along the Transvaal east border with the former Portuguese East Africa 
territory (Mozambique) where the hunting of the wild species was controlled and only allowed to 
white people in some periods of the year. But, in the early 20th century, they noticed that in 
Portuguese colony of east Africa (Mozambican) no action were taken to demarcate areas for 
exclusive protection of fauna.303 The absence of a map of protected areas in Mozambique 
resulted in continued pressure from international wildlife organizations and the South African 
government appealing to the Portuguese administration to establish conservation areas in 
Mozambique, particularly along the South Africa and Mozambique border.304  
 
                                                          
300AHM: Governo-Geral - Cx 178/C3; File Reservas e Parques de Caça - Letter from J.B.M. Hertzog to the 
Mozambique General Governor in Lourenço Marques. Dated 9/8/1927 
301 MacKenzie, John M. 1988. The empire of nature: hunting, conservation and British Imperialism. p.  201  
302Beinart, William and Peter Coates.1995. Environment and History, p. 30, 75. 
303 Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume II, p. 69 
304Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume II, p. 43; See also 1910 hunting regulation. The 
1910 Hunting Regulation differentiated open hunting zones where hunting could be undertaken during the hunting 
seasons (i.e. from May to October) from game reserves where sport hunting was allowed during the hunting 
seasons but with several restrictoions for the protection of fauna. 
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In the early 1900s, the Portuguese administration delegated to the Mozambican Game Board 
(CCM) the responsibility of reviewing the recommendations of the London Conference and 
bring about advice to improve measure for the preservation of fauna. It seems, however, that in 
the first decades of the 20th century, the Board concentrated its efforts in drafting game 
regulations rather than working toward the establishment of game reserves and national parks in 
Mozambique.305  
 
Lack of delimitation of hunting frontiers and inefficient supervision of hunting in the Sul de Save 
Province, allowed that some individuals who got hunting licences from Companhia de 
Moçambique (Mozambique Charted Company that administrated the territories of Sofala and 
Manica) to cross the limits of the Companhia to hunt in the territory of Sul de Save Province. 
According to the then governor of the Gaza district, Luís Augusto de Oliveira Franco, this 
problem was leading to loss of income by the administration because the hunters paid the 
hunting fees to the Mozambique charted company and not to the Gaza district administration. In 
1921, the governor of the Gaza district addressed a letter to the High Commissioner of the 
Mozambique Province in Lourenço Marques explaining that such this problem was a result of 
bureaucracy installed at the Civil Administration office in Chai-Chai [sic]. The administrator 
reported that the Civil Administration staff there took a lot of time to issue hunting licenses. As a 
result, hunters from the neighbouring countries preferred to apply for hunting licenses to 
Companhia de Moçambique and use them in the territory of the Sul de Save Province (north of 
Limpopo to south of Save rivers).306  
 
 
                                                          
305AHM: DSAC, Secção A; Cx 83. File Armas, Caça e Munições. 
306A note from the Governor of Gaza district Mr. Luis Augusto de Oliveira Franco to High Commissioner of the 
Mozambique Province indicate that because the colonial institution in Chai-chai [sic] were taking long periods to 
issue hunting licenses, some hunters ended up requesting licenses to Companhia de Moçambique and hunt in their 
territory (north of Limpopo to south of Save River). This problem was making the administration of the Gaza 
district to lose incomes because the hunters pay fees to Mozambique Charted Company and not to Gaza district 
administration. See  AHM Cx. Carta  do Governador do distrito de Gaza Sr. Luis de Oliveira Eramsus para a 
secreataria geral do Alto Comissariado Provincial de Moçambique. Chai-chai [sic] 15/9/1921 AHM: DSAC, 
Secção A; Cx 83. File Armas, Caça  e Munições 
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I did not find any response of the High Commissioner of Mozambique Province in Lourenço 
Marques to the governor of the Gaza district. It is known that a couple of months earlier, i.e. 
before the governor of Gaza district had sent the letter referred to above, the CCM had already 
noticed the problem and was working to establish game reserves in Mozambique. Accordingly, 
in June 1920, it requested the Governor of the Gaza district to establish two hunting reserves in 
his district. The first was to be located on the north bank of the Shingwedzi River and the second 
in the Massingir region on the south bank of the Elephants River. After analysis of the requests 
of the CCM, the governor of Gaza district responded to the CCM, highlighting that the areas 
earmarked for the establishment of the hunting reserves had considerable clusters of African 
villages, especially on the south bank of the Elephants River.307 Accordingly, it was not feasible 
to transform the areas into hunting grounds with African populations still living inside those 
areas. Instead, he channelled the CCM requests to the DCA in Lourenço Marques for further 
analysis.308 
 
After a study of the indigenous population of the area, the DCA requested that the Governor-
General establish on the north bank of the Elephants River a State Reserve for indigenous people 
rather than a hunting reserve. As a result, from 9th June 1923 the area, forming a triangle limited 
in the East by the Transvaal border, in the North and West by the Limpopo River and in the 
South by the Elephants River was declared a State Natives Reserve.309  
 
As in the early 1920s, the government of the Sul de Save Province did not consider the CCM’s 
request for the establishment of two hunting reserves in the Guijá region in the late 1920s. The 
Board reviewed its proposal and re-submitted them to the Governor-General in Lourenço 
Marques. The CCM requested that the Governor-General establish three hunting reserves, 
namely in Maputo, Guijá and Chibuto.310 As a response to this request in April 1930, the 
                                                          
307AHM. GG Cx187-C3- Nota da Portaria nº 485 de 9 /6/1945. Nota enviada ao Consul Geral da União Sul-africana 
em Moçambique / Notas sobre reservas e parques que limitam a União Sul-Africana. 
308Ibiden. 
309For more detailed information on game reserves established in Gaza district, see Portaria Provincial nº. 485, 
9/6/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº 23, 1ª Série.  Portaria Provincial nº 608, 1/12/1923 - Boletim Oficial nº. 47 2ª Série  
310AHM-GG, Cx. 384 Comissão de Caça do Distrito de Lourenço Marques. Nota nº 17 para a Direcção de 
Administração Civil, 21/6/1930    
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Governor-General converted the Natives Reserve of the Circunscrição de Guijá into a hunting 
reserve. However, no further actions were taken to relocate Africans living in the hunting 
reserve.311  
 
In reality, until the early 1960s, this conservation area remained as a “paper reserve” as no 
touristic infrastructure was built in the area and had no staff working for the control of hunting. It 
seems that even the South African authorities had no information of activities carried out in the 
hunting reserve. Joubert states that the KNP authorities received information from the 
Portuguese about the creation of the hunting reserve along the Mozambique and KNP border, but 
soon after its creation, they did not hear about any activity implemented in the reserve.312  
 
The reason for transformation of the Natives States of Alto Limpopo into a hunting reserve is not 
explained in the archival files. An analysis of the colonial economy and administration systems 
seems to suggest that Portugal wanted to use the area as a means to collect some income through 
the establishment of fees imposed on licensed hunters when entering this area rather than 
protection of fauna. Colonial documents show that the revenues gained from hunting fees were 
used to pay the CCM staff and some provincial administration expenses.313 
 
In fact, the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve was a hunting ground for licensed hunters and a source 
of revenue for the Portuguese administration. Moreover, since the Portuguese considered that the 
number of Africans living in this game reserve was particularly insignificant (½ inhabitants per 
km2), they did not consider measures to relocate the Africans in villages located outside of the 
                                                          
311See Portaria 1145/ 1930; see also Diploma Legislativo nº 343/5 1932; see also Deploma Legislativo nº 765 de 
13/8/1941, see also Mozambique: Decreto governmental nº 2704 – 8/4/1936, see also Diploma legislativ nº 765 -  
13/8/1941 
312 Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume II, p. 69 
313AHM. Administração Civil. Cx. 80. Direção dos Serviçoes de Administracao Civil; see also Portaria nº 821 –
12/10/1910. Secretaria da Comissão de Caça do Distrito de Lourenço Marques. 15/8/1927. The government set 
that 50% of the fees paid by the hunter was for the Lourenço Marques district Game Board (CCLM) and the 
remaining money could be used to pay local government expenses. A caça em Moçambique é uma fonte de 
receita. Entrevista com o tectnico Warmer Von Alverenestein da Moçambique Safarilandia. Jornal Noticias, 
11/5/1963, see also Em defesa da grande riqueza que é a fauna cinegetica, Jornal Noticias, 30/10/56 
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hunting reserve.314 Thus, the local populations continued living inside the hunting reserve despite 
all threats that their presence in the area represents to their own safety and to conservation.315 
 
There is no information of any response regarding the establishment of a hunting reserve in 
Chibuto region. Existing sources indicate that during the colonial and post-colonial periods, there 
has never been a hunting reserve in Chibuto.316 It is known that in April 1932 the Portuguese 
established south of the Lourenço Marques city (now Maputo) a hunting reserve for sports and 
trophy hunting (Maputo Game Reserve). However, the concentration of African villages with 
inhabitants devoted to agriculture and livestock farming in the eastern part of the hunting reserve 
was threatening the conservation purpose of the reserve. To resolve the situation, in October of 
the same year, the Portuguese administration excluded the Eastern part from the limits of the 
hunting reserve. The Portuguese colonial administration converted the remaining areas into a 
sanctuary for the protection of African elephants (Elephas Africanus). Later, this hunting reserve 
became known as Maputo Special Reserve.317 In 1936, the Portuguese established another two 
game reserves, namely the Panda and Zinave hunting reserves in Inhambane district.318 Like 
other protected areas of Mozambique, these hunting reserves also lacked financial resources, 
touristic infrastructure, and staff for supervision of hunting and enforcement of hunting 
regulations.  
 
3.4. Evolution of conservation policies in southern Mozambique, 1930-1940 
The establishment of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique coincided with political changes 
in Portugal, which resulted in the introduction of the institution of a dictatorship known as 
‘Estado Novo’ (literally the ‘New State’) 1932-1974. The policies of the ‘Estado Novo’ and 
particularly those implemented by Antonio Salazar, Minister of Finance (1928-32) and then 
                                                          
314Nota Ps/MJ nº 44/1º; Acerca da regulamentação da caça – Direção dos Serviços de Administração Civil em 
Lourenço Marques, nota assinada por Arnaldo de Almeida Gomes, 28/2/ 1951 
315I don’t discuss in this thesis the resettlement program undertaken as a result of the transformation of this area into 
LNP. Resettlement programs were designed after 2002.  Moreover, my study covers a period before the beginning 
of the resettlements in the LNP.    
316Moçambique: Decreto Governamental nº 1145 - 28/6/ 1930; see also Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: 
A History. Vol. I, p. 43 
317See Diploma Legislativo n° 34; 23/4/ 1932 and Portaria nº1805 – 29/10/1932.  
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Prime Minister (1932-1968) had a considerable impact on the life, economy, society and wildlife 
in southern Mozambique. The conservative and authoritarian ideologies of Salazar led him to 
establish an anti-democratic and authoritarian regime through which he proposed to put Portugal 
on the map of the developed nations, and lessen its growing dependence on other European 
states.319 
 
From the early 1930s to 1950s, the Salazar administration in southern Mozambique increased the 
exploitation of local resources and its population through the continuation of collection of hut 
taxes (introduced since 1897) labour export to the South African mining industry and production 
of raw materials specifically cotton to feed the emerging Portuguese textile sector.320 The Salazar 
administration also continued to exploit local resources through a controlled system of licenses 
issued for timber companies exploiting wood (logging licenses) in the Mozambican forests and 
hunters (hunting licenses) entering the Mozambican hunting reserves.321  
 
In order to achieve its goals, the Salazar administration hyped the propaganda about the 
existence of game in Mozambique.322 The entry of foreign tourists into Mozambique represented 
a source of revenue that helped the colonial administration to pay its expenses. From the early 
1930s to the late 1950s, many white hunters among them nationals and foreigners applied for 
hunting permits to hunt in Mozambique.323  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
318AHM. Administraçao Civil- Cx. 80. Nota: A Comissão de Caça propõe a extinção da Reserva de Caça de 
Elephantes de Zimane. See also Portaria nº  2704- 8/4/1936 or Boletim Oficial nº 33 III Série – 19/8/1936  
319Hedges, D and A. Rocha, 1993. “Moçambique durante o apogeu do colonialismo Português, 1945- 1961: a 
economia e a estrutura social.” UEM- Departamento de História (Ed.). História de Moçambique Vol. 3: 
Moçambique no auge do colonialismo, 1930 – 1961. Maputo: Imprensa da UEM: 1993, pp. 35-82 
320 For more details on this regard see Chapter IV. 
321The Mozambican hunting regulation (1931, 1936, 1941, 1944, 1946 and 1955) gave much emphasis on fees paid 
by the hunters rather looking to issues considered important to better fauna preservation in Mozambique. See also 
“A Caça em Moçambique é uma fonte de receita”. Entrevista com o téctico Warmer Von Alverenestein da 
Moçambique Safarilandia. Jornal Noticias, 11/5/1963, see also “Em defesa da grande riqueza que é a fauna 
cinegética”, Jornal Noticias, 30/10/56  
322 Souza Correa, Sílvio Marcus de. 2011. “Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial.” p.3 
323AHM. DSAC; Cx. 80 Pasta Armas, Caça e Munições 
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In the 1940s, owing to the easy profits arising from hunting many Portuguese citizens left their 
jobs in cities and towns in Mozambique to engage in hunting. In 1942, the president of the CCM, 
Dr Mário Alcantra, recognised that due to the lower prices paid by the hunters for their hunting 
licenses and owing to the lack of staff to control hunting, illegal hnting had become an activity 
much more rewarding than working as a government officer.324  
 
Since unlicensed hunting was increasing along the Mozambican and South African border and 
some hunters entering KNP territory, the South African authorities started using international 
conservation forums to make their case. During the Convention for the Preservation of Wild 
Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa held in 1933 in London under the direction of the Society for 
the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire, the South African Consul in Mozambique 
appealed to Portugal to strengthen conservation measures in order to protect wildlife along the 
South Africa and Mozambique border.325 
 
In the early 1930s, the southern African was affected by a severe drought, which negatively 
affected fauna and flora. In some regions along the Mozambican side of the border, water was 
still available in natural ponds. Some animals of the KNP left their habitats and crossed the 
frontier in search of pasture and water and it was reported that Mozambican hunters killed some 
elephants. The Consul argued that the establishment of a park in Mozambique along the KNP 
border would contribute to the protection of these mammals and other migratory species, which 
usually cross the borderline in both directions. While diplomatically, the South African 
authorities were still lobbying the Portuguese, locally the preservation of wildlife required 
immediate intervention. In order to mitigate the impacts caused by drought on fauna, Colonel 
James Stevenson-Hamilton, the first warden of the KNP sunk boreholes within the KNP to 
provide water for the fauna and avoid its migration to Mozambique.326 
 
                                                          
324AHM, DSAC; Cx 80, Pasta Armas e Caça 1946-57; Nota 24/1952 da Comissão de Cça da Colónia de 
Moçambique datada de 17/3/1942. Assinado pelo presidente Mário de Carvalho Alcantra 
325Souza Correa, Sílvio Marcus de. 2001. Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial  
326 Mavhunga, Clapperton; Marja Spierenburg. 2009. “Transfrontier Talk, Cordon Politics”, p. 728 
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The increase in unlicensed hunting, especially poaching, in southern Mozambique did not only 
impact on the reduction of fauna but resulted in human and wildlife conflicts. As is 
commonplace, hunting practices lead to movement of wild animals. Sometimes, the movements 
of wild animals can endanger the lives of the local communities if the wild animals chased by the 
hunters run in the direction of local villages and chase undefended women and children. In order 
to take control of the situation, the Portuguese gazetted in 1936 a hunting regulation that allowed 
licensed hunters to kill an unlimited number of elephants found outside the limits of the hunting 
reserves. This issue became problematic because there were no fences limiting the game reserves 
in southern Mozambique. 327 
 
Archival date alludes to the dishonest hunters who entered into the hunting reserve and killed as 
many elephants as they wanted and in their reports, purported that the slaughtered elephants had 
been found outside the limits of the reserves.328 In March 1939, during the closed season for 
hunting, the representatives of the CCM of the district of Lourenço Marques received reports 
from the authorities of the Maputo Game Reserve stating that hunters were killing elephants 
inside the limits of the game reserves. The reports also indicated that herds of elephants in that 
district were leaving their habitats because the hunters who sought the bigger animals chased 
them away.329 
 
In the late 1930s, the preservation of fauna in southern Mozambique and particularly along the 
South African and Mozambican borders no longer concerned the South Africans only but also 
Portuguese naturalists and ecologists. In 1938, a Portuguese ecologist known as Gomes de Sousa 
wrote a letter to the Portuguese authorities proposing friendly negotiations between Mozambican 
and South African authorities for the establishment of trans-frontier parks along the common 
                                                          
327 Mozambique, Governmental Decree nº 765; 13/8/1936 
328 Mozambique, Governmental Decree nº 765; 13/8/1936 
329AHM: GG. Cx.80 Projecto Portaria. Secretaria da Comissão de Caça de Lourenço Marques. 20/3/1939; File: 
Armas caça e muniçoes: Texto- protecção das espécies raras e outras.  
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border. Ecological reasons for the protection of migratory species were some of the concerns that 
Gomes de Sousa had.330 
 
Gomes de Sousa and the Portuguese educated class defended close cooperation between 
Mozambique and South Africa and the creation of multiple teams to protect fauna along the 
Mozambican and South African border to facilitate the monitoring of migratory species, 
especially the elephants and zebras that from time to time moved between the two territories. In 
the Mozambican archives, I did not find information of further negotiations between the 
Mozambican and the South African authorities (including the KNP Board) for the period from 
1938 to 1954. Available archival sources indicate that as from 1955 to 1956 the KNP exempted 
visitors from payment of entrance fees and assisted Portuguese researchers who went to the KNP 
to study the methods used for wildlife conservation to adapt them to the Mozambican 
contexts.331  
 
Although the KNP’s authorities had trained some Portuguese officials working on conservation 
initiatives to improve their knowledge and skills about programs aimed at monitoring fauna 
along the common border, no initiatives were taken by the Portuguese government in 
Mozambique to improve fauna management along the South Africa and Mozambique border 
zones. Information regarding lack of cooperation by the Portuguese on initiatives to design 
programs to monitor fauna movements along the common border is scarce. However, as I have 
been arguing the Portuguese were more interested to capture revenues from the hunting 
activities, which were used to pay some of the government expenses at the district level, 
including the salaries of the CCM staff, rather than creating condition for better preservation of 
the fauna.   
                                                          
330Moçambique; Provincia do Sul de Save: Decreto nº 6 de 1921; see also AHM- Fundo do Governo Geral, Cx. 
78/C3 - Nota 25- 7/5/1925 da Secretaria da Comissão de Caça para o Administrador da Circunscrição de Guijá-
Caniçado 
331AHM. Governo-Geral, Cx. 384 Nota sobre os trabalhos da Missão Zootecnica de Moçambique elaborada pelo 
Chefe da Missão, o Professor F. Frade Viegas da Costa para o Governador da Provincia de Moçambique. 
Relatório datado de 3 de Novembro de 1955; see also AHM-GG, Cx. 384- Governo-Geral de Moçambique. 
Arquivo da Repartição de Gabinete. Ano 1948-58 – Processo A/ 10 F. The Mozambican team was admitted to the 
KNP without the payment of entrance fees.  Dated 24/8/1955 [the composition of the Mozambican team: 9 
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3.5. Challenges in protecting fauna in southern Mozambique, 1940-1950s 
In the 1930s and early 1940s, lack of touristic infrastructure (roads, scouts camps) sufficient 
qualified staff to work on the control of the hunting reserves and means of transport for the 
mobility of the scouts continued to hinder the preservation of fauna in Mozambique. However, 
when analysing the Mozambican regulations (1940-1950) I got the impression that the 
Portuguese legislators were not aware of conditions, which existed in the hunting grounds and 
because of that reason, they passed hunting regulations that did not respond to the local needs to 
improve the preservation of the fauna.  
 
In another case, the 1941 hunting regulation established that at sunset the licença especial or 
special licenses holders had to report to the local authorities of the area in which they had carried 
out hunting for registration of the slaughtered animals. In practice, this obligation could be 
achieved only if the hunter was undertaking hunting near a Portuguese administration. However, 
in most cases, the Portuguese administration offices where hunters had to go for registration, 
verification of their licences and registration of slaughtered animals were located far away from 
the hunting grounds.  
 
For example, the colonial administration office in the Massingir region was situated at the 
Mavodze village at the south of the reserve – about 120 km from the north end. As there was no 
transport infrastructure like roads, travel on foot from one end to the other took at least one 
week. In addition, owing to the existence of many rivers within the forest, in the rainy season it 
was practically impossible to make the journey. The authorities in Mavodze lacked staff to work 
specifically on control of hunting. The same staff dealing with African affairs (enforcement of 
colonial rule, collection of taxes, etc.) also had to deal with issues related to conservation and 
specially the control of hunting.332 This situation resulted in agreements between the hunters and 
government staff working at local levels. The negotiations allowed the hunters to declare weekly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
members, being 5 qualified veterinarians and 2 administrative staff,  2  white administrative assistants and 2 non-
qualified Africans] 
332Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, January, 26  February  2014  
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or monthly the species and numbers that they had killed. Accordingly, the government officers 
had to rely on the numbers given by the hunters to fill the hunters’ registration books.333 The 
above-mentioned fact illustrates the differences existing between the hunting regulations and the 
reality at the hunting field. Thus, it was practically impossible to undertake effective control of 
the area and supervise hunting with lack of both staff and vehicles.334  
 
While the 1941 Hunting Regulation raised issues about lack of staff (to locate in different control 
posts within the hunting reserves to control hunting), infrastructure (roads within the game 
reserves) and transport for the mobility of the staff, the 1944 Hunting Regulation gave room to 
the extermination of wild stock by herders and farmers living near the hunting reserves. The 
1944 Game Regulation allowed livestock farmers to request the Governor-General to give them 
permission to exterminate wild stock that was perceived as endangering the development of 
livestock near their farms. The misinterpretation of the article nº43 was at the centre of the 
problem.335  
“The owners of plots of land located within hunting reserves, who develop the livestock industry 
and related activities may within the areas of their concessions exterminate game that can bring 
threats to their activities”.336 
 
Apparently, the regulation was clear; but farmers misinterpreted it to justify the slaughter of 
animals to feed their staff and sell the extra meat in the neighbouring villages and towns. The 
regulation stated that in the development of livestock farms in open spaces, the owners of the 
livestock had to protect their cattle by fencing off the grazing areas to prevent the intermingling 
of wildlife and livestock. Farmers could only request the slaughtering of wild stock in the nearby 
areas only in cases of threat of the spread of infectious diseases. Moreover, applicants should 
necessarily be working on a special regime within or near the hunting reserves. Owing to the 
                                                          
333 Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador. Moçambique: Lourenço Marques – 
1961 see in http://michelepeixe.com/amadeupeixe/livro.asp, p. 230 acessed May 2014; see also Despacho da 
Direção dos Serviços de Administração Civil explicando a interpretação do regulamento de caça de 1951. 
Assinado por Arnaldo de Almeida Gomes, 5/3/1951  
334 See a copy of a Hunting License book and pages to register the slaughtered animals in appendix 1 document 1 
and 2, pages 263 and 264 respectively.  
335AHM, GG. Cx. 80 - File Armas, Caça e Munições:  Ano: 1944-5. Análise pela Comissão de Caça do Sul de Save 
de Requerimento da Empresa Pecuária do Sul de Save dirigida ao Senhor Governador Geral, 8/11/1944 
336Moçambique - Regulamento de Caça aprovado Diploma Legislativo nº 765, 13/8/1944 
  
115 
 
fragility of the system, even companies outside of the reserves came to request the General-
Governor to authorise the extermination of game in their areas.337 
 
In adition, Portuguese journalists and the South African authorities also made several appeals on 
the need for Portugal to strengthen measures to improve the preservation of fauna in 
Mozambique and particularly along South African and Mozambican border. They argued that 
lack of financial and human capacity and game laws that did not fit into the local contexts was 
undermining effective protection of fauna. As a result, in 1943 additional appeals came to the 
Governor-General office indicating the need for Mozambique to strengthen its conservation 
measures. A letter from the African Wildlife Protection Society (AWPS) to Governor-General 
office in Lourenço Marques besides appealing for the increase in efforts to protect fauna, it 
offered support to the Portuguese government to establish a Wildlife Protection Society in 
Mozambique, which would work on specific issues for the protection of Fauna.338 
 
Owing to criticisms over the lack of measures to improve the management of wildlife in 
Mozambique, in 1947 the Governor-General created a multidisciplinary team to frame a new 
conservation policy and hunting regulation for the colony. For the transparency on the 
investigation process, the Governor excluded members from the CCM.339 Before the report of 
the multidisciplinary team came out, in later September 1948 the Portuguese consulate in Nairobi 
sent another letter to the Governor-General’s Office accusing the CCM of not doing anything 
about elephant slaughter in southern Mozambique. The letter was then channelled to the CCM 
for explanations. The CCM explained that one of the reasons leading to the extermination of 
                                                          
337Moçambique - Regulamento de Caça aprovado Diploma Legislativo nº. 765, 13/8/1944 
338AHM. Fundo do Governo-Geral, Cx 178/C3 – File: Caça Transgressões e M  ultas. Carta da WLPS – South 
Africa, 15/4/ 1943 see also AHM. Fundo do Governo-Geral. Cx 178/C3 – File: Caça, Transgressões e Multas. 
Carta da African wildlife Protection Society. Assunto: Criação de uma Wildlife Society para a protecção da fauna 
em Moçambique, 23/9/1943 
339The team was composted by five members and directed by Dr. Francisco Paiva, a veterinarian and director of the 
MMCT and other members from the departments of health, agriculture, railways and the administrator of the city 
of Lourenço Marques. AHM. Fundo do Governo-geral. Cota 178/C3 – File: Caça, Transgressões e Multas. Carta 
da African Wildlife Protection Society. Assunto: Criação de uma Wildlife Society para a protecção da fauna em 
Moçambique, 23/9/1943 
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elephants in the Sul de Save Province was related to the fact that hunters holding special licences 
could hunt an unlimited number of elephants within the areas indicated in their licences.340 
 
In October 1948, the report of the investigation undertaken by the multidisciplinary team was 
released.341 It concluded that the different hunting regulations implemented by the government in 
the Sul de Save Province did not meet faunal protection needs.342 To correct some of the 
practices largely denounced by Portuguese citizens and international organizations, the 
government limited to three (3) the number of elephants allowed to be killed by special licence 
holders in the Mozambican forests and hunting reserves. Accordingly, hunters had to pay 1500 
escudos (60USD) for the licence and 165 escudos (6.5 USD) for the official stamps. For the 
national hunters the costs of the licence was fixed at the price of 500 escudos (20USD). All 
hunters either Portuguese or foreigners had to pay 1500 escudos (60USD) for each elephant they 
killed.343  
 
The colonial administration intended that this measure would increase incomes paid by the 
hunters as it increased according to the number of elephants each hunter had killed. However, the 
problem was always the same. How did the colonial authorities assess the number of elephants 
killed by each hunter? How many new scouts/guards did the colonial authorities put in the 
Mozambican forests and game reserve to supervise hunting activities? The over exploitation of 
game in southern Mozambique was not related to lack of hunting regulations but lack of staff to 
enforce the regulation and clear delimitation of conservation areas where game would be driven 
and experts would take care of it.  
                                                          
340AHM.G. G, Cx. 80: Comissão de Caça da Colonia de Moçambique. Chefe de Repartição do Gabinete. Oficio 
Actual I55/1948- Resposta em Referência ao Ofício nº 1860/ C3 da Comissãoo de Caça ao Governador-Geral, 
21/10/1948 
341The team was composted by five members and directed by Dr. Francisco Paiva, a veterinarian and director of the 
MMCT and other members from the departments of health, agriculture, railways and the administrator of the city 
of Lourenço Marques. AHM. Fundo do Governo-Geral. Cx. 178/C3 – File: Caça, Transgressões e Multas. Carta 
da African Wildlife Protection Society. Assunto: Criação de uma Wildlife Society para a protecção da fauna em 
Moçambique, 23/9/1943 
342In 1948, the exchange rate 1 Escudo was equivalent to 98 Sterling Libra. Note that in the same exchange rate 
sterling Libra to rand was equivalent to 1 to 1. Source: Leite, Joana Perreira. 1989.  La information de economie 
colonial au Mozambique [PhD] Paris, Ecole de Hautes Etudes en Scenecie Sociales, p.385  
343AHM.GG, Cx80: Comissão de Caça da Colonia de Moçambique. Chefe de Repartição do Gabinete. Oficio Actual 
I55/1948- Resposta em Referencia ao Ofício nº 1860/ C3 da Comissão de Caça ao Governador -Geral, 21/10/1948  
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The colonial authorities also requested foreign hunters applying for hunting licences to deposit 
an amount of 25,000 escudos (1000 USD) in the CCM account in Lourenço Marques. This sum 
was to be used to pay fines if the hunter infringed the hunting regulation but the hunter was 
refunded if there was no infringement.344 However, the fact that a hunter had to deposit a 
warranty in the CCM´s account didb not stop him hunting outside the limits set by the hunting 
regulations. Moreover, the warranty was deposited into the account of the CCM in Lourenço 
Marques and the licence holder could then hunt in Guijá, (450 km north of Lourenço Marques). 
Owing to difficulties in the channels of official communication, hunters returned to Lourenço 
Marques and claimed their warranty back before a report on their activities was available in the 
capital.345 
 
In the late 1940s, the evidence of fauna extermination north of the Elephants and Limpopo rivers 
(Guijá and Alto Limpopo) came out. In 1948, a brigade of the Mozambique Zoological Mission 
working in the reserve noticed that species of animals that were once declared as abundant in the 
region were becoming scarce. For example, the brigade reported that in previous decades, eland 
(Taurotragus Oryx) were easily seen in the area, but in 1948, the brigade did not find many eland 
within the reserve. The Mozambique Zoological Mission accused both hunters and the 
companies working on the maintenance of local roads of exterminating fauna and complained 
about lack of attempts by the local authorities to stop the decimation of wildlife.346 
 
Responding to this accusation, the administrator of the circunscrição of Massingir blamed the 
central government for the killing of wild stock in the area. According to the administrator, the 
central government and companies that had staff working in Alto Limpopo did not send enough 
foodstuffs for their workers. Consequently, workers relied on wild stock for food. 347 
 
                                                          
344AHM.GG, Cx. 80: Carta da Comissão de Caça de Moçambique endereçada ao Chefe da Repartição do Gabinete 
do Governador Geral; Ref 155/1948, 21/10/ 1948 
345AHM.GG, Cx80: Carta da Comissão de Caça de Moçambique endereçada ao Chefe da Repartição do Gabinete do 
Governador Geral; Ref 33/1949, 17/2/1949  
346AHM. GG Cx 384, Relatório da Missão Zoológica de Moçambique, assinado pelo Doutor Frade Viegas da Costa; 
2/11/1948 
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In the early 1950s, Portuguese environmentalists used the Mozambican newspapers to criticize 
the Portuguese authorities’ attitudes towards the control of hunting in Mozambique.348 They 
demanded that the government should hire qualified staff to work in the hunting reserves.349 
They also demanded that before the government came up with new hunting regulations it had to 
undertake detailed and scientific research on the state of the environment in the colony and 
specific needs for the better management of the ecosystems and wildlife.350 
 
As a response to growing criticism, in 1953, the colonial government started to hire people with 
recognised hunting skills to work as scouts in southern Mozambique forest and hunting reserve.  
The archival sources are silent on the numbers recruited by colonial authorities. However, in the 
Jornal Noticias I was able to find, some announcements made by the CCM to hire people with 
abilities to work as scouts in southern Mozambique.351 
 
Since criticisms were coming not only from Mozambique, but also from all Portuguese African 
colonies in 1955, the authorities in Lisbon issued a normative document to regulate hunting and 
forest uses in all Portuguese African colonies. The Decree 40.040 consolidated all the previous 
forest and hunting regulations and promulgated a single regulation for all Portuguese overseas 
territories. Like other Portuguese forest and wildlife regulation, the document contained many 
definitions of concepts for hunting, reserves, and competencies of institutions involved in the 
management of fauna and flora, rather than clear strategies to improve their management in 
Portuguese African colonies.352  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
347AHM. GG Cx 384, Relatorio da Missao Zoologica de Moçambique assinado pelo Doutor Frade Viegas da Costa; 
2/11/1948 
348 “A protecção da Fauna: em defesa da grande riqueza que é a fauna cinegetica” Noticias, 30/10/56; O 
abastecimento de carne, de caça. Noticias, 29/6/1952; ‘A caça em Moçambique e o clube de caçadores’. Notícias, 
8/2/52 
349 “A caça em Moçambique e o clube de caçadores” Noticias, 8/2/52 
350 “A protecção da fauna. Noticias, 57/11/1952; “Em defesa da grande riqueza que é a fauna cinegética” Noticias, 
30/10/56 
351 Announcement of a vacancy to people willing to work as scouts in the southern Mozambican forests and game 
reserves, Noticias,  7/5/ 1953; Anúncio nº 56194; see Vacancy announcement for scouts/ hunting supervisor for 
forests  and game reserve in colonial southern Mozambique in Appendixes 1 Document 1, p.260 
352 Moçambique: Decreto Governamental nº 40040- 20/1/55  
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3.6. Conclusion  
The Portuguese administration in Mozambique issued game laws to limit Africans from 
continuing to engage in hunting for commercial purposes. Thus, they used the national forests as 
a means to collect revenue through the establishment of a system of collection of fees paid by the 
licensed hunters when entering the Mozambican forest and hunting reserves. In 1909, the 
Portuguese created the Mozambique Hunting Board (CCM) an institution that had as part of its 
duties to issue advice to the governmental institutions working on fauna protection and to the 
Governor-General for the establishment of hunting reserves; opening of hunting seasons and 
proposed changes to game management and hunting practices. However, as suggested by the 
South African wildlife Society, only institutions concerned with wildlife protection would work 
toward the establishment of laws, regulations and strategies to better wildlife management. the 
composition of the CCM (government appointed staff and professional hunters) did not 
encourage it to issue good advice to the government concerning the protection of fauna.  
 
Most often, effective implementation of conservation practices entails suspension and sometimes 
temporarily or permanent closure of hunting activity and therefore the CCM did not want to see 
its members out of the activity. As the game board was concerned with sports and commercial 
hunting it influenced the government to look to hunting regulations as a way to protect fauna. 
Throughout the years 1910 to 1956 the Portuguese government kept changing the hunting 
regulations. However, no hunting regulations met the specific needs for the better management 
of wildlife in Sul de Save Province. The colonial hunting regulations tackled issues related to 
hunting fees paid by licensed hunters, penalties to those found hunting illegaly, hunting seasons, 
etc. In reality, the problems of protection of fauna in southern Mozambique were related to the 
luck of clear demarcation of hunting reserves, where hunting of some species would be restricted 
in some periods of the year or banned if considered that could lead to extinction of some species. 
Moreover, owing to the large number of hunting permits issued by the colonial government and 
the limited staff working within the hunting reserves, it was not possible to control the hunters 
and their activities. Thus, licensed and non-licensed hunters ended up acting on their own free 
will and killing fauna beyond the limits set by hunting regulations.  
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It has to be acknowledged that conservation areas located along the border need special attention 
for the better management of the wildlife. For that reason, cooperation between countries is 
crucial for a better management of such areas. Since the establishment of the KNP, the South 
African authorities became concerned with best management practices for the preservation of 
wildlife along the South Africa and Mozambique border. From the early incidents along the 
border (the killing of a South African police officer by Mozambican hunters in 1927), the South 
African government appealed to the colonial authorities in Mozambique to establish a national 
park along the KNP border. The Portuguese authorities did not establish such a national park in 
Mozambique. Existence of population and cattle south of the Elephants River was one of the 
reasons alleged by the Portuguese to not establish such a park. This situation would remain 
unresolved until 2001 when the GoM finally transformed Coutada 16 into the LNP.      
 
In the early 1930s, the Portuguese established hunting reserves in Mozambique. However, they 
did not relocate Africans living within the reserves in villages situated out of them. Indeed, 
Beinart and Coates have stressed that farming and conservation practices often exist in conflict 
with each other because if local people are not able to grow enough food for their subsistence, 
they tend to look for alternative food sources including hunting of wild animals.353  
 
During drought and lack of foodstuffs local communities relied on bush meat for food. The 
presence of communities in the hunting reserves made control of the areas particularly difficult, 
as African hunters could remain concealed in the local villages and forests. In the 1930s to 1950s 
ecologists, wildlife organizations, and South African institutions systematically denounced the 
extermination of fauna in Mozambique and particularly along the South African and 
Mozambican border but little efforts made to improve fauna management. As examined in 
Chapter 4, the state of wildlife management in southern and particularly in the Alto Limpopo 
Game Reserve, was worsened by introduced forced cotton production. From the early 1940s to 
later 1950s, cotton production in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve contributed to degradation of 
the local ecosystems, poverty, and hunger.  
                                                          
353Beinart, William and Peter Coates. 1995. Environment and History 
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CHAPTER IV: CHANGING LIVELIHOODS: COLONIAL RULE AND THE LIVES OF 
AFRICANS IN THE SOUTH WESTERN MOZAMBIQUE BORDERLAND, 1940s-1974 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of the Salazar administration on Mozambique´s economy and 
natural resources. The Salazar administration in Mozambique issued hunting regulations that 
contributed to the decimation of fauna. It appears also that the regime had very limited 
cooperation with neighbouring African states, especially South Africa. The Salazar regime in 
Mozambique did not even cooperate with environmentalists and international conservation 
agencies that were concerned about the state of environmental affairs in the southern Africa and 
were keen to help the colonial government in Mozambique to improve the management of fauna.  
 
This chapter analyses the impact of colonial rule on the lives of Africans in general and 
specifically focuses on the impact of colonial conservation practices in the south western 
Mozambican borderland. The chapter focuses particularly on the period from the 1940s to 1974. 
In the beginning of the 1940s, the Portuguese administration in the southern Mozambique 
hinterland forced the cultivators´ families to produce cotton to supply the emerging Portuguese 
textile sector. Additionally, in 1942 they increased the amounts of taxes that Africans had to pay 
for each hut used as a house. These measures increased the workload of African families and 
brought about misery to the cultivators’ families, as they had to spend much time on the 
production of cotton rather than on production of food crops. Moreover, money gained from the 
sale of cotton was used to pay the taxes. In 1974, there were political changes in Mozambique, 
which culminated with Mozambique independence June 1975. September 1974 marks the 
victory of Frelimo over the Portuguese and marks the end of Portuguese colonialism in 
Mozambique.   
 
By focusing on the analysis of the lives of Africans in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve, the 
chapter aims to examine the differences that existed between the colonial rule and their local 
practices. The chapter seeks to answer to the following question. What was the impact of the 
colonial rule on the life of Africans in Alto Limpopo Game Reserve? How did the colonial 
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authorities articulate their economic objectives (exploitation of local populations though hut 
taxes and cotton forced cultivation) with conservation objectives? What strategies were put in 
place in South Africa to overcome the increase of hunting along the border with Mozambique?  
 
From the late 19th century to the late 1950s, the south western Mozambique region was affected 
by animal diseases, particularly foot and mouth diseases and trypanossomiasis. These diseases 
had adverse consequences for cattle, fauna, economy, and society not only in Mozambique but 
also in South Africa and implied the establishment of measures to control animal diseases along 
the Mozambique South Africa border as well as in the whole southern Mozambique hinterland. 
Thus, the chapter examines how the colonial government in Mozambique and South Africa deal 
with the outbreak of animal diseases in the above-mentioned period. 
 
This chapter comprises three main sections. The first section analyses the impact of colonial rule 
and conservation policies on the lives of Africans in Alto Limpopo Game Reserve; it describes 
the evolution of labour migration from Alto Limpopo and Guijá to South Africa and its impact 
on economy, society and wildlife. It lays particular emphasis on the impact of forced cotton 
production on the lives of Africans, fauna and ecosystems. The second section analyses the 
outbreak of animal diseases in southern Mozambique and their implication on the preservation of 
fauna. The third section describes changes introduced by the Portuguese to improve management 
of hunting reserves in southern Mozambique.  
 
I argue in this chapter that the Portuguese development policy in Mozambique pushed Africans 
to misery and contributed to the depletion of local resources. While, on the one hand, colonial 
conservation policies enhanced the need for the preservation of fauna and local ecosystems, on 
the other hand, the Portuguese staff at local levels coerced Africans to open up cotton farms in 
the reserves leading to the destruction of local forests and ecosystems. Forced cotton production 
in Alto Limpopo Game Reserve resulted in crop failures. Accordingly, hunting became a means 
of survival and an alternative source of income to pay hut taxes.  
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In 1930, the Portuguese transformed the State Reserve of the Circunscrição de Guijá into a 
hunting reserve. Regardless of this transformation, no measures were implemented for the safety 
of the local populations or to relocate them to villages outside the hunting reserve. Africans 
continued to live in the reserve despite all the threats that hunting practices presented to their 
lives. Moreover, even within the reserve, the Portuguese required African people to pay hut 
taxes. Owing to the lack of employment in the area, many Africans were forced to search for 
new sources of income including migrating to South Africa in search of employment to earn 
some money to pay the hut taxes and buy commodities for their families. Africans who remained 
in the reserve were forced to engage in cotton production. The Portuguese also hired militias 
known as cipaios to help colonial staff (chefes de posto) working at the local levels 
(administrações) to enforce colonial rule. Chefes de posto and cipaios controlled the payment of 
the hut taxes and labour migration to South Africa and cotton production which was meant to 
feed the emerging Portuguese textile sector.  
 
4.2.1. Labour migration from the south western Mozambique borderland to South Africa  
Hunting and labour migration in south western Mozambique borderland were important 
livelihood strategies undertaken by Africans to cope with periods of food scarcity.354 Indeed, in 
the late 19th century ecological crisis, a war that hit the Gaza-Nguni state, raids by neighbouring 
states (the Zulu, Swazis, and Nguni) and animal diseases that destroyed cattle forced some 
populations in southern Mozambique to migrate to the Transvaal and many Africans were driven 
to sell their labour to recover the losses.355  
 
Existing sources indicate that Manukussi, the first king of the Gaza-Nguni state (1833-1858), 
ruled the state by terror and many people in southern Mozambique and particularly from the area 
of study (Nwalungo, Loyi and Ncunas) fled to the Transvaal in search of refuge.356 Therefore, 
                                                          
354Stevenson-Hamilton, James. 1929. The Lowveld: its wildlife and its people, p. 176 
355Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. 1982. A History of African labour in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, 1877 to 1950. 
Boston: Boston University 1982, p. 16 
356Stevenson-Hamilton, James. 1929. The lowveld: its wildlife and its people, p. 170 
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during the Gungunhane´s war of resistance against the Portuguese, a considerable number of 
Africans migrated to the Transvaal.357   
 
Academics and historians have convincingly argued that the development of an agro-industry in 
Natal and the discovery of gold and diamonds in the Transvaal boosted labour migration from 
southern Mozambique to South Africa.358 Hence, the Portuguese economic situation favoured 
export of African labour from Mozambique to South Africa. Lack of capital and resources to 
develop jobs and to productively employ local labour in Mozambique forced the Portuguese 
authorities to use hut taxes and labour export to South Africa as ways to collect revenue.359 Since 
the mining industry paid a lot better than the farms in Natal, Cape or Mozambican cities, many 
Africans preferred to work for the mining industry rather than in the Mozambican emerging 
cities and towns.360  
 
In 1897, the Portuguese and the Transvaal administration signed accords on labour export from 
Mozambique to South Africa.361 These accords allowed Portugal to set the basics of the 
Transvaal's overseas trade that passed through the Port of Lourenço Marques. The accords also 
enabled the Portuguese to benefit from a deferred payment scheme for migrants' earnings, which 
ensured that the migrants would not spend all of their salaries before returning to Mozambique. 
This scheme was introduced to force the Mozambicans to return to their home villages and use 
their money in the local rural shops known in Portuguese as cantinas. Migrants also used the 
money earned in South Africa to pay the hut taxes and buy consumer goods for their families. 362   
                                                          
357Stevenson-Hamilton, James. 1929. The lowveld: its wildlife and its people, p. 72 
358Universidade Eduardo Mondlane – CEA.  1980. O mineiro moçambicano na África do Sul’, Maputo: UEM-CEA, 
Brock, Lisa Ann. 1989. From kingdom to colonial district: A political economy of social change in Gazaland, 
southern Mozambique, 1870-1930 [PhD Thesis] Evanston: North Western University; Harries, Patrick. 1994. 
Work, culture and identity: migrant labourers in Mozambique and South Africa, c 1860- 1910. London:  James 
Currey:  Heinemann, Portsmouth; Moodie, D. T. 2001. Going for gold: men, mines and migration. Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press; Covane, L. A. 2001. O Trabalho migratório e a agricultura no sul de 
Moçambique (1920-1992). Maputo: Promédia 
359Roesch, Otto. 1991. “Migrant labour and forced rice production in southern Mozambique: the colonial peasantry 
of the Lower Limpopo Valley” JSAS , 17 (1991): 239-70, p. 242 
360Brock, Lisa Ann. From kingdom to colonial district, p. 68 
361Roesch, Otto. 1991.  “Migrant labour and forced rice production in southern Mozambique”, p. 242 
362The 1928 Labour Migration Agreement made between Mozambique and South Africa made  deferred payments 
compulsory for Mozambican mine workers in South Africa. This meant that half of their 18 months’ pay had to be 
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The accords on labour export from Mozambique to South Africa were updated in 1896, 1989, 
1901, 1909 and 1928 to accommodate specific contexts and needs in both countries. In general, 
the accords gave monopoly to the South African recruiting companies and specifically to the 
Witwatersrand Natives Labour Association (WENELA) to recruit labour from southern 
Mozambique to the South African mining sector.363 In 1918, WENELA was allowed to build a 
road in the northern section of the Shingwedzi Reserve to be used for the transportation of 
migrants from southern Mozambique to the South African mines.364  
 
In the 1920s, WENELA built a recruitment post within the Shingwedzi Reserve near the border 
between Mozambique, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). This recruitment 
benefited migrants from Southern Rhodesia and southern Mozambique and particularly travellers 
from the districts of Gaza and Inhambane.365 Hansen has pointed out that due to the fact that 
communication between the capital (Lourenço Marques) and Pafuri could take more than two 
weeks, officials working in this facility were left to their own devices. At times, they could leave 
their work and hunt in the forest and therefore have bush meat for their survival.366 Hansen’s 
statement highlights some of practices of the Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique toward the 
management of forests and fauna (i) use of hunting as a survival strategy for colonial officers 
working in remote rural areas; (ii) lack of staff to supervise hunting in the game reserves; (iii) 
and exemption of payment of hunting fees by the Portuguese officials working at local levels. 
Portuguese officers understood that they were exempted from the obligation of applying for 
hunting licenses and that they could hunt whenever they pleased as long as they did it in the 
districts they had been appointed to work in.  In the late 1930s, WENELA paid to the Portuguese 
administration £1 for each African from southern Mozambique they secured for the mines. 
Accordingly, Africans willing to go to work on their own account in South Africa had to pay the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
received in the nearest administration center to the migrants’ home villages after the end of their contracts. A 
convenção de 1928, in Covane, L. A. 1989. As relações económicas entre Moçambique e a África do Sul   
363Covane, L. A. 1989. As relações económicas entre Moçambique e a África do Sul, p.38 
364Carruthers, Jane, 1989. Creating a national park, 1910 to 1926. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand: 
African Studies Institute (Paper presented at African Studies Seminar on the 15th May 1989), p.15  
365Setevenson-Hamilton. James. 1937. South African Eden: from Sabi Game Reserve to Kruger National Park. 
London:  Cassel and Company LTD, p. 184; see also AHM. ISANI; Cx. 26. António Policarpo de Sousa Santos. 
Relatório de inspecção ordinária feita à circunscrição de Alto Limpopo povoados de Massangena Saúte e  Mavue 
– no período de 12 de Dezembro de 1942 à 14 de Maio. Relatório final elaborado em Maio de 1956, p.11-13 
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Portuguese £1 to get their permits or passes to do so. Migrants from southern Mozambican 
willing to work in South Africa and in companies different from those under the aegis of 
WENELA and unwilling to pay the  £1 to the Portuguese authorities, travelled from their 
communities to the KNP and handed themselves over to KNP authorities as trespassers. After 
being sentenced to 14 days of work they got permits or passes that allowed them to go to work 
on their own account in South Africa. The passes also allowed them to choose the companies 
they wanted to work for as well as the time of their stay at the worksite.367  
 
The system of exchanging passes for 14 days of work in the KNP in lieu of the £1 became 
known in south western Mozambique as a-mafourteen. Between the 1940s and 1960s, the 14 
days pass system allowed the KNP to have free labour from southern Mozambique and it also 
used the same system to select candidates for permanent appointment. Up to the late 1960s, more 
than 80% of the KNP rangers were Shangane selected through this system.368 Migrants who 
found jobs at Skukuza (local name for KNP) did not proceed to other places.369 
 
In the 1940s, the increase in the hut taxes forced many Africans in Guijá and particularly in the 
Alto Limpopo Game Reserve to seek wage incomes and consequently increased labour migration 
from the area to South Africa.370 The migrants used the money they got in South African to pay 
the hut taxes, buy clothes, pay the bride price or lobola and buy useful goods for their families.371  
Migrants from Massingir and border villages preferred to use the bush route to travel from their 
villages to South Africa rather than to walk the long distance to the official border gates. For 
example, from Massingir to the nearest border point is 37 km and 100 km to the Pafuri border 
gate.372  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
366Hansen, Heidi Suzanne. 2008.  Community perceptions of a mine recruitment centre in Pafuri, p. 15 
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369Interview with Samuel Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 22/01/2014   
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372AHM-ISANI. Cx. Santos, António Policarpo de Sousa. ‘Relatório de inspecção ordinária feita à circunscrição de 
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As mentioned earlier, WENELA was a recruiting agency affiliated to the Chambers of Mines 
and accredited by the Mozambique government to recruit labour from Mozambique to South 
Africa. However, in South Africa companies not affiliated to the Chambers of Mines could not 
benefit from workers recruited by WENELA. Such companies hired their own recruiting agents, 
who were placed along the South Africa border with southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. The 
agents offered incentives (such as issuing all the necessary documentation and transport to travel 
from the recruiting posts established along the border to their worksites).373 Moreover, 
differently from mining companies’ contracts which forced migrants to stay at the worksite for a  
period of about 12 to 18 months, migrants employed in other sectors of the South African 
economy (construction, agriculture, conservation in the KNP) were not obliged to stay long 
periods. Migrants, could return to their villages after one or two months of work and help their 
families in agriculture and some engage in hunting.374 
 
Thus, while the colonial state administration was concerned with agreements that could keep 
migrants in their worksites and ensure more direct benefit to local commerce from miners’ 
spending at the end of their contracts, a number of migrants from border villages in the southern 
Mozambique hinterland were concerned with jobs that would allow them to earn only sufficient 
cash to pay hut taxes and the bride price or lobola and then return to their villages. Thus, 
migrants found in illegal migration a way to go to South Africa without passing by the local 
colonial administration offices where they would be registered and forced into work for the 
South African mining companies, which would force them to stay in South Africa for a period 
from 12 to 18 months.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
December 2005, the governments of South Africa and Mozambique opened the Giriondo border post for tourists 
use only. See Noticias Newspaper or Jornal Noticias 6/12/2005 
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perceptions of a mine recruitment centre in Pafuri 
374Interview with Samuel Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 22/01/2014   
  
128 
 
A confidential report of a Breyner & Wirth agent based in Pafuri, indicates that between 1942 
and 1956 many migrants from border villages in southern Mozambique migrated to South Africa 
without passing through the legal points of entry that allowed them to be registered by the legal 
recruiting companies and then proceed with their trips to South Africa. The report highlighted 
that between 1942 and 1956, there were 4 paths from southern Mozambique that gave access to 
the KNP.375 
1) From Madousse and Tomo villages people walked to Chifubje within the Guijá Hunting 
Reserve and from then they crossed the border and entered into the KNP; 
2) From Mapulangune in the circunscrição de Sabie along the border with the south end of 
the KNP people walked to Isweni within the KNP and 
3) The local people from the villages of Macaene, Pandzane, Matunganhane and 
Machautine converged at Mangalane where they took the path to Saliji in the KNP; from 
Salige they walked to Skukuza where they got their passes in return for 10 to 14 days of 
work. From Skukuza, Africans who used this route could walk until Nhamdene where 
they caught vans to Bush Buck Ridge and Graskop.  
4) Migrants from the Massingir village walked to Mala-mala within the KNP. In Mala-mala, 
migrants were taken to Lethaba where passes were issued in return for 2 to 6 days of 
work; from Lethaba migrants caught transport to Zoekmakare in South Africa where they 
were delivered to agents recruiting migrants for diverse companies in South Africa. The 
passage from the KNP to Lethaba allowed the migrants from Massingir to meet other 
migrants who had crossed the border using the Pafuri border post.376  
 
Migrants who preferred to work for the mines were obliged to pass through inspection. The 
others could choose whether to work for the farms or for the construction companies in towns 
located on the other side of the border.377 The workers using these routes had to keep their passes 
to use on their return so that they could not spend more time in the KNP. There are no official 
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records of numbers of Mozambican migrants that were employed in the KNP during the period 
of study of this thesis. There is also lack of information on the numbers of those who passed 
through the KNP to work in diverse sectors of economy in South Africa. Existing official records 
only refer to migrants recruited in Guijá and Massingir by WENELA. The table below shows the 
number of mineworkers recruited in Guijá and in the Massingir region by WENELA from 1944-
1955. 
  
Table 2: Migrant labour recruited by WENELA in Guijá and Massingir, 1946-1955378 
 
Year  Nº of workers 
Guijá Massingir 
1946 1632 21 
1947 2433 162 
1948 1358 162  
1949 1601 155 
1950 1189 172 
1951 1665 174 
1952 1673 184 
1953 64 124 
1954 1421 199 
1955 674 73 
 
The table above clearly demonstrates that there were many Mozambican migrants recruited in 
Guijá rather than in the Massingir region. As explained above, due to the proximity of the 
border, migrants from Massingir could easily get to labour recruitment posts in South Africa 
rather than migrants from Guijá. Because of the long way to the border, the latter preferred to 
follow the procedures imposed by the Portuguese administration. In the 1940s, the Portuguese 
administration in south western Mozambique complained that clandestine companies were 
illegally recruiting many workers from the area and officials companies had problems finding 
workers for the mining industry.379 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, colonial authorities tried to 
                                                          
378AHM. ISANI; Cx. 26. António Policarpo de Sousa Santos. Relatório de inspecção ordinária feita a circunscrição 
de Alto Limpopo povoados de Massangena Saúte e  Mavue – no periodo de 12 de Dezembro de 1942 à 14 de 
Maio. Relatório final elaborado em Maio de 1956, p. 37 
379AHM :ISANI. Cx. 26. Administration Services and Indigenous Inspection – Republic of Portugal – Mozambique 
Province - Ordinary report on the inspection made to the districts (circumscription) of Guijá – Massingir 
administrative post. Report covering the period from August 1942 to January 1957; p. 100: The inspector Júlio 
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control illegal migration by policing the Shingwedzi River. They used militias to arrest illegal 
migrants from southern Mozambique found on their way to South Africa. These efforts failed 
because migrants used different routes from those the colonial militias were placed and 
indifference of the militias.380 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Carlos Espírito Santo Leonor met with the villages’s headmen of Chaque, Chitar, Munhamane, Mongoé and 
Guijá. The meetings did not include headmen from the villages of Madingane, Massunguele, M`bhingo, 
Machamba, Chimange e Chibanze. 
380The report on African affairs inspection in Alto Limpopo does not details what it means by convenience or 
indifference of the militias. However, interviews in Massingir indicated that the Portuguese militias were recruited 
locally and they could not arrest migrants from their own villages but only coming from other villages and passing 
through their territories. This was a complaint of the official agent based in Pafuri who noticed that despite the 
existence of militias in that region there were many migrants who went to South Africa without passing through 
the procedures established by the Portuguese administration. See AHM-ISANI. Cx. Santos, António Policarpo de 
Sousa. ‘Relatório de inspecção ordinária feita à circunscrição de Guijá – Sede do posto de Massingir – do período 
de Agosto de 1942 à Janeiro de 1957’, p. 245  
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Map 5: WENELA recruiting posts in southern Mozambique and routes used by official 
and clandestine migrants from Southern Mozambique to South Africa.381 
 
                                                          
381Souto, Amelia. 1991. Moçambique: A delimitação de fronteiras. A look at a map shows why migrants from the 
coastal area preferred to converge in the Wenela recruitings station and then travel to Lourenço Marques where 
they boarded a train for South Africa, p.38  
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From the late 1950s up to the early 1970s, the roles of the villages’ headmen became more 
efficient in controlling illegal migration in the region. They informed the Portuguese 
administration about the passage of migrants from other regions through their villages. In most 
cases, foreign migrants arrested were brought to the public administration or taken to plantations 
to perform forced labour. It was for this reason that, in the early 1960s, migrants began to use 
more conventional routes and facilities created by WENELA in the region. Thus, migrants from 
the Massingir region preferred to be registered at the local administration offices, get the 
necessary documentation and travel documents and walk to Caniçado to take transport to South 
Africa rather than use the bush route. In doing this, they avoided to be arrested by the colonial 
administration officials and penalized 3 to 15 days of forced work at local administration. 
Moreover, they avoided all kinds of challenges of the bush route where some migrants were lost 
and starved to death; some were killed by poisonous animals like snakes, lizards, spiders or eaten 
by wildcats like lions and leopards.382 
 
Labour migration from southern Mozambique to South Africa had a direct impact on the 
development of agriculture and hunting practices. Migrants used their incomes to buy firearms 
used in hunting and invest in agriculture. In the early 1930s, migrants introduced the first 
ploughs in the area. The migrants’ families that used cattle to pull the ploughs were able to 
increase the size of their plots and their production rather than those who continued to rely on 
small handle hoes.383  
 
In the 1950s, a considerable proportion of migrants from Elephant and Shingwedzi catchments 
bought ploughs from South Africa to use in agriculture in their home villages. Thus, cultivators 
who produced enough for their consumption could sell their surplus to shopkeepers (cantineiros) 
at Mavodze village. They used the money they obtained from the sale of their surplus for the 
payment of hut taxes and to buy basic domestic commodities and some went as far as re-
investing some of it in agriculture.384 
                                                          
382 Interview with  Simion Mahori, Massingir Velho, July, 13th 2012 
383 Interview with Salomão Zandamela, Guijá, February 1979. In Manghezi, A. Trabalho forçado, p.19 
384 Ibiden 
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Agricultural development along the Elephants and Shingwedzi rivers brought about social 
differentiations in Massingir region. The families that had some of their members working in 
South Africa were amongst the wealthiest families. They could afford to buy cattle, ploughs and 
ox wagons. Thus, they could increase the size and productivity of their farms. They also used ox 
wagons for the transport of corn from the field to the granaries (barns) in their homesteads or 
used ox wagon to transport grains from their houses to the nearest villages (Mavodze shops) to 
exchange by other commodities. Those who had no money to buy ox wagon built slerghs (locally 
known as slay) to use in transporting crops and other goods.385 While in south of the Alto 
Limpopo Game Reserve local communities used oxen carts and slays for the movement of their 
goods, due to rough terrains and rivers in the inner villages, local communities preferred to use 
donkeys to transport their goods, dried bush meat and grains to sell or exchange and buy other 
commodities at Mavodze shops.386   
 
Oral accounts in the Massingir region also indicate that migrants brought from Transvaal, iron 
traps, firearms and wires used for the construction of traditional traps (Thithaga) and 
construction of kraals. Conventional iron traps and the traditional ones (made of wire) were very 
important instruments for hunting and security of African villages. They were used to kill wild 
animals for food and hunt predators that approached African villages to kill cattle. In some 
occasions, traps were used to kill predators that approached African villages and panic the 
villagers. Although the colonial hunting regulations allowed Africans to request to the colonial 
officers at local levels (chefes de posto) the permission to use traps to kill predators that 
approached African villages and panic the villagers, my interviewees referred that local hunters 
rarely approached the chefes de posto. Africans hunters knew that in such cases they would get 
permissions to use traps to kill predators. However, they feared that after they kill the predator 
the Portuguese authorities would confiscate the traps and they would have access to them only in 
other cases where presence of predators near their villages panics the villagers. However, the 
hunters needed the traps for their daily activities.387 
                                                          
385Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi,  23/1/ 2014 
386Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi,  23/1/ 2014 
387 Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi,  23/1/ 2014 
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The increase of firearms with Africans used particularly for hunting brought about changes the 
trade of firearms and gunpowder in southern Mozambique. Owners of the shops, which sold 
gunpowder and bullets used in hunting and related activities were requested to keep names and 
identities of their costums. In the early 1960s, when shops in Lourenço Marques started to 
request shooting licences to sell gunpowder, migrants working in the mines in South African 
began to use the opportunities they had in their companies to collect gunpowder to bring home 
and use for hunting. Carlos Ntongane recalled how difficult it was to collect gunpowder at his 
work place and take it to Mozambique.    
“In 1961, I was working in a goldfield in the Free Estate in South Africa. I was informed by a 
friend of mine who came after me that the Portuguese were no longer selling bullets and 
gunpowder to Africans without a proof of licence for gun use. I began to collect gunpowder from 
my work. I was working in a mining company. I was working underground; my team was 
responsible for the opening of new paths for the extraction of gold. We had to break down big 
pieces of stone used in the production of gold. We worked with sticks of dynamite and had a 
white supervisor behind us. When the white was not there, I took my chance to steal dynamite to 
extract the gunpowder. The dynamites weighed around 100g. There were days that it was 
practically impossible to steal the dynamite. It took me long time to collect about 4 kg of the 
gunpowder. Moreover, it was not easy to take the gunpowder home. If someone was found by the 
customs office at the border gate in Ressano Garcia with gunpowder the person was immediately 
arrested. I hide the gunpowder in my luggage. Arrived at home I used the gunpowder to load the 
guns. At that time, I used a muzzle-loading guns known in Shangan as xibamo xa muguinguelua. 
Once a person shot the gun, he had to reload it again”.388  
 
The weakness of Portugal's capitalist economy limited its ability to implement effective projects 
to explore the potentialities of land and use local labour to work toward the development of 
capitalist agriculture in Mozambique. Thus, labour migration in southern Mozambique and 
particularly in Guijá and Alto Limpopo became the mean of getting income to pay the colonial 
taxes and buy commodities for their families. Besides bringing home money to pay for the lobola  
and buy goods for their families, Africans found in labour migration an opportunity to acquire 
instruments used in hunting (conventional traps, wires used for the construction of traditional 
traps, gunpowder) that they could not access locally due to impositions of the colonial rule.  
 
 
 
                                                          
388Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, January, 26/2/ 2014 
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As examined in the next section, the migrants were not exempted from other forms of colonial 
exploitation. While they were working in South Africa their families were requested by the 
colonial administration to engage in cotton production. Thus, some migrants brought ploughs 
from South Africa to help their families in agriculture including the opening up of cotton 
farms.389 
 
4.2.2. Cotton production in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve  
Isaacman argues that the production of cotton in Mozambique to feed Portugal’s textile sector 
dates back to the colonial occupation of Mozambique.390 It seems, however, that before 1938 the 
Portuguese regime did not succeed in coercing Africans to grow cotton. Opposition from African 
cultivators, fluctuations of cotton prices in the European markets and lack of capital by the 
Portuguese administration are some of the reasons for such failure that Isaacman identified.391   
 
In the late 1930s, Salazar, Portugal’s Prime Minister, opted for forced cotton production to 
overcome lack of capital by the Portuguese administration. Accordingly, cotton enterprises or 
concessionárias were created to promote the production of cotton.392 Given the increasing 
demand for cotton by the European textile industry on the eve of World War II, Salazar 
centralized cotton production and its trade in the colonies and created the Colonial Cotton Export 
Board known in Portuguese as Junta de Exportação de Algodão da Colonia (JEAC).393 “To 
contain dissatisfaction and to stimulate production, the concessionary companies employed a 
number of European field agents known as propagandistas and overseers or capatazes in whom 
the state vested de facto police powers. The former were supposed to select the most suitable 
                                                          
389 Interview with Simião Sitoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014 
390Isaacman, Allen.1992. “Coercion, paternalism and the labour process: The Mozambican cotton regime 1938-
1961” JSAS,  18 (3): 487-526, p.490 
391 Isaacman, Allen.1992. “Coercion, paternalism and the labour process”, p.491  
392Complaints presented to the colonial inspectors by the villages headmen in Mongoè and Chaque, see AHM-
ISANI. Cx. 26. Santos, António Policarpo de Sousa. ‘Relatório de inspecção ordinária feita à circunscrição de 
Guijá – Sede do posto de Massingir – do período de Agosto de 1942 à Janeiro de 1957’, p. 108; In  southern 
Mozambique the Algodoeira do Sul de Save (ASS) was the cotton enterprise created to promote cotton 
production. 
393Isaacman, Allen “Coercion, paternalism and the labour process”, p.518 
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land and to provide the peasants with minimal technical instruction. They did neither. Instead, 
they relied on force and headmen of the local villages to increase output”.394  
In order to enlist the collaboration of the local villages’ headmen or regulos, the Portuguese 
empowered the régulos as their representatives at local levels.395 The Portuguese also exempted 
the régulos from the payment of hut taxes, and forced labour at the administration. From the 
early 1940s, the régulos became very important allies of the colonial administration for the 
enforcement of colonial laws at local level. People interviewed in the Massingir region 
acknowledge that régulos were the closest allies of the Portuguese within their villages. They 
produced information about numbers and ages of people in their villages and areas suitable to 
grow cotton. Accordingly, the Portuguese used such information to plan cotton farms and people 
to be involved in cotton production in each village.396 During their work, the régulos relied either 
on their village militias known as ndunas or on the colonial state militias known as cipaios.397  
 
From 1946 to the late 1950s, all adult males in southern Mozambique (i.e., aged 18 to 55) had to 
have a farm of 1 (one) hectare of cotton and half (½) hectare of cotton for each of their wives. 
The introduction of cotton in Guijá resulted in the scarcity of fertile land along the valleys of 
main rivers. The propagandistas (propagandists) and the concessionaries took the best land 
along the river valleys, near the water courses, roads and local markets for cotton production 
leaving the marginal land for food production.398  
 
                                                          
394Isaacman, Allen. 1985. “Chiefs, rural differentiation and peasant protest: The Mozambican forced cotton regime 
1938-1961” In.  African Economic History, 14, pp. 15-56, p. 21  
395Isaacman, Allen. 1985. “Chiefs, rural differentiation and peasant protest”, p. 24-25.  A number of material 
benefits accompanied the position of state-appointed chief. The colonial administration exempted the regulos 
from burdensome labour and tax requirements, provided them with uniforms and shoes, and, most importantly, 
paid them an annual salary as government functionaries. In the 1950s, most southern Mozambican regulos used 
tributary labour and plough to cultivate their fields. Since this exploitation of peasant labour enabled the régulos 
to fulfil their twin obligations as labour supervisors and model farmers, colonial officials not only sanctioned, but 
enforced, this practice. An elder from the southern region of Chibuto bitterly recalled that "every sunday Chief 
Cossa sent his madodas [assistants] to bring all the people to work his land. If they refused they were sent to the 
administrator where they were beaten and imprisoned. 
396Interview with Augusto Fanequisse, Machamba 26/2/ 2014; see also Interview with Fabião Vuqueia, Chimangue 
February 2014, see also Interview with Jeremias Mafanate Valoi, Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014 
397Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012 
398Interview with Assista Doutor Valoi, Massingir Velho, 27/1/ 2014 
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Cotton production in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve did not only use the best lands but also 
consumed most of the peasants’ time that could otherwise be spent on the production of food 
crops. Moreover, whereas in the family plots people could choose the size of the area they 
wanted to plant, the cotton fields were required to have standard sizes.399 Peasants in Guijá and 
Massingir recall famines that occurred in the region from the 1930s and 1940s related to 
combined factors such as cotton production and drought. Isaacman’s paper on cotton production 
in Mozambique clearly elucidates the difficulties that the peasantry in southern Mozambique 
experienced with the opening of new cotton farms (clearing the brush, burning vegetation in the 
heavy clay soils). 
“Cotton is a thankless crop. It demands everything from us but what do we get in exchange? 
We have to sell it at the price the government wants; we cannot dispute the price like corn, 
with the chestnuts, or with the mafurra seed. If it is a bad year and we lose all the cotton, 
does someone, pay us for the work we did? If, in the bargain, we have the misfortune of not 
getting anything from our field, what will we eat during the year? How will we clothe our 
children? Where can we go for help? In addition, on top of all that they say we do not want to 
work.”400 
 
From the early 1940s to the early 1950s, the weakness of the Portugal’s capitalist economy did 
not allow Portugal to invest in modern agriculture in southern Mozambique. It nonetheless 
exploited local labour to benefit the Portuguese economy by coercing Africans to engage in cash 
crop production to feed the Portuguese emerging textile industry. Lack of investment in agrarian 
extension led the Portuguese to rely on local authorities to choose areas for cotton production. In 
the Guijá region, cotton promoters forced the local cultivators to open cotton farms in the 
reserve. The introduction of forced cotton production in Alto Limpopo Game Reserve 
demonstrated that there were big differences between the general colonial policies with local 
practices. The same authorities, on the one hand, promoted ideas of fauna and ecosystem 
protection forced Africans to cut down trees to clear fields to grow cotton, on the other hand.401  
 
 
                                                          
399Isaacman, Allen “Coercion, paternalism and the labour process”, p.518  
400Polanah, Luís, 1980. The saga of a cotton capulana, Madison: University of Wisconsin-Madison. 1980, p.34, 
quoted in: Isaacman, Allen “Coercion, paternalism and the labour process, p. 509 
401Interview with Maressane Foliche Mbombe; Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014 
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Colonial administrative inspections made in the Guijá region in the period between 1942 and 
1957 noticed that there were many claims against cotton promoters. Africans reported to the 
government inspector that farmers who did not clear the cotton fields to increase cotton plants 
productivity were taken by the capatazers (overseers) or cipaios to be beaten at the 
administration.402 For fear of being arrested or being beaten up by the colonial authorities if they 
failed to collect cotton of good quality (known as cotton of 1st class), many people from the 
Guijá and particularly from Alto Limpopo Game Reserve left their villages and went to live in 
the Transvaal.403 
 
In 1958, cotton promoters forced local communities of the western part of Guijá (just at the east 
limit of the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve) to grow cotton inside the hunting reserve. As a result, 
the local communities requested a meeting with the administrator of Guijá to explain to him that 
they were not going to open cotton farms in the hunting reserve. This group of African 
cultivators had the assistance of an educated African who worked for the Portuguese authorities 
and knew the Portuguese law. Africans lodged such complaints as a strategy in order to buy time 
to enable them to work on their farms while the administration was looking for other areas to 
open up cotton farms. Nevertheless, a considerable number of Africans did not know about the 
existence of such regulations and grew cotton within the limits of the hunting reserve.404  
 
Interviews with local people in LNP (former Alto Limpopo Game Reserve) indicated that during 
the colonial period almost all the families living in the reserve had cotton farms. Although the 
numbers of people involved in forced cotton production are not available from statistics, 
interviews demonstrate the significance that cotton had on the Portuguese economy. Most often 
the colonial authorities working at local levels, instead of promoting values and rules that helped 
the protection of ecosystems in conservation areas, their policies resulted in devastation though 
the opening of new fields. Cotton production in Alto Limpopo Game Reserve showed there were 
                                                          
402For more details on cotton politics in Mozambique see Lemos, Manuel J. C. de. 1885. Fontes para o estudo do 
algodão em Moçambique: documentos de arquivo, 1938-1974. Trabalho de Diploma, Licenciatura em História 
com Especialidade em Documentação, UEM; see also Isaacman, A.1992.  “Coercion, paternalism and the labour  
process”  
403Interview with Gabriel Mukavi, Guijá, 16 February 1979. Manghezi, A. Trabalho forçado, p.46 
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differences between colonial rules and their enforcement. This contradiction was an inherent part 
of Salazar´s economic policy (1930-1974), which prompted economic growth in the colonies by 
exploiting them through a highly regimented labour regime requiring little capital investment.405  
 
It seems that, in the view of Salazar´s policies, Portuguese officers at local levels were forced to 
expand activities that contributed to expand revenues for the Portuguese (collection of hut taxes, 
labour migration, cash crops, etc.) whatever these were sustainable or in the local environments. 
In fact, north of the Elephants River, hunting fees paid by the sports and professional hunters 
entering the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve constituted another source of revenue for the colonial 
state.  
 
Interviews with local people in the LNP also indicated that during the colonial period cotton 
prices were very low and even during years of good production a family of about 6 to 8 people 
owning two (2) hectares of cotton could not live by income from cotton sales alone. Quite often, 
they used incomes from cotton sale to pay the hut taxes and buy some basic consumer goods. 
Due to complaints made by the local people about the abuses committed by cotton promoters, in 
the late 1950s, the colonial government recommended the abandonment of forced cotton 
production within the reserve.406 Forced cotton production was not abandoned immediately. 
During the 1950s, it was a source of income of some families, which did not have most of their 
members working in South Africa. These families continued to rely on income from cotton to 
pay the colonial taxes. Along the alluvial soils of the Elephants River cotton production rendered 
much more rather than in the arid upper land north the Elephants River. Interviewees did not 
establish a direct relationship between elimination of forced cotton production and hunting north 
of Elephants River. However, cultivators interviewed on this issue mentioned that in the 1950s 
and 1960s, a considerable number of the villagers of north of the Elephants River exchanged 
biltong for grains and other commodities at Mavodze shops  and some sold biltong to get cash to 
pay the colonial hut taxes.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
404Interview with Gabriel Mukavi, Guijá, 16 February 1979. Manghezi, A. Trabalho forçado, p.45 
405 For more comprehensive explanation on this regard see cotton production in Massingir in previous chapter 
406Interview with Salomão Zandamela, Guijá, February 1979. Manghezi, A. Trabalho forçado, p.35-37 
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4.2.3. Hunting for survival 
In the 1940s, the Portuguese administration in southern Mozambique increased the hut taxes 
from about 200 escudos in 1942 to about 250 escudos (9 USD) in 1949. Such taxes were too 
heavy for the local population. Just to elucidate on this point, a European hunter paid about 40 
escudos for a license that enabled him to kill four (4) elephants and put ivory on the market at a 
price of about 150 pounds each (at that time, the exchange rate for 150 pounds was equivalent to 
500 Escudos).407 In the early 1950s, the price of cattle in southern Mozambique was about 150 to 
200 escudos per head. In practice, in the absence of other sources of income all adults owning 
huts used as houses had to sell their cattle or the surplus of their production to pay the taxes, 
migrate to South Africa to look for employment or engage in hunting to gain some cash to pay 
the taxes.408 
 
Oral accounts in the Massingir region indicate that soon after the establishment of the Portuguese 
administration in the area, shopkeepers known in the Portuguese literature as cantineiros also 
came to open shops near the Portuguese administration office at Mavodze village. The 
cantineiros traded a wide range of commodities with Africans. The barter system practiced by 
the cantineiros at Mavodze village allowed them to buy grains and dried bush meat locally 
known as mitonga or biltong from Africans and sell to them basic consumer goods such as 
clothes, salt, alcoholic beverages, matches and kerosene.409  
 
Ntongane recalls that until the early 1950s, there was no hunting control in the area.410 Colonial 
documents indicate that due to deficient registration of hunters on their arrival at the Reserve and 
lack of communication systems between the Portuguese administration’s offices allowed hunters 
                                                          
407The exchange rate in 1949 was 1 USD to 28$75 escudos; see also AHM. ISANI; Cx 26 . António Policarpo de 
Sousa Santos. Relatório de inspecção ordinária feita a circunscrição de Alto Limpopo povoados de Massangena 
Saúte e  Mavue – no periodo de 12 de Dezembro de 1942 à 14 de Maio. Relatório final elaborado em Maio de 
1956 p,11-13 
408 Covane, L. A. O trabalho migratório e a agricultura no sul de Moçambique , p. 49  
409 Interview with Maressane Foliche Mbombe Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014 
410 Interview  with Carlos  Ntongane, Machamba, 26/2 /2014 
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to stay in the forest without the knowledge of local authorities.411 Since some Africans had the 
ability to use hunting rifles and knew the areas of concentration of the game, most often white 
hunters came to rely on the assistance of Africans for hunting and in some cases Africans hunted 
on their behalf.412 The case described below illustrates just how fragile the hunting control 
system in southern Mozambique was: 
“In 1949, a South African citizen of 46 years known as Charles White was arrested and accused 
of contraband, illegal hunting and prostitution in Saute Village, circunscrição of Alto Limpopo. 
The population of Saute village in Alto Limpopo reported to the administration that a South 
African citizen had settled in their village, hunting elephants, smuggling goods from South Africa 
to Mozambique, offering alcohol to young women and seducing them for sex. In 1947, White had 
applied for a hunting permit in Lourenço Marques district. His request was denied and he left 
Lourenço Marques and went to Inhambane where he applied for another hunting permit. Without 
knowing White’s behaviour, the government of Inhambane granted him a hunting licence, which 
he then used to hunt in Alto Limpopo. When the Gaza government had the information that 
White was using a permit issued in Inhambane to hunt in Gaza, it cancelled the licence. However, 
he continued hunting in Magude and Guijá in exchange for the payment of 10 pounds to his 
assistants for each elephant he killed. Disrespect shown to local authorities and general 
misconduct (prostitution and smuggling of alcoholic beverages from South Africa to 
Mozambique) led community members of Saute village to report to the local administration the 
presence of Charles White in their village. White was arrested and taken to Lourenço Marques for 
judgment.”413   
 
The arrest of Charles White was only a sign of the lack of intra-institutional communication and 
collaboration between the local and provincial authorities in southern Mozambique.414 Oral 
accounts indicate that the increase of hut taxes in Guijá region and lack of employment in the 
area forced Africans to migrate to seek employment in South Africa and those who stayed 
behind sought alliances with white hunters who paid them with rifles, bullets, clothes and money 
as compensation of their work. In the 1940s and 1950s, Africans used these rifles to hunt for 
themselves and sell the products of hunting to cantineiros at Mavodze.415 Before the late 1950s, 
                                                          
411 Ibiden 
412In the late 1940s special licences holders were allowed to stay 90 days in the bush and take with them 250 bullets; 
see AHM. G.G. Cx 178/C3; Caça, Transgressões e Multas. Comissão de Caça da Colonia de Moçambique, Nota 
para o Chefe de Repartição do Gabinete do Governador Geral de Moçambique em Lourenço Marques. Oficio nº 
33/1949 - Projecto Portaria para acabar com a caça livre do elefante em Lourenço Marques. 
413AHM. G.G. Cx 178/C1; Caça, Transgressões e Multas. “Do Processo Crime de Charles White; Requerimentos’  
Publica Forma  do abandono do comportamento  moral de Charles White. 
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when the Portuguese restricted the sale of bush meat to hunting licences holders, many Africans 
in the reserve used incomes from hunting to pay the Portuguese hut taxes.416 
 
Archival documents point to the inefficiency of the Portuguese administrative system as one of 
the reasons that contributed to the increase the number of illegal hunters in Alto Limpopo. The 
legislative decree nº 956 of 12/3/1945 authorized European citizens living in the Mozambican 
rural areas to buy self-defence weapons as long as they had applied for licences for use of self-
defence rifles. In the early 1950s, the Development of irrigated schemes and Portuguese planned 
settlements (Colonatos) in Chokwe region contributed to an influx of European families to the 
area (carpenters, masons, peasants, mechanics, and missionaries). After their arrival, the settlers 
requested the Portuguese authorities if they could obtain licenses for use of weapons for personal 
defence on allegations that Africans in southern Mozambique were violent.417 Most often, these 
settlers instead of using the rifles for self-defence, they used the rifles for hunting and thus 
contribute to escalate hunting in southern Mozambique.418 To solve the problem, in 1954, the 
Portuguese administration commissioned a study to examine the issue of firearms licenses in the 
district of Lourenço Marques. The commission concluded that dishonest citizens were using 
firearms not for self-defence only but also for hunting.419  
 
Based on the conclusion of the study, the Portuguese authorities differentiated the types of rifles 
that had to be used for the purpose of self-defence from those used for hunting. Therefore, it 
defined that applicants had to use pistols for self-defence and rifles of one or two pipes for 
hunting. Nevertheless, hunting continued to escalate in southern Mozambique and contributed to 
human and wildlife conflicts. As is commonplace knowledge, hunting practices represent threats 
to the lives of the population living in the hunting reserves because they can lead to movements 
of the wild as they flee from hunters chasing after them. Sometimes, the animals chased by the 
hunters ran in the direction of local villages, leading to panicking and endangering the 
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419 See License for carrying and use of the self-defence rifles in Appendix 1, document 7, p. 266 
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defenceless villagers especially woman and children. In 1957, Oscar Ruas, the then governor of 
the Gaza district got reports from local Portuguese administration in Guijá and Alto Limpopo 
indicating that hunting practices in the south Mozambique hinterland were leading to the random 
movement of herds of Elephants, thus threatening the lives of the local communities. In response 
to such reports, Ruas demanded that the central government relocate the population of the 
reserve to villages outside it or abolish the hunting reserve to re-establish the state reserve 
(created in 1923 and transformed into hunting reserve in 1930) to save the local peoples’ lives.420  
 
Regardless of the demand, no measures were implemented to protect the local families. The 
DCA alleged that because the population density in the area was very low (½ per km2), the soils 
were very poor for the development of agricultural projects and that there were no Portuguese 
interests to defend, it was therefore unfeasible to think about relocations or abolish the hunting 
reserve.421 As the government of the province did not implement any measures to protect the 
local communities, the government of Gaza district sent militias to the area to chase the 
elephants away from the local villages and kill them in severe cases. The government of Gaza 
district also gave orders to the militias not to leave a wounded animal in the proximity of the 
villages to prevent the injured animals to terrorize the villages.422 The governor of Gaza district 
solved this specific problem but did not resolve issues regarding measure to better fauna 
management in southern Mozambique. Over exploitation of natural resources, special fauna 
owing to uncontrolled hunting and animals diseases continued to be the problems of the 
Mozambican conservation areas and particularly of the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve.    
 
4.3. Animal diseases and conservation in the south western Mozambique borderland  
The study of animal diseases is an issue that needs fuller and comprehensive analysis in the 
history of conservation in Mozambique. Existing historical accounts have documented the effects 
                                                          
420Ibiden  
421AHM-GG, Cx. 384 - Governo do Distrito de Gaza. Ref Gov/MC. N 226/A/8; Carta assinada pelo chefe de 
Repartição de Gabinete do Distrito de Gaza em João Belo para o Director dos Serviços de Administração Civil de 
Lourenço Marques, 22/1/1957; The Governor of  Gaza district had a meeting with population living in the reserve. 
In such a meeting he and the population debated the increase of hunting within the area and impacts on the local 
populations and to fauna. Accordingly, the population demanded that the Government abolish the reserve. 
422 Ibid. 
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of animal diseases on wildlife and cattle. However, they paid little attention to the relationship 
between animal diseases and conservation. In the following pages, I examine the outbreak of 
animal diseases and game policies along the south western Mozambique borderland.  
 
Before the advent of colonialism in Mozambique, African societies developed strategies to deal 
with animal diseases specifically the tsetse fly. As discussed in Chapter 2, cultivators in southern 
Mozambique used to burn vegetation and pastures to enable its regeneration during the rainy 
season. This practice allowed them to kill the tsetse and its germs and keep their villages free 
from the depredations of tsetse flies. During the civil war in the Gaza state (1858-62) this 
practice was abandoned contributing to the spread of tsetse fly northward which devastated cattle 
in the region extended 30 miles east of the Libombo Mountains in the Mozambican hinterland.423  
 
Mackenzie indicates that in the 1860s and 1860s, Umzila combined human settlements and large 
scale hunting to combat tsetse fly in the region north of the Save River.424 Little is known about 
further interventions made by Umzila’s son Gungunhane after he had left Mussorize and tracked 
to Mandlakasi in southern Mozambique where he established the capital of the Gaza state and 
ruled until 1895 when he and his allies were forced to surrender by the colonial army.  
 
Gargalho has argued that despite the fact that in the early 20th century several cases of the 
outbreak of the disease were reported in central Mozambique, the Portuguese did not develop an 
efficient method to control the disease.425 In the 1920s and 1930s, some fragmented tsetse belts 
continued to be found north of the Save River right up to the Zambezi River.426 Curiously, 
almost all the game reserves in southern Mozambican were created during the 1930s (Maputo 
Special Reserve, Alto Limpopo Game Reserve, Panda and Zinave game reserves) and some 
(Alto Limpopo Game Reserve, and Zinave Game Reserve) were located near the region prone to 
                                                          
423Harries, Patrick. “Labor migration from Delagoa Bay hinterland to South Africa” 
424MacKenzie, John M. 1988. The empire of nature: hunting, conservation and British imperialism, p. 243 
425Gargalho, Eduard. 2009. “A question of game or cattle? The fight against Trypanosomiasis in Southern Rhodesia 
(1898–1914)”  JSAS,  35(3): 727-753, p. 743 
426Ford, J. 1960. “The advances of Glossina Morsitans and G. Pallidipes into the Sabi and Lundi River Basins, 
Southern Rhodesia”. Proceedings of the 8th meeting of the ISCTRC (Jos), CCTA Publication nº 62: pp. 219–229, 
p. 220 
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infection by the tsetse fly. Nevertheless, the colonial authorities in southern Mozambique did not 
develop strategies to combat the tsetse fly and other animal diseases in the game reserves. Nor 
did they hire qualified staff to work on the protection of fauna in cases of outbreak of animal 
diseases within and outside of the “limits” of hunting frontiers. 
 
In the late 1930s, the southern Mozambique region was affected by foot and mouth disease, 
which reduced the population of wild stock and cattle.427 The statistics of such losses in 
Mozambique are scarce but very detailed on the South African side. It is known, however, that 
the Portuguese and the South African authorities introduced import restrictions on timber, fruits, 
vegetables and live animals (pigs, sheep and cattle) and animal products (skins, lather, wool, 
feathers, milk, cream, blood, meat, manures, forage, dry hay and cattle food) between the two 
territories.428  
 
Due to the absence of a border fence between the Transvaal and Mozambique that could deter 
animal movements from Mozambique to the KNP, the South African authorities feared that 
animals from Mozambique could enter the South African territory and thus contribute to 
widespread of the disease into the KNP. The South African authorities also feared that the 
situation could result in a wide loss of the KNP wild stock. As a measure of protection, in early 
January 1938, the South African authorities began to erect fences on some sections along the 
Transvaal and Mozambican frontier and in March of the same year, they requested that the 
Portuguese administration in southern Mozambique move back (7 km) the cattle of the villages 
located along the border.429 For that reason, the South African authorities argued that cattle from 
                                                          
427AHM. Direção dos Serviços de Administração Civil Cx. 80  Portaria nº 821 –12/10/1910; see also Portaria 
Provincial nº 47 – 14/2/1925/ 84, 84- 18/2/1925; see also Correspondence from Consul General for the Union of 
South Africa to Governor-General of Mozambique  Later reference - C.G. 29 Vol. 2  - FFP/CAP 15/10 /1938 
428The statistics in South Africa indicates that in Barbeton district altogether 2741 cattle and 493 small stocks were 
destroyed. Nota para a Repartição Técnica dos Serviços de Veterinaria em Lourenço Marques. 22/4/1938 - 
Referência informação recebida da África do Sul em 29/1/1938 
429AHM. Direção dos Serviços de Administracão Civil Cx. 80. Nota da União da Africa do Sul Refêrencia N.C.G. 
de 14/1/ 1938 - Registado na Repartição do Gabinete dos Serviços de Veterinária de Moçambique em 14/1/1938 
sob Oficio nº 114 – Assinado pelo Chefe interino dos Serviços com a aprovação do Governador-Geral José Cabral 
- Oficio do Consulado da União da África do Sul;  See correspondence from  Mozambique General-Governor to 
the to the South Union High Commissioner’s Office in Cape Town, Reference 161/L-18  on 13/3/1938, see also 
Correspondence from Mozambique General-Governor to the to the South Africa Union High Commisioner´s 
office in Cape Town on 14/3/1938, See also Correspondence from the Mozambique General-Governor to the to 
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Mozambican villages in the south KNP were crossing the border to drink water in a waterhole in 
Munwuenei Spruit. Therefore, since the wild stock in the KNP also used the same waterholes, 
cattle from Mozambique were considered a threat to the wildlife in the KNP because they could 
infect water and in turn affect the wild stock in the KNP.430 In the AHM, I did not find further 
correspondence between the South Africans and the Portuguese regarding foot and mouth 
disease and the construction of fences to avoid contamination of wild stock in the KNP by cattle 
from Mozambique. Nevertheless, it is known that fences along the border between the South 
East Transvaal and Mozambique (Crocodile to Sabi rivers) were only erected in 1961 and 
completed in 1962 and the northern section was concluded in the late 1970s.431  
 
Joubert also traced some scenarios and routes that the disease would have followed to reach the 
KNP. However, he concluded by saying that the KNP authorities suspected that the diseases 
could have been brought to KNP territory by Africans from northern region of the KNP 
including those from Mozambique entering KNP mainly from the border of Pafuri.432  But, 
colonial documents indicate that the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique rejected the 
hypothesis that the foot and mount diseases, which affected both wildlife and cattle in the KNP, 
would have entered the South African territory coming from the south western Mozambique.433 
Lack of written evidences does not allow me to conclude from which side the disease appeared. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that in the 1920s to the late 1950s the Pafuri border gate was the main 
entry point used by migrants from northern regions of Sul de Save Province.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the South Africa Union High commissioner’s Office in Cape Town,  Ref. 161/L-18  on 13/3/1938, see also 
Correspondence from Mozambique General-Governor to the to the South Africa Union High Commissioner’s 
Office in Cape Town on 14/3/1938 
430AHM. Direção dos Serviços de Administracao Civil Cx. 80. Nota da União da Africa do Sul Referencia N.C.G. 
de 14/1/ 1938 - Registado na Repartição do Gabinete dos Servicos de Veterinaria de Mocambique em 14/1/1938 
sob Oficio nº 114 – Assinado pelo Chefe interino dos Serviços com a aprovação do Governador-Geral José Cabral 
- Oficio do Consulado da Uniao da Africa do Sul. 
431Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume II, p. 277  
432 Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume II, p. 69 
433AHM. Direcção dos Serviços de Administracao Civil Cx. 80. Nota da União da Africa do Sul sob referência 
N.C.G. de 14/1/ 1938 - Registado na Repartição do Gabinete dos Serviços de Veterinaria de Moçambique em 
14/1/1938 sob Oficio nº 114 – Assinado pelo Chefe interino dos Serviços com a aprovação do Governador-Geral 
José Cabral - Oficio do Consulado da União da África do Sul. 
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As mentioned above the outbreak of foot and mouth disease had forced the South African 
authorities to implement some measures to protect KNP animal from the disease. However, until 
the early 1940s, only a few sections of the border were fenced.434  The natural conditions, which 
existed north of the Limpopo to Save River, were favourable for the development of Glossinas 
Morsitans. Moreover, the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve was just a hunting ground for 
professional hunters as it lacked staff to supervise hunting or take care of the fauna in the case of 
outbreak of infectious diseases.  
 
Unfortunately, between the 1940s and 1950s, the regions north of Save River came to be 
devastated by animal disease caused by the tsetse fly, the Glossina Morsitans. Thus, the 
continuation of hunting practices south of Save River to the north bank of the Limpopo River 
represented a serious threat to livestock ranchers as hunting practices could have resulted in 
movements of wild stock from the areas of concentration of G Morsitans to the southern 
regions.435 Of course, the contact between the infected wild stocks with cattle represented a 
disaster for African herders.436 Additionally, lack of physical boundary between the Mozambique 
and South Africa represented a threat to cattle and wildlife not only in Mozambique but also to 
the KNP’s wild stock because the infected stocks could move from one country to another.437  
 
As a measure to curb the quick spread of the disease from north of Save River to the southern 
Mozambique region in 1951, the Portuguese government recommended a complete closure of 
hunting in the Sul de Save Province for a period of two (2) years. The Government needed time 
to harmonize strategies between the Department of Civil Administration (DCA), the 
Mozambican Game Board (CCM) and the Mozambique Mission to Combated Tripanossomiasis 
                                                          
434 For more comprehensive details see Chapter V. 
435The limits were set as follows: west side - a straight line from the right bank of the Limpopo River in front of 
Machambo (now the village of Machamba) to the village of Massingir on the left bank of the Elephants River. 
Decreto Provincial nº 765, 13/8/ 1941 
436AHM. Direcção dos Serviçoes de Administracção Civil Cx. 80; North of Limpopo River the hunting seasons were 
restricted to 3 months, i.e., from July to September. See also Comissão de Caça da Província de Moçambique. 
Lourenço Marques. Ref. 68/57 de 8/3/1957. Carta da Comissão de Caça assinada pelo Presidente da Comissão Sr. 
Mário de Carvalho Alcantra para o Director dos Serviços de Administração Civil em Lourenço Marques. 
437 For more comprehensive details see Chapter V. 
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(MCT) and bring about a new strategy to fight tsetse fly and the spread of G. Morsitans from the 
north bank of the Save River to southern Mozambique.438  
 
Unfortunately, it seems that from 1951 to 1954, no efficient methods were developed to deter the 
advance of the tsetse fly southward. In August 1955, the CCM reported that five kraals in two 
villages located along the street Massangena-Chigamane-Maxaila in the north bank of the 
Limpopo River had been devastated by tsetse fly causing considerable loss of cattle.439 Another 
report dated 19th September 1955 from the headman of a village located just a few kilometres 
from the north bank of the Limpopo River indicated that infection of the area by tsetse fly 
resulted in the loss of 552 cattle in 27 kraals.440 
 
In 1956, the president of the CCM, Andrade da Silva Alantra, as a way to justify  the spread of 
the disease from central Mozambique to region located south of the Save River, accused the 
Departments of veterinary, civil administration and agriculture for being the institutions 
responsible for the widespread of G. Morsitans southward. For Alantra, the spreading of G. 
Morsitans southward was a result of the restriction of hunting activities, which had been imposed 
by the government from 1945 to 1952 and from 1953 to 1956. From the viewpoint of the head of 
the CCM, the only way to stop the spread of G. Morsitans southward was not the complete 
closure of hunting activities but the development of agriculture along the south bank of Save rive 
particularly in Massangena region, as the farms would create a tsetse free belt preventing the 
advance of the fly southward.441  
 
                                                          
438The records of Department of Veterinary indicate that in the 1950s, there were more than 70,000 head of cattle in 
the district of Lourenço Marques, being Alto Limpopo (20.000) and Guijá (52.000): See: AHM. G.G- Direcção 
dos Serviços de Administracao Civil. Cx, 104; Carta de Arnaldo de Almeida Gomes chefe da Repartição de Caça 
da Direção dos Serviços de Administração Civil para a Comissão de Caça da Colónia, Carta datada de 22/6/ 1951 
439AHM. GG Cx 384. Carta da MCT Sobre a forma como decorreu a acção de controle de caça na Circunscrição de 
Alto Limpopo, por brigradas subordinadas a Comissao de Caça em que a Missão de Combate as 
Tripanossomíases deveria assistir tecnicamente. Lourenço Marques, 22/1/1956, carta assinada pelo chefe da 
missão o Sr. Mario Andrade e Silva; see also Governo Geral de Moçambique. Arquivo de Repartição de Gabinete. 
Ano 1948-58 – Processo A/ 10 F, Assunto: Missao Zoológica. Ordenado do motorist da Missão Zoologica, 
12/08/1955 
440AHM. G.G. Cx 384. Carta do Chefe da Missao de Combate as Tripanossomíases. Lourenço Marques 4/10/1955. 
Assinado pelo secretário Jorge Lopes Domingos 
441Ibid. 
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Given the weakness of the Portugal´s capitalist economy, the plan of the president of CCM was 
unrealistic and came out as a response of restrictions of hunting imposed by the government. The 
area north of Limpopo River to Save River is arid and lacks water. Therefore, the development 
of agriculture in that area would imply considerable investment in infrastructure and human 
resettlements. Clearly, this kind of investment takes time and at that period, the government 
plans were focused on the development of irrigation schemes in the Lower Limpopo and studies 
for the construction of the Massingir dam.442 It was not feasible to invest many resources for 
agricultural development in an arid area with poor soils and lacking water. In fact, until the late 
1960s no agricultural projects were developed in the area proposed by Alcantra. 
 
According to Mutwira, in the late 1940s and 1950s trypanosomiasis scares led to massive game 
sweeps (killing of game) in Southern Rhodesia in an attempt to clear areas infested by the 
disease. A Rhodesian veterinary report circulated during the International Scientific Committee 
Meeting held in Salisbury in September 1956 indicated that 41,576 animals were slaughtered 
only in 1951.443 After this conference, the MCT proposed the Portuguese authorities in 
Mozambique to use game sweeps as a measure to prevent the spread of G. Morsitans southward. 
Despite the fact that the CCM disagreed with the mass killing of the game (The CCM proposed 
to slaughter the infected livestock) to fight the tsetse fly because it considered that the measure 
would lead to an irrecoverable loss of livestock and damage the environment. In the late 1950s, 
the colonial government in Mozambique came to use game sweeps as a measure to prevent the 
spread of G. Morsitans from the north bank of Save River to the southward regions.444 
Archival accounts demonstrate that the strategy of using animal slaughtering for disease control 
was an inefficient method to deter the advance of tsetse fly southward. The MCT and the CCM 
lacked staff, financial and technical resources to deter the advance of the tsetse fly southward. 
The two joint teams created by the colonial government (the teams were composed of members 
                                                          
442For more detailed information in this regard see Chapter V 
443Mutwira, Roben. 1989.  “Southern Rhodesian Wildlife Policy (1890-1953): A question of condoning game 
slaughter?”  JSAS 15 ( 2): 250-262  
444AHM. G.G; Cx. 384. Missão de Combate as Tripanossomíases – Assunto: Sobre a forma como decorreu a acção 
de caça na área da circunscrição do Alto Limpopo por brigadas subordinadas a Comissão de Caça em que a 
Missão de Combate as Tripanossomíases devia assistir. Informação nº. 18, de 20/12/1956; assinado por M. A. 
Andrade da Silva., Presidente da MCT. 
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from the Entomology services, Veterinary Department and hired hunters) and coordinated by 
staff of the CCM and the MCT had 42 members each and had to control an area approximately 
200 km inland from the seaside sand dunes.445 Moreover, only 15 hunters in each team were 
armed with rifles, the other members assisted the hunters, cleaning the slaughtered animals and 
clearing the paths used by trucks for the transportation of the meat.446 
 
The joint commission worked for a period of 5 months a year. Consequently, even in the case of 
a successful round up where the wild stock from infected areas was driven back to the north 
(Mabote, Manhone and, Chituta), the wild stock returned to the southern areas when the mission 
was interrupted (October to May each year). Moreover, unlike elephants, mammals like kudus 
and zebras lived not in organized herds but scattered in the bush, thus making their control 
practically impossible.447 
 
Until the late 1950s, only few sections of the Transvaal and Mozambican border had fences. 
Therefore, the expansion of the tsetse belt southward was a concern not only of the Portuguese 
but also of the KNP board, which feared a disaster in the Park. To avoid the encroachment of the 
tsetse belt onto KNP territory, the KNP board demanded the disinfection of cargo and people 
entering the KNP from the Mozambican districts of Alto Limpopo and Guvuro. In response to 
this appeal, in 1957, the colonial government in Mozambique installed in Alto Limpopo and 
Govuro 4 disinfection posts for the purpose.448  
 
The numbers of the slaughtered animalsf presented by different commissions involved in the 
programme varies significantly. It is estimated that from 1947 to 1969 the brigades working on 
the control of the wild stock diseases in Alto Limpopo killed at least 230.000 mammals, among 
them elephants, rhinos, hippopotamus, buffalos, zebras, gazelles and antelopes. The use of 
animal slaughtering for disease control was severely criticized by different institutions and 
                                                          
445Clapperton Mavhunga & Marja Spierenburg “A finger on the pulse of the fly” 
446AHM: G.G. Cx. 384 Comissão de Caça da Província de Moçambique. Instrução para o funcionamento das 
brigadas de controlo de caça na Coutada do Save; Lourenço Marques,  21/1/ 1957. 
447 Ibiden 
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conservationists who defended the idea that Portugal had to take the issue of fauna protection 
seriously.449 In the 1940s and 1950s, Portuguese citizens from the main Mozambican cities and 
international organizations recommended that the authorities create national parks in southern 
Mozambique where the wild stock would be confined and where the government would 
implement effective disease control for wild stock, avoiding its contact with cattle.450 The 
criticism focused particularly on lack of supervision of the hunting reserves and forests.451 
 
Besides the above-mentioned problems, the program to combat the tsetse fly on the north bank of 
the Limpopo had social and economic implications for Africans. Africans involved in the 
programme were paid 100 escudos monthly as against 900 escudos paid to the Portuguese non-
qualified staff and 20000 to Portuguese qualified staff.452 In the same period, unqualified black 
employees in industry had a salary of 180 escudos.453 Besides the low salaries, the workload of 
these Africans was quite heavy. They had to cut down trees to build fences to prevent the 
movement of animals from one side to the other. Very often, Africans had to call their family 
members to help transport the slaughtered animals to sites where the meat was loaded into trucks 
for transport to the nearest villages and towns.454 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
448AHM: G.G. Cx. 384. Carta do Chefe da Missão de Combate a Tripanossomíases assinada pelo seu director 
Andrade Silva para o directir da Administração Civil em Lourenço Marques. Note 2/3/ 1957, p.6 
449Clapperton Mavhunga & Marja Spierenburg “A finger on the pulse of the fly”, p.130-132 
450 Souza Correa, Sílvio Marcus de. “Caça esportiva e preservacionismo na África colonial, p. 7, see also Clapperton 
Mavhunga & Marja Spierenburg “A finger on the pulse of the fly, p.131 
451 Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador", p230 
452 In 1941, the exchange rate 1 escudo was equivalent to 99 Sterling Libra. Note that in the same exchange rate 
sterling Libra to rand was equivalent to 1 to 1. Source: Leite, Joana Perreira. 1989.  La information de economie 
colonial au Mozambique [PhD] Paris, Ecole de Hautes Etudes en Scenecie Sociales, p.385 
453AHM: G.G. Cx. 384 Missão de Combate as Tripanossomíases – Assunto: sobre a forma como decorreu a acção 
de caça na área da circunscrição do Alto Limpopo por brigadas subordinadas a Comissão de Caça em que a 
Missão de Combate as Tripanossomíases devia assistir. Informação nº 18, 20/12/1956, assinado por M. A. 
Andrade da Silva. Presidente da MCT. 
454 AHM: G.G. Cx. 384 Comissão de Caça da Província de Moçambique. Instrução para o funcionamento das 
brigadas de controlo de caça na Coutada do Save; Lourenço Marques.  21/1/ 1957. 
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In reality, it meant that the Portuguese paid 100 escudos for two or three Africans from the same 
family working in this programmes. Having 2 to 3 members of the same family working for a 
very low salary meant reduction of labour force for the production of food crops.455 During my 
fieldwork in the Massingir region, I did not find people who participated in these programmes. 
People interviewed about colonial programs undertaken within the area for the control of animal 
diseases reported that it was practically impossible to refuse the call from the administration to 
join such a programme in which participation was compulsory. 
 
4.4. New management approaches for hunting reserves in southern Mozambique 
In the late 1950s, Portugal sought cooperation from private firms to improve the management of 
the Mozambican hunting reserves in Mozambique. In the early 1960s, they leased the 
administration of the Zinave Hunting Reserve in Inhambane district to Mozambique Safarilandia 
owned by two brothers, namely Rui Abreu and Mário Abreu.456 The company built some tourist 
chalets to host the visitors and some gravel roads within the hunting reserve. The company also 
hired up to eight professional hunters to work as scouts and accompanied visitors during their 
stay in the reserve.457  
 
In 1961, the Portuguese converted the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into a Hunting Concession 
nº 16 well known in Portuguese as Coutada 16 and delegated the Veterinary Department to 
undertake detailed studies for the final delimitation of Coutada 16. The transformation of the 
Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into Coutada 16 was aimed at better fauna management in the area 
as well as the provision of sport and adventure opportunities to licensed hunters on the payment 
of a fee to the colonial government. Official documents on activities undertaken by the 
Portuguese from 1961 to 1972 are scarce. Personal notes of Amadeu Peixe, a professional hunter 
who worked for Moçambique Safarilandia, indicate that Coutada 16 was leased to a private 
                                                          
455AHM: G.G. Cx. 384. Missão de Combate as tripanossomíases – Assunto: sobre a forma como decorreu a acção de 
caça na área da circunscrição do alto Limpopo, por brigadas subordinadas a comissão de caça em que a MCT 
devia assistir. Informação nº 18, de 20/12/1956, assinado por M. A. Andrade da Silva. Presidente da MCT. 
456These brothers owned the Tivoli hotels in Lourenço Marques and Beira: see Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei 
caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador", p.197 
457Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador", p.19 
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safari company known as Limpopo Safaris belonging to a Portuguese executive named Manuel 
Sarnadas.458  
 
In the early 1960s, Sarnadas built some tourist facilities in Coutada 16 near the Machampane 
River (a tributary of the Elephants River) where he had a Portuguese professional hunter known 
as Madaulene.459 In the late 1960s, Madaulene hired some Africans who assisted him to develop 
the infrastructure, and he forbade local people to hunt near the areas surrounding his facilities.460 
From 1961 to 1974, the Limpopo Safaris was one of the most often-visited safari reserves in 
Southern Mozambique. In his notes, Peixe emphasised that many of the clients of the Zinave or 
Coutada 4 asked him to assist them to acquire permits to hunt on the south bank of the Limpopo 
(Coutada 16), where by 1964 elephants could still be found. Peixe, who made notes while on his 
hunting trips, noted the following: “We chased a group of Cambaco (name given to big elephants 
by Portuguese) trying to kill the big ones for trophies … unfortunately, they run and entered 
KNP territory. We were able to kill the small one.”461 This statement demonstrates that despite 
the establishment of private Safari companies to improve the preservation of the fauna in 
southern Mozambique hunting reserves, the control on hunting frontiers had never been effective 
and hunters who got their licences in Mozambique sometimes entered the alien territories for 
hunting. 
 
While Coutada 16 operated south of Limpopo River, in the north banks another private safari 
company known as Nyalaland Safaris owned by Jose Ruiz Cartigas was devoted to sport hunting 
of Inyala (Tragelapusphus anglasi). Due to the absence of clear limits between Coutada 16 and 
Nyalaland Safaris, some of the clients of the Nyalaland Safaris ended going beyond its limits to 
hunt in Coutada 16. This problem was definitively solved in 1969 when the Portuguese 
                                                          
458Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador", p.197 
459 Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 25/8/ 2013 
460After independence Madaulene and his assistants abandoned the area leaving the infrastructure unattended. In 
2002, soon after the establishment of the Limpopo National Park, the area was leased to a South African 
enterprise, which is currently developing new touristic facilities. Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, 
26/2/2014 
461Peixe, Amadeu. Como me tornei caçador guia e um bem sucedido atirador, p.197 
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government defined the limits of Coutada 16, the so- called “final demarcation” of the limits of 
Coutada 16.462 
 
People interviewed during my fieldwork in the Massingir region indicated that from the early 
1960s to 1974, the Portuguese administration used to send African scouts known locally as 
mbocotanas regularly to the area to undertake supervision of the reserve. Normally, the scouts 
travelled in groups of two to three people. During their mission, they stayed three to four days in 
a village and then moved to other villages where they could stay for a number of extra days. 
Most often, the mbocotanas entered private spaces such as houses and corn granaries looking for 
vestiges of hunting. Those who were found with bush meat, animal skins were taken to the 
administration where they were beaten or imprisoned and subjected to hard labour. 463  
 
The mbocotanas faced many problems in their work. The area for their supervision was quite 
big. Quite often they commuted by bicycles or donkey. Consequently, hunters knew the direction 
that they had taken. Moreover, after remaining in Coutada for 2 or 3 weeks they returned to 
Guijá- Caniçado (the former headquarters of the circunscrição de Guijá) to submit their reports 
to colonial authorities. Therefore, Africans hunted during the time mbocotanas were not present 
in the area.464 In the later 1960s, the working condition of mbocotanas had improved 
significantly; they had a vehicle (Land Rover) which they used as transport during the 
supervision activities. They also had a tent used for camping. Since there were no roads within 
Coutada 16 the vehicle could only reach some of the villages located at the southern end of 
Coutada and the mbocotanas had to use bicycles to reach the distant areas.465   
                                                          
462The representative of the Governor-General of Mozambique Rui de Araujo Ribeiro by the ordinance 14987 of 
1stof May 1961 converted the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve to Safari Game Reserve nº 16 and set the precise 
coordinates of Coutada.  North: a point situated on the border with Transvaal and five km distance from the right 
bank of the Limpopo river, following in parallel the right bank of the river until this changes direction toward the 
southeast; Esat: Continuing the previous boundary, parallel to the river, 5 km distance until arriving in front of the 
Mapai Village, following the axis of the river; from here move on to accompany the course of the Limpopo River 
until its crossing with the Elephants River. South: it follows the course of the Elephants River upstream until the 
international border next to the frontier L. West: from the frontier [L] following the line of the border until the 
5km from the Limpopo River. 
463 Interview with Mareassane Foliche Mbombe, Mbingo 24/2/2014 
464 Interview with Mareassane Foliche Mbombe, Mbingo 24/2/2014 
465 Interview with Carlos Ntongane, Machamba, 26/2/2014 
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As explained in chapter 5, in the early 1970s the Portuguese began the construction of Massingir 
dam along the Elephants River. The dam was built to regulate water in the Lower Limpopo and 
enhance the development of irrigation schemes in the Massingir region. Therefore, the 
Portuguese planned to relocated people living along the Elephants valley in villages located at 
the confluence of Shingwedzi-Limpopo Rivers. Therefore, this measure would allow them to 
benefit from irrigation schemes that were to be built by the Portuguese administration few 
kilometres downstream of the Massingir dam as well as resettle the families that had its houses 
and field along the Elephants valley in new villages situated out of Coutada. The Frelimo 
government, which came to power on 25 June, 1975 did not follow the colonial resettlement 
program. Instead, it moved the communities from the Elephants valley to poor soils in upland 
areas in Coutada 16, reducing the ability of these communities to produce crops for their 
sustenance and thus increasing their dependence on bush meat for food.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
Despite the establishment of the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve in 1930, Africans continued to 
live in the reserve and relied on rain fed agriculture, cattle keeping and hunting for their survival.  
The implementation of the Salazar rule in the colonial districts of Guijá and Alto Limpopo 
(1930s to 1950s) increased the exploitation of the local resources and its population. Thus, 
Africans were coerced to grow cotton to feed the emerging Portuguese textile sector. Cotton 
farms used the best African lands and consumed cultivators’ time that could otherwise be spent 
on food crops. Such situations resulted in crop failure and famines and pushed Africans to rely 
on hunting for food.  
 
In the 1940s, the Salazar administration in southern Mozambique also increased the hut taxes, a 
situation that pushed many youths and men to look for sources of income to pay the taxes. Thus, 
hunting and labour migration to Skukuza and other places in South Africa were some of the 
strategies used by Africans to earn some cash income. Labour migration in the colonial districts 
(circunscrição) of Guijá and Alto Limpopo was responsible for the introduction of ploughs, 
which contributed to the increase in farming areas. Africans also brought from South Africa 
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gunpowder and iron traps used for hunting. Lack of staff, lack of inter-institutional coordination 
and inefficient control of the hunting reserves in southern Mozambique allowed illegal hunters to 
take control of the reserves and hunt out of limits imposed by game regulations. Most often, 
European hunters hired African hunters to assist them in hunting. As compensation, they offered 
them money, alcohol, rifles and ammunition. Accordingly, Africans used the rifles and 
ammunition given to them by Europeans to hunt for their own survival and sell the products of 
hunt to cantineiros at Mavodze village. 
 
From the early 20th century to the late 1950s, the outbreak of animal diseases resulted in new 
challenges for the Portuguese government in Mozambique to improve its capacity to control wild 
stock diseases inside and outside the limits of the reserve. In the late 1930s, the outbreak of the 
foot and mouth disease was controlled by import restrictions on wood and animal products 
between South Africa and Mozambique. In the late 1950s, the Portuguese administration tried to 
control the advance of tsetse fly from the central region to southern Mozambique by introducing 
mass killing of fauna along the Limpopo River and Save River corridor. Lack of resources and 
staff hindered the control of the disease and in the mid-1950s some regions in southern 
Mozambique were devastated by the tsetse fly with considerable cattle loss. 
 
In 1961, the Portuguese transformed the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into a Safari Game 
Reserve. The measure was introduced to allow private institutions to apply for the control of the 
area and introduce effective game control measures. Four years later, the Frelimo liberation 
movement began a war to overthrow the colonial regime (see chapter five for more details) and 
in 1975, the country gained its political independence and Frelimo rose to power. The next 
chapter (See Chapter V) examines how independence and Frelimo development policy affected 
conservation and development programmes started during the colonial period. Due to the 
construction of the Massingir dam, the government relocated the communities living along the 
Elephants’ valley specifically in the area designed for dam reservoir in poor lands located above 
the food plain in Coutada 16. This situation resulted in widespread famines and hunger and 
hunting for food became a means of survival.  
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CHAPTER V: THE BUILDING OF THE MASSINGIR DAM:  DEVELOPMENT, 
CONSERVATION AND RURAL TRANSFORMATION IN COUTADA 16, 1972-1983 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I demonstrated that from the early 1900s to the mid-1940s the 
Portuguese administration made very few investments in the southern Mozambique hinterland. 
The Portuguese administration in this area put much of its efforts on the collection of fees 
imposed on hunters when applying for hunting licenses, collection of hut taxes, control of labour 
migration to South Africa and exploitation of the local population by coercing them to produce 
cotton to supply the Portuguese textile industry.  
 
By the early 1950s, the Portuguese administration had embarked on infrastructure development 
programmes such as the construction of railways, dams and irrigation schemes designed to 
‘improve’ Portuguese African colonies and set up the conditions for the establishment of Planned 
Portuguese Communities (colonatos) in the fertile lands of the their African colonies. In this 
period, the development of the Lower Limpopo irrigation scheme in Chokwe region 
demonstrated that effective use of its potentialities depended on the regulation of the Limpopo 
River water flows upstream of the irrigated areas. During the dry seasons, the irrigation scheme 
received limited flows of water and in the rainy season, it received too much water that flooded 
the irrigated areas and destroyed crops.  
 
In 1954, the Portuguese began the construction of Macarretane dam along the Limpopo River (a 
few kilometres upstream from the Lower Limpopo irrigation scheme) to regulate water flows for 
the irrigated area. However, during the rainy season this dam alone was not capable to control 
water passing through the irrigation scheme as the Elephants River, a tributary of the Limpopo 
River, continued to discharge water in the Limpopo River. Thus, the construction of a second 
dam along the Elephant’s River would help regulate water flows passing thorough the irrigation 
scheme and enhance the development of agriculture in Choke (about 130 km) downstream the 
Massingir region. The Construction of the Massingir dam would also set up conditions for the 
development of irrigation schemes in Massingir region to allow the establishment of Planned 
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Portuguese Communities (colonatos) 10 kilometres downstream of the Massingir dam.   
 
The construction of the Massingir dam began in 1972, eight years after Frelimo had started an 
armed struggle in the northern province of Cabo Delgado to overthrow the Portuguese in 
Mozambique. In 1975, the Frelimo government rose to power before the completion of the 
construction of the dam. Frelimo government took the responsibility to continue and to finalise 
the construction of the dam. The construction of the Massingir dam caused displacements of 
families living along the Elephants valley. In 1978, Frelimo relocated the displaced families in 
the bush in Coutada 16 where most of the families lacked fertile land for cropping; famines and 
the proximity of the families to hunting frontiers increased pressure on fauna as hunting became 
a mean of survival.466  
 
This chapter examines the pitfalls of the late colonial period; it explores how the rupture between 
the colonial government and Frelimo affected the continuation of colonial projects in the 
postcolonial period. By focusing particularly on the construction of the Massingir dam, the 
chapter seeks to highlight the extent to which the late colonial and early post-colonial 
development projects affected the lives of remote rural populations, local ecosystems, and fauna 
in Mozambique and particularly in the Massingir region. Equally, it describes the process of 
removal of communities that had their houses and fields along the Elephants River and their 
relocation to upper lands in Coutada 16. Rather than contributing to an improvement in local 
communities’ lives, Frelimo development policies implemented in this area contributed to 
deterioration in the living standards of the local families. Frelimo government officials relocated 
the families in poor soils of a conservation area known as Coutada 16. This measure contributed 
to a degradation of the local ecosystems, to poverty and hunger. 
 
The chapter seeks to answer the following question: How did the late colonial projects impact on 
the lives of the local families in the Massingir region? How Frelimo government managed the 
rupture between colonialism and its governance? How did the rupture affect the construction of 
                                                          
466Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014; see also William Number One Valoi, Massingir 
Velho,10/7/2012; 25/8/ 2013 
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the Massingir dam? How changes introduced by Frelimo to colonial resettlement program for 
people displaced by the construction of the Massingir dam affect the resettlement process, the 
lives of the displaced families and preservation of fauna in Coutada 16. What were the main 
social and development policies introduced by Frelimo in Massingir region soon after 
independence, and how did such policies affect the preservation of wildlife?   
 
The findings from the fieldwork demonstrates that regardless of the Frelimo rhetoric about 
uplifting the livelihoods of the poor, the Massingir dam project worsened the living conditions of 
the local population who had hoped to find in independence a panacea for their freedom and a 
way to improve their lives. The construction of the Massingir dam contributed to the depletion of 
fauna as it threw the displaced families in poor lands in the forest in Coutada 16 resulting in 
famines and increased dependence on bush meat for food. The chapter documents experiences 
undergone by the down-river communities during the resettlement process, the impact of this 
relocation on local ecosystems and wildlife management practices by both governmental 
institutions and relocated families.  
 
The research findings in Coutada 16 demonstrate that during the planning for relocation of 
families from the north bank of the Elephants River, Frelimo government officials 
underestimated regional and local socio-economic factors such as labour migration policies, the 
retrenchment of workers in the South African mining industry and local politics (the power and 
authority of the villages’ headmen or regulos). These factors played a key role in decision-
making by the displaced families on whether to leave or not, and where to go. 
    
A process of establishment of communal villages followed the relocation of the displaced 
families in upper lands in Coutada 16. This process entailed profound transformations not only 
of territorial organization (the establishment of communal villages or aldeias comunais), but also 
in modes of production (from individual plots to collective production based on peoples´ farms 
or machambas do povo) and the polity (from villages commanded by traditional leaders to 
villages commanded by new chiefs or secretarios and grupos dinamizadores (dynamizing 
groups).  
  
160 
 
 
The chapter is structured into five sections. The second section analyses the politics behind the 
construction of the Massingir dam; the third section analyses the relocation of families from the 
north bank of the Elephants valley to new villages in Coutada 16. The fourth section analyses the 
lives of the families relocated in communal villages in Coutada 16. The last section examines the 
measures implemented by Frelimo in the late 1970s and early 1980s to improve the lives of the 
impoverished families of the villages of the south of Coutada16. 
 
5.2. The dam built on the eve of independence 
During the 1930s and early 40s, the Salazarist government in Portugal tried to intensify 
Portuguese economic growth by decreasing investment in the colonies and exploiting them 
through a highly regimented labour regime requiring little capital investment. The Salazar 
government continued to impose hut taxes on the African population and labour exports to the 
South African mining industry. The state also made it mandatory for African populations to 
produce cash crops specifically cotton to feed the emerging Portuguese textile sector.467 North of 
the Elephants River, hunting fees paid by the sport and professional hunters entering the Alto 
Limpopo Game Reserve constituted another source of revenue for the colonial state. 
  
By the late 1940s, the Salazar government came under severe censure from anti-colonial 
movements within and outside Portugal. To appease its critics, the administration embarked on 
the development of its colonies. Infrastructure development programs such as the construction of 
railways, dams and irrigation schemes were designed to improve the development of Portuguese 
African colonies. The implementation of the infrastructural development programs (Planos de 
Fomento) set up the conditions for the establishment of Planned Portuguese Communities 
(colonatos) in the fertile lands of the Portuguese African colonies. In the colonatos, Portugal 
allocated land and agricultural inputs to settlers to help them to start agricultural production.468 In 
                                                          
467 For more comprehensive explanation on this regard se cotton production in the Massingir region in previous 
chapter 
468Covane, L. A. O Trabalho migratório e a agricultura no sul de Moçambique, p 222. The Portuguese authorities 
selected the fertile land along the river valleys in Revue, Lichinga and highveld in Montepuez and Angónia to 
establish the Portuguese Planned Communities (colonatos). 
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the 1950s, the establishment of the colonato of Chokwe in the Lower Limpopo region resulted in 
the expropriation of fertile land from the local populations.469 
 
During the development of the Lower Limpopo irrigation scheme, the constructors noted that the 
location of the irrigation schemes in the Chokwe region (, i.e., floodplains regions located 
downstream of dams built in South Africa along the Limpopo River and its tributaries) made the 
irrigation scheme highly dependent (dry season) and vulnerable (rain season) on discharges made 
upstream.470 During the dry seasons, the irrigated areas received limited flows of water and in the 
rainy season, the irrigated areas received too much water resulting in floods and destruction of 
crops.471 In the later 1940s, Portuguese engineers started the design phase for the construction of 
two dams, one along the Limpopo River and the other along the Elephants River.472  
 
In the early 1950s, the Portuguese started the construction of Macarretane dam along the 
Limpopo. This dam was completed in August 1956 and in the same year was handed over to the 
settlers for its use and supply with water settlers´ farms along the Limpopo valley as well as 
regulate water flow of the Limpopo River to avoid floods and the destruction of crops in the 
settlers’ farms.473 Accordingly, in 1972, the Portuguese began the construction of the Massingir 
dam on the Elephants River.474 The dam would allow the regulation of water flow of the 
Limpopo River (a tributary of Limpopo River) and allow the development of irrigation schemes 
                                                          
469Hermele, Keneth, 1988. Land struggles and social differentiation in southern Mozambique, p.7 
470In the later 1950s, the South Africans authorities build 10 small dams along the Elephants River and its 
tributaries; See in Cabrita, Viriato de Noronha Castro.1961. “Possibilidades energéticas do Rio dos Elefantes/ 
Limpopo na albufeira de Massingir.” Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique, nº 126 (Secção F), pp. 3-
17, p.4; the main tributaries of the Limpopo River are the Elephants River, Nuanitze and Shingwedzi: See 
Barradas, Lereno Antunes. 1961. “O aproveitamento do Limpopo.” Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de 
Moçambique, nº 126 (Seccao F), pp.1-8 
471The planning of the building of the lower Limpopo irrigation infrastructures was based on early studies 
undertaken in the later 1920s and 1930s. Cabrita, Viriato de Noronha Castro. 1961  “Possibilidades energéticas do 
Rio dos Elefantes/  Limpopo na albufeira de Massingir”, p. 2 
472Trigo the Morais was the Portuguese engineer responsible for development of the lower Limpopo Irrigation 
Scheme. See Cabrita, Viriato de Noronha Castro. 1961. “Possibilidades energéticas do Rio dos Elefantes/  
Limpopo na albufeira de Massingir”, p. 2 
473Amilai, Castilho Mussa. 2008. Evolução e diferenciação de sistemas agrários: situação e perspectivas para a 
agricultura e agricultores no perimetro irrigado de Chòkwè/ Moçambique.  Universidade Federal do Rio Grande 
do Sul. Porto Alegre; p.10 
474Carmo-Vaz, Álvaro, Rui Gonzalez, Benjamim Alfredo, Carlos Quadros, Isabel Zucule. 2008. Comissão de 
inquérito ao acidente da Barragem de Massingir. Maputo 
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in Massingir region to benefit Portuguese settlers.475 As other dams built during the last years of 
colonialism in Mozambique, the Massingir dam was of great importance for the Portuguese, as it 
would allow the generation of electricity to supply cities and towns in southern Mozambique and 
lessen the dependency that southern Mozambique had on South African power suppliers.476  The 
building of the Massingir dam would also allow the transformation of the lands located 
downstream of the dam into irrigated areas where white farmers were to settle and engage in 
irrigated agriculture. 
 
The construction of the dam led to resettlements of hundreds of Africans whose villages were 
located along the Elephants and Shingwedzi valleys to use their limited arable lands to produce 
cotton for the colonial economy, leaving them vulnerable to the vagaries of food insecurity.477 In 
October 1971, the Portuguese government granted the construction of the Massingir dam to a 
Portuguese company known as the Tâmega Consôrcio.478 The Portuguese authorities aimed to 
develop the project in two phases; the first phase comprised the construction of the dam wall, the 
reservoir and the relocation of the downriver (riverside) communities displaced by the filling of 
the reservoir. After the completion of the first phase, the contractor would start the second phase 
of the project, which would comprise the building of the hydroelectric power plant to generate 
electricity for southern Mozambican villages and towns.479 Just like the Cahora Bassa dam 
constructed on the eve of independence (1969-1974) in the central province of Tete-
Mozambique, the construction of the Massingir dam in the hinterland of Gaza province 
represented an indication that the Portuguese were still interested in continuing their rule in 
Mozambique.480 
                                                          
475Barradas, Lereno A. 1956. “O aproveitamento do Limpopo” Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique, nº 
126: 1-15, p.2 
476Barradas, Lereno A. 1956. “O aproveitamento do Limpopo” Boletim da Sociedade de Estudos de Moçambique, nº 
126: 1-15, p.2 
477Manghezi, A. Trabalho forçado, p.45 
478Moçambique – Decreto Governemental nº 41968; 22/11/1958 and Portaria nº 712, 17/10/ 1973; see also the 
Portaria 413; 06/8/1971; by these decrees the Portuguese Oversee Ministry authorised the Mozambique Governor-
General to sign a contract with the Portuguese construction company [Tâmega Consôrsio, Lda] to start the 
building of the Massingir dam and its social infrastructure. 
479https://asuldomundo.wordpress.com/2010/02/27/barragemdemassingir/ acessed May 2014; see also Portaria 712, 
17/10/ 1973 
480Isaacman, Allen F and Barbara Isaacman. 2013. “Displacement, and the delusion of development:  
Cahora Bassa and Its legacies in Mozambique, 1965–2007. Ohio, Athens: Ohio University Press (See chapter IV: 
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The building of the Massingir dam started in 1972 and gave rise to a modern village in a remote 
rural area, Tiovene, where for many years there was a lack of facilities such as roads, schools, 
markets, hospitals, etc. As a direct consequence of the infrastructural improvements made at 
Tiovene, the headquarters of Massingir district moved from the remote rural village of Mavodze 
in the north bank of the Elephants River to Tiovene (7 km south of the dam). The construction of 
the dam, instead of adding hope to the local communities, increased the uncertainty of the 
downriver cultivators who feared displacements due to the filling up of the reservoir.481  
 
The Portuguese planned to settle the upriver cultivators (area reserved for the dam reservoir) in 
new villages that would be established 10 km downstream of the dam wall, namely Marrenguele, 
Chinhangane and Chibotana. About 1,700 people living in the villages of Massingir Velho and 
Mavodze in the north bank of the Elephants valley and 1,275 people from the villages of 
Canhane and Cubo in the south bank were to be relocated in the above-mentioned villages.482 
The Portuguese also announced that in the new villages they would establish irrigation schemes 
to benefit the settlers and the local populations.483 After the Tâmega Consortium had started the 
building of the dam, the Portuguese hired a company known as CODAM (Companhia de 
Aluguer de Máquinas) to clear (deforestation) 2,300 ha for the relocation of the families 
displaced by the dam.484  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Displaced People:  Forced Eviction and Life in the Protected Villages, 1970–75, pp. 95-121); see also Isaacman, 
Allen and Chris Sneddon. 2000. “Toward a social and environmental history of the building of Cahora Bassa 
dam”, in JSAS, 26 (4): 597-632 
481AHM - CNAC. Cx Informação sobre o distrito de Massingir – Gaza. CNAC, 1980-1982   
482Ibiden   
483Casimiro, J.F. e A. P. Veloso. 1969. Reconhecimento pedologico e de utilização de solo do Posto Adminstrativo 
de Massingir. Junta Provincial de Povoamento [Unpublished Report]; Casimiro, Jose Figueiredo and Antonio P. 
Veloso. 1972. Levantamento dos solos da margem direita do Rio dos Elefantes e sua aptidão para o regadio, 
zona a montante da confluência com o rio Chinguidzi [Sic]. Lourenço Marques: Grupo de Trabalho para o 
Limpopo, [Unpublished Report], Casimiro, J.F and Veloso, A.P, 1972. Levantamento dos solos da margem direita 
do Rio dos Elefantes e sua aptidao para o regadio (Marenguele e Banga), Grupo de Trabalho para o Limpopo; 
Lourenço Marques, [Unpublished Report]  
484DNA - Província de Moçambique. Grupo de Trabalho para o Limpopo. 1972. Relatório, p.11 
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During planning for the relocation of the riverine communities of the north bank of the Elephants 
river, the Portuguese warned the local families that in the near future all the people living in 
inner villages of Coutada 16 would be settled in areas surrounding the irrigated areas or outside 
of Coutada 16. Before the beginning of the construction of the dam, the colonial authorities 
commissioned detailed studies on fertility of soils at the confluence of Elephants and Shinguedzi 
River. The irrigated areas were not aimed at benefiting Portuguese settlers only but were also 
intended for commercial farming and for the employment of Africans displaced by the 
construction of the dam. The colonial government advised the families living in the area 
earmarked for the construction of the Massingir dam reservoir that they would be the first ones to 
be relocated in such areas. After the completion of their relocation, the Portuguese administration 
would embark in other programs to relocate communities living in inner village of Coutada 16 to 
free the area for conservancy and protection of fauna. The Portuguese did not give any options to 
the communities living along Elephants valley to move to upper lands in Coutada 16.485  
 
Fearing the violent methods (forced labour or whipping) used by the Portuguese administration 
to discipline those who refused to comply with colonial policies, the affected communities 
lacked the power to refuse the Portuguese relocation option. The cultivators and their families 
knew that they would be relocated in the place chosen by the colonial government on their free 
will or forced by the cipaios.486 However, this plan to relocate Africans by force should they be 
unwilling to do so voluntarily did not materialise as the political changes that occurred in mid-
1975 abruptly ended the colonial state’s plan.  
 
In 25th June 1975, Frelimo government came to power and subsequently took over the 
responsibility to complete the dam and relocate the downriver communities. Frelimo adopted a 
social, economic and development policy for Mozambique that differed from its colonizers. 
Whereas, in the colonial state’s scheme of things, Africans would have been the ones cajoled to 
either relocate or flee their homes, under the new Frelimo government, it was ironically, 
                                                          
485 Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012 
486Interview with Simião Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, July, 6 th  2012, see also Interview with Salomão 
Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014, Interview with Finiasse Sechene Valoi,  Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014 
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Portuguese technicians and government civil servants that did not agree with Frelimo’s policies 
who were made to flee.487 This situation left the Frelimo government without qualified staff to 
implement the dam project as effectively as the colonial state had intended, albeit at the expense 
of Africans. As such, several mistakes were committed during the completion of the construction 
of the dam wall, and there were changes made on the colonial resettlement programme.488   
 
As explained in the ensuing section, my research in the Massingir region suggests that the 
rupture between the colonial government and Frelimo resulted in changes on the project design 
due to lack of staff or lack of information on colonial development plan and particularly the 
colonial resettlement programme. Frelimo did not follow the colonial plan designed to relocate 
families affected by the construction of the Massingir dam. Instead, the party staff relocated the 
population in the forest (hunting reserve) to upper lands in Coutada 16. As we shall see below, 
the Frelimo guerrillas had, prior to independence, already begun consultations about how they 
would deal with the consequences of the dam construction, especially the ordinary people’s 
welfare. 
 
5.3. The independence of Mozambique and its impact on Massingir Dam Project  
The Mozambique liberation struggle commanded by Frelimo guerrilla forces started on 25th 
September 1964 in the northern province of Cabo Delgado. By the later 1960s, the liberation war 
had reached the northern and central provinces of Mozambique and was moving southward.489 
On 25th April 1974, a military coup organised by left-leaning military officers took place in 
Lisbon–Portugal. The coup deposed the Salazar-Caetano longstanding authoritarian regime and 
installed a democratic regime in Portugal. The political changes made in Portugal opened a 
convenient window for the independence of Portugal’s overseas territories. The new government 
or the National Salvation Junta (Junta de Salvação Nacional) had been opposed to the 
                                                          
487 https://asuldomundo.wordpress.com/2010/02/27/barragemdemassingir/ accessed June 2015  
488CarmoVaz, Álvaro, Rui Gonzalez, Benjamim Alfredo, Carlos Quadros, Isabel Zucule. 2008. Comissão de 
inquérito ao acidente da Barragem de Massingir 
489Coelho, João Paulo Borges. 1998 “State resettlement policies in post-colonial rural Mozambique: the impact of 
the communal village programme on Tete province, 1977-1982.”JSAS, 24 (1):  61-91 
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Portuguese colonial war to defend the so-called overseas territories. Instead, it favoured their 
independence and Frelimo assumed power on 25th June 1975.490    
 
 
After independence, the Frelimo government was obliged to continue with the construction of 
Massingir dam. This also meant that it had to assume the responsibility of relocating the families 
living along the Elephants River in the area designed for the construction of the dam reservoir. In 
early 1976, Frelimo officials started meetings with the local population to redesign the 
relocations of the riverine communities of the Elephants valley. During the first meetings, the 
community representatives noted that Frelimo government officials had vague knowledge about 
the colonial resettlement program. According to Amós Matebula, former traditional leader of 
Mavodze village, soon after independence, Frelimo introduced radical political changes that 
resulted in the abandonment of the area by colonial government staff, shopkeepers and many 
technicians involved in several projects. This situation prevented Frelimo officials from learning 
from the colonial government staff about colonial development projects for the area including 
the resettlement programme.491  
 
Analysis of data collected during fieldwork suggests that during the planning for the relocation 
of populations affected by the dam, very few studies were made to understand the polity in 
Massingir region, social organization and modes of production of the displaced to capture the 
significant strengths to apply lessons to the new social and development projects. Lack of such 
relevant information led the Frelimo staff to allow the relocation of the families affected by the 
construction of the Massingir dam in upper lands above the flood plain on the north bank of the 
Elephants River.  
 
It also appears that Frelimo did not have a map with the development projects and protected 
areas of the region and the Frelimo staff working in the resettlement program did not even know 
                                                          
490Funada-Classen, Sayaka. 2012. The origins of war in Mozambique: a history of unity and division. Tokyo: 
Ochanomizu Shobo, p. 269, 384 
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that north of Elephants River was Coutada 16.492 Additionally, when Frelimo came into power, 
the social infrastructure (roads, markets, hospital, schools, water pumps, irrigations schemes, 
etc.) which was part of the Massingir dam project to benefit Portuguese settler and the resettled 
communities had not yet been built. Thus, the party had to start the resettlement program from 
scratch (i.e., choose the area for resettlement, survey it and build the infrastructure). This 
situation was particularly difficult because the party lacked the financial wherewithal to complete 
the project and qualified staff to undertake specific studies on suitability of land for agriculture 
and pasture in the new resettlement areas. 493 
 
5.3.1. Relocations in Coutada16  
Besides the technical and financial components, the resettlement program to relocate families 
affected by the construction of the Massingir dam was also highly influenced by social and 
economic factors. As explained in the next sections, social, economic, cultural factors 
contributed for the decision making of local communities about where to go and when to leave. 
Similarly, these factors help to explain why the local communities resisted leaving their villages 
or not cooperating with Frelimo staff working on the resettlement program.  
 
In her PhD thesis, Lunstrum analysed the relocations of families from two villages displaced by 
the filling up of the Massingir dam reservoir (Canhane in the north bank of the Elephants River 
and Massingir Velho in the south bank).494Lunstrum emphasized that villagers of Canhane and 
Massingir Velho took a long time to accept the idea that their villages would be filled up by 
water and because of that they only started to move to the upland regions when they noticed that 
water was flooding their houses and fields and was advancing up to a 100 m of height leaving 
their villages submerged. According to Lunstrum, this situation limited the government’s ability 
to relocate the populations in areas identified by the colonial government. Therefore, it had to 
move them to upland regions located immediately above the floodplains of their former 
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villages.495 My research on the north bank of the Elephants River has not brought about a 
different argument, but has provided a more comprehensive picture regarding the relocation 
process. My analyses are based on 3 factors, namely: (i) the political economy of the region (ii) 
economic activities and livelihood strategies of the local families and, (iii) the politics in 
Massingir region. 
 
i) The political economy of the region 
Due to lack of investment by the colonial administration in Alto Limpopo, this region remained 
backward. Consequently, until early 1970s, there were no employment opportunities in the 
region that could secure wage incomes for the majority of the population. Local communities 
relied on hunting and labour migration to secure wage incomes that allowed them to pay the hut 
taxes or pay the bride price known in southern Mozambique as lobola.496  
 
With the increase of mine income from 1973, mineworkers were able to buy ploughs and carts 
used in agriculture to improve productivity.497 The existence of shopkeepers (cantineiros) in 
Mavodze where the cultivators sold the surplus of their crops motivated the cultivators to 
increase their production. The barter system practiced by the shopkeepers in southern 
Mozambique and particularly at Mavodze village allowed the migrants and their families to buy 
the basic consumer goods such as tools, clothes, matches, kerosene and alcoholic beverages.498 
Labour migration to South Africa, which had contributed to the monetization of rural economy 
in southern Mozambique, resulted in the dependence of the local population on money for their 
                                                          
495Lunstrum, E. M. The making and unmaking of sovereign territory”, p. 112-3, see also COBA e Pofabril. 1983. 
Desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comunais de Cubo, Paulo Samuel Kankomba, Massingir Velho e Mavodze: carta 
de potencial agricola, carta de pastagens e carta do potencial florestal. [Unpublished report], SERLI, Maputo, 
1983; see also COBA e Profabril. 1983. Desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comunais de Cubo, Paulo Samuel 
Kankomba, Massingir-Velho e Mavoze: levantamento uso de terra: [Unpublished report], SERLI, Maputo, 1983.  
496Roesch, Otto. 1991. “Migrant labour and forced rice production in southern Mozambique, p. 243 
497Labour migration and the division of work in southern Mozambique in the early 20th century increased the 
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Hermele, Keneth, 1988. Land struggles and social differentiation in southern Mozambique, p.14 
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daily life, and at the same time offered a degree of accumulation to those whose incomes allowed 
them to save and invest in agriculture.499 
 
Due to political changes in Mozambique, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Portuguese 
regime and the rise to power of the Frelimo government, which was opposed to the apartheid 
regime of South Africa, the South African government feared that Frelimo would limit labour 
recruitment in its territory resulting in shortage of labour to the South African mining sector. The 
South African authorities resolved the situation by increasing the proportion of domestic labour 
in the total proportion of mineworkers – a process also known as the internalization of labour 
force. In summary, the internalization of labour would allow to reduce the dependency that the 
mining sector had on migrant workers, as the sector would recruit a considerable part of its 
workers within South African frontiers. This process was also aimed at addressing local 
unployment. Moreover, the increase of salaries in the mining industry since 1973 also stimulated 
many South Africans to search employment in the mining sector.500  
 
The internalization of labour force affected particularly Mozambique because the country was 
then the major supplier of mineworkers to the South African mining industry.501 Thus, in 1976, 
WENELA recruited 32 803 mineworkers from southern Mozambique, but in 1977 recruited only 
8 825 migrant workers and closed 17 of its 21 camps in Mozambique, including the Pafuri post, 
mainly used by migrants from the Massingir region. In the following years, many migrants were 
not able to renew their contracts; they lost their jobs and were forced to return to their home 
areas to restart their lives.502  
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After losing their jobs in South Africa, the former mineworkers began to work on their land to 
continue to generate income and produce food for their families’ survival while livestock 
keeping, gathering and hunting remained as alternative livelihoods. Nevertheless, while the 
former mineworkers were trying to rebuild their lives along the Elephants valley, the filling of 
the Massingir dam reservoir forced them to leave their villages and the fertile alluvial soils to be 
relocated on poor land in Coutada16. The disillusionment of losing their jobs in South Africa and 
removal from their lands angered the migrants and many of them refused to cooperate with 
Frelimo officials working in the resettlement program. William Valoi, a former mineworker and 
former government representative in Massingir Velho village recalled the moment in the 
following terms:  
“Migrants who lost their jobs in South Africa rushed home to assist their families in 
agriculture. The migrants who used the bush route from Massingir to South Africa were 
taken by surprise when they arrived at the border and found that there were companies 
erecting fences along the boundary line; as a result, they had to walk dozen of miles to find 
section where the fence had not yet been erected. …When the migrants arrived in Massingir 
they were told that they had to leave their ancestors’ land and find other place to live… their 
former villages would be filled by water. 503 
 
According to Valoi, the migrants saw a direct connection between labour retrenchment in the 
South African mines, which led to their dismissal from their positions, and the construction 
of the border fence as direct consequences of the Samora Machel´s policy, which was 
opposed to Apartheid. Many migrants were angry and refused to cooperate with Frelimo 
officials in the resettlement programs. Lack of cooperation between the people affected by 
the feeling of Massingir dam and Frelimo officials resulted in the delay of removals of local 
families from the Elephants valley to the new resettlement areas.504  
 
ii) Chieftaincies and the resettlements 
During my fieldwork in Massingir, I raised questions about why the representatives of the 
displaced population chose to move from the north bank of the Elephants valley to a non-fertile 
land in Coutada16 rather than be relocated downstream of the Massingir dam. Salomon 
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Ngovene, now the traditional leader of the Massingir Velho village explained that Frelimo 
officials just like those of the colonial government did not make it clear where we should be 
relocated. There were vague references to the resettlement areas. People were only told that they 
had to be relocated to Marrenguele, Chinhangane or Chibotana downstream of the Massingir 
dam. Thus, lack of information about the natural conditions of the area (fertile soils for 
agriculture and pasture) and the political structures of the new area were some reason that led the 
local population to refuse to leave their areas.  
 
The interviewees also indicated that along the Elephants valley, the local communities had good 
land for agriculture, pasture for the cattle and did not want to move to a land where they were not 
clear about natural conditions.505Additionally, Frelimo was in power for only two years and the 
local population knew little about the party. Based on experiences from the colonial government 
they suspected and feared to be relocated in an area non-suitable for agriculture and therefore 
they resisted relocation to such areas.   
 
Ngovene also explained that the land downstream of the Massingir dam did not belong to them. 
As a result, the former leader of the Massingir Velho village feared that if he accepted the move 
from his home village and be relocated in new villages downstream of the Massingir dam, he 
would not have the same authority and influence in his community as he had in his home village. 
According to the local traditions, only one man in a village has the right to perform traditional 
ceremonies to evoke spirits to thank them for good harvesting or demand rains. In the new 
village, their leader would become a common cultivator and lose his right to undertake 
traditional ceremonies. Accordingly, the situation would put him and the community in a 
disadvantageous position since the community leader would lose his power to undertake 
traditional ceremonies. In addition, the whole community would lose protection from ancestral 
spirits and, consequently, would ask the local headmen to perform traditional ceremonies. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
504Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 25/8/ 2013, see also Interview with Simeão 
Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012, see also Interview with Finiasse Sechene Valoi Massingir Velho, 
21/1/ 2014 
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situation would subject the entire community to the level of subjects of the headmen of the 
villages where we would be relocated.  
“Massingir was the powerful leader in the region. In recognition of his authority in the area, the 
Portuguese named the whole district south of Shingwedzi River as Massingir. Massingir was one 
of the first local leader to trade with the Portuguese … our village is Massingir Velho (Old 
Massingir).506 The Mavodze (which in the local language means to find ...ku hodza) migrated 
from Nhaneti in Vetcha [probably Venda] to Massingir in the search for fertile land for 
agriculture and livestock farming ... when they arrived here they said He hodzile … (We found 
the good land) … they were known as ka Mavodze (people who found land in other people 
land)… We are the owner of the land … This land belongs to us… We did not want to leave our 
land and be vassals of our vassals”.507  
 
The above quotation is a local explanation of the reality in the eyes of a traditional leader. The 
colonial government in southern Mozambique had given authority and power to the régulos or 
traditional leaders. For example, they were exempted from undertaking forced labour at the 
administration just as, simultaneously they could use the same system (forced labour) to recruit 
non-paid labour to work on their fields or other domestic activities.508 Apart from the taxes paid 
by the migrants to the local administration, the traditional leaders demanded additional taxes in 
money and kind for each migrant returning back from work in South Africa. During the colonial 
period, the régulos in the Massingir region demanded a share of the hunt from hunters entering 
their territories and forced migrants to pay 100 escudos (USD 3.5) known as mpondo ya hosi and 
a South African sliced bread locally known as Nchicua sha yosi.509 
 
The colonial government allowed the régulos to extract from the mineworkers part of their 
incomes and became wealthier people in their communities. Their authority and wealth resulted 
in social differentiation in the Massingir region. Consequently, their relocation in other regulos´ 
territory would limit their autonomy and privileges, as they would become common cultivators 
under the rule of the regulo of the relocation area. As a result, they preferred to move to upland 
regions adjacent to their villages where they thought they would continue to have the same 
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authority and power in their communities. The villages would continue with the same names, 
with the same social and political structures.510 
 
iii) Alternative livelihoods strategies 
If the headmen of the down river-communities cared about their authority in the new villages, the 
ordinary populations were not quite aware of the resources they would find in the new villages 
such as land for cropping, livestock farming, pasture, hunting frontiers, etc. The riverine 
communities of Massingir Velho and Mavodze villages used to climb to the upland regions in 
Coutada 16 for hunting and gathering. The relocation of this population downstream of the 
Massingir dam (Marrenguele, Chinhangane or Chibotana) would put them in a disadvantaged 
situation in terms of proximity to the hunting frontiers. Therefore, they would have to walk for 
more than 30 km from the new villages to find hunting grounds.511  
 
In addition, the original villages were located a few kilometres from the Mozambican border 
with South Africa. Some members of these communities had experienced life in South Africa 
and were conscious about the evolution of conservation policies and practices in the KNP and 
knew that if they accepted to move to areas located outside Coutada 16, they would not be 
allowed to go back to their former land for whatever reason even for traditional purposes (to 
perform traditional ceremonies or to evoke the spirits of their ancestors).  The communities also 
feared that after their relocations fences would be erected to prevent trespassing to the hunting 
grounds just like what happened in 1969 when the Makuleke, a fellow Shangane community in 
South Africa was evicted from their land to allow the KNP to extend its territory.512  
 
5.3.2. Deciding when to leave and where to go 
Labour retrenchments in South Africa resulted in the reduction of wage incomes and more 
dependence of former mineworkers on agriculture. The fear of families to lose their alternative 
livelihoods (especially hunting), lack of clarity of condition in the new resettlement area (fertile 
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soils and social infrastructures) and the fear of the local leaderships of losing their authority and 
privileges in the new villages affected the way these populations negotiated with Frelimo 
officials the resettlement program. Many times the meetings between Frelimo officials and 
community representatives ended without any conclusion. Most often, the population demanded 
to see real assets such as irrigation infrastructures downstream of the dam and allocation of land 
in the irrigated areas before they move. Despite holding negotiations for more than 2 years, there 
was no progress in the resettlement program and people continued to live on the land despite the 
warning that their land would be filled by water to become a reservoir of the Massingir dam.513 
 
In late 1976, the assembling of the dam floodgates of the Massingir dam signalled the 
completion of its construction. However, the government had not yet found arguments to 
convince upriver communities to move to areas located downstream of the Massingir dam. Lack 
of resettlement options for the families affected by the filling of the reservoir was putting the 
government under pressure. In the following years, the Massingir dam would start the filling of 
the reservoir to help regulate floods in the Lower Limpopo and enable the development of 
agriculture in its irrigated areas. Due to time pressure, and the limited capacity of the Frelimo 
government to undertake civic work to convince the communities to move to areas located 
downstream of the Massingir dam, the government had no other option but to ask the 
representatives of the communities for their own options for relocations.514 
 
The representatives of the communities of the north bank of the Elephants valley used this 
opportunity to suggest to Frelimo officials their relocation to upland regions above the 
floodplains in Coutada 16 rather than to move to downstream of the dam.515 Without carrying  
out a critical analysis of this resettlement option, the Frelimo government agreed to move the 
population from the north bank of the Elephants valley to the uplands in Coutada 16, despite the 
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consequence that the measure represented to people’s lives (wildlife conflict) and livelihoods 
(agriculture and cattle keeping), local ecosystems and wildlife conservation.516  
 
5.4. The illusion of socialization of the countryside in Coutada 16 
In the late 1976, Frelimo government officials came to an agreement with the local families 
living along the Elephants valley for their relocation in Coutada 16. After this agreement, the 
government rushed to mobilize machinery (bulldozers and tractors) to clear the areas for the 
establishment new villages and open the paths used by trucks for the transport of goods and 
people to the new villages. Coincidently, the planning for the relocation of families displaced by 
the construction of the dam took place soon after the 8th Session of Frelimo Central Committee 
had debated in February 1976, the social and economic policy to be followed for the 
development of the countryside in Mozambique.517 
 
Frelimo members present at this meeting agreed that the country had to go through a process of 
socialization of the countryside to allow the development of the remote rural areas. This policy 
entailed radical transformations in the economic mode of production, and the socio-political and 
territorial organization of the countryside. The cornerstone of the policy was based on the 
development of communal villages or aldeias comunais. Frelimo government expected to use 
communal villages to bring the dispersed rural population into modern rural villages where it 
would build social and economic infrastructure and the population was encouraged to work on 
peoples´ farms, state agro-industrial enterprises and cooperatives.518 
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In the Massingir region, Frelimo officials working in the resettlement of families displaced by 
the dam, despite not yet having the guidelines for the establishment of communal villages, used 
the opportunity to test this policy and thus establish communal villages or aldeias communais in 
Coutada 16. In late 1976, they cleared the land for the new villages and urged the displaced 
families to build their houses in blocks known as quarteirões. These comprised units of 10 
houses headed by a chief (chefe de 10 casas). A unit of several blocks constituted a bairrio or 
neighbourhood and a unit of several barrios formed a communal village.519  
 
The first families that went to build new homesteads in the new communal villages were given 
10 to 15 zinc sheets for the roofs of their houses depending on the sizes of their households. For 
that reason and according to Lunstrum, it is true to say that people moved to the new area when 
their villages were flooded by water. However, when the rainy season started in late 1976, some 
families with help from the government had already started to build their houses in the new 
resettlement area.520 Until the early 1977, Frelimo government officials had managed to create 
four communal villages; two on the north bank of the Elephants River (Massingir Velho and 
Mavodze villages) and the other two were communal villages in the south bank (Canhane and 
Cubo) to relocate communities removed from the Elephants river due to the filling of its 
reservoir. 
 
According to Araujo, after the Marrupa meeting (seminar for planning of agricultural 
development that took place in the northern province of Niassa in Marrupa district) of 1975 and 
the 8th Session of Frelimo Central Committee (February 1976), some Frelimo members hastened 
to create communal villages without the guidelines on the structure and purposes of the 
communal villages. Moreover, most of the Frelimo government officials at local level lacked 
training in territorial and development planning. This fact led the officials to ignore elementary 
principles to be taken into consideration during the planning of communal villages (this include 
natural conditions, water, fertile soils, social infrastructure (roads, markets, schools, hospitals).521 
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As explained in the next pages, socialization of the countryside was adopted as state policy 
during Frelimo’s 3rd Congress held in Maputo on February 1977 and the guidelines for the 
establishment of communal villages were made public after this Congress.522  
 
After the 3rd Congress, the party at all levels organized meetings with its staff to harmonize the 
process of the establishment of communal villages in Mozambique. In Gaza province, the first 
such seminar took place in May 1977 and only in August 1979 did the provincial government of 
Gaza organize a similar meeting to harmonize the procedures to be followed for the 
establishment of such villages in Massingir district. These seminars took place after the 
government of Massingir district had established a number of communal villages in Coutada 
16.523 This meant that the villages of Massingir Velho and Mavodze were established before the 
diffusion of policy guidelines and orientation for the establishment of communal villages in rural 
areas in Mozambique. This problem resulted in poor planning of almost all the communal 
villages in Coutada 16.  
 
5.4.1. Moving to new communal villages in Coutada 16  
In early 1977, the southern Mozambican region witnessed the passage of the cyclone Emilie that 
caused atmospheric changes and above-normal rainfall and floods. It is a fact that Massingir dam 
is small when compared to the infrastructure and complexity of the Cahora Bassa dam, whose 
construction involved the relocation of about 45.000 people compared to the 3.000 displaced by 
the Massingir dam. Because of its small size the Massingir dam reservoir was amongst the fastest 
to fill up. But for the Cahora Bassa dam, the Portuguese needed four months to fill the reservoir 
and Kariba took 4 years to fill its reservoir.524 The heavy rains in the Massingir region from 1st to 
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11th February 1977 resulted in quick filling of the reservoir.525 The heavy rains filled the dam in 
only 11 days and washed away all the villages located upstream of the Massingir dam.526 
 
The beginning of the filling up of the dam was a surprise to many families who were still 
beginning to build their houses in the new villages. The water quickly sprawled in the riverine 
villages leaving them totally inundated. The populations quickly left the riverine areas and 
escaped to the upland regions; furthermore, even the households that had already built their 
houses in the new communal villages in Coutada 16, had not yet moved to their new homes.527  
 
During the removal of the population affected by the flooding, the Tâmega Consortium allowed 
the local government to use its trucks for transportation of the affected population, their goods 
and livestock excluding cattle. Households owning cattle had to drive them from the old villages 
along the Elephants Valley to the new villages in Coutada 16 (approximately 30 km). A part of 
the family took the transport with the family goods to the new communal villages and some 
members had to stay behind to drive the cattle from the old villages to the new communal 
villages in Coutada 16.528  
 
Voices of the local cultivators indicate during the filling up of the reservoir many wildlife  and 
flora disappeared. The subsequent removal of the population from the Elephants valley to the 
new communal villages in Coutada 16 occurred whilst most of the families were yet to start the 
harvesting of maize from their fields. Due to the rapid filling up of the reservoir, the affected 
families hastened to move to the new villages without having finished the harvest of their maize. 
In the new villages, they depended on foodstuffs distributed by the government, which, quite 
often, were not enough for their survival.529  
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Food insecurity and hunger were some of the consequences of the displacement process. 
People’s accounts in this regard indicate that in most households of the new villages bush meat 
was the alternative food for survival. The area also lacked physical infrastructure needed for the 
population’s daily life such as roads, schools, hospitals, markets, etc. The main rivers of the 
region run far from the communal villages. The families relied on water distributed by a 
government tanker truck that most often was not enough for their consumption, bathing and 
cooking. The resettled families had to rely on water puddles near their villages formed during the 
rainy season and most often, the families claimed suffering constantly from diarrhoea and other 
stomach diseases.530 
 
The establishment of the poorly planned communal villages with little or no consultation with 
the people who were meant to be the beneficiaries of these new postcolonial policies rather than 
improving the living conditions of the local communities, tended to create conditions that 
deepened people’s levels of poverty. People interviewed in the Massingir region recorded that 
soon after their relocation in communal villages in Coutada 16, life was much harder if compared 
to colonial period. They argued that their removal from Elephants valley made them lose the 
fertile alluvial soils from where they grazed their cattle, developed agriculture and produced 
enough crops to eat all year round and even sell part of their production to get money to pay for 
the colonial hut taxes and buy goods for their families. However, such natural conditions did not 
exist in the new communal villages what made agricultural pursuits a daunting exercise.531    
 
5.4.2. Development of agriculture and fisheries in the new communal villages 
Coutada 16 has a semi-arid climate and savanna-like environment. The soils are poor and not 
suitable for cropping.532 In general, rains in the area occurred from November to February and 
                                                          
530AHM. CNAC. Cx. AC 71. Informação sobre o distrito de Massingir – Gaza. CNAC, 1980-1982;  see also AHM: 
CNAC. Cx. AC 223. “Linhas orientadoras para o desenvolvimento das aldeas comunais” Pasta – Planificação 
fisica das Aldeias Comunais; CNAC: Maputo 1980  
531Interview with Simião Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/7/ 2012, see also Interview with Finiasse Sechene 
Valoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014, see also Interview with William Number One, Massingir Velho, 10/7/2012 
532 COBA- Profabril: Desenvolvimento das aldeias comunais de Cubo, Paulo Samuel Kankomba, Massingir-Velho e  
Mavoze: Levantamento uso de terra: Lisboa Portugal, 1983, p.6, 31 
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the average of rainfall in the region is about 400 mm a year. Far from the main rivers, 
Shingwedzi and the Elephants, agriculture is risky. Droughts occur regularly, often with 
devastating consequences to crops and pastures.533  
 
According to Almina, after their arrival in the new villages in Coutada 16, it was relatively easy 
for cultivators of Massingir Velho to find some land near their homesteads and up to a distance 
of 5 km to open new fields than the cultivators of the Mavodze village. She argues that in 
Mavodze, most of the households did not succeed in finding good soils around their village and 
had to go to the nearest village of Mbingo (a village located along the Shingwedzi River and 9 
km from Mavodze village) to clear new fields to plant.534  
 
The preparation of new fields in the forest was a hard and painful job. The texture of the soils of 
Coutada 16, i.e., the heavy clay and the sandy and rocky soils made it too difficult to cultivate by 
hand. Additionally, the cultivators had to cut down the trees and clear the grass to plant. This 
situation was particularly difficult because the government did not give any support (agricultural 
inputs and machinery clear new fields) to these families after their relocations in Coutada16. The 
families had to rely on members of their households to clear new fields. With regards to the soil 
conditions of the village of Massingir Velho, Mrs. Celeste, the wife of the community leader of 
Massingir Velho left the following account.  
“The land of this village is not good for the production of maize and vegetables. We 
produced vegetables in down-river area (ncoveni). Here it is not possible to produce 
vegetables. Here we grow only maize, but not in the same quantities that we did in 
ncoveni…. In ncoveni it was possible to produce maize twice a year. Here we plant maize 
once a year”. 535 
 
                                                          
533Data collected and analysed by COBA indicate that in every month of the year, the potential evapotranspiration 
exceeds the precipitation. Given the Thornthwaite method to estimate potential evapotranspiration in tropical 
regions, the water deficit for the practice of agriculture deteriorates even more. Excluding alluvial soils of the 
floodplains of Shingwedzi, it can be concluded that the climate of the region is a serious limiting factor for the 
practice of the rain fed agriculture regardless of other factors as soil topographic conditions); see COBA- 
Profabril: Desenvolvimento das aldeias comunais de Cubo, Paulo Samuel Kankomba, Massingir-Velho e  
Mavoze: Levantamento uso de terra: Lisboa Portugal, 1983, p.51  
534 Interview with Almina Jossias Simango, Mavodze , 26/8/ 2014 
535 Interview with Celeste Mathe, Massingir Velho, 23/01/2014 
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African agricultural practices based on the slash and burn mode have several implications for the 
fertility of the soils, and after a period of use of the plots they have to be left unplanted for a 
period not less than 5 years for the regeneration of the soils fertility. This practice presumed that 
each household had to have some plots of land in use and another set of plots as fallow grounds. 
As the interviewees recognised, the moisture rich and fertile soils of the Elephants valley were 
easier to cultivate and they did not need to leave plots unplanted.536   
 
The proximity of the area to the river meant that during the rainy season and small-scale floods, 
the river deposited silt in the clay soils, rejuvenating the fertility of the valley and improving 
agricultural yields. The structure of the clay soils allowed the land to retain water for long 
periods making it easier to work these fields compared to those of upland regions.537 These 
natural conditions allowed the cultivators in their former villages (Ncoveni) to plant twice a year 
and secure enough food for their families, as they could use the same plots for many years while 
at the same time reducing the burden of having many fields to work.538   
 
Given the low and irregular rainfall in the new upland villages, access to the river-fed soils was 
critical to ensure household food security. Some household members went back to the reservoir 
shore to establish gardens to exploit the fertility of the dark alluvial soils remaining accessible. 
While in the upland regions of Coutada16 they could plant maize and sorghum once a year, the 
soils of the dam shore allowed them to plant the second season maize and vegetables. Cultivating 
vegetables in maize fields ensured food security as vegetables took only a few weeks to grow 
and were ready for consumption while waiting for the maize to ripen and be ready for harvest.539  
 
 
                                                          
536 Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi,  23/1/ 2014 
537Brito, R; S. Famba, P. Munguambe, N. Ibraimo and C. Julaia, 2009 “Profile of the Limpopo Basin in 
Mozambique a contribution to the Challenge Program on Water and Food Project 17.” Integrated Water Resource 
Management for Improved Rural Livelihoods: Managing risk, mitigating drought and improving productivity in 
the water scarce Limpopo Basin. Maputo: FAEF Secção de Uso de Terra e Água, Departamento de Engenharia 
Rural,, WaterNet Working Paper 11, p 46-47 
538 Interview with Winalse Mathe, Mavodzi,  23/1/ 2014 
539 Interview with Abel Elias Ngovene, Mavodze, 23/1/2014 
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The distances from the new villages to the reservoir shore is approximately 8km to 17 km 
depending on the location of the homesteads in the new villages. The paths to the fields located 
along the reservoir shores are made through thick bushes, hills and very rough terrain. In order to 
reach their fields the cultivators had to walk about three to four hours one way. This distance and 
the topographic condition of the land along the path to the reservoir shore made it impossible for 
the cultivators to commute to their fields and return home every-day. Moreover, given the need 
to protect their crops from attacks by hippos and other herbivores, the cultivators had to build 
huts near the shores of the reservoir to live there until the crops were ripe and collected to their 
homes. The need to protect crops was not only restricted to the fields located along the dam 
shore. It also affected fields near the new communal villages. Most often, wild stock came to 
these fields and destroyed crops creating shortages of foodstuffs for some of the households. The 
families were encouraged to build hedges to protect their fields. The situation increased the 
burden of work for the local families especially for women who, despite their involvement in 
agriculture, had to take care of the children and walk long distances to fetch water for bathing 
and cooking.540 This coping strategy resulted in the division of the family members for quite long 
periods. While some members remained in upland regions in Coutada 16, other members had to 
live along the Massingir dam shore to protect the crops until they were harvested, collected and 
transported to their homes.541 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
540 Interview with Rosina Sitoe, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014 
541 Interview with Alicina Zitha, Massingir Velho, 23/1/  2014 
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Photo1: Maize field along the Massingir dam reservoir542 
 
 
Photo2: Resident of the LNP (former Coutada 16) who live near the reservoir keep fires lit to 
keep the hippopotamus from eating the maize planted along the dam shore in the dry season.543 
 
 
                                                          
542Photo taken by the author during fieldwork in 2013 
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Until recently, no research was undertaken to analyse the impact on the environment resulting 
from the development of agriculture along the shores of the reservoir. A look at the fields where 
cultivators are still active shows that soil erosion caused by the cultivators when opening farms 
on hills along the reservoir shore began to occur. In general, the cultivators who had fields along 
the reservoir shores used their extra time for fishing. They sent their families the fish they caught 
from the reservoir for consumption or sold it to obtain additional income. During the course of 
the war, 1976-1992, the government staff responsible for fisheries abandoned the area leaving 
the activity without control.544 Moreover, during the course of the war, the population that 
remained in their villages relied on food aid and hunting rather than fishing. Thus, the 
overexploitation of natural resources south of the Elephants River was intense within the inner 
Coutada 16 forests rather than in Massingir Lake.  
 
5.4.3. Developing peoples’ farms inside a conservation area (Coutada16) 
The development of peoples´ farms was at the centre of Frelimo’s policy for the socialization of 
the countryside. Beside their use as areas for agricultural development, the peoples´ farms were 
“territories” where local people would have space and time to meet, discuss and find solutions to 
the problems of their villages. The peoples´ farms together with state farms were designed to 
replace most of the traditional peasants’ cultivation models, deemed by Frelimo to be inefficient 
and backward. The communal farms were seen also as space for the people to learn new 
agricultural techniques that would be provided through Frelimo’s governmental institutions. The 
peoples’ farms would produce food to feed not only the local villagers, but also the population 
living in the Mozambican cities and towns. Therefore, it was intended that the sale of production 
from the communal farms would generate income for the villagers to buy commodities and 
goods not produced locally.545 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
543Milgroom, Jessica. 2012. Elephants of democracy, p.6 
544 Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 25/8/ 2013 
545AHM: CNAC. Cx. AC 223. “Linhas orientadoras para o desenvolvimento das aldeas comunais” Pasta – 
Planificação fisica das aldeias Comunais; CNAC: Maputo 1980 
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Unlike the Chókwè region where the peoples’ farms and state farms (e.g. farms owned by the 
Agro Industrial Company of Limpopo or CAIL) were established after the floods of February 
1977 in the areas abandoned by the Portuguese settlers, Coutada 16 lacked fertile soils, irrigation 
schemes and other infrastructure for such developments. Indeed, despite this fact, the Frelimo 
staff urged each household to allocate one of its members for a day of work in the collective 
farms.546   
 
According to information gleaned from interviews, the communal farms increased the burden of 
work for the local families especially women who had to work on their field and on communal 
fields, they entailed additional work of clearing field in the bush to plant. Questioned about the 
levels of productivity in the collective farms, the interviewees mentioned that it was very low 
when compared to families´ plots. The development of peoples’ farms in Coutada 16 was 
abandoned in the early 1980s because of drought and the intensification of the armed conflict.547 
During my fieldwork in the Massingir region, I noticed that due to the work done that led to 
deforestation of some areas, local populations are using such areas as grazing fields for the cattle.  
 
5.4.4. Livestock keeping inside communal villages in Coutada16  
The development of animal husbandry requires the existence of good pastures and water for 
livestock. Soon after the establishment of the new villages in Coutada 16, local communities 
faced several difficulties in feeding the cattle. In Massingir Velho village, the cattle had to be 
driven for a distance of 8 km to Bonzuene (a tributary of the Elephants River) to drink water and 
in Mavodze village cattle were driven to Shingwedzi River, located 9 km from the village. The 
development of cattle in such conditions meant that the boys engaged in cattle herding had to 
spend the whole day taking care of the cattle and thus had little time to help their families and 
even to go to school. Pertaining to the changing patterns of cattle keeping in Massingir Velho 
village, Manuela Valoi complained: 
 
                                                          
546Roesch, Renamo and peasantry in southern Mozambique, pp.3-4; see also Bowen, Merle. 2000. The state against 
the peasantry,  p.129 
547 Interview with Manuela Valoi, Mavodze , 26/8/ 2014 
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“When we were living along the Elephants valley, it was possible for kids to drive the cattle to 
the grazing areas and leave them there grazing and come back to help the family in domestic 
activities including agricultural activities. Here in upland in Coutada 16, the situation is 
completely different…. young people could not abandon the cattle. They have to go to the 
grazing field in groups of about 3 to 5 young men from three to five families respectively. Going 
to graze in groups give them a sense of security and they can help each other if a predators come 
to attack the cattle.”548 
 
Before February 1977, the former Massingir Velho and Mavodze villages were located along the 
flood plain areas of Elephants valley. Before this period, predators also inhabited the upper lands 
of Coutada 16 and crossed their villages when going down to the river to drink water. Semeão 
also explained that even when the wild beast walked down to the river they used their own paths 
that were not usually used by local villagers to avoid human and wildlife conflicts. The 
resettlement of the relocated families in communal villages located in the forest in Coutada 16 
exacerbated conflicts between wildlife and resettled families. Frequently predators invaded local 
communities’ kraals, killing goats and chickens, while lions attacked cattle. From early 1977 to 
the mid-1980s, many families of the communal villages of Massingir Velho and Mavodze lost 
their livestock due to predators.549 
 
The relocation of the riverine communities in Coutada 16 also resulted in changes in cattle 
keeping practices. Along the Elephants valley, households that had no kids to take care of the 
cattle used to take the cattle to the grazing areas in the evening and leave them grazing overnight 
and collect the cattle on the following day. This practice allowed the households to work in their 
fields during the day and take care of the cattle after returning from their fields. In the new 
villages, this practice was abandoned due to attacks on cattle by predators. It was not secure to 
leave the cattle grazing overnight in the bush.550 Simeão Penicela Ngovene, a herdsman and 
cultivator in the Massingir village explained the changing patterns of the cattle keeping in the 
following words: 
 
                                                          
548Interview with Manuela Valoi, Mavodze, 26/8/ 2014  
549Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012  
550 In Gaza province cattle is normally taken care by young herders aged 8 to 14 years old. Interview with Simeão 
Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012 
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“When we arrived here, there were many predators. Wild dogs (Hyenas) eat goats and 
chickens and lions attacked the cattle. In the lower land (Ncoveni), we did not take the cattle 
back to kraals every day. Some days we used to leave the cattle grazing overnight. After we 
have arrived in this place we noticed that some cattle disappeared overnight eaten by lions 
and other predators. We abandoned leaving the cattle grazing overnight.”551  
 
The data on wild stock population before the establishment of communal villages in Coutada 16 
is scarce. The existing files refer only to elephant population surveys done by the KNP board 
from 1972 to 1976 to analyse elephant’s movements between the KNP and Mozambique.552 
Relying on interviewed cultivators, I can ascertain that the relocation of communities from the 
Elephants valley in Coutada 16 contributed to human and wildlife conflicts. While predators 
(hyenas and lions) are reported to have contributed to the reduction of the livestock, herbivores 
(gazelles, impales) are constantly mentioned as species that destroyed local families’ and 
households’ crops. The grazing areas had gone from the open fields along the Elephants valley to 
areas with shrubs and trees in Coutada16.  Due to the attacks on the cattle in the grazing areas, it 
became mandatory for the young herders to take with them hunting dogs to the grazing fields. 
The dogs were often used to scent predators when approaching the grazing areas. The warning of 
the dogs (barking) allowed the young herders to call their colleagues to help them to chase the 
predators away. 553 
 
After the relocations, the cattle bells became very important instruments for the security of the 
cattle. The cattle bells helped the young herders to detect the location of their cattle and in the 
event that some cattle had gone astray, the young herders could quickly follow the bells to bring 
back the cattle. Although the cowbells helped to locate the cattle, they also warned the predators 
about the existence of cattle in the bush. In such a situation, the predators could follow the noise 
of the bell to track and kill the cattle. Consequently, the herders were urged to keep all the cattle 
close to each other to avoid being caught by predators.554 
 
                                                          
551 Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012 
552Smuts, J. L, 1976  “Population characteristics and recent history of lions in two parts of the Kruger National Park 
Koedoe 19: pp. 153-164 
553 Interview with Simeão Peninicela Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 6/6/2012 
554 Interview with William Number One Valoi, Massingir Velho, 25/8/ 2013 
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Establishing communal villages in the central part of Coutada 16 
In 1978, Frelimo government officials from the district of Massingir worked to set up new 
communal villages in the central part of Coutada 16 where some communities along the 
Shingwedzi catchment were still living in scattered households. In this area, Frelimo government 
officials organized weekly meetings with the local population where they explained the 
objectives of the communal villages and urged the scattered households to move to the 
communal villages. 555 If compared to the south end villages, the villages of the central part of 
Coutada 16 were better located because they were established near the source of water 
(Shingwedzi River) for the population and cattle. Moreover, the best arable lands in the region 
were located along the Shingwedzi valley and the population had to walk a few kilometres to 
their fields.556   
 
Despite the fact that many heads of the local families attended the meetings with Frelimo 
officials, not all families in the central part of Coutada 16 moved from their former homesteads 
to the areas designed for the establishment of the communal villages.557 Living scattered in the 
bush had great advantages to this population rather than living in communal villages. Living in 
the bush allowed them to continue to hunt in the local forests without interference from the 
Frelimo local staff or secretários. The replacement of traditional leaders by Frelimo staff broke 
communication between Frelimo officials and the local population who continued to be loyal to 
their traditional leaders. Consequently, despite several appeals made by Frelimo officials 
concerning the need for scattered households to move to the new communal villages, some 
families continued living apart in the bush until the early 1980s when the civil war forced them 
to join other villagers in the new communal villages.558  
 
By late 1979, Frelimo officials had managed to establish three villages in the central part of 
Coutada 16. The villages lacked social infrastructure and access facilities especially roads and 
bridges over the main rivers of the area. This situation made travel from the Massingir 
                                                          
555 Group Interview with, Rosina Mbombe, Elina Malhaule, Naquirosa Valoi,  Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014 
556 Ibiden 
557 Entrevista com Simion Number One Ngoveni, Mukatine, 26/04/2016 
558 Ididen. 
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administration (Tihovene) to these areas very difficult. In the rainy season, no vehicles could 
reach these villages. After the establishment of these villages, Frelimo officials named it after the 
names of the party’s heroes, former Frelimo bases (barracks) and slogans used by Frelimo during 
the liberation war.559 Archival documents are silent in this regard. It is known, however, that 
soon after independence Frelimo used names of its heroes, bases and slogans to popularize the 
party its programs and its social and economic policy. Thus, Frelimo party officials used the 
names to remember its heroism during the war to overthrown the colonial government and thus 
persuade the population to affiliate the party and follow its social and economic programmes. 
 
Table 3: Communal villages established by Frelimo in Coutada nº16560  
Area Name of the village Location N de hab. 
Massingir Velho Aldeia Comunal Venceremos  South region 1309 
Mavodze Aldeia Comunal Cahora Bassa South region 1414 
Mbingo Aldeia Comunal Gorongosa Central region 567 
Machamba Aldeia Comunal Nachingueia Central region 606 
Chimangue Aldeia Comunal 500 anos Central region 688 
 
There are no official statistics of the number of families that joined communal villages in 1981/2. 
From the interviews, I knew that from this period until 1984/5 almost all families of the inner 
villages of Coutada 16 lived in communal villages to benefit from the protection of the national 
army due to the occurrence of the armed conflict. In 1984-5, the civil war reached these villages 
and local families left their village and sought refuge in other Mozambican villages and towns 
while some households migrated to South Africa. 
 
5.4.5. Frelimo dispute traditional leaders in Coutada 16   
In 1977, at the party 3rd Congress, Frelimo proclaimed itself as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard 
party of the worker-peasants alliance. During the congress, the Frelimo government adopted the 
                                                          
559 Group interview with, Rosina Mbombe, Elina Malhaule, Naquirosa Valoi Mbingo, 24/2/ 2014 
560AHM. CNAC, Cx. 71 RPM – Relatório da 1ª fase da Missão a Província de Gaza- 1980-82: A primeira reunião 
sobre formação sobre o processo de formação das aldeias comunais em Massingir - Aldeia III congresso  e Aldeia 
de Chissunguele. Massingir , 10 e 11/8/1979.  
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socialization of the countryside as the state strategy for the development of rural villages.561 In 
the period following the congress, the party launched campaigns to broaden its base, 
incorporating new militants at every level.562 The party advocated that all the government staff at 
all levels had to be in alignment with Frelimo´s development polices to allow the mobilization of 
the population to embrace its central planning strategy and the implementation of the policy for 
the socialization of the countryside in remote rural areas.563  
 
Frelimo´s strategy to bring into the administration members who were only loyal to the party 
resulted in the replacement of former heads of rural villages or régulos by new chiefs known as 
secretaries or secretários. In most rural villages, the former heads of the villages were removed 
from office not only because of their loyalty to the colonial regime, but also because they 
represented the traditional practices (power of the ancestors), which was in conflict with 
Frelimo´s nation making project, and of the creation of the homem novo literally, the new man.564  
 
In rural villages and towns, the secretários and the mass-based groups composed of Frelimo´s 
sympathizers formed the grupos dinamizadores (“dynamazing” groups) whose functions were 
carrying out administrative, economic and political tasks.565 Bowen argues that after 1977, in 
some rural villages in southern Mozambique, the one-party state merged into the same person or 
the secretário, the political and administrative functions. The secretários and grupos 
                                                          
561FRELIMO (1977b), Documentos de base da FRELIMO (3º Congresso, 3 à 7 de Fevereiro de 1977). Maputo: 
Departamento do Trabalho Ideológico da FRELIMO 
562Anton, Johnston. 2014. “The Mozambican state and education”. Carnoy, Martin and Joel Samoff (Eds) Education 
and social transition in the Third World. Prince Town: University Press, pp. 275-314; p, 287 
563 Interview with Simiao Sitoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014 
564FRELIMO used media and community meeting to pass its messages and slogans (palavras de ordem) to the 
population and those deemed to perpetrate the colonial, capitalist and backward practices as tribalism and racism 
were labelled as Xiconhocas (greedy, lazy, corrupt, ugly personality) and were denied access to higher position in 
the community. Meneses, Maria Paula 2015. “Xiconhoca, o inimigo: Narrativas de violência sobre a construção 
da nação em Moçambique” Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais 106 (2015) Memórias de violências: Que futuro 
para o passado?  
565Anton, Johnston. The Mozambican state and education in Education and Social Transition in the Third World, p, 
286 
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dinamizadores played a fundamental role in the sensitization of their communities so as to 
embrace Frelimo´s policies.566 
 
The disruption of the colonial state apparatus at the grassroots level, i.e. the removal of the 
former local and traditional leaders from the office and the lack of supervision of local forests by 
government staff in Coutada 16 resulted in anarchy in the management of the local forests 
resources. The replacement of former local leaders also sharpened disparities concerning access 
to and management of natural resources (land forest and wildlife).567 Despite their removal from 
office, the traditional leaders continued to be recognized in their communities as legitimate 
authorities. The secretários and the grupos dinamizadores did not have the same legitimacy that 
the traditional leaders had.568  
 
While the government reserved its institutions and staff, the management of natural resources 
including the supervision of local hunting, the loyalty that the population retained for their 
traditional leaders allowed them to continue to be in control of natural resources such as 
allocation of land in their villages and surroundings. However, they abandoned their duties as 
guardians of the local forest and supervisors of hunting activities. The secretários and the grupos 
dinamizadores lacked authority in their villages. Consequently, it was difficult for them to arrest 
illegal hunters and take them to proper institutions to be judged or pay penalties. In some 
                                                          
566Bowen, Marle. 2000. The state against the peasantry: rural struggle in colonial and postcolonial Mozambique. 
Virginia: Virginia University Press, p. 41 
567During the colonial period, the traditional authority in southern Mozambique was encompassed in the figure of 
the village leader – the Régulo. The regulos’ authority and power was associated with the Portuguese colonialism. 
They represented the colonial authorities in their villages and also were the entities that connected the new 
generation with their ancestors; they command ceremonies linked to ancestors which were believed to demand 
rains, thanks the spirits of the ancestors for a good agricultural season, a good hunt etc. see Alexander, Jocelyn. 
1997. “The local state in post war Mozambique: political practice and ideas about authority” Africa, 67 (1): 1-26 
568During the colonial period, the local population in most rural areas in Mozambique maintained loyalty to the 
traditional leaders not only because they were the representative of the Portuguese colonial government but due to 
the divine power that they had in their communities. During the Estado Novo the traditional authorities, the 
regulos had a considerable authorities in their villages as they represented the colonial authorities at the local 
level.  Moreover, the regulos worked closely with the colonial systems in the implementation of the colonial rule. 
Because they acted as assistants of the colonial government at local levels, they were exempted for forced work at 
administration. In the late 1930s when the production of cotton was intensified in southern Mozambique, regulos 
used the cipaios (colonial police in rural areas) to recruit people to work on their fields; see Isaacman, A.  1992. 
“Peasants, 1992. Work and the labour process: forced cotton cultivation in colonial Mozambique,1938-1961” 
Journal of Social History, Vol. 25 (4): 815-855 
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circumstances, the roles played by the secretários in Coutada 16 were controversial. They 
represented their villages at the administration but at local levels they continued to be under the 
rule of the traditional leaders.569 The headman of Mbingo village recalled the political 
transformations in his villages soon after independence and the state of management of natural 
resources, land and fauna, this way: 
 
“The Portuguese empowered the régulos us as managers of the local resources. We had the right 
to allocate land to the population and supervised hunting in the area. After Mozambique gained 
independence, people continued to come to us to ask for permission to clear new plots in the 
villages or its surroundings. They never went to the secretários. They did not recognise their 
authority… they had authority only at the administration but locally they obey us. They had no 
right to perform local ceremonies.   
 
During the colonial period when hunters killed an animal, they brought a part of it to us. It was 
said that the belly of the animal belongs to the king. When the hunters had killed a big animal 
such as an elephant or rhino, they had to bring one of the tusks to the king … it was said that the 
horn on the side that the animal lays down after being shot belongs to the king. We did the control 
of hunting. Those who did not obey our rules were taken to the administration to pay penalties 
(forced work or be whipped by a special whippier known as xipacani). In the mid-1950s, the 
Portuguese introduced forest scouts locally known as or mbocotanas to supervise hunting in the 
area.  
 
After independence the scouts disappeared … then there were people who came here saying that 
they were from the Department of Agriculture in Massingir… they did not know anything about 
hunting. When they heard the first gunshots of Mapswanga (local name for RENAMO’s army) 
they disappeared. Due to draught and hunger in the region, people increased hunting…. There 
was no one to take the control of the game. We were excluded from Frelimo’s administration. 
Frelimo created a big problem in the management of forest resources in the area. Who were the 
secretários? Who knew them? Who listened to them?”570 
 
The above quotation demonstrates the dissolution of former traditional leaders in Massingir 
region. As I have pointed out in previous chapters, the participation of the traditional leaders in 
the management of local resources and supervision of hunting was direct consequence of the 
benefits that they had from the colonial administration (exception of hut taxes, use of local 
labour in their field, etc.). The colonial administration in southern Mozambique allowed Shangan 
traditional leaders to share the products of hunting and thus incentivise their participation in the 
                                                          
569While in the colonial period traditional leaders´ work was more concerned about the enforcement of colonial rules 
in the villages; after independence, the secretarios in rural areas were more committed with territorial 
organization of space of their villages, political functions and modes of production. 
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supervision on hunting. Because Frelimo replaced the former villages’s headmen (régulos) by 
new chiefs or secretários the régulos resigned their duties as guardians of the local resources and 
refused to cooperate in the supervision of hunting and management of the wildlife (flora and 
fauna).  
 
The mismanagement of ecosystems and fauna north of the Elephants River was worsened 
because from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, Frelimo officials in the Massingir district seemed 
to completely ignore that the area between the confluence of Limpopo and the Elephants River in 
the north to the Mozambique and South Africa border in the east was a hunting concession. The 
local government of Massingir district and its staff was only concerned with the socialization of 
the countryside and nothing was made to improve the management of the natural resources. 
During the period from 1977 to 1983, the state of natural resource conservation in Coutada 16 
was appalling as the area witnessed a massive depletion of the forest resources and wildlife. 
 
5.6. Improving the living conditions of the local populations in Coutada 16 
In 1979, the GoM realized that the relocation of the families displaced by the construction of the 
Massingir dam in communal villages in Coutada 16 was a disaster and that it had condemned the 
population to misery. In contrast to the communities of the central and northern parts of Coutada 
that depended on Shingwedzi alluvial soils for cropping, the poor soils of the Massingir Velho 
and Mavodze villages were not suitable for agriculture. In addition, cyclical periods of drought 
had condemned the populations to hunger and poverty. Additionally, human and livestock 
diseases reduced cattle herds and deteriorated significantly the living standards of the local 
populations. The situation resulted in mass abandonment of the area, especially by youths who 
migrated to South Africa in search of new opportunities in life.571 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
571COBA, Consultores. 1983. Desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comunais de Paulo Samuel Kankomba, Massingir 
Velho e Mavodze: Carta de Potencial Agricola, Carta de pastagens, Carta de Potencial Florestal. Maputo: SERLI 
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The deterioration of the living conditions of the population in the new communal villages in 
Coutada 16 due to adverse factors listed above led the government in later 1979 to commission 
studies on the conditions of life in the relocated communities and land suitability to base land 
development programs to increase agricultural yields in the communal villages of Coutada 16. 
The evaluation reports concluded that a part of Coutada 16, especially the area where the 
government had established the communal villages of Mavodze and Massingir Velho was not 
suitable for the development of agriculture and cattle keeping. The reports also emphasised the 
fact that if the government wanted to improve the living conditions of the local populations, it 
had to develop irrigation schemes along the Shingwedzi valley and introduce new cattle species 
resistant to drought and that could feed on existing pastures.572  
 
The report also indicated that between the confluence of the Shingwedzi and Elephants River, 
there were about 5.830 ha of arable land of which 78% could be used for the development of 
irrigation schemes and the 22% could be used for rain fed agriculture. Part of the land could be 
cleared and given to local households and other land could be used for the establishment of state 
farms.573 In the late 1970s, Frelimo government staff began to convince the population from the 
villages of Massingir Velho and Mavodze to resettle along the irrigated area just a few 
kilometres from the foot of the dam wall. Again, lack of clarity about the new relocation program 
led the population to remain in the upland region of Coutada 16.574  
 
In the 1980s, the government started to develop small-scale irrigation schemes downstream of 
the Massingir dam (15 km downstream from the foot of the dam wall to 20 km to the confluence 
between the Elephants and the Shingwedzi rivers). With this project, the government expected to 
                                                          
572 COBA- Profabril: Desenvolvimento das aldeias comunais de Cubo, Paulo Samuel Kankomba, Massingir-Velho e  
Mavoze: Levantamento uso de terra: Lisboa Portugal, 1983 
573RPM. 1984. Projecto do Rio dos Elefantes, margem esquerda [Estudo de Viabilidade].  This study was 
commissioned by the GoM and conducted by MacDonald and Partner Limited. Principal Report. The report has 7 
huge annexes or books (1- Solos, 2-Agricultura, 3-Irrigação, 4-Infraestruturas, 5-Organização Administrativa, 6-
Estimativas de Custos, 7-Economia). The Library of the Instituto de Investigação Agronómica de Moçambique- 
Maputo (IIAM) has a series of unpublished reports done by the Portuguese authorities and the post independent 
state regarding research done on soils fertility for the development of irrigation schemes downstream Massingir 
dam. The documents on feasibility studies on water component can be found at the Library of the National 
Directorate of Water or Direcção Nacional de Aguas (DNA).  
574Lunstrum, E. M. The making and unmaking of sovereign territory, p. 112 
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attract the families from the upland regions region of Coutada 16 to migrate and settle in the area 
to take advantage of job opportunities existing on the state farms and develop agriculture in the 
fertile lands. In 1983, the government began planning for the development of irrigation 
infrastructure downstream of the Massingir dam. The assessment reports in this regard 
recommended that the government should include the already planned Massingir irrigation 
schemes and its state farms as part of the big governmental project for accelerated development 
of agriculture along the Incomati and Limpopo valleys. The Project was under tutelage of SERLI 
or State Secretariat for the Accelerated Development of the Incomati and Limpopo Region 
(Secretaria do Estado para o Desenvolvimento Acelerado da Região do Limpopo e Incomati).575   
 
Combined factors such as drought (1982-3) and the intensification of the armed conflict (1982-
1992) drove a considerable part of the population to seek refuge in South Africa and 
Mozambican villages and towns. Due to the increasing criticism about the negative impact of the 
policy for the socialization of the countryside in most of rural villages, in 1984 during the 4th 
Congress of Frelimo party, the government officially abandoned the policy and SERLI was 
dismantled before making any investment to establish state farms in Massingir region.576  
 
The failure of this project meant that once again the project of relocation of communities living 
in the core conservation area of Coutada 16 in new villages located outside the Coutda was 
postponed to an unknown future. As I have demonstrated in the next chapter, the implementation 
of effective strategies to protect fauna in Coutada 16 would wait for another 11 years (1985-
1996), when finally in 1996 the government with active support from the World Bank designed a 
project to rehabilitate ecosystems destroyed by war and enhance community development in the 
area.    
 
                                                          
575RPM. 1984. Projecto do Rio dos Elefantes, margem esquerda [Estudo de viabilidade: Relatório de consultoria - 
MacDonald and Partner Limited with Hunting Technical Services].Maputo. Relatório Principal.  
576Entrevista com o administrador de Massingir Artur Macamo, 15/6/2012; See also Alberts, Tom and Krister 
Eduards. 1987. “Drought and destabilization: an evaluation of Swedish disaster relief in Mozambique, 1983 to 
1985.” Goppers, Karlis (Ed.). Sida Evaluation Report Series.Varnamo: Sida Evaluation Section; see also Bowen, 
Merle L. 1989. “Peasant agriculture in Mozambique: the case of Chokwe, Gaza province” Journal of African 
Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, 23 ( 3): 355-379 
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5.7. Conclusion 
The political independence of Mozambique celebrated on 25th June 1975 implied considerable 
changes in the country’s development policies. After independence, the abandonment of the 
country by technicians involved in several projects did not allow Frelimo officials to learn from 
them about the potentialities of the region or even locate important files concerning development 
projects started during colonial period. This fact resulted in many mistakes during the building of 
the dam wall and the planning for resettlement of communities affected by the filling of the dam 
reservoir.  
 
The building of the Massingir dam caused displacement of the communities living along the 
Elephants valley and their relocation to upland regions above the flood plains. The building of 
the dam implied also great transformation of land, ecosystems at the dam site and reservoir, 
structural changes in the new villages built to host government staff, the workers employed in the 
construction of the dam and in the new villages established to host the families displaced by the 
construction of the dam. The filling up of the dam resulted in the Massingir Lake and consequent 
destruction of the natural ecosystem and wildlife along the reservoir.  
 
The relocation of riverine communities to poor soils in Coutada16 resulted in the decrease of the 
local families’ agricultural yields. Thus, hunting for food became a means for survival for many 
of the households. The opening up of family and communal farms in Coutada 16 increased the 
destruction of local ecosystems. Moreover, the conflict between Frelimo and traditional 
authorities and their replacement by new chiefs (chefes and secretaries) loyal to the party left a 
vacuum in the field of natural resources management. The removal from office of traditional 
leaders who were the effective managers of local natural resources and lack of government staff 
to take control of the natural resources resulted in a disorder in the management of local natural 
resources. As a result, the area witnessed the destruction of wildlife and fauna. 
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Chapter 6 examines the consequences of the armed conflict on already fragile ecosystems. 
Indeed, the armed conflict (1976-1992) forced a considerable part of the inhabitants of Coutada 
16 to seek refuge in other Mozambican villages and towns and in South Africa. Far from the 
control of governmental institutions, the armies fed on local fauna and the increase of illegal 
hunters contributed to exterminate the fauna in Coutada 16.   
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CHAPTER VI: COMMUNITIES IN TRANSITION: WAR AND CONSERVATION IN 
THE SOUTH WESTERN MOZAMBIQUE BORDERLAND, 1976-2002 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Chapter 5 examined how rural transformation in Massingir and particularly in Coutada 16 
resulted in the relocation of the families that lived along the Elephants and their restelment in 
upper lands in Coutada 16. In the new village in Coutada 16, some families did not succed to 
find fertile soils for cropping. Thus, hunting for food became a mean for survival of the local 
populations. In the new communal villages, the replacement of traditional leaders by Frelimo 
staff broke communication between Frelimo officials and the local population who continued to 
be loyal to their traditional leaders. This situation resulted in anarchy in the management of the 
local forests resources including fauna.     
 
From 1976 to 1992, much of the countryside was severely affected by armed conflict that 
destroyed social and economic infrastructure built during the colonial period and soon after 
independence. In most rural areas, the government staff left their positions and sought refuge in 
the cities and towns. In Massingir district, the government armies were present to protect the 
town of Massingir and the dam. From 1984, RENAMO´s armies took control over inner villages 
in Coutada 16, burning homes and granaries, stealing cattle, mutilating people and exterminating 
the fauna forcing local populations to leave their villages and and seek refuge in safer places in 
towns, and some people migrated to South Africa. 
 
The end of the armed conflict in October 1992 brought hope to the hundreds of thousands of 
displaced who rushed to return to their home villages. The political stability allowed the GoM to 
implement programmes aimed at pushing the country’s economy forward and rehabilitate 
ecosystems and wildlife destroyed by the war. In 1996, the GoM received funding from the 
World Bank to rehabilitate the ecosystems in border zones in Maputo, Gaza and Manica. The 
  
199 
 
funding allowed the government to set the framework for further integration of these areas into 
the Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) Projects.  
 
The rationale behind TFCA lay in the fact that colonial borders, administrative rules, colonial 
and post-colonial conservation policies resulted in fragmentation of natural ecosystems and 
blocked wildlife migrations patterns. These areas had their natural equilibrium, specific animal 
and human carry capacity rather than governed by state legislation. The TFCA were seen as 
solutions to heal the wounds of the pre and post-independence wars in border regions in southern 
Africa, which resulted in fragmentation of African ecosystems, displacements and separation of 
African communities. Thus, TFCA encouraged regional integration while fostering peaceful 
cooperation between countries that in the past may be engaged in conflict with one another. The 
TFCA concept also laid hope that they would reduce political and cultural tensions related to 
disputed borderlands and competition for shared resources and encourage use of resources in 
borderlands. The use of this conservation approach would also allow the member states to bring 
down fences along the border regions and allow migratory species to move freely from one area 
to another within the same conservation unit.577 
 
This chapter examines the armed conflict in the Massingir region and its impact on the lives of 
the local communities and the environment. It documents experiences undergone by the local 
communities in Coutada 16 to escape the war and the routes followed to find refuge within and 
across national borders; it also analyses the return of these communities from exile and the 
process of rebuilding lives in Coutada 16. The chapter seeks to answer the following questions. 
What was the state of environmental conservation in Coutada 16 after the resettlements caused 
by the construction of the Massingir Dam? What was the impact of the war to the local 
communities and environment? What strategies were put by the GoM to rehabilitate the local 
ecosystem soon after the end of the civil conflict?  
 
                                                          
577Wolmer, William 2003. “Transboundary Conservation: the politics of ecological integrity”, p. 265 
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This chapter argues that the integration of former Coutada 16 in the regional TFCA initiative or 
GLTP forced the GoM in 2001 to transform Coutada 16 into LNP. This transformation was 
followed by the adoption of the KNP´s conservation model where communities are not allowed 
in protected areas. However, lack of funding by the GoM is limiting the effectiveness of the 
resettlement programs for people living in the core conservation area of the LNP and 
environmental related business initiatives in buffer zones. During my last field work in Massingir 
region in April 2016, there were communities still living in the LNP.  
 
The chapter is structured into four sections. The second section examines the political 
environment in the region that led to armed conflict in Mozambique and particularly the 
Massingir region. The section describes the severity of the armed conflict, its impact on the 
environment and strategies adopted by local populations in Coutada 16 to escape the warfare. 
The third section examines the economic and political transformations in Mozambique and the 
end of armed conflict; it analyses the return of the local population from exile and the process of 
rebuilding life in their home villages in Coutada 16. The fourth section reviews the establishment 
of TFCA initiatives in the region and the road to the GLTP. The last section examines the 
processes of transformation of Coutada 16 into LNP and implications for the lives of the 
communities affected by the relocations.  
 
6.2. Roots of armed conflict in Mozambique and Massingir region 
The political independence of Mozambique was declared by Frelimo in Maputo on 25th June 
1975.578 After independence, the political and economic policy adopted by Frelimo differed from 
the capitalist development approach of its neighbours and particularly of South Africa and 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Moreover, after the party had taken the reins of power, it supported 
                                                          
578In 1964, Frelimo guerrilla forces started in the northern province of Cabo Delgado an armed struggle to overthrow 
the Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique. In April 1974, the collapse of the Salazar-Caetano longstanding 
regime in Portugal and the decision of the new government in Lisbon to end Portuguese defence of colonial rule 
in Africa opened the way for the independence of Mozambique. On 7th September 1974, Frelimo signed an 
agreement with Portugal that as from 25th September 1974 to 24th June 1975 the country would be ruled by a 
transitional government (composed of Portuguese staff and Frelimo nominees) to prepare power transfer from the 
Portugal´s Oversees Ministry to a Frelimo government; the political independence of the country was celebrated 
on 25th June 1975. This agreement is known in the History of Mozambique as Lusaka Accords as it was signed in 
  
201 
 
the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in its armed struggle for 
Zimbabwean independence and the African National Congress (ANC) in its long struggle against 
racial discrimination in South Africa. In March 1976, the GoM closed transport links to the land-
locked Rhodesia in support of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle.579  
 
This support resulted in rivalry between the GoM, the Rhodesian government and the Apartheid 
regime. The apparent regional polarisation became worse on July 1976 when the Frelimo 
government nationalized land, natural resources and leasing buildings affecting the owners of big 
companies and settlers that had left the country immediately after independence. From 1977, the 
Rhodesian government supported a group of rebels unhappy with the country’s economic and 
political orientation. By mid-1977, the Rhodesian security forces through the Central Intelligence 
Organization (CIO) had managed to recruit some Africans (among them black Mozambicans 
Diaspora in South Africa and Lisbon) and formed the rebel movement which became known as 
the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) otherwise known in Mozambique as Resistência 
Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO). André Matsangaissa, a former Frelimo member, led the 
movement. Matsangaissa was accused of robbery and sent to prison on charges of theft. 
Matsangaissa managed to escape from jail and joined the MNR thereafter RENAMO.580  
 
The Rhodesian security forces supported the formation of RENAMO with the objective of 
counteracting the support that Mozambique was giving to ZANU-PF. Thus, supporting 
insurgency in Mozambique, the CIO expected that the Mozambique government would redirect 
its resources to fight insurgency within the country rather than supporting Zimbabwe National 
Liberation Army (ZNLA). While Smith´s troops acted at a national level, the Matsanga (name 
given by local populations to RENAMO´s men in reference to the movement´s chief 
commander, André Matsangaissa) acted in rural areas to destabilize Frelimo’s governance.581 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Zambian capital of Lusaka on 7th September 1974. See Cabrita, João M.  2000. Mozambique: the tortuous 
road to democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
579Minter, William and Elizabeth Schmidt. 1988. “When Sanctions Worked: the case of Rhodesia re-examined” 
African Affairs;  87(347) 207-237, p. 213 
580 Vines, Alex. 1992. Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique. London: James Currey, p.15 
581Tajú, Gulamo. 1988. “Renamo: Os factos que conhecemos.” Cadernos de História. Maputo: Universidade 
Eduardo Mondlane 
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Between 1978 and 1979, Rhodesian forces attacked strategic economic infrastructures in 
Mozambique such as bridges, roads, military positions, schools, hospitals and fuel deposits. In 
May 1976, Smith’s forces tried to limit the movement of people, vehicles trains in the northern 
Gaza province by lying landmines, derailing trains and ambushing both military and civil 
vehicles. From May to October 1976, several villages located north of Coutada 16, namely 
Chigamane, Machailia, Jorge de Limpopo and Massangena were attacked.582  
 
In 1977, Smith’s paratroopers landed in Chimangue village, about 80 km from the town of 
Massingir and unloaded several containers. Information about what was in the containers is 
scarce. It is believed however that it was military equipment to support RENAMO in its attacks 
in southern Mozambique. When the government troops approached the site they were ambushed 
and 2 were killed. The Mozambican forces retreated to Massingir to gather more support and 
when they returned to the site, the equipment and troops were no longer there.583   
 
The opening of the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference held in London in September 
1979 brought hope to millions of Zimbabweans for peace and independence. Conscious that the 
future government of Zimbabwe would not support insurgent forces of the region, in late 1979, 
the CIO negotiated with the South Africa authorities to host and continue to support RENAMO. 
This request was particularly favoured by internal changes within South Africa.584  In 1978, due 
to “Muldergate” information scandal, the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, who was 
considered a moderate in foreign policy and favoured detente was removed from the cabinet and 
replaced by P.W. Botha, the then Minister of Defence.585  
 
Botha had great support from the military, which offered an armed approach to solve political 
problems with the neighbouring states. Botha accused particularly Mozambique of fomenting 
                                                          
582At the time ZNLA had established its base in the central province of Manica which it used for training of its 
troops; see Robinson, David Alexander. 2006. Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war, [PhD 
Thesis]; University of Western Australia; p. 99-101  
583AHM. CNAC; Cx 71 “RPM – Relatorio da 1ª fase da missão a província de Gaza - 1980-82 
584Norman, William Oliver. 2004. Living on the Frontline: Politics, p.147 
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revolution in the region and threatening stability in South Africa itself. Botha argued that South 
Africa was facing a ‘Total Onslaught.586 Under its Total National Strategy (TNS) Botha found 
alliances within the SADF to support insurgency and attacks to ANC members in 
Mozambique.587  
 
Up to the early 1980s, the Apartheid regime had channelled support to RENAMO via CIO. 
Documents collected by Mozambican Armed Forces soon after the attack to Garagua Base in 
Manica demonstrate support provided by SADF to RENAMO. As the independence of 
Zimbabwe was approaching the British forced CIO to close down its support to RENAMO and 
offered the rebels a choice of be integrated into civilian life or continue sabotage to Mozambique 
under the support of South Africa. After independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980 and the 
ZANU-PF victory, the rebels operating under the umbrella of CIO preferred to be transferred to 
South Africa and rely on South African support to continue sabotage to Mozambique.588  
 
From early 1980, the RENAMO leaders moved from Zimbabwe to northern Transvaal where its 
troops received logistical support and military training.589 The existence of an extensive forest on 
the south western Mozambique border with South Africa without effective control of the 
government armies allowed the rebels to take control over the area and set up bases to manage 
military support from the SADF. Accordingly, the Apartheid regime also used its bases in 
Phalaborwa to channel support to RENAMO in Mozambique. Unspecified military equipment 
passed through KNP to RENAMO in Mozambique. RENAMO used the support from South 
Africa to prepare its forces for further interventions in Mozambique.590  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
585Vines, Alex. 1992. Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique. London: James currey, p.20 
586Daniel, John. 2009. The impact of the cold war and the fall of the Berlin wall on southern Africa see 
http://www.kas.de/upload/Publikationen/Panorama/2009/1/daniel.pdf  accessed June 2015 
587Geldenhuys, Deon. 1981. “Some foreign policy implications of South Africa’s Total National Strategy", with 
particular reference to the "12-pointplan”. The South African Institute of International Affairs - Special Study; 
pp1-63; see also David, Alexander. curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil, p.113 
588 Vines, Alex. 1992. Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique. London: James Currey, p18 
589 Robinson, David Alexander. 2006. Curse on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war , p. 121 
590Robinson, David Alexander. 2006. Curse on the land: a History of the Mozambican civil war, p.163, Ellis, 
Stephen. 1994.  “Of elephants and men: politics and nature conservation in South Africa” p. 67 
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From later 1978 to 1983, the movement increased the number of its fighters from less than 300 to 
8.000 in 1982.591 From 1983 to the end of the armed conflict in 1992, RENAMO intensified 
attacks in southern and central Mozambique using two main routes. From the KNP near 
Phalaborwa, RENAMO infiltrated its troops to Mapulanguene and then to southern Mozambique 
and from KNP troops were driven to Chicualacula and then infiltrated in central Mozambique.592 
In 1985, RENAMO had managed to establish a base in Coutada 16 near Machamba village 
(along the Shingwezi River). The difficult access to the area by road made incursions by the 
government troops by land very difficult. RENAMO used its bases in Coutada 16 to conduct 
sporadic attacks in Gaza province, particularly in the districts of Massingir, Mabalane, and Guijá. 
Until 1989, RENAMO controlled the region north of the Shingwedzi basin and conducted 
sporadic attacks to villages located south of Coutada 16.593   
 
The horrors of RENAMO military strategy in Coutada 16 included mutilating civilians by 
cutting off their limbs, ears or breasts, and public killings and destruction of social infrastructure 
such as schools, clinics, shops and mills, power lines, roads and bridges making it almost 
impossible to link by road the major cities and towns. The brutal attacks of RENAMO also 
involved burning down homes, granaries, leaving families without food. Due to hunger and war, 
local populations abandoned their villages and sought refuge in relatively safe places where 
humanitarian agencies distributed foodstuffs.594 
 
6.2.1. Escaping the warfare 
Relying on oral sources, it was difficult to produce an accurate chronology of war in the 
Massingir region and particularly in Coutada 16 as most of the interviewees did not remember 
the date that some events  (attacks by RENAMO) took place. However, soon after the civil war, 
a British anthropologist, William Norman, who conducted his PhD research in Coutada 16, 
                                                          
591Pihale, Estevão.  2003. The environmental impact of the armed conflict in southern Mozambique, 1977-1992. 
[MA Thesis] University of Cape Town, p. 2; see also Robinson, David Alexander. 2006.  Curse on the land: a 
history of the Mozambican civil war, p.105 
592Norman, William Oliver. 2004. Living on the frontline, p.148; see also Robinson, David Alexander. 2006. Curse 
on the land: a history of the Mozambican civil war, p. 257 
593 Norman, William Oliver. 2004. Living on the frontline; 
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produced a chronology, which I have used in this work. By 1989, the war had reached the central 
and northern regions of Coutada 16 and forced the local population to abandon their homes and 
migrate to the village of Mavodze where the presence of the government army protecting the 
dam made the village safer.595  
 
During this period, RENAMO intensified its attacks to civilians in the inner villages of Coutada 
16 and even the village of Mavodze was subjected to RENAMO´s ambushes. According to 
Simão Sitoi, the secretary of Massingir Velho village, due to insecurity in Mavodze, people with 
relatives in the Mozambican towns escaped to Tihovene, Xai-Xai, Maputo, etc. Owing to the 
proximity of the area to the border and familial ties that some families in Coutada 16 had with 
relatives in South Africa many people preferred to cross the border to find refuge in South 
Africa.596  
 
The population that stayed at Mavodze village was composed of militias, old people, the disabled 
and individuals who, due to their government appointments or physical condition, did not leave 
for the nearest villages in South Africa. Even those who stayed behind did not live in their 
houses. They opened shelters in the bush to hide from RENAMO. In such a situation, cropping 
was practically impossible and the population depended on humanitarian aid to survive. Local 
peoples’ memories also reflect that hunting was also difficult because people feared that during 
hunting parties they could meet RENAMO´s men who would probably kill or arrest them. Those 
who were arrested by RENAMO´s men were forced to carry their heavy bags of products stolen 
locally and walk through the bush until their bases, which were located far away from their 
villages.597 
 
People who escaped to South Africa used the bush routes to make their way to the nearest 
villages. The bush route from Coutada 16 to the border was made through thick forests, plateaus, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
594Lunstrum, E. M. 2007. The making and unmaking of sovereign territory; see also Norman, William Oliver. 2004. 
Living on the frontline, p.149 
595 Norman, William Oliver. 2004. Living on the frontline; 
596 Interview with Simiao Sitoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014 
597 Interview with Simiao Sitoi, Massingir Velho, 21/1/ 2014 
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ravines and swamps, having wild beasts and predators. The area is also inhabited by mosquitoes 
responsible for malaria transmission. The situation represented a threat to the lives of the 
refugees; there are cases reported that lions in the KNP killed people in their way to South 
Africa.598 Most often community members who fled to South Africa migrated in small groups 
and relied on the assistance of others who knew the track. Nowadays, people in Coutada 16 still 
remember the horrors of the armed conflict and the despairing moments that they experienced on 
their way to South Africa. The rebels killed many people and others got lost in the bush and 
starved to death. A young woman now living in Massingir Velho village who engaged in the 
risky adventure to travel through the bush from Magude to South Africa recalled the journey this 
way:  
“When the war began I was still a teenager and I was living in Magude. My friend and I 
decided to escape to South Africa. … We did not know the way and did not ask for help. 
We decided to go to South Africa and left our village. I took my younger brother with 
me. We walked…. walked… walked in the forest and got lost…we stayed in the bush for 
more than two weeks. We were thirsty, hungry and my younger brother got a fever. 
Suddenly we saw a group of troops …there were about 20 men. We shouted and they 
came in our direction ….we were lucky because they were not RENAMO men; they were 
government troops leaving border patrols and they were on their way to Tihovene. They 
took my brother on their shoulders and walked to Massingir… they gave medicine to my 
brother… we stayed in Massingir then we had assistance of someone who knew the way 
to South Africa and we followed him until Lulekani Refugees´ Camp  in South 
Africa.”599 
 
People interviewed in the Massingir region noted that in the mid-1980s they crossed the border 
in sections where fences were not electrified or had been damaged due to elephant crossings or 
natural factors. In some areas, non-permanent rivers opened channels under fences and wild pigs 
had dug deeper under such areas allowing animals to move from one side to another. The local 
population travelling in both directions also used such places to cross the fence. Oral accounts 
indicate that even after crossing the border travellers were not safe. They could be arrested and 
repatriated via official border gates.600 
                                                          
598 Interview with Fátima Chaúque, Massingir Velho, 11/7/ 2012 
599 Interview with Fátima Chaúque, Massingir Velho, July, 11 th  2012 
600 Interview with Felisberto Penicela Matebula, Machamba, 26/2/ 2014 
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The Apartheid regime was not a signatory of conventions and protocols on refugee rights. It 
denied Mozambican migrants seeking asylum in South Africa a refugee’ status and did not 
provide protection or assistance to them as required under International Law on War and 
Displaced (ILWD).601As a result, the role played by the South African authorities in assisting 
refugees along the border was controversial as it depended on the will of the KNP guards or 
SADF troops. Accordingly, some park employees assisted Mozambican refugees entering South 
Africa, giving them food, water and transport to the Mozambican refugees’ camps in Phalaborwa 
and Tzaninee, while other KNP guards arrested the migrants and sent them to prison where, after 
a long period (1 week to 3 months), they were deported to Mozambique via the border gates of 
Pafuri and Mapulanguene.602  
 
According to Joubert, this apparent conflicting situation arose from the fact that some groups of 
KNP guards were composed mainly of Africans who were keen to help Mozambican refugees 
while the white counterparts of the SADF had no such attitude.603 I will not examine in this 
thesis the daily life of Mozambican refugees in South Africa as this has been explored by a 
number of scholars in South Africa and Mozambique.604 In the following sections, I examine the 
impact of the armed conflict on environment, the process of repatriation of Mozambican refugees 
from South Africa and their relocation in inner villages of Coutada 16 as well as the impact of 
this relocation to the local ecosystems. 
 
 
                                                          
601Azevedo, Mario J. 1980. “A sober commitment to liberation?' Mozambique and South Africa, 1974-1979” 
African Affairs, 79 (317) 567-584 see also Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. 2004 “Confronting uncertainty and 
responding to adversity: Mozambican war refugees in Limpopo Province, South Africa” Refugee Livelihoods. 
Working Paper nº 105. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, School of Public Health; see also, Crush, 
Jonathan and D. McDonald. 2002. “Introduction to special issue.” 
602 Golooba-Mutebi Frederick, 2004 “Confronting uncertainty and responding to adversity” p.7 
603Joubert, Salomon. 2007. The Kruger National Park: a history. Volume II, Johannesburg: High Branching, 2007   
604 Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick, 2004 “Confronting uncertainty and responding to adversity” p.1; see also Rodger, G. 
2002. When refugees don't go home: post-war Mozambican settlement across the border with South Africa. [PhD 
Thesis] University of the Witwatersrand; also see Crush, Jonathan and D. Macdonald. 2002. “Introduction to 
special issue”; see also Rodger, G. 2001. “Structuring the demise of a refugee identity: the UNHCR's voluntary 
repatriation programme for Mozambican refugees in South Africa.” Wet, C.D & R. Fox (Eds.) Transforming 
settlements in southern Africa. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
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6.2.3. Armed conflict and the environment 
The Ember’s analysis of conservation in America and Africa during warfare have found that war 
has negative impacts on ecosystems. During wars, belligerent armies ignore limitations imposed 
by conservation laws (hunting, setting of fires, etc.), thus destroying natural ecosystems and 
exterminating fauna.605 In Coutada 16, the armed conflict did not only affect the lives of people 
but also contributed to a change in landscapes and to depletion of fauna. Owing to the intensity 
of war, the government recruited local villagers, trained them and supplied them with machine 
guns (AK-47s) to defend their villages. Oral accounts in the Massingir region and Coutada 16 
indicate that the militias used their AK-47s to hunt for food, instead of using the AK-47s for self-
defence and to protect the local communities, their villages and belongings and other social and 
economic infrastructures in the Massingir region.606 
 
Armed conflict negated much effort undertaken by the Frelimo government in the years 
following independence. It forced rural families to abandon their land, their belongings and cattle 
to seek refuge inside and outside the national boundaries. By 1989, the government's presence 
had been consolidated in the major cities and towns but rural areas remained mostly defenceless 
and the population left to their own fate. RENAMO guerrilla forces blocked the main roads 
impeding road links from one district to another and from one province to another. Even the aid 
supply convoys were subjected to ambushes by RENAMO guerrilla forces.607 
 
Apart from armed conflict, from 1981 to 1983 the country was hit by drought, which reduced the 
ability of the cultivators to produce enough crops to sustain their families. From 1982, there were 
many reported cases of famine throughout the country. The government and humanitarian 
agencies put in place emergency plans to save the lives of people affected by the war and 
drought and minor actions were taken to improve the management of the environment and 
                                                          
605Ember, C. R. and M. Ember. 1992. “Resource unpredictability, mistrust, and war”. Journal of Conflict Resolution 
36(2): 242-262. 
606 Interview with Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014 
607 Ibiden  
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fauna.608 A considerable number of wild stock especially elephants and rhinos were exterminated 
during the course of the armed conflict.609   
 
Lack of data prevents me from fully comparing the state of wildlife conservation in Coutada 16 
before and after armed conflict. Aerial surveys conducted by the KNP from 1970 to 1972 to 
monitor elephant movements between KNP and Coutada 16 indicated the existence of 
approximately 789 elephants in Coutada 16, but soon after armed conflict elephants could be 
hardly seen in the area.610 Parallel analyses of wildlife management from other conservation 
areas in Mozambique have also pointed out the extermination of fauna during the armed 
conflict.611 According to Ellis, during the armed conflict in Mozambique, RENAMO allies in 
South Africa demanded payments in commodities such as hardwood, rhino horns and elephant 
tasks.612  
 
Mozambican surveys on the environment indicated less destruction of ecosystems (deforestation) 
but massive depletion of fauna.613 For example, in Gorongosa National Park where RENAMO 
had the most important base in central Mozambique, the number of elephants prior to the armed 
conflict was about 3000 whilst in 1994 only 108 elephants were recorded during an aerial survey. 
Massive declines were also recorded for buffalo (14,000 in 1979 to 0 in 1994), hippos (4800 in 
1979 and 0 in 1994), wildebeest (5500 in 1968 and 0 in 1994) and waterbuck (3500 in 1988 to 
129 in 1994). Similar trends were observed in Mozambican forests and conservation areas where 
plundering of forest resources, especially rhino horns and ivory were done not only by 
RENAMO but also by the national troops and their allies.614 
                                                          
608Alberts, Tom and Krister Eduards. 1987. “Drought and destabilization: an evaluation of Swedish disaster relief in 
Mozambique 1983 to 1985.”  
609 Ellis, Stephen. 1994. “Of elephants and men: politics and nature conservation in South Africa”, p.56 
610Whyte, I.J and S. C. Joubert, 2010 “Impacts of fencing on the migration of large mammals in the Kruger national 
park” Ferguson, K. & Hanks, J. (eds.), Fencing impacts: A review of the environmental, social and economic 
impacts of game and veterinary fencing in Africa with particular reference to the Great Limpopo and Kavango-
Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Areas. Pretoria: Mammal Research Institute, p. 142 
611Hatton, John; Mia Couto and Judy Oglethorpe, 2001. Mozambique: biodiversity and war; p. 58, 68 
612Ellis, Stephen. 1994. “Of elephants and men”  p. 58, 63 
613Moçambique, República de/ MITUR. Relatório Final: Projecto das Áreas de Conservação Transfronteira e 
Desenvolvimento do Turismo em Moçambique: estrutura de gestão ambiental e social. Maputo: MITUR, 2004. 
614Hatton, John; Mia Couto and Judy Oglethorpe, 2001. Mozambique: biodiversity and war”; p. 58, 68 
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6.3. Economic and political reforms and the end of armed conflict in Mozambique 
As referred to earlier in this chapter, in the early 1980s, the armed conflict and drought reduced 
cultivators’ ability to produce for their survival and in many rural villages, people relied on 
foreign aid for survival. Most of the government rural development enterprises had collapsed and 
some other rural developed plans cancelled due to drought, war or lack of technical and human 
capacity. In the Massingir region, the Government cancelled the development of the Massingir 
Irrigation Scheme.   
 
In 1983 at its 4th congress the party abandoned the policy of the development of the countryside. 
In 1984, the Government started dialogue with the South African authorities aimed at cutting off 
SADF support to RENAMO and thus minimise the movements operation in Mozambique. On 
16th March 1984 a Non-aggression Pact and Good Neighbourliness was signed by the 
Mozambique president Samora Machel and the president of South Africa P.W Botha. The 
Accord was signed in an arranged place on the banks of Nkomati River, which is at the border 
between Mozambique and South Africa. The pact became known as the Inkomati Accord.615   
 
The GoM was sure that ending South African support to RENAMO would reduce its power and 
consequently reduce its incursions into civilian areas and the destruction of economic 
infrastructure. In turn, the situation would allow the government to bring about measure for 
economic recovery.616 From June to October 1984, the South African authorities mediated 
negotiations towards a ceasefire between RENAMO and the Mozambique government. 
However, no results were achieved.617  It seems, that despite the fact that Mozambique and South 
Africa had signed in March 1984 a Non-aggression and Good Neighbourliness Pact and 
Mozambique closed ANC offices in Maputo, some sectors of the SADF did not cease their 
support for RENAMO.  
                                                          
615Cameron, Hume, 1994. Ending Mozambique War: the role of mediation and good offices; Washington: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, p.11 
616Davies, Robert. 1985. South Africa strategy towards Mozambique in the post Nkomati period: a critical analysis 
of the effects and implications. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, p.17 
617Vines, Alex. 1992. Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique. London: James Currey, p. 22 
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I will not discuss in this chapter the evolution of the armed conflict and the whole negotiation 
process to ceasefire in Mozambique. This topic is well developed by several academic works and 
is not the main subject of my thesis. However, it is important to underline that from 1984, 
RENAMO increased actions toward destabilization of the economy in Mozambique and the 
armed conflict reached almost all rural villages. RENAMO´s attacks targetted civilians, aid 
workers, power lines, railways, roads, bridges, and factories in order to paralyse the progress of 
the national economy.618   
  
Desperate to improve national economic performance, from 1984-1986 the GoM began a process 
of internal reforms to rebuild the country´s economy; the government relied on the assistance of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development) to change its economic development approach, moving from a 
socialist oriented to a market based economy. In 1987, the government introduced the Economic 
Recovery Programme (PRE) aimed at liberalizing the economy and stimulating private sector 
investment.619 The reforms were successfully implemented only in the major Mozambican cities 
and towns that remained protected by government armies. In most rural areas the local 
population still lived in refugee camps within and across national borders. 620 
 
In the early 1980s, the dire situation in which many Mozambicans were living forced the GoM, 
the Mozambican Christian Council (MCC), the Catholic Church and other non-governmental 
institutions to search for lasting solutions to end the conflict. In 1984, the MCC created the Peace 
and Reconciliation Commission. In the late 1989, the MCC and the Catholic Church re-
approached RENAMO leaders in Nairobi to established a platform for negotiations between the 
                                                          
618Vines, Alex. 1992. Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique. London: James Currey, p.24; see also Davies, Robert. 
1985. “South Africa strategy towards Mozambique in the post Nkomati period: a critical analysis of the effects 
and implications”. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Research report nº 73, p. 26  
619 Hanlon, J. 1991. Mozambique: who calls the shots? London: James curry, p.117 
620 Hanlon, J. 1991. Mozambique: who calls the shots? London: James Currey, p.117 
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GoM and RENAMO.621 The formal negotiation took place in the Italian capital, Rome, from 
1989 to 1992.622 
 
The details of the negotiations between the Frelimo government and RENAMO are not a subject 
of analysis of this thesis. It is known, however, that in its 5th Congress held in Maputo in July 
1989, the party abandoned officially its centralized socialist development model in favour of a 
market based economy and started working toward changes in the country’s political orientation 
from a one party state to a multiparty system. These changes were further incorporated into the 
new constitution passed by Parliament in 1990.623 The 1990 constitution helped the conciliatory 
approach between the belligerents and created a political environment conducive to the formal 
end of armed conflict on 4th October 1992 and to the first multiparty election held in October 
1994.624  The end of the armed conflict also allowed the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of 
Mozambicans who had left the country in search of safer places within and across national 
borders. 
 
6.3.1. Returning from exile and rebuilding life in Coutada 16 
The peace agreement signed between the GoM and RENAMO in the Italian capital Rome on 4th 
October 1992 brought hope to hundreds of thousands of displaced persons living in refugee 
camps within and outside the country. After the peace agreement, the media and humanitarian 
institutions within national borders and in neighbouring countries began to disseminate 
information about the end of the armed conflict in Mozambique. Salomão Ngovene, a traditional 
leader of Massingir Velho who at the time was living in a refugee camp in South Africa, recalls 
how these messages were spread by the leaders of the area where he was living. 
                                                          
621Rupiya, Martin. 1998. “Historical Context: War and Peace in Mozambique.” In Mozambican Peace Process in 
Perspective, Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson and Alex Vines (Eds). London and Maputo: Conciliation 
Resources and Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, pp. 10–17 
622 Rupiya, Martin. 1998. “Historical Context: War and Peace in Mozambique.” In Mozambican Peace Process in 
Perspective. Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson and Alex Vines (Eds). London and Maputo: Conciliation 
Resources and Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, pp. 10–17, see also Hume, Cameron, 1994. Ending 
Mozambique War: the role of mediation and good offices. Washington: United States Institute of peace press, 
p.126 
623 Rupiya, Martin. 1998. “Historical Context: war and peace in Mozambique” 
624 Mozambique. Republic of. 1990. Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 
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“In early October 1992, the heads of our village in South Africa came and gathered us for a 
meeting… they told us that there was peace in Mozambique. Frelimo and RENAMO had finally 
come to an agreement and a peace agreement was signed on 4th October; the soldiers had lowered 
their weapons… then we could go back home in peace.... all individuals who wanted to return 
home could do so with support from the South African Government and UNHCR. Every person 
was allowed to take their belongings to their home village. There were free shuttles to carry 
people and their belongings home…. These messages were later spread by the local radio stations 
in South Africa.”625 
 
While in exile, some families had managed to integrate themselves into local social and 
economic life. These people preferred to continue their lives in exile rather than returning 
home.626 People interviewed in Coutada 16 told me that a part of the population from their 
villages did not return to Massingir. Some of these people succeeded in starting businesses. 
Others had found employment or had their children enrolled in schools in the areas where they 
went to seek refuge. Moreover, people recalled that before they left Coutada 16 and went to 
South Africa there were no schools in inner villages of Coutada 16. Such people preferred to 
continue living in South Africa rather than return to Massingir. However, the vast majority of the 
population who depended on agriculture for survival, land was the only asset that they had in 
their home villages to produce crops to feed their families. After the armed conflict, these 
populations preferred to return to their home villages to rebuild their lives through agriculture 
and rising livestock.  
 
Literally the so called “voluntary repatriation” started only in March 1994 after all necessary 
logistical arrangement were made by the institutions involved in the process, namely the  
government of South Africa, the GoM, United Nation High Council for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
International Organization of Migrations (IOM).627 The UNCHR contracted the Medicines Sans 
Frontieres-France (MSF-F) to administer the five transit camps in South Africa where the 
returnees received medical check-ups before being transported by IOM trucks to another transit 
                                                          
625 Interview with Salomão Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014  
626 Polzer, Tara. 2004 “Adapting to changing legal frameworks”; see also Rodgers, Graeme. 2002. When refugees 
don't go home 
627 Dolan, Chris. 1999. “Repatriation from south Africa to Mozambique.” Black, Richard Khalid Koser (Eds.). The 
end of the refugee cycle? Refugee repatriation and reconstruction. New York and Oxford Berghahn Books, pp: 
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centres in Mozambique.628 It should be remembered that the Mozambican refugees in South 
Africa did not only escape from the Massingir region but from other districts of the province of 
Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo. However, the statistics indicate that the Massingir district had the 
most significant number of Mozambican refugees in South Africa (4956 out of 25000).629 
 
The IOM provided transport to Mozambican refugees in South Africa to the transit centres in 
Mozambique where from there they were transported by the Núcleo de Apoio aos Refugiados - 
NAR (Mozambique government department responsible for refugees) vehicles to their final 
destinations.630 I did not access documents on the repatriation process for the Massingir 
returnees. People interviewed during my fieldwork in Massingir, mentioned that they got 
transport from their refugees’ camps in South Africa to the transit centres located near the 
border. From there they got another transport to Tihovene (the headquarter of Massingir district). 
Owing the lack of roads in rural Massingir the vehicles that transported the returnees did not 
reach the local villages in Coutada 16; the populations had to make it on foot. In order to avoid 
land mine explosions, the GoM sent specialized teams in advance to inner villages in Coutada 16 
to undertake careful checks along the main paths that gave access to local villages.631  
 
 
Whiteside analysed the condition of the displaced in Mozambique and noticed that almost all 
people who sought refuge out of their home villages after their return, in most cases found that 
infrastructure left behind had been destroyed, making the returnees strongly dependent on food 
supply agencies to survive because they needed to cultivate, plant crops and wait until the first 
harvest.632 Humanitarian agents were also placed in Tihovene to assist the people on their arrival. 
Foodstuffs, seeds, hoes and other agricultural inputs were distributed to these populations before 
they moved to their home villages. Salomon Ngovene vividly recalled the process: 
“The South African authorities opened many entry points along the border to allow the returning 
of the Mozambican refugee from South Africa. Communities living in the former Gazankulu 
                                                          
628 Dolan, Chris. 1999. “Repatriation from south Africa to Mozambique”, p. 88 
629 Dolan, Chris. 1999. “Repatriation from south Africa to Mozambique”, p. 90 
630 Dolan, Chris. 1999. “Repatriation from south Africa to Mozambique”, p. 88 
631 Interview with Salomon Ngovene, Massingir Velho, 17/1/ 2014 
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homeland were transported to Letaba and from there they were taken to Mapulanguene… there 
were other routes…. I was living in Phalaborwa; from Phalaborwa we were directed to Mongoe; 
from Mongoe, we used a bush path to walk to Cubo and from there we walked to Massingir 
Velho.”633 
 
6.3.2. Rebuilding lives in Coutada 16 
The return of the refugees to their home village ensured that they would rebuild their houses in 
the same places where their homesteads had been located before leaving the area. There were 
rare cases where people preferred to go to other villages. This change had other implications for 
access to land and plots for agriculture. Moreover, given the local conditions (villages located in 
bush areas) the construction of houses in new areas implied additional work to clear the bush to 
set up new homesteads and farms. Lack of data does not allow me to undertake a careful analysis 
of population trends before and after armed conflict. Moreover, the data produced by the 
Mozambique National Statistics Institute (INE) regarding the population census in Massingir 
before and civil war does not offer desegregated numbers of the population in villages of 
Coutada 16. Relying on interviews it is easy to understand that many people who left the area 
and sought refuge in different places in Mozambique and across national borders did not return 
to their home villages. 
 
During my fieldwork in Massingir Velho and Chimangue, I noticed that many former 
homesteads of the local families remained unoccupied. Interviewees confirmed that after the 
armed conflict only Mavodze village had increased the number of its inhabitants. The existence 
of social infrastructure such as roads, schools and clinics and its proximity to the town of 
Massingir (28 km) had attracted people from the inner villages of Coutada 16 to build houses in 
this village so that their children could attend schools and live near the social infrastructure. 
Many of these families continued with their fields in their home villages. 
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Table: Inhabitants of the Villages of Massingir634 
Village   1978 2002 2010 
Mavodze 1414 2686 2205  
Massingir Velho 1309 1105 1233 
Machamba 606 686 612 
Chimangue 688 595 548 
Mbingo 567 572 290 
 
As pointed out earlier, cattle in south western Mozambique is an important asset for the local 
communities. It is an asset that functions as “banks” because in time of bad harvest they sell their 
cattle to get some cash to buy food. Additionally, cattle in these communities are also used as 
currency to pay the lobola or bride price, which can range from 8 to 15 head of cattle. During the 
armed conflict, the cultivators-herdsmen lost a considerable part of their cattle. I did not find data 
about the evolution of cattle keeping for Massingir before and after the war. The Magude district 
that border Massingir district in the south, is the richest cattle-breeding district nationwide and 
had about 20000 head of cattle between the commercial farmers and the family sector but only 
2000 survived the conflict.635 
 
In the post-armed conflict period, some regions of Mozambique benefited from livestock 
restocking programs. However, Coutada 16 villagers did not benefit from such programs because 
when livestock restocking programmes were being implemented (1996-8), the government had 
just begun the implementation of the TFCA initiative in Coutada 16, and it was unfeasible to 
restock in a protected area. Despite such limitations, local households borrowed and purchased 
cattle and small livestock for restocking from each other. According to Ngovene during the war 
some individuals who did not migrate still had some cattle and gave or lent some to their families 
to restart livestock farming.636 
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6.4. The rise of the Transfrontier Conservation Areas initiatives in southern Africa 
In the later 19th century, colonial borders separated African lineages, “natural ecosystems” or 
“bioregions” into different colonial states. Accordingly, natural resources management laws and 
regulation differed from one state to another. Such differences limited the establishment of 
coordinated efforts for the preservation of ecosystems and fauna along the border zones.637  
 
The increase of illegal hunting along the Transvaal-Mozambique border and lack of control of 
hunting by the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique, led the South African authorities in 1938 
to start unilaterally erecting fences along the Transvaal and Mozambique border. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the South African authorities erected fence in two parallel lines (the first being the 
border between Mozambique and South Africa and the second the KNP fence). The fences were 
aimed at protecting the wildlife in the KNP, trespassers. Up to 1976, the South African 
authorities had fenced the full length (a perimeter of about 350 km) of the Transvaal and 
Mozambique border.638  
 
Indeed, from the later 1970s to the early 1990s fences were not used to deter fauna movements 
only but to avoid intrusion of insurgent forces into South African territory.639 During the armed 
conflict in Mozambique, the South African authorities electrified some sections of the fence to 
prevent intrusion by insurgent nationalists or ANC into South African territory. Alongside the 
fences, the South African authorities placed units of SADF for surveillance.640  
                                                          
637 For more details on this account see chapter III and IV.  
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returning to the barriers?” Ferguson, k and J Hanks (Eds.). Fencing impacts: a review of the environmental, social 
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Analysis of fencing and fauna conservation in the KNP has demonstrated that fences have a 
catastrophic impact on wildlife. Fences allowed the protection of fauna in the KNP but they 
separated natural ecosystems along the border. Whyte argues that many migratory species such 
as zebra from the eastern part of the Kruger and western Mozambique would have died of 
hunger, thirst or of being trapped by the fence where they could spend hours expecting that other 
zebras on the other side could cross the fence and join the herd.641 Despite the existence of 
fences, people escaping war in Mozambique systematically violated them and crossed the border 
to South Africa.642 
 
In the mid-1980s, it became evident that fencing was no longer socially or politically acceptable; 
nor, was it a sustainable way to manage and protect wildlife. National park managers argued that 
fencing protected areas was not only expensive (deploying personnel and equipment) but that it 
was also counterproductive; they did not stop the unlicensed hunting and poaching and further 
encroachment on wildlife areas. From then on, wildlife managers and policy makers started to 
advocate an approach that emphasized that communities had to become actively involved in 
wildlife management.643 However, the advance of the decolonization process in the region with 
Mozambique favouring the liberation of South Africa from Apartheid became an impediment to 
establish coordinated efforts to protect fauna and natural ecosystems along the common border 
between Transvaal and South Africa.644  
 
The end of civil war in Mozambique in 1992 and consequent relocation of the refugees within 
Coutada 16 posed another serious threat to conservation not only in Mozambique but also in the 
KNP. Wolmer argues that the KNP authorities became concerned about resettlement of 
Mozambican refugees in border region of Coutada 16, who in times of crop failure relied on 
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bush meat for food and could enter KNP territory for poaching. Therefore, interstate 
conservation initiatives were seen as a solution to prevent unlicensed hunting and poaching along 
the border and to provide measures to deter the increase of human settlement in Coutada 16. On 
the South African side, the establishment of the Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) were 
justified by the need to appease international criticism against South African elephant culling 
methods implemented in the 1980s to reduce elephant negative impact on the environment. 
Therefore, bringing down fences would allow dislocation of some elephants to neighbouring 
parks especially to Coutada 16 in Mozambique.645 
 
In the early 1990s, the shift of South Africa from Apartheid to democracy and its admission as a 
member of the SADC opened up opportunities for greater cooperation between regional states on 
social and economic development projects including environmental related ones. In order to 
address the concern around the establishment of a transnational park across South Africa and 
Mozambique the two government created a joint commission also known as Working Group to 
examine specific issues and needs for the establishment of transnational parks.646  
 
Accordingly, a South African philanthropist, Anton Rupert, visited Mozambique and met 
Joaquin Chissano the then president of Mozambique (1986-2004) to discuss the establishment of 
TFCA along Mozambique and South Africa. The meeting opened windows for greater 
cooperation between the two countries in wildlife management.647 In the later 1990s and early 
2000s, the Peace Park Foundation (PPF) assisted the SADC members’ states to establish TFCA 
or “peace parks” in the region while lobbying the international donor agencies (World Bank, the 
USAID, and the German Development Bank or KFW) for funding social, economic and 
environmental appraisals to base new management models for the proposed TFCA. The PPF also 
                                                          
645Wolmer, William 2003. “Transboundary Conservation: the politics of ecological integrity in Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park.” JSAS,  29 (1): 262-278, p. 269 
646The working group was co-chaired by Mr. Abdul Adamo from the National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife 
in Mozambique and by Dr. Solomon C. Joubert, warden of the KNP see Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National 
Park: A History. Volume II, High Branching, Johannesburg, p. 320 
647 Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume II, p. 320 
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worked in close relationship with IUCN and WWF on programs toward the materialization of the 
TFCA initiatives in the region.648  
 
The involvement of the SADC secretariat in the TFCA initiatives allowed the member states to 
promote common conservation platforms and wildlife policies that allowed the establishment of 
the idea of “peace parks” in the region. In 1997 in the Malawian city of Blantyre, the SADC 
heads of states signed the protocol on SADC Wildlife Policy. Indeed, the policy aimed among 
other things, to enhance inter-state cooperation in the management and sustainable use of 
ecosystems, which transcend national boundaries. Accordingly, in August 1999 in Maputo - 
Mozambique, the heads of states of SADC signed a protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law 
Enforcement, which opened the window for regional cooperation in the development of natural 
resources, and enforcement of the laws governing their sustainable use across southern Africa 
borders.649 In practice, the SADC Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement 
provided the framework for TFCA development and management.650 John Hanks the then 
director of TFCA initiatives in southern Africa emphasized that this protocol was also a 
demonstration that the heads of states of SADC had finally accepted the concept of TFCA and 
that it was seen also as priority.651 
 
6.5. From Coutada 16 to LNP and the establishment of the GLTP 
In the early 1990s, the World Bank in southern Africa and particularly in Mozambique 
advocated for a close relationship of community development projects and conservation pursuits.  
Indeed, lack of resources to develop poverty alleviation programs forced the GoM to rely on 
resources from bilateral aid agencies. In 1994, the GoM conducted social appraisals in border 
regions to base projects on poverty alleviation and rehabilitation of ecosystems devastated by 
                                                          
648Duffy, Rosaleen. 2006. “The potential and pitfalls of global environmental governance: the politics of 
transfrontier conservation areas in southern Africa”. Political Geography, 25: 89-112, p. 96-98 
649Katerere, Y., R. Hill, and S. Moyo. 2001. A critique of Transboundary Natural Resource Management”; see also 
Hanks, J. 2002. “Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAS) in southern Africa: their role in conserving 
biodiversity, socioeconomic development and promoting a culture of peace.” Journal of Sustainable Forestry, 17 
(1/2): 127-148. 
650Spenceley, Anna. 2006 “Tourism in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park” Development Southern Africa, 23(5) 
649-667; p. 651 
651 Hanks, John. 2001. “Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa.” 
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armed conflict. The appraisal indicated 3 border regions (Maputo, Gaza and Manica) as 
havingthe necessary atural conditions for the establishment of conservation related initiatives and 
community development projects.652  
 
In 1996, the GoM signed an agreement with the World Bank that founded the Mozambique 
Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Institutional Strengthening Project. Apart from the 
rehabilitation of ecosystems destroyed by the armed conflict, the Project set a framework for 
integration of the same areas into the regional trans-frontier conservation areas initiatives.653 
During the early 1990s, the KNP offered great impetus to the project by allowing the GoM to use 
its facilities for training of its staff and service for research and survey in the areas disengaged 
for the Mozambique and South Africa TFCA.654  
 
In 1999, a ministerial meeting was held in Maputo with the purpose of introducing to the 
representatives of Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe the TFCA concept and a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to that effect was signed. The MoU showed the road 
map that would lead to the establishment of TFCA between the 3 countries. With the ministerial 
committee leadership, the countries undertook long negotiations that resulted in the signing of 
the Gaza/ Kruger/ Gonarezhou Park (GKGP) agreement by the ministers of the three countries 
on 10th November 2000 at Skukuza, South Africa.655 The GKGP covered an area of about 
100.000 square kilometres of which 66.000 in Mozambique, 22.000 in South Africa and 12.000 
in Zimbabwe.656  
 
Apparently, Mozambique had the biggest share of the GKG Park because the GoM included 3 
parks conservation areas in Mozambique (Coutada 16, the Zinave and Banhine national parks) 
and all the areas surroundings these conservation areas. The GoM expected to secure funds from 
                                                          
652Soto, Bartolomeu:  2012“Fast-track strengthening of the management capacity of conservation institutions: the 
case of the effect of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park in Mozambique’s capacity.” Quinn, Michael S; Len 
Broberg, and Wayne Freimund. Parks, peace, and partnership: global initiatives in transboundary conservation.  
Calgary: University of Calgary Press., pp265-282, p.271 
653Katerere, Y., R. Hill, and S. Moyo. 2001. A critique of transboundary natural resource management” 
654 Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume II, p. 320 
655 Soto,  B.  2012.“Fast-track strengthening of the management capacity of conservation institutions, p. 272 
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the initiative to founding small-scale projects within buffer zones and areas surrounding these 
parks.657 In practice, until late 2002, very few community development initiatives were funded 
within or in adjacent areas of these parks. It is known, however, that in the Massingir region in 
an area adjacent to LNP the Swiss NGO Helvetas secured 70.000 USD to build the Covane 
Community Lodge owned by the Canhane community on the southern bank of the Elephants 
River.658    
 
Map 6: Regional context of the Gaza-Krueger- Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park659 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
656 Wolmer, W. 2003. “Transboundary Conservation: the politics of ecological integrity”; p. 268 
657 Joubert, S. 2007. The Kruger National Park: A History. Volume II, High Branching, Johannesburg, p. 320 
658 Spenceley, Anna. 2006. “Tourism in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park” p. 660 
659Hughes, McDermott. 2005. “Third nature: making space and time in the Great Limpopo Conservation Area” 
cultural anthropology, 20 (2): 157-184, p. 163 
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Without exception, all the Mozambican protected areas have communities living inside them. 
The active involvement of PPF in the establishment of TFCAs in southern Africa and particular 
in Mozambique resulted in the adoption of the KNP conservation model where no communities 
are allowed inside protected areas. Therefore, the GoM was forced to look to resettlement of the 
communities living in Coutada 16 as a must. Katerere et al have criticised the move away from 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) where international donors have 
generously supported natural resource management initiatives and involved local communities in 
management of their resources and sheared benefits to TFCAs projects.660  
 
According to Katerere et al, the imperatives of donor agencies to develop natural resource 
management at the larger trans-border scale in the region forced African governments to throw 
away lessons learned in CBNRM. As a result, the adoption of a single management plan across 
TFCA has neglected traditional forms of natural resource management and has resulted in social 
disruption and displacement of people. Katerere et al also doubted fair compensation and 
benefits arising from the expansion of TFCA in the region.661 
 
Since Mozambique had no parks bordering the South African KNP and the Zimbabwean 
Gonarezhou Park, in early 2000, the government started working toward the transformation of 
Wildlife Utilization Zone or Coutada 16 into a national park. Such transformation “legally” 
allowed the government to demarcate the limits of the park and to limit social and economic 
activities within it (see Mozambique Land Law 19/97 and Forest and Wildlife Law 10/99).662  To 
legitimate the transformation of Coutada 16 into a national park, in 2001, the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN), academic institutions (Eduardo Mondlane University and 
University of the Witwatersrand) and private organizations (Sani/Create) undertook community 
hearings to capture the local communities´ perceptions and plans after the transformation of the 
area into a national park. The hearings awakened issues of the old resettlement programs where 
the local communities especially in Mavodze and Massingir Velho villages refused to move from 
                                                          
660 Katerere, Y., R. Hill, and S. Moyo. 2001. A critique of transboundary natural resource management”  
661 Katerere, Y., R. Hill, and S. Moyo. 2001. A critique of transboundary natural resource management” 
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the Elephants valley to areas located downstream of Massingir dam and chose to stay in Coutada 
16 (see chapter V for more details).663 
 
The hearings brought confusion within the local communities because the university researchers 
and private consultants came to discuss with the local communities their resettlement in areas 
outside the limits of Coutada 16 before the central and local governments had spoken about such 
possible resettlement. Therefore, all the possibilities announced by the researchers and 
consultants seemed unfounded, as the government had autonomy and authority over the 
resettlement process. The contradictions that existed during the consultation process for the 
transformation of Coutada 16 into the LNP can be blamed on lack of communication between 
the different actors involved in the consultation process with the communities. 
i. There was no official information regarding the transformation of the area into a national 
park; the very few people  in the park (former Coutada 16) that had such information had 
heard it on radios in South Africa or were informed by neighbours and not from the 
centres of local government,664 
ii. Lack of education of the majority of representatives of communities in Coutada 16 
hindered their ability to differentiate the mandates of the diverse institutions working in 
the resettlement program. For the local communities there was no  difference between the 
IUCN, SUNI / CREATE, WWF, GIZ, Peace Park Foundation, the Government, Park 
staff managers  and NGOs operating within the area.665  
iii. Moreover, even after the community workshops held by the government in May 2001, 
June 2001, and November 2001 and attended by village administrators with the intention 
to “provide information to the community representatives regarding the GLTP” it seems 
the information did not filter down to the household level.666 
 
                                                          
663 Interview with Germano Dimande, Maputo, 28/8/2013; see also The SANI-create hearing was commissioned by 
the PPF to base the LNP Management Plan – quoted by Refugee Research Programme (RRP). 2002. “A park for 
the people” 
664Cau, Henrique Simione. 2005. Processo da criação do Parque Nacional de Limpopo; see also Refugee Research 
Programme (RRP). 2002. “A park for the people”, p.9 
665 Refugee Research Programme (RRP). 2002. “A park for the people”, p.7 
666 Refugee Research Programme (RRP). 2002. “A park for the people”,  p.7 
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Despite the contradictions, which existed during the consultation process, the hearings produced 
useful information about the area, its people, its local resources and local management practices 
and possible threats to wildlife management in the future park. They also produced very 
important recommendation for the development of the LNP management plan which was 
realised in 2004. From a close analysis of the models proposed by the consultation teams it 
seems, however, that they were very influenced by the KNP management models and 
consequently little attention was given to local community options.   
 
Due to time pressure to release the elephants from KNP, the Park authorities in Mozambique 
constructed a wildlife sanctuary of 35 000 hectare near Massingir Velho village to host elephants 
and other animals moved from the KNP to Coutada 16.667 In October 2001, 25 elephants were 
released from KNP into Mozambican territory.668 The construction of the 35 000-hectare wildlife 
sanctuary near the Massingir Velho village led the communities to believe that the park would be 
confined only to such an area and that they would continue in their villages.669  
 
During my fieldwork in Massingir region in 2014, I participated in one of the meetings on the 
arrangements for relocation of people of Machamba village to new villages on the south bank of 
the Elephants River. Those present at the meeting raised issues of their participation in the 
management of the park. It seems that focus on CBRM led the population to believe that they 
would not be removed from the area or at least that they would be moved to the buffer zones to 
have opportunities to develop small-scale business that would follow the establishment of the 
KNP.670 As I understood, the hearings conducted by IUCN staff opened the window for 
community participation in the natural resource management as if the park would allow them to 
continue to live inside it. One of the community members addressed the GIZ officer in the 
following terms:    
                                                          
667 Interview with Germano Dimande, Maputo,  28/8/2013   
668Draper, Malcolm, Marja Spierenburg and Harry Wels. 2004. “African dreams of cohesion: elite practicing and 
community development in Transfrontier Conservation Areas in southern Africa”  Culture and Organization, 10 
(4): 341-353, p.343    
669Notes from community meeting with park staff on the arrangement for relocation in Machamba village; 25/2/2014   
670Suni/Create preliminary report, page 20, published February 2002 quoted by Refugee Research Program (RRP). 
2002. Refugee Research Program (RRP). 2002. A park for the people? p. 6-7 
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“When we started working in the resettlement process …prior to establishment of LNP, 
Massango (a former IUCN consultant, now part of LNP staff) told us about three possibilities: 1st 
the communities could continue in the park and contribute to the management of biodiversity; 
2nd the park would erect a fence to limit the biodiversity conservation area and communities 
would live out of these fences; 3rd removal of communities to be resettled in other locations 
outside the park. At that time we told Massango that we did not want to leave and we could 
continue to live with the animals… we have been living with the animals since we were born…. 
Massango agreed with us and then he disappeared … we know that he works for you (Reference 
that he works for the park)… in 2002 we saw fences in Massingir Velho… we thought the 
problem was then solved….. No one came after such fence … now you come again to say things 
that we have settled in 2002.”671 
 
The relocation of 25 elephants in Coutada 16 was one of the steps toward the accomplishment of 
a big project, which culminated, with the establishment of the GLTP.672 In October 2001, a 
Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was indicated to develop further steps to establish the park 
bases on regional models. Following the KNP model, the LNP was divided into three major 
zones: the tourism zone, the wilderness zone and support zone.673 The establishment of the park 
would lead to relocation of about 7000 people who live in the 8 villages along the Shingwedzi 
catchment and Elephants valley; 20000 in the buffer zone would be affected in a minor sense; 
these people would not leave their villages and would continue with their livelihoods in the area 
demarcated as resource zone.674 
 
Hearings conducted in early 2002 by the Rural Research Program of the University of the 
Witwatersrand found that local people did not want to leave their land and preferred to live with 
the animals because of their attachment to the villages where they were born, to the land of their 
ancestors and to sacred trees and other icons.675 As I explained in chapter V their continuation in 
the area ensured that they would continue to have access to land, water and fauna and their 
leaders would continue to have authority over their populations. Moreover, due to past relocation 
                                                          
671 Refugee Research Programme (RRP). 2002. A park for the people? p. 8 
672Draper, Malcolm, Marja Spierenburg & Harry Wels. 2004. “African dreams of cohesion: elite practicing and 
community development in Transfrontier  Conservation Areas in southern Africa”p. 343   
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programs, local communities doubted that the promises of better services as water pumps, houses 
and proper compensation would be effective in the relocation areas.  
 
The villagers were also aware that due to the lack of education of youth in the area, the job 
opportunities that would be created by the Park would benefit youths from other areas and not of 
Coutada 16. Therefore, when the Wits RRP asked the local communities “where would they go 
if they were forced to move,” the respondents replied that they would go to South Africa, rather 
than to any other place in Mozambique. Local communities preferred to return to South Africa 
where they have family ties and social networks that would allow them to restart their lives 
rather than moving to land lacking good soils for agriculture. The experiences undergone by the 
first 18 families moved from the Village of Nanguene and Macaveni to Banga in 2014 was 
specially documented and analysed by Milgroon in her PhD thesis.676 
 
On 27th November 2001, the GoM transformed Coutada 16 into the LNP; however, there was no 
clarity of the future of the people who lived in former Coutada 16, now LNP.677 The 
transformation of the area into the LNP was also followed by measures to protect the elephants 
and other species. Hunting was controlled and local populations could no longer kill wild species 
even when these came to their villages and destroyed crops.678 The whole consultation made 
several recommendations about scenarios (relocation; fencing the core conservation area and 
living with animals).  Relocation did not happen immediately after the establishment of the park 
because the GoM lacked resources to undertake induced resettlements and the KWF, the World 
Bank had not secured yet funds for the resettlement of the population of Coutada 16.  
While the LNP management plan was still underway, the heads of state of Mozambique, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe on 9th December 2002 in Xai- Xai Mozambique signed a formal treaty 
establishing the GLTP. The government committed itself to continue working on the 
management plan which was completed only in 2004. 679   
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With the establishment of the GLTP wildlife protection measures were enforced and there was 
no compensation for cattle killed by wild animals. Local communities were not initially forced to 
leave. However, since 2002 human and wildlife conflicts began to be a serious problem in the 
area and local communities were and are not allowed to kill the wild animals in any 
circumstance. Due to the increase of human and wildlife conflicts, it became clear that in near 
future all communities from the core conservation area had to be relocated in villages outside the 
LNP.  
 
Following the transformation of Coutada 16 into the LNP, the park began a census to estimate 
population numbers and their belongings. From then onward local communities were forbidden 
to extend their farms or build new houses. Local people recognised that their families and sons 
that were still in South Africa but wished to return to Coutada 16 encountered difficulties 
because they could no longer (officially) clear new farms for cropping. Therefore, some youths 
preferred to stay definitively in South Africa. Feniasse Ngovene, an old man living in the village 
of Massingir Velho disappointed with successive relocations argued in the following terms:   
We are people on the move … we will die while the relocations have not ended … we 
are originally from Ritave [Lethaba mountains] our grandparents migrated from Ritave to 
this area [Massingir] because they wanted fertile lands along the Elephants valley and the 
game…. After our arrival the Mavodzes came also… they settled near our village; we 
welcomed them… then the Amaveshuas [Sotho] came to steal our cattle. Our 
grandparents fought them and they left the area and went away….then the Portuguese 
came…. our fathers came to an agreement with the Portuguese that we could live in this 
land but obey their rules…. then Frelimo came… Frelimo said that fought the Portuguese 
because they were oppressors… Frelimo said then that we were independent.  
 
 
Soon afterwards, Frelimo came, took our land, and fill it with water to build their bridge 
[probably because of the road over the dam]. Frelimo moved us to here [Coutada 16] …then 
came the Mapsanga [RENAMO] and its war….We ran to South Africa and some went to 
Tihovene and Xai-xai … the war came to an end in 1992 and we came back to our villages and 
continued cultivating the land …. Now Frelimo is returning with another strategy. Frelimo sold 
our land to south Africans to keep their animals…the Park speaks on behalf of the South 
Africans… it says we must leave this area to an area that we refused to go long ago [1977]… we 
are people on the move… others will go but I will die in this land… I don’t have the strength to 
build a hut or open a new farm… I am too old to be relocated again.680  
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The integration of LNP into the GLTP resulted in deep transformation of the wildlife 
management in southwestern Mozambique borderland and had considerable impact on the lives 
of the local populations. The planned business opportunities did not follow the establishment of 
the LNP, however; the local communities are facing restriction on the access to land and local 
resources. Apparently, such restrictions will continue for years because the government lack 
funds for relocation of the population from the core conservation area of the LNP to the new 
promised villages. This problem is making the process very slow and the promised investment in 
buffer zones is not taking place. 
 
In April 2016, I met Finiasse Valoi in his new home in Mukatine (45 km south of the Elephant 
River). I interviewed Feliciano in 2012 and 2014 in the former village of Massingir Velho (45 
km north of Elephants River and within the core conservation area of the LNP). Feliciano and 
other villarges from Massingir Velho were moved from their villages in August 2015 to 
Mukatine where the Park built a new village for the community of Massingir Velho. 
Unfortunately, some people whom I interviewed in 2012 to 2014 passed away; amog them is the 
community leader of the Massingir Velho Village Mr. William Valoi and our guide Mr. Rafael 
Mbumbi. Feliciano was very depressed and unable to speak. However, regardless his opinion 
regarding resettlement due to the establishment of the LNP he was moved. Probably this could 
be his last move, but I do not think that this could be applicable to his sons and grandsons. 
Feliciano managed to survive the long process of resetlements, which started with his removal 
from the Elephants valley to upper lands in Coutada 16: then he joined the army, rebuilt his 
house after the conflict, and in August 2015 was moved to Mukatine.  
 
I did not analyse in this thesis the reason why the World Bank and KFB abandoned their 
commitment to finance the resettlement process in the LNP. However, it is clear that during the 
establishment of the GLTP the key players did not take into account the differences of 
conservation approaches undergone since the end of the colonial period until the formal end of 
the Cold War. Such differences posed serious threats to the development of a common 
conservation model for the GLTP. On the Mozambican side, while communities are still living in 
the park conservation would continue to be threatened as local people would continue hunting 
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for survival. Moreover, the restriction on farming practices as the opening of new plots in the 
LNP seems to contribute to impoverishment of the communities still living in the park. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The armed conflict in Mozambique (1976-1992) forced many people in rural areas to leave their 
villages and seek refuge in safer villages within the country and across national borders. During 
the armed conflict there was a complete shutdown of conservancy in Mozambique; the 
government and humanitarian agencies were active in supporting people affected by the war and 
drought, rather than helping local communities living within conservation areas to establish 
small-scale business or environmental related business. 
 
By the mid-1990s, the GoM worked to push the economy forward and rehabilitate ecosystems 
destroyed by war. In 1996, the GoM with support of World Bank and other donor agencies 
designed a Project aimed at rehabilitating endemic ecosystems destroyed by the armed conflict 
as well as set a framework for the integration of Mozambique´s conservations areas located 
along the border into the regional TFCA initiatives. This Project became known as Mozambique 
Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Institutional Strengthening Project. Accordingly, in 
November 2000, a tri-party agreement was signed in Skukuza, South Africa, which formally 
created the KGK Park covering the KNP in South Africa, Coutada 16 in Mozambique and 
Gonarezhou Park in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
In the later 2000s, South Africa and Zimbabwe were regarded as the most advanced countries in 
southern Africa in terms of wildlife management; KNP had no communities living inside it and 
had capable technical team in the field, operating with sufficient funds to enforce its regulations. 
The Gonarezhou Park in Zimbabwe had less capacity and fewer resources if compared to the 
KNP but had a highly successful Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous 
Resources (CAMPFIRE) functioning in buffer zones and national forests. In the mid-1970s 
Zimbabwe had also experienced private game reserves an activities that in the post-Apartheid 
South Africa had great support of white rural farmers and even the government. 
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The implementation of the TFCA initiative in southern Africa implied countries involved in the 
initiative to adopt a similar platform for park management. Indeed, it seems that the model that 
sees inclusion of people in protected areas as harmful to conservation became dominate for the 
southern Africa TFCA. Until November 2000 when the first agreement was signed to establish 
the Gonarezou-Kruger Park, Mozambique had no parks bordering the South African KNP and 
the Zimbabwean Gonarezhou Park; the country had only a non-operational wildlife utilization 
zone known as Coutada 16.  
 
In order to follow the regional conservation approaches for the GLTP, in later 2001, the GoM 
transformed Coutada 16 into LNP and thus allowing its further integration in the GLTP. Such 
transformation took place few years after the local population had returned from the exile and 
restart life in Coutada 16. Fifteen years before, the same government had agreed to move the 
same population from Elephants valley to upper lands just above the flood plains in Coutada 16. 
For these populations it is practically inacceptable that the government should now come in the 
name of regional agreements to force them to leave their ancestral land and move to a land that 
they refused to go to in 1976-77. Moreover, up to 2000 the local populations and especially the 
elders had undergone several voluntary and involuntary relocations processes. This and other 
factors explained in chapters 5 and 6 and are compromising the way the local communities are 
discussing their resettlement in villages located outside the Park. They are demanding the 
construction of houses and roads and social facilities (schools and hospitals) before they leave 
their home to the new villages.    
 
Research work done soon after the establishment of the TFCAs in southern Africa pointed out 
that there is a big gap between TFCA conservation objectives and community development 
initiatives. It seems that TFCAs are focusing on the preservation of the fauna and linking broken 
natural ecosystems rather than funding community development programs.  Consequently, 15 
years after the inception of the GLTP, few developments had been achieved in the Mozambican 
where some communities are still living inside the LNP.  
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CONCLUSION 
In the 18th century, Europeans travelled from the main ports of the Mozambique coast especially 
from Lourenço Marques and Inhambane to the southern Africa hinterland and established trade 
networks between the Indian Ocean ports and the southern Mozambique interland. Historical 
accounts indicate that during the 18th and 19th centuries, Africans traders supplied European 
traders with iron, copper, gold, tin, civet, animal skins, ostrich, marabou, crane fathers and oil 
seed from the eastern Transvaal in exchange for hoes, beads, rifles, gunpowder and cloth. It 
appears however, that ivory, rhino horns and slaves were the main commodities exchanged by 
Africans for European and Asian commodities. 
 
The 18th and 19th century the ivory trade in southern Africa led to an increase of power and 
prestige of African elites as they were able to accumulate European commodities, rifles and 
ammunition. The high demand for animal products led to the professionalization of a caste of 
African hunters (maphissa) who were responsible for the killing of elephants and selling ivory to 
the Europeans; these professional hunters abandoned agricultural activities and were more 
dependent on the product of hunting to sell to European traders or exchange for grains with 
African cultivators.  
 
Although oral accounts indicate that before the establishment of the Portuguese administration in 
the southern Mozambique hinterland (late 19th century) there were semi-nomadic communities 
that used hunting as a means for survival, the majority of African cultivators settled along the 
main rivers of the area such as the Elephants, Shingwedzi and Limpopo were sedentary and were 
engaged in hunting to fill the food deficit during periods of drought and crop failure. In the later 
19th century the decrease of game and the ivory trade in southern Mozambique pushed the 
professional hunters to move to areas where game could still to be found; existing sources (both 
written and oral) acknowledge that some of these hunters settled in the south western 
Mozambique borderland and some settled in the Transvaal. 
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In 1895-6, the Portuguese came to dominate the southern Mozambique hinterland and 
established administrative structures to take control over the people and local resources. Owing 
to the fact that the colonial districts of Guijá and Alto Limpopo are arid they received little 
investment for development for white settlement and agro-industrial projects; the Portuguese 
relegated the areas to hunting frontiers and local communities remained in their villages. In 1903, 
the Lourenço Marques district administration introduced hunting regulations and obliged hunters 
to pay fees to hunt in forests located near the city of Lourenço Marques and surroundings. In the 
same year, they established the Lourenço Marques Game Board, which had the responsibility of 
issuing hunting licences and supervising hunting activities. In the following year (1904) the 
district government of Inhambane also issued hunting regulations. In practice, the Lourenço 
Marques and Inhambane hunting regulations were aimed at banning African hunting techniques 
(nets and fires) and restricting Africans access to big game and establish control of hunting by 
Europeans.   
 
In 1906, the Portuguese unified the hunting regulations of Inhambane and Lourenço Marques 
districts and issued a hunting regulation for the Sul de Save Province. In 1909, they created the 
Mozambique Game Board (Comissão de Caça de Moçambique) to supervise hunting nationwide 
and issue advice to the institutions working on fauna protection for the establishment of game 
reserves; they also supervised the opening of hunting seasons and proposed changes to improve 
game regulations and hunting practices. However, since the CCM was concerned with sports and 
commercial hunting rather than pure conservation objectives, it put little effort into the 
preservation of fauna but facilitated hunting by its members in the Mozambican forests. The 
CCM also influenced the Portuguese administration in Mozambique to look to hunting 
regulations as a way to protect fauna. Consequently, during the colonial period the government 
relied on game regulations (1910, 1932, 1936, 1941, 1944, 1951 and 1956) to regulate hunting. 
However, almost all hunting regulations issued by the colonial administration did not meet the 
specific needs for better management of wildlife in the Sul de Save Province. Moreover, the 
government lacked staff for the supervision of hunting activities.  
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Although one of the responsibilities of the CCM was to map areas for the establishment of 
hunting reserves, until late 1910 no hunting reserves were established in southern Mozambique. 
Since game could be found near the major coastal towns of Lourenço Marques and Inhambane, 
the game board put much emphasis on issuing hunting regulations that allowed its members to 
continue hunting and to enable the government to collect revenues to pay its activities and staff 
rather than initiate work on projects to establish parks and hunting reserves for the protection of 
fauna.   
 
In 1926, the South African authorities created the KNP along the east Transvaal and 
Mozambique border. Since then, the South African authorities and the KNP board became 
concerned with best management practices for the preservation of wildlife along the South 
Africa and Mozambique border. They demanded that the Portuguese establish a national park in 
Mozambique contiguous to the KNP. The requests were repeatedly denied by the Portuguese 
who claimed the existence on the Mozambican side of a high number of African settlements with 
cultivators devoted to agriculture and cattle keeping.  
 
In the later 1910s, game started to become scarce in forests located near the town of Lourenço 
Marques. As a result, the CCM started working on the identification of areas to establish hunting 
reserves. In the early 1920s, it requested the Governor of Gaza district to establish two hunting 
reserves; the first would be located on the north bank of the Shingwedzi River and the second in 
the Massingir region on the south bank of the Elephants River. Due to the existence of a 
considerable numbers of African villages on the south bank of the Elephants River, the 
government did not establish a hunting reserve in that area, but in April 1930 it transformed the 
state reserve located north of the Elephants River into the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve (known 
in some of the literature as Guijá or Pafuri Game Reserve). 
 
Despite the establishment of the reserve, no measures were undertaken to relocate the local 
populations in areas located outside the reserve. The local population continued living in the 
reserve despite all threats that hunting represented to their lives and to the preservation of 
ecosystems and fauna; Africans continued relying on rain fed agriculture, cattle keeping and 
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during periods of drought and lack of foodstuffs, they continued to rely on bush meat. Existing 
archival information has pointed out that the presence of local communities within the hunting 
reserves of southern Mozambique made the control of hunting very difficult because local 
communities could remain hunting in the local forests even without licences. 
  
In the 1930s, there were political changes in Portugal, which prompted other changes in the 
economy and society in Mozambique. António de Oliveira Salazar, a Portuguese economist who 
became the Prime Minister of Portugal in 1931, introduced radical changes in Portugal’s 
economic policies and in its overseas territories. Salazar was against high investment in the 
Portuguese colonies but rather envisioned a highly disciplined labour regime requiring little 
capital investment. In southern Mozambique, he used three strategies to exploit the local 
resources and the populations:  i) collection of hut taxes; ii) export of labour force to the South 
African mining industry; iii) production of raw materials, specifically cotton, to feed the 
emerging Portuguese textile sector.  
 
The Salazar administration in Mozambique also increased the hut tax from about 200 escudos in 
1942 to 250 escudos in 1949; this increase in Guijá and Alto Limpopo pushed Africans to look 
for alternative sources of income to pay the taxes. As demonstrated in the dissertation, labour 
migration to Skukuza and other place in South Africa became the main strategy used by Africans 
to earn some cash. Labour migration in the colonial districts of Guijá and Alto Limpopo had an 
impact on the local economy, society and hunting. Besides the money that migrants brought to 
pay the hut taxes and bride price, and to buy useful commodities for their families, migrants were 
responsible for the introduction of ploughs, which contributed to the increase of farming areas 
and productivity; the migrants also brought from South Africa gunpowder and iron traps used for 
hunting.    
 
From 1930s to later 1950s, Portugal increased publicity on the existence of fauna in 
Mozambique. The publicity resulted in the increase of number of people (nationals and 
foreigners) who applied for hunting permits to hunt in the Mozambican forests and hunting 
reserves. Lack of staff to control hunting and hunting regulations, which did not fit into the local 
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contexts, resulted in extermination of much of the fauna. In the later 1930s, Mozambican 
ecologists, wildlife organizations, and South Africans institutions systematically denounced the 
extermination of fauna in Mozambique and particularly along the South African-Mozambique 
border and requested that the Portuguese government improve measures to protect the fauna. 
Existing archival information indicates that the South African government through the KNP 
board allowed the colonial government in Mozambique to send veterinarian staff to the KNP to 
learn about their conservation practices to further their use in the management of fauna in 
Mozambique. Despite such help, it seems however, that the Portuguese authorities expended 
very little efforts to improve wildlife management in southern Mozambique. 
 
During the 1940s to the late 1960s, the obstacles to protection of fauna in the Mozambican 
hunting reserves and particularly in the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve remained the lack of 
qualified staff to undertake the supervision of the reserve and lack of inter-institutional 
communication mechanisms. Thus, lack of supervision allowed “illegal hunters” to take control 
of the hunting reserves and hunt outside limits imposed by the regulations. Most often, European 
hunters hired Africans to assist them or hunt on their behalf; as compensation, they offered to 
Africans money, alcohol, rifles and ammunition. During this period, the existence of rural shops 
known in Portuguese literature as cantinas at Mavodze village, within the reserve, where 
Africans could sell the products of hunting was one of the motivations for hunting by Africans in 
the area.  
 
Apart from the problems examined above, in the 1930s and 1950s, the Sul de Save Province was 
also affected by animal diseases with a disastrous impact on cattle and fauna. In 1938, the 
outbreak of foot and mouth disease resulted in restrictions in the trade of wood and animal 
products between South Africa and Mozambique. It is also known that in the later 1930s the 
South African authorities restricted the use of waterholes in the KNP by cattle belonging to 
herdsmen of border villages in Mozambique. The restriction was made to avoid contamination of 
water sources and infection of fauna in KNP by cattle from Mozambique. Although the origins 
of the disease is an issue that needs further investigation, it is known that soon after the outbreak 
  
237 
 
of the disease the South African authorities started the construction of fences in some sections of 
the South Africa and Mozambique border.  
 
In the later 1950s, wild stock in southern Mozambique region was again devastated by G 
Morsitans with disastrous consequences for cattle. The Portuguese authorities of the Sul de Save 
Province tried to control the advance of the tsetse from central to southern Mozambique by 
introducing mass killing of fauna along the Limpopo River and Save River corridor. However, 
lack of human and financial resources hindered the control of the disease. In the mid-1950s, 
some villages along the Limpopo-Maxila-Massagena corridor north of Limpopo River were 
devastated by the tsetse fly with considerable cattle loss.  
 
Despite the fact that the game sweeps program did not achieve its objectives (control of tsetse), it 
resulted in mass killing of fauna north of the Limpopo River to the south bank of Save River. In 
the later 1950s and early 1960s, conservationists, professional hunters and wildlife organizations 
condemned the use of game sweeps to combat the tsetse fly; they argued that Portugal had to 
work more seriously on the protection of fauna and create parks and game reserves into which 
wild stock would be driven to avoid its contact with cattle. Thus, it would be in such protected 
areas that the government would put its effort into the control of fauna, and eventually eliminate 
fauna outside the reserve so as to clear the land for agriculture and cattle keeping.  
 
To appease the criticisms of mismanagement of fauna in the hunting reserves, in 1961, the 
Portuguese rushed to transform the Alto Limpopo Game Reserve into a Safari Game Reserve 
known in Portuguese as Coutada 16. This change was made to allow safari companies to apply 
for the management of the area and introduce effective measures to protect the game; however, 
very few improvements were made in Coutada 16 and the problems remained the high number of 
people living in the hunting reserve, lack of touristic infrastructure and lack of staff to enforce 
the hunting regulations.  
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From interviews conducted with local communities in Massingir region, in the late 1960s, the 
Portuguese administration in the colonial district of Guijá hired some scouts locally known as 
mbocotanas to supervise the area. The mbocotanas travelled from one village to another looking 
for signs of hunting; villagers found with bush meat and animal skins were taken to the 
administration where they were beaten or imprisoned and subjected to hard labour for the 
administration.   
 
In 1972, the colonial government started building the Massingir dam to control the flow of water 
along the Elephants River and thus enhance development of irrigation schemes in Massingir and 
Lower Limpopo regions. Accordingly, the colonial government planned to use the construction 
of the dam to resettle families living along the Elephants valley (the area designated for the 
reservoir) in areas located at the confluence of Shingwedzi and Elephants River. After 
independence, the Frelimo government relocated the population from the Elephants valley to 
poor lands in Coutada 16. This relocation resulted in the decrease of the local families’ 
agricultural yields; thus, hunting for food became a means of survival of many households. 
Moreover, the opening of family and communal farms in Coutada 16 increased destruction of 
local ecosystems.   
 
The already fragile situation of local ecosystems and wildlife was worsened by the government’s 
replacement of traditional authorities by chefes and secretários loyal to Frelimo party. The 
removal of traditional leaders who were the effective managers of local natural resources left a 
vacuum resulting in anarchy in the management of local natural resources, and the area 
witnessed further destruction of wildlife and fauna. This situation became worse from 1984 to 
1992 when armed conflict forced the inhabitants of Coutada 16 to seek refuge in safer villages 
within and across national borders, leaving the natural resources to their own fate. Far from the 
control of governmental institutions, the armies fed on local fauna and illegal hunters 
exterminated the fauna.   
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The end of armed conflict in 1992 allowed hundreds of thousands of those displaced to return to 
their home villages to rebuild their lives. The resettlement of the Mozambican refugees in 
Coutada 16 became a concern of the KNP board which feared that in times of crop failure the 
populations would enter KNP territory for hunting. The establishment of a transnational park 
across the two countries would allow the South African authorities to monitor preservation of 
fauna along the common border. Moreover, it would allow the South African authorities to 
relocate in Coutada 16 the excess elephant population of the KNP, which were considered to 
contribute to the degrading of the environment. 
 
From 1990, the two governments worked together to design programs to improve wildlife 
management along the common border. The efforts included training of the Mozambican staff in 
the KNP facilities and surveys conducted by KNP staff to examine the potentialities of some 
conservation areas in southern Mozambique (research in Coutada 16, Banhine and Zinave). In 
1996, these areas were included in the World Bank funded project known as Mozambique Trans-
frontier Conservation Area and Strengthening Project. Besides allowing for capacity building 
within the Mozambican National Directorate of Forest and Wildlife, the Project set the basis for 
the establishment in 2000 of the Gaza- Kruger-Gonarezhou Park, which in 2002 was transformed 
into GLTP. 
 
Initially, the TFCA initiatives were aimed at creating synergies between poverty alleviation 
programs, community development and wildlife conservation. However due to regional 
agreements, Mozambique followed conservation approaches practised in South Africa and 
Zimbabwe where communities are not allowed in conservation areas. In later 2001, the GoM 
transformed Coutada 16 into LNP and in 2002, the area became part of the GLTP.  
 
The transformation of Coutada 16 into LNP and its further integration into GLTP turned into 
reality the Hertzog’s 1927 ambition of creating a cross-border park across South Africa and 
Mozambique; the integration of the LNP into the GLTP meant that the GoM had to restrict social 
and economic activities within the park and relocate the local communities in areas outside it. 
Now the concern of the inhabitants of Coutada 16 is the availability of land in the resettlement 
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areas for development of agriculture and pasture for their cattle. In 1977-8, the GoM failed to 
secure infrastructure in the resettlement areas (Chibotana and Marrenguele) and thus local 
population preferred to move from Elephants valley to Coutada 16. Due to their experiences, 
people fear that some of the government promises will never be accomplished.  
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